ISBN:
9783030126278
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (x, 92 Seiten)
Series Statement:
SpringerBriefs in Economics
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als Felsenthal, Dan S. Voting Procedures under a Restricted Domain
DDC:
302.1
Keywords:
Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy
;
Electoral Politics
;
Political Philosophy
;
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
;
Democracy
;
Welfare economics
;
Elections
;
Political science / Philosophy
;
Economic theory
;
Democracy
;
Politische Soziologie
;
Wähler
;
Wahl
;
Wohlfahrtstheorie
;
Abstimmung
;
Wahl
;
Wähler
;
Abstimmung
;
Politische Soziologie
;
Wohlfahrtstheorie
Description / Table of Contents:
Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- References -- 2 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- 2.1 Non-ranked Voting Procedures -- 2.1.1 Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post) Procedure -- 2.1.2 Plurality with Runoff Voting Procedure -- 2.1.3 Approval Voting (Brams & Fishburn, 1978, 1983) -- 2.1.4 Successive Elimination (Farquharson, 1969) -- 2.2 Ranked Voting Procedures That Are Not Condorcet-Consistent -- 2.2.1 Borda's Count (Black, 1958 -- Borda, 1784) -- 2.2.2 Alternative Vote (aka Instant Runoff) -- 2.2.3 Coombs's Method (Coombs, 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Coombs, Cohen, & Chamberlin, 1984 -- Straffin, 1980) -- 2.2.4 Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) (Lepelley, Moyouwou, & Smaoui, 2018) -- 2.2.5 Bucklin's Method (Hoag & Hallett, 1926, pp. 485-491 -- Tideman, 2006, p. 203) -- 2.2.6 Range Voting (Smith, 2000) -- 2.2.7 Majority Judgment (Balinski & Laraki, 2007a, 2007b, 2011) -- 2.3 Ranked Voting Procedures That Are Condorcet-Consistent -- 2.3.1 The Minimax Procedure -- 2.3.2 Dodgson's Procedure (Black, 1958, pp. 222-234 -- McLean & Urken, 1995, pp. 288-297) -- 2.3.3 Nanson's Method (McLean & Urken, 1995, Chap. 14 -- Nanson, 1883) -- 2.3.4 Borda's Elimination Rule (BER) (Baldwin, 1926) -- 2.3.5 Copeland's Method (Copeland, 1951) -- 2.3.6 Black's Method (Black, 1958, p. 66) -- 2.3.7 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny, 1959 -- Kemeny & Snell, 1960 -- Young, 1988, 1995 -- Young & Levenglick, 1978) -- 2.3.8 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz, 1972, 1986) -- 2.3.9 Young's Method (Young, 1977) -- Exercises for Chapter 2 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 2 -- References -- 3 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Investigated Procedures to Upward Monotonicity Failure -- 3.2.1 Fixed Electorates
Description / Table of Contents:
3.2.2 Variable Electorates -- 3.3 The (In)Vulnerability of the Investigated Procedures to Downward Monotonicity Failure -- 3.3.1 Fixed Electorates -- 3.3.2 Variable Electorates -- 3.4 Conclusions -- Exercises for Chapter 3 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 3 -- References -- 4 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Various Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox Under the Restricted Domain Assumption -- 4.2.1 The Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 4.2.2 Totally Invulnerable Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 4.2.3 Plurality with Runoff and the Alternative Vote (AV) Procedures -- 4.2.4 Coombs's Procedure -- 4.2.5 The Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) -- 4.2.6 Bucklin's Procedure -- 4.2.7 The Majority Judgment (MJ) Procedure -- 4.3 Conclusion -- Exercises for Chapter 4 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 4 -- References -- 5 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Assumptions and Definitions -- 5.3 Examples Demonstrating the Possibility of No-Show Paradox Under Eight Condorcet-Consistent and Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures When a Condorcet Winner Exists in the Initial Profile -- 5.3.1 Black's Procedure -- 5.3.2 Kemeny's Procedure -- 5.3.3 Nanson's and the BER (Baldwin's) Procedures -- 5.3.4 Successive Elimination Procedure -- 5.3.5 Young's Procedure -- 5.3.6 Copeland's Procedure -- 5.3.7 Dodgson's Procedure -- 5.3.8 Coombs's and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) Procedures -- 5.3.9 The Majority Judgment Procedure
Description / Table of Contents:
5.4 Proofs Regarding the Impossibility of the No-Show Paradox Under Two Condorcet-Consistent and Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures When a Condorcet Winner Exists and Is Elected in the Initial Profile -- 5.4.1 Minimax Procedure -- 5.4.2 Schwartz's Procedure -- 5.4.3 The Plurality with Runoff Procedure -- 5.4.4 The Alternative Vote Procedure -- 5.4.5 Bucklin's Procedure -- 5.5 Proofs Regarding the General Impossibility of the No-Show Paradox Under Four Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 5.5.1 Plurality Voting -- 5.5.2 Approval Voting Procedure -- 5.5.3 Borda's Procedure -- 5.5.4 Range Voting Procedure -- 5.6 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 5 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 5 -- References -- 6 Which of 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Subset Choice Condition -- 6.3 The Condorcet-Consistent Voting Procedures -- 6.4 Seven Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures Violating SCC Generally and Under the Restricted Domain Assumption -- 6.4.1 Plurality Voting -- 6.4.2 Plurality with Runoff -- 6.4.3 Alternative Vote -- 6.4.4 Coombs's Procedure -- 6.4.5 The Borda Count and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) -- 6.4.6 Bucklin's Procedure -- 6.5 Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures Which Satisfy SCC -- 6.6 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 6 -- Answers to Exercises for Chapter 6 -- References -- 7 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 7.2.1 Minimax -- 7.2.2 Young's Procedure -- 7.2.3 Dodgson's Procedure -- 7.2.4 Successive Elimination -- 7.2.5 Black's, Copeland's, Kemeny's, Nanson's, Baldwin's and Schwartz's Procedures -- 7.3 Ranked Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 7.3.1 Plurality Voting
Description / Table of Contents:
7.3.2 Approval Voting -- 7.3.3 Plurality with Runoff -- 7.3.4 Alternative Vote -- 7.3.5 Coombs's and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) Procedures -- 7.3.6 The Borda Count -- 7.3.7 Range Voting -- 7.3.8 Majority Judgment -- 7.3.9 Bucklin's Procedure -- 7.4 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 7 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 7 -- References -- 8 Summary -- Reference
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8
URL:
Volltext
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URL:
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URL:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8
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