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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press
    ISBN: 0521259649 , 9780521259644 , 9780521074650
    Language: English
    Pages: X, 169 S.
    Edition: 1. publ.
    Series Statement: Econometric Society publication 7
    Series Statement: Econometric Society monographs in pure theory
    Series Statement: Econometric Society publication
    DDC: 302.3/4
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    Keywords: Choix collectif - Modèles mathématiques ; Comités - Modèles mathématiques ; Commissies ; Jeux, Théorie des ; Kiesgedrag ; Social choice ; Speltheorie ; Vote - Modèles mathématiques ; Mathematisches Modell ; Committees Mathematical models ; Game theory ; Social choice Mathematical models ; Voting Mathematical models ; Wahlverhalten ; Spieltheorie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Abstimmung ; Ausschuss ; Ausschuss ; Abstimmung ; Mathematisches Modell ; Wahlverhalten ; Spieltheorie
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  • 2
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press
    ISBN: 9780521074650 , 9780521259644
    Language: English
    Pages: X, 169 S.
    Edition: Digital print.
    Series Statement: Econometric Society monographs 7
    Series Statement: Econometric Society monographs in pure theory
    DDC: 302.34
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    Keywords: Wahlverhalten ; Spieltheorie
    Note: First published1984
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  • 3
    Book
    Book
    Cambridg [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press
    ISBN: 0521259649
    Language: English
    Pages: X, 169 S.
    Series Statement: Econometric Society monographs in pure theory
    DDC: 302.34
    RVK:
    RVK:
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    Keywords: Spieltheorie ; Wahlverhalten
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  • 4
    ISBN: 9783642138744
    Language: English
    Pages: XVII, 154 S.
    Edition: 1. ed.
    Series Statement: Studies in Choice and Welfare
    Parallel Title: Online-Ausg. Peleg, Bezalel Strategic Social Choice
    DDC: 302/.13
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    Keywords: Verfassungsökonomik ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Spieltheorie ; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Abstimmungsregel ; Theorie ; Social choice Mathematical models ; Mathematical sociology ; Statics and dynamics (Social sciences) ; Game theory ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Verfassung ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Strategisches Spiel ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Koalitionstheorie ; Public-Choice-Theorie ; Spieltheorie
    URL: Cover
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
    ISBN: 9783642138751
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource , v.: digital
    Edition: Online-Ausg. Springer eBook Collection. Business and Economics Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    Series Statement: Studies in Choice and Welfare
    DDC: 302.13
    RVK:
    Keywords: Economics ; Mathematics ; Economics, Mathematical ; Social sciences Methodology ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Koalitionstheorie ; Public-Choice-Theorie ; Spieltheorie
    Abstract: This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
    Abstract: This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part, the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution
    Description / Table of Contents: Strategic Social Choice; Preface; Contents; Preview to this book; Part I Representations of constitutions; Chapter 1 Introduction to Part I; Chapter 2 Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms; Chapter 3 Nash consistent representations; Chapter 4 Acceptable representations; Chapter 5 Strongly consistent representations; Chapter 6 Nash consistent representation through lottery models; Chapter 7 On the continuity of representations of constitutions; Part II Consistent voting; Chapter 8 Introduction to Part II; Chapter 9 Feasible elimination procedures
    Description / Table of Contents: Chapter 10 Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functionsChapter 11 Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters; References; Author Index; Subject Index
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9781139052283
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 169 pages)
    DDC: 302.3/4
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    Keywords: Spieltheorie ; Wahlverhalten
    Abstract: This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg | Cham : Springer International Publishing AG
    ISBN: 9783642138751 , 3642138756
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (XVIII, 154 Seiten) , 2 illus.
    Edition: 1st ed. 2010
    Series Statement: Studies in Choice and Welfare
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Peleg, Bezalel Strategic Social Choice
    DDC: 330.1556
    Keywords: Verfassung ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Strategisches Spiel ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Social choice ; Welfare economics ; Game theory ; Econometrics ; Sociology Methodology ; Social Choice and Welfare ; Game Theory ; Quantitative Economics ; Sociological Methods
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