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  • BSZ  (6)
  • KOBV  (5)
  • Cambridge : Cambridge University Press  (8)
  • Mathematics  (8)
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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9781108706681
    Language: English
    Pages: 90 Seiten , Diagramme
    Series Statement: Cambridge Elements
    Series Statement: Elements in decision theory and philosophy
    DDC: 302.13
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    Keywords: Entscheidungstheorie, allgemein ; Philosophy of science ; SCIENCE / Philosophy & Social Aspects ; Soziale und politische Philosophie ; Spieltheorie
    Abstract: The Nash bargaining problem provides a framework for analyzing problems where parties have imperfectly aligned interests. This Element reviews the parts of bargaining theory most important in philosophical applications, and to social contract theory in particular. It discusses rational choice analyses of bargaining problems that focus on axiomatic analysis, according to which a solution of a given bargaining problem satisfies certain formal criteria, and strategic bargaining, according to which a solution results from the moves of ideally rational and knowledgeable claimants. Next, it discusses the conventionalist analyses of bargaining problems that focus on how members of a society can settle into bargaining conventions via learning and focal points. In the concluding section this Element discusses how philosophers use bargaining theory to analyze the social contract
    Description / Table of Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Motivating problems; 3. Defining the problem; 4. Solution concepts; 5. Rational choice justifications of solutions; 6. Bargaining conventions; 7. The Nash bargaining problem as a tool for analyzing the social contract; Appendix. Braithwaite ranking; Bibliography.
    Note: Interessenniveau: 4CT, für die Hochschulausbildung
    URL: Cover  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 2
    ISBN: 9781108724265
    Language: English
    Pages: xviii, 271 Seiten , Illustrationen, Diagramme
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    DDC: 302.231
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    Keywords: Social media ; User-generated content Social aspects ; Einführung ; Einführung
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index , Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
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  • 3
    ISBN: 9781107446984
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xv, 535 Seiten) , Diagramme
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    DDC: 302/.130285
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    Keywords: Informatik ; Social choice ; Interdisciplinary research ; Computer science ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Computerunterstütztes Verfahren ; Public-Choice-Theorie ; Informatik ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Public-Choice-Theorie ; Computerunterstütztes Verfahren ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Informatik
    Note: Auf der Frontpage: "Online publication date: May 2016" , Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 May 2016)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 4
    ISBN: 9780521195331
    Language: English
    Pages: xv, 727 Seiten , Illustrationen, Diagramme, Karte , 27 cm
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Easley, David Networks, crowds, and markets
    DDC: 303.48/33
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    Keywords: Telecommunication Social aspects ; Information society ; Informationsgesellschaft ; Mathematisches Modell
    Abstract: "Over the past decade there has been a growing public fascination with the complex connectedness of modern society. This connectedness is found in many incarnations: in the rapid growth of the Internet, in the ease with which global communication takes place, and in the ability of news and information as well as epidemics and financial crises to spread with surprising speed and intensity. These are phenomena that involve networks, incentives, and the aggregate behavior of groups of people; they are based on the links that connect us and the ways in which our decisions can have subtle consequences for others. This introductory undergraduate textbook takes an interdisciplinary look at economics, sociology, computing and information science, and applied mathematics to understand networks and behavior. It describes the emerging field of study that is growing at the interface of these areas, addressing fundamental questions about how the social, economic, and technological worlds are connected"--Provided by publisher
    Description / Table of Contents: Machine generated contents note: 1. Overview; Part I. Graph Theory and Social Networks: 2. Graphs; 3. Strong and weak ties; 4. Networks in their surrounding contexts; 5. Positive and negative relationships; Part II. Game Theory: 6. Games; 7. Evolutionary game theory; 8. Modeling network traffic using game theory; 9. Auctions; Part III. Markets and Strategic Interaction in Networks: 10. Matching markets; 11. Network models of markets with intermediaries; 12. Bargaining and power in networks; Part IV. Information Networks and the World Wide Web: 13. The structure of the Web; 14. Link analysis and Web search; 15. Sponsored search markets; Part V. Network Dynamics: Population Models: 16. Information cascades; 17. Network effects; 18. Power laws and rich-get-richer phenomena; Part VI. Network Dynamics: Structural Models: 19. Cascading behavior in networks.
    Note: Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 693-710 , Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9780511598975
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 272 pages)
    DDC: 303.6/9
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    Abstract: Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or 'bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9780511528309
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 390 pages)
    DDC: 302.3/0724
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    Keywords: Spieltheorie ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Konferenzschrift ; Konferenzschrift
    Abstract: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 7
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 0521267579 , 0521022746 , 9780521267571 , 9780521022743
    Language: English
    Pages: ix, 390 Seiten , Illustrationen ; Diagramme
    DDC: 302.30724
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    Keywords: Game theory Congresses ; Negotiation Mathematical models ; Congresses ; Konferenzschrift ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Konferenzschrift ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Konferenzschrift 1983
    Note: Literaturangaben , Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9781139052283
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 169 pages)
    DDC: 302.3/4
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    Keywords: Spieltheorie ; Wahlverhalten
    Abstract: This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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