ISBN:
9789401586214
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (X, 246 p)
,
digital
Edition:
Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
Series Statement:
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 173
Series Statement:
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 173
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
Philosophy (General)
;
Genetic epistemology
;
Biology Philosophy
;
Science Philosophy
;
Social sciences Philosophy
;
Metaphysics
;
Philosophy and social sciences.
;
Biology—Philosophy.
;
Science—Philosophy.
;
Knowledge, Theory of.
Abstract:
1. Empiricism vs. Realism — The Perennial Debate in the Philosophy of Science -- 2. Fundamental and Refined Principles: The Core of Modern Science -- 3. Empirical Laws: The Supervention of Experience -- 4. Scientific Theories: Closing the Circle -- 5. The Principle-Theory-Law Model of Scientific Explanation -- 6. The Social Sciences: A Consideration of Economics -- 7. Natural Kinds -- 8. Probability and Confirmation -- 9. Empiricism vs. Realism Revisited -- 10. Modern Science and the Future -- References.
Abstract:
The roots of this work lie in my earlier book, Scientific Progress, which first appeared in 1981. One of its topics, the distinction between scientific laws and theories, is there treated with reference to the same distinction as drawn by N. R. Campbell in his Physics: The Elements. Shortly after completing Scientific Progress, I read Rom Harre's The Principles of Scientific Thinking, in which the concept of theory is even more clearly delineated than in Campbell, being directly con nected to the notion of a model - as it was in my book. In subsequent considerations regarding science, Harre's work thus became my main source of inspiration with regard to theories, while Campbell's re mained my main source with respect to empiricallaws. Around the same time I also read William Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. In this work, Whewell depicts principles as playing a central role in the formation of science, and conceives of them in much the same way as Kant conceives of fundamental syn thetic a priori judgements. The idea that science should have principles as a basic element immediately made sense to me, and from that time I have thought of science in terms of laws, theories and principles.
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-015-8621-4
URL:
Volltext
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