ISBN:
9781784710347
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (1 v)
,
cm
Series Statement:
Elgar research reviews in economics
Series Statement:
Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als The economics of organisation and bureaucracy
DDC:
302.35
Keywords:
Organisationstheorie
;
Bürokratietheorie
;
Bureaucracy Economic aspects
;
Organizational sociology Economic aspects
;
Economics Sociological aspects
;
Electronic books
;
Aufsatzsammlung
;
Electronic books
;
Aufsatzsammlung
;
Electronic books
;
Electronic books
;
Aufsatzsammlung
;
Bürokratie
;
Organisationssoziologie
;
Geschichte 1937-2008
Abstract:
This authoritative and in-depth collection presents seminal papers from leading academics in the field of organisation and bureaucracy. It encompasses sections on organisational boundaries, neo-Schumpeterian theories, hierarchy and international organisation, organisational culture and behaviour, power politics and authority, as well as organisational institutions and practices. Professor Jackson has chosen works which have shaped the views of how the economics of organisation and bureaucracy are viewed today and has included papers from conflicting ends of the spectrum to illustrate the fluid and evolving nature of the subject. This indispensable volume, with an original introduction by the editor, will be of immense value to students, scholars and practitioners interested in this topical and relevant field
Abstract:
Adam Smith ([1776] 1976), 'Of the Division of Labour' and 'Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour', in R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (eds), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Volume I, Chapters 1 and 2, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 13-30 -- Philip Selznick (1948), 'Foundations of the Theory of Organization', American Sociological Review, 13 (1), February, 25-35 -- Luther Gulick (1937), 'Notes on the Theory of Organization', in Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (eds), Papers on the Science of Administration, Chapter 1, Columbia University, NY: Institute of Public Administration, 3-45 -- R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4 (16), November, 386-405 -- Herbert A. Simon (1951), 'A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship', Econometrica, 19 (3), July, 293-305 -- Robert Gibbons (2005a), 'Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58 (2), October, 200-45 -- Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691-719 -- Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), December, 1119-58 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (2), October, 233-61 -- Bengt Holmström and John Roberts (1998), 'The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (4), Fall, 73-94 -- Benjamin Klein (2007), 'The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body - General Motors', International Journal of the Economics of Business, 14 (1), February, 1-36 -- Herbert A. Simon (1991), 'Organizations and Markets', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (2), Spring, 25-44 -- Filipe M. Santos and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (2005), 'Organizational Boundaries and Theories of Organization', Organization Science, 16 (5), September-October, 491-508 -- Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization', American Economic Review, 62 (5), December, 777-95 -- Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), October, 305-60 -- Eugene F. Fama (1980), 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 88 (2), April, 288-307 -- Stephen A. Ross (1973), 'The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem', American Economic Review, 63 (2), May, 134-9 -- James A. Mirrlees (1976), 'The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization', Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (1), Spring, 105-31 -- Bengt Holmström (1979), 'Moral Hazard and Observability', Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1), Spring, 74-91
Abstract:
Beckmann, M. (1977) 'Management Production Functions and the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Economic Theory, 14; pp 1-18. -- Beckmann, M. (1988) Tinbergen Lectures on Organization Theory. Springer-Verlag: Berlin and Heidelberg. -- Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1966) The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Anchor Books. -- Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C. (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New Jersey: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc. -- Boltanski, L. and Chiapello, E. (2005) The New Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso. -- Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. (1994) 'The Firm as a Communication Network', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4); pp 809-39. -- Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. (1995) 'The Time and Budget Constraints of the Firm', European Economic Review, 39 (3/4); pp 691-9. -- Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (1990) 'Contested Exchange: New Microfoundations of the Political Economy of Capitalism', Politics and Society, 18; pp 165-222. -- Braverman, H. (1974) Labour and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press. -- Burawoy, M. (1979) Manufacturing Consent. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. -- Burns, T. and Stalker, G. (1961) The Management of Innovation. London: Tavistock. -- Cachon, G. P., Zipkin, P. H. and Anderson, P. (1999) 'Complexity Theory and Organization Science', Organization Science, 10 (3); pp 216-32. -- Calvo, G. and Wellisz, S. (1978) 'Supervision, Loss of Control and the Optimal Size of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 87; pp 943-52. -- Chandler, A. D. (1977) The Visible Hand. Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. -- Chandler, A. D. (1990) Scale and Scope, Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. -- Coase, R. H. (1988) The Firm, The Market and The Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. -- Coleman, J. S. (1988) 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', American Journal of Sociology, 94, Supplement: Organisations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure; pp S95-S120. -- Crémer, J., Garicano, L. and Prat, A. (2005) 'Codes in Organisations', mimeo, Universite de Toulouse. -- Crozier, M. (1964) The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Abstract:
Bengt Holmström (1982), 'Moral Hazard in Teams', Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (2), Autumn, 324-40 -- Robert Gibbons (2005b), 'Incentives Between Firms (and Within)', Management Science, 51 (1), January, 2-17 -- George P. Baker (1992), 'Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement', Journal of Political Economy, 100 (3), June, 598-614 -- Hideshi Itoh (1991), 'Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations', Econometrica, 59 (3), May, 611-36 -- W. Bentley MacLeod (2007), 'Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement', Journal of Economic Literature, XLV (3), September, 595-628 -- Margaret A. Meyer and John Vickers (1997), 'Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (3), 547-81 -- Sidney G. Winter (2006), 'Toward a Neo-Schumpeterian Theory of the Firm', Industrial and Corporate Change, 15 (1), 125-41 -- F.A. von Hayek (1937), 'Economics and Knowledge', Economica, 4 (13), February, 33-54 -- Nicolai J. Foss (2002), '"Coase vs Hayek": Economic Organization and the Knowledge Economy', International Journal of the Economics of Business, 9 (1), 9-35 -- Kenneth J. Arrow (1975), 'Vertical Integration and Communication', Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (1), Spring, 173-83 -- Richard P. Rumelt (1984), 'Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm', in Robert Boyden Lamb (ed.), Competitive Strategic Management, Chapter 26, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 556-70 -- David Teece and Gary Pisano (1994), 'The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: An Introduction', Industrial and Corporate Change, 3 (3), 537-56 -- Anna Grandori (2001), 'Neither Hierarchy nor Identity: Knowledge-Governance Mechanisms and the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Management and Governance, 5 (3-4), 381-99 -- Oliver E. Williamson (2005), 'The Economics of Governance', American Economic Review, 95 (2), May, 1-18 -- Jean Tirole (2001), 'Corporate Governance', Econometrica, 69 (1), January, 1-35 -- Marianne Bertrand and Antoinette Schoar (2003), 'Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVIII (4), November, 1169-208 -- Raaj K. Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1991), 'The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (1), February, 289-95 -- Jacques Crémer (1995), 'Arm's Length Relationships', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CX (2), May, 275-95 -- Claude Ménard (2004), 'The Economics of Hybrid Organizations', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160 (3), September, 345-76
Abstract:
Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G. (1963) 'A Behavioural Theory of the Firm. Prentice: Englewood Cliffs NJ. -- Demsetz, H. (1967), 'Towards a Theory of Property Rights', American Economic Review, 57(2); May, pp 347-359. -- Demsetz, H. (1973) 'Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy', Journal of Law and Economics, 16; pp 1-9. -- Demsetz, H. (1988) 'The Theory of the Firm Revisited', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4 (1); pp 141-61. -- Dewan, T. and Carillo, J. (2008) 'The Qualities of Leadership: Direction, Communication and Obfuscation', American Political Science Review, 102, pp 351-68. -- Doeringer, P. B and Piore, M. J. (1971) Internal Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis. Lexington, MA: Heath. -- Donaldson, L. (1985) In Defence of Organization Theory: A Reply to the Critics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- Eaton, B. C. and Lipsey, R. G. (1989) 'Product Differentiation', in R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland. -- Edwards, P. (1990) 'The Politics of Conflict and Consent: How the Labour Contract Really Works', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisations, 13 (1); pp 41-61. -- Etzioni, A. (1961) A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. -- Fehr, E., Hart, O. D. and Zehnder, C. (2011) 'How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiations Shape Contractual Reference Points?', NBER Working Paper 17545, National Bureau of Economic Research Inc. -- Fisher, F. M. (1999) Microeconomics: Essays in Theory and Application. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- Foley, D. (2006) Adam's Fallacy. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. -- Foss, N. J. (1993) 'Theories of the Firm: Contractual and Competence Perspectives', Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 3; pp 127-44. -- Foss, N. J. (1996) 'The Alternative Theories of Knight and Coase and the Modern Theory of the Firm', Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 18; pp 76-95. -- Foss, N. J. (2003) 'Bounded Rationality and Tacit Knowledge in the Organizational Capabilities Approach: An Evaluation and Stocktaking', Industrial and Corporate Change, 12; pp 185-201. -- Galbraith, J. K. (1967) The New Industrial State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. -- Gintis, H. (1976) 'The Nature of Labour Exchange and the Theory of Capitalist Production', Review of Radical Political Economics, 8 (2); pp 36-54. -- Graicunas, V. A. (1933/37) 'Relationship in Organization', The Bulletin of the International Management Institute, reprinted in L. Gulick and L. Urwick (eds) (1937), Papers on The Science of Administration. New York: Institute of Public Administration
Abstract:
Grandori, A. (1997) 'An Organizational Assessment of Inter-Firm Coordination Modes', Organization Studies, 18 (6); pp 897-925. -- Grandori, A. (2001) Organization and Economic Behaviour. London: Routledge. -- Grandori, A. (2013) Handbook of Economic Organization. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. -- Grandori, A. and Furnari, S. (2008) 'A Chemistry of Organization: Combinatory Analysis and Design', Organization Studies, 29; pp 459-85. -- Hahn, F. H. (1981) 'General Equilibrium Theory', in D. Bell and I. Kristol (eds), The Crisis in Economic Theory. New York: Basic Books. -- Hall, R. and Hitch, C. (1939) 'Price Theory and Business Behaviour', Oxford Economic Papers, 2 (1); pp 12-45. -- Hart, O. D. (1990) 'An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm', in O. E. Williamson (ed), Organization Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- Hart O. D. (1995) Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- Hart, O. D. (2009) 'Hold Up, Asset Ownership and Reference Points', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124; pp 267-300. -- Hart, O. D. and Holström, B. (1987) 'The Theory of Contracts' in T. F. Bewley (ed.) Advances in Economic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- Hart, O. D. and Holmström, B. (2010) 'A Theory of Firm Scope', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125 (2); pp 483-513. -- Hart, O. D. and Moore, J. (2008) 'Contracts as Reference Points', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (1); pp 1-48. -- Hayek, F. A. (1945) 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', American Economic Review, 35, September; pp 519-30. -- Hermalin, B. (2007) 'Leading for the Long Term', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisations, 62; pp 1-19. -- Hesterly, W. S., Liebeskind, J. and Zenger, T. (1990) 'Organizational Economics: An Impending Revolution in Organization Theory?', Academy of Management Review, 15; pp 402-20. -- Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P. (1991) 'Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problems: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, Special Issue. -- Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P. (1994) 'The Firm as an Incentive System', American Economic Review, 84 (4), September; pp 972-91. -- Holmström, B. R. and Tirole, J. (1989) 'The Theory of the Firm', in R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland. -- Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1992) 'Specific and General Knowledge and Organizational Structure', in L. Werin and H. Wijkander (eds), Contract Economics. Oxford: Blackwell
Abstract:
Julius Margolis (1975), 'Comment', Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (3), December, 645-59
Abstract:
Keren, M. and Levhari, D. (1983) 'The Internal Organization of the Firm and the Shape of Average Costs', Bell Journal of Economics, 14; pp 474-86. -- Klein, B., Crawford, R. G. and Alchian, A. A. (1978) 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process', Journal of Law and Economics, 21; pp 297-326. -- Knight, F. H. (1921) Risk Uncertainty and Profit. New York: Harper and Row. -- Kornai, J. (1971) Anti-Equilibrium. Amsterdam: North-Holland. -- Kreps, D. M. (1990) 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory', in J. E. Alt and K. Shepsle (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- Kreps, D. M. (1996) 'Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory', Industrial and Corporate Change, 5; pp 561-96. -- Kuhn, T. S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. -- Lachmann, L. (1971) 'Ludwig von Mises and the Market Process', in F. A. Hayek (ed), Towards Liberty: Essays in Honour of Ludwig von Mises. Menlo Park, CA: Institute for Humane Studies. -- Lafontaine, F. and Slade, M. (2007) 'Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries', Journal of Economic Literature, 45 (3); pp 629-85. -- Lamoreaux, N. R., Raff, M. G. and Temin, P. (2003) 'Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Towards a New Synthesis of American Business History', American Historical Review, 108, April; pp 404-33. -- Langlois, R. N. (1992) 'What Was Wrong with the "Old" Institutional Economics? (and What is Still Wrong with the "New"?)', Praxiologies and the Philosophy of Economics, 1; pp 389-420. -- La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997) 'Trust in Large Organisations', American Economic Review, 87 (2), May; pp 333-8. -- Lawrence, P. R. and Lorsch, J. W. (1967) Organization and Environment. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. -- Lawson, T. (2003) Reorienting Economics. London: Routledge. -- Loasby, B. J. (1990) 'Firms, Markets and the Principle of Continuity', in J. K. Whitaker (ed), Centenary Essays on Alfred Marshall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- MacNeil, I. R. (1981) 'Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a Rich Classificatory Process', North Western University Law Review, 75; pp 1018-41. -- Malmgren, H. B. (1961) 'Information, Expectations and the Theory of the Firm', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75; pp 399-421. -- Mandeville, B. (1714) The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. -- March, J. G. and Simon, H. A. (1958) Organisations. New York: John Wiley and Sons
Abstract:
Marglin, S. (1974) 'What Do Bosses Do? Part 1', Review of Radical Political Economics, 6 (2); pp 60-112. -- Marschak, J. (1954) 'Towards an Economic Theory of Organization and Information', in R. M. Thrall, R. L. Davis and C. H. Coombs (eds), Decision Processes. London: John Wiley and Sons. -- Marschak, J. (1955) 'Elements for a Theory of Teams', Management Science, 1; pp 127-37. -- Marschak, J. (1965) 'Economic Theories of Organization', in J. G. March (ed), Handbook of Organisations. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company. -- Marschak, J. and Radner, R. (1972) Economic Theory of Teams. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. -- Ménard, C. (1994) 'Organisational Coordinating Devices', Metroeconomica, 45 (3); pp 224-47. -- Ménard, C. (2006) 'Hybrid Organization of Production and Distribution', Revista de Analisis Economico, 21 (2); pp 25-41. -- Milgrom, P. J. and Roberts, J. D. (1988) 'Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present and Future', Canadian Journal of Economics, 21; pp 444-58. -- Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1990) 'The Economics of Modern Manufacturing:Technology, Strategy and Organization', American Economic Review', 80(3); pp 511-528. -- Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1991) 'Complementarities, Momentum and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing', American Economic Review, 81 (2); pp 85-9. -- Mirrlees, J. (1971) 'An Exploration of the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation', Review of Economic Studies, 38 (2); pp 175-208. -- Mirrlees, J. (1974) 'Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty', in M. S. Balch, D. L. McFadden and S. Y Wu (eds), Contributions to Economic Analysis. Amsterdam: North-Holland. -- Nelson, R. and Winter, S. G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: Press. -- Niskanen, W. (1968) 'Non-Market Decision Making: The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy', American Economic Review, 58 (2); pp 293-305. -- Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C. M. and Warren, R. (1961) 'The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry', American Political Science Review, 55; pp 831-42. -- Ouchi, W. G. (1980) 'Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans', Administrative Science Quarterly, 25; pp 129-41. -- Penrose, E. (1959) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- Perrow, C. (1972) Complex Organisations: A Critical Essay. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman. -- Pfeffer, J. (1981) Power in Organisations. Marshfield, MA: Pitman
Abstract:
Piore, M. J. and Sabel, C. F. (1984) The Second Industrial Divide. New York: Basic Books. -- Polanyi, M. (1958) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post Critical Philosophy. London: Routledge. -- Prahalad, C. K. and Hamel, G. (1990) 'The Core Competence of the Corporation', Harvard Business Review, 68 (3); pp 70-87. -- Pratt, J. W. and Zeckhauser, R. J. (eds) (1985) Principals and Agents. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. -- Radner, R. (1993) 'The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing', Econometrica, 61; pp 1109-46. -- Radner, R. (1997) 'Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy and the Managerial Theory of the Firm', in Z. Shapira (ed), Organizational Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- Radner, R. (2000) 'Costly and Bounded Rationality in Individual and Team Decision-Making', Industrial and Corporate Change, 9 (4); pp 623-58. -- Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (2000) 'The Governance of the New Enterprise', in X. Vives (ed), Corporate Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- Richardson, G. B. (1972) 'The Organization of Industry', Economic Journal, 82; pp 872-90. -- Roberts, J. D. (2004) The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- Robertson, D. H. (1928) Control of Industry. London: Nisbet. -- Roethlisberger, F. J. and Dickson, W. (1939) Management and the Worker. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. -- Rubenstein, A. (1998) 'Economics and Language', The Schwartz Lecture, Northwestern University; Working Paper, 14/98, Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University. -- Schackle, G. L. S. (1958) Time in Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland. -- Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997) 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', Journal of Finance, LII (2); pp 737-83. -- Siggelkow, N. (2011) 'Firms as Systems of Interdependent Choices', Journal of Management Studies, 48; pp 1126-40. -- Silverman, B. S. (2002) 'Organizational Economics', in J. A. C. Baum (ed), Companion to Organisations. Oxford: Blackwell. -- Simon, H. A. (1947) Administrative Behaviour. New York: The Free Press. -- Simon, H. A. (1957) Models of Man: Social and Rational. New York: John Wiley and Sons
Abstract:
Recommended readings (Machine generated): Alchian, A. (1977) Economic Forces at Work. Indianapolis: Liberty Press. -- Alt, R. (1949) 'The Internal Organization of the Firm and Price Formation: An Illustrative Example', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 63; pp 92-110. -- Andrews, P. W. S. (1949) Manufacturing Business. London: Macmillan. -- Andrews, P. W. S. (1964) On Competition in Economic Theory. London: Macmillan. -- Anthony, P. D. (1977) The Ideology of Work. London: Tavistock Publications. -- Aoki, M. (1986) 'Horizontal vs Vertical Information Structure of the Firm', American Economic Review, 76; pp 971-83. -- Archer, M. (2000) Being Human: The Problem of Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- Arrow, K. J. (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing. Helsinki: Yrjo Johansson Lectures; North-Holland. -- Arrow, K. J. (1969) 'Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities', in J. Margolis (ed), The Analysis of Public Output. NBER Conference Series, No. 23. New York: Columbia University Press. -- Arrow, K. J. (1971) Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company. -- Arrow, K. J. (1974) The Limits of Organization. New York: Norton. -- Arrow K. J. (1985) 'The Economics of Agency', in J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. -- Arrow, K. J. and Hahn, F. H. (1971) General Competitive Analysis. Edinburgh: Oliver Boyd. -- Arrow, K. J. and Radner, R. (1979) 'Allocation of Resources in Large Teams', Econometrica, 47; pp 361-86. -- Athey, S. and Roberts, J. (2001) 'Organizational Design Rights and Incentive Contracts', American Economic Review, 91 (2); pp 200-205. -- Augier, M. and March, J. G. (2008) 'A Retrospective Look at the Behavioural Theory of the Firm', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 66; pp 1-6. -- Babbage, C. (1832) On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures. London: Charles Knight. -- Barnard, C. I. (1938) The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. -- Barney, J. B. and Hesterly, W. (1996) 'Organizational Economics: Understanding the Relationship Between Organisations and Economic Analysis', in S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy and W. R. Nord (eds), Handbook of Organization Studies. London: Sage. -- Becker, G. S. and Murphy, K. M. (1992) 'The Division of Labour, Coordination Costs and Knowledge', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (4); pp 1137-60
Abstract:
Simon, H. A. (1969) The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. -- Simon, H. A. (1979) 'Rational Decision Making in Business Organisations', American Economic Review, 69 (4); pp 493-513. -- Smith, A. ([1776]1976) in R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (eds), An Inquiry into the Nation and the Cause of the Wealth of Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- Spence, M. A. (1975) 'The Economics of Internal Organization: An Introduction', Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (1); pp 163-72. -- Thorelli, H. B. (1986) 'Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies', Strategic Management Journal, 7 (1); pp 37-51. -- Tullock, G. (1965) The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press. -- Tullock, G. (1992) Economic Hierarchies, Organization and the Structure of Production. Studies in Public Choice, Norwell, MA/Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. -- Van den Steen, E. (2010) 'Culture Clash: The Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity', Management Science, 56 (10); pp 1718-38. -- Weick, K. E. (1969) The Social Psychology of Organizing (2nd edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. -- Wernerfelt, B. (1984) 'A Resource Based View of the Firm', Strategic Management Journal, 5 (2); pp 171-80. -- Wernerfelt, B. (1999) 'Organizational Languages', mimeo, MIT - Sloan School of Management. -- Williamson, O. E. (1971) 'The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations', American Economic Review, 61, May; pp 112-23. -- Williamson, O. E. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies. New York: The Free Press. -- Williamson, O. E. (1985) 'Reflections on the New Institutional Economics', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 141, March; pp 187-95. -- Williamson, O. E. (1988) 'The Logic of Economic Organization', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4 (1), Spring; pp 65-93. -- Williamson, O. E. (1991) 'Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives', Administrative Science Quarterly, 36; pp 269-96. -- Williamson, O. E. (2002) 'Empirical Microeconomics: Another Perspective', in M. Augier and J. G. March (eds), The Economics of Choice, Change and Organization. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. -- Winter, S. G. (2003) 'Understanding Dynamic Capabilities', Strategic Management Journal, 24; pp 991-5. -- Zingales, L. (1998) 'Corporate Governance', in P. Newman (ed.) the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. New York: Macmillan
Abstract:
Walter W. Powell (1990), 'Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization', Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336 -- George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2008), 'Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between "Islands of Conscious Power"', Journal of Japanese and International Economics, 22 (2), June, 146-63 -- Joseph E. Stiglitz (1975), 'Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy', Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (2), Autumn, 552-79 -- John Geanakoplos and Paul Milgrom (1991), 'A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention', Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 5 (3), September, 205-25 -- Roy Radner (1992), 'Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing', Journal of Economic Literature, XXX (3), September, 1382-415 -- Mark Casson (1994), 'Why are Firms Hierarchical?', Journal of the Economics of Business, 1 (1), 47-76 -- Oliver Hart and John Moore (2005), 'On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization', Journal of Political Economy, 113 (4), August, 675-702 -- Dilip Mookherjee (2006), 'Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective', Journal of Economic Literature, XLIV (2), June, 367-90 -- Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland and Chenggang Xu (2006), 'Coordination and Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations', Journal of Political Economy, 114 (2), April, 366-402 -- Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1962), 'Introduction - Strategy and Structure', in Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1-17 -- Henry Ogden Armour and David J. Teece (1978), 'Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the Multidivisional Hypothesis', Bell Journal of Economics, 9 (1), Spring, 106-22 -- Neil Fligstein (1985), 'The Spread of the Multidivisional Form Among Large Firms, 1919-1979', American Sociological Review, 50 (3), June, 377-91 -- David Thesmar and Mathias Thoenig (2000), 'Creative Destruction and Firm Organization Choice', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (4), November, 1201-37 -- Masahiko Aoki (1990), 'Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm', Journal of Economic Literature, XXVIII (1), March, 1-27 -- Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1986), 'The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies', American Economic Review, 76 (4), September, 716-27 -- James G. March (1962), 'The Business Firm as a Political Coalition', Journal of Politics, 24 (4), November, 662-78 -- Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), 'Formal and Real Authority in Organizations', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), February, 1-29 -- George Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999), 'Informal Authority in Organizations', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15 (1), 56-73 -- Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998), 'Power in a Theory of the Firm', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (2), May, 387-432
Abstract:
Wouter Dessein (2002), 'Authority and Communication in Organizations', Review of Economic Studies, 69 (4), October, 811-38 -- Jacques Crémer (1993), 'Corporate Culture and Shared Knowledge', Industrial and Corporate Change, 2 (3), 351-86 -- Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner (1993), 'Leadership Style and Incentives', Management Science, 39 (11), November, 1299-318 -- Benjamin E. Hermalin (1998), 'Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example', American Economic Review, 88 (5), December, 1188-206 -- Eric Van den Steen (2005), 'Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 21 (1), 256-83 -- James N. Baron (1988), 'The Employment Relation as a Social Relation', Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 2 (4), December, 492-525 -- Donald W. Griesinger (1990), 'The Human Side of Economic Organization', Academy of Management Review, 15 (3), 478-99 -- Edward P. Lazear (1991), 'Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (2), Spring, 89-110 -- Julio J. Rotemberg (1994), 'Human Relations in the Workplace', Journal of Political Economy, 102 (4), August, 684-717 -- Paul Osterman (1994), 'Supervision, Discretion, and Work Organization', American Economic Review, 84 (2), May, 380-84 -- George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmström (1994), 'The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4), November, 881-919 -- Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi (1997), 'The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines', American Economic Review, 87 (3), June, 291-313 -- Canice J. Prendergast (1995), 'A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations', Journal of Labor Economics, 13 (3), July, 387-400 -- Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1999), 'Advocates', Journal of Political Economy, 107 (1), February, 1-39 -- Edwin G. Dolan (1971), 'Alienation, Freedom, and Economic Organization', Journal of Political Economy, 79 (5), September- October, 1084-94 -- Samuel Bowles (1985), 'The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models', American Economic Review, 75 (1), March, 16-36 -- Charles Perrow (1986), 'Economic Theories of Organization', Theory and Society, 15 (1/2), January, 11-45 -- William Lazonick (1991), 'Business Organization and Economic Theory', in Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy, Chapter 8, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 265-302 -- William A. Niskanen (2001), 'Bureaucracy', in William F. Shughart II and Laura Razzolini (eds), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Chapter 11, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 258-70
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