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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Social Analysis
    Keywords: COVID-19 ; Disease Control and Prevention ; ECA ; Education ; Education Reform and Management ; Health and Education ; Health, Nutrition and Population ; Human Capital ; Resilience ; Social Protections and Assistance ; Social Protections and Labor
    Abstract: Risk and uncertainty are on the rise, and countries across Europe and Central Asia (ECA) are not immune from it. The region is being hit by crises, conflicts, and continued uncertainty that are negatively affecting people's livelihoods in the short term and prosperity in the long term. Then COVID-19 hit, inflicting massive harm on people's wellbeing, livelihoods, and human capital. Lockdowns prevented people from working, school closures prevented students from learning, and overwhelmed hospitals had to defer important treatments. This report explores how to strengthen the resilience of health, education, and social protection systems to better protect people's human capital from the long-term effects of recurrent shocks and crises
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (39 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Hernandez, Carlos Ospino Protecting Who? Optimal Social Protection Responses to Shocks with Limited Information
    Keywords: Adaptive Social Protection ; COVID-19 Pandemic ; Disaster Risk Management ; Social Protection ; Social Protections and Labor ; Targeting ; Targeting Social Protection Response
    Abstract: The literature on shock-responsive social protection focuses on operational features that improve the speed and reach of the response, but little is known about the optimal design of emergency social protection responses in terms of which programs to use, information about the people affected, and the extent of their losses. This paper studies optimal social protection responses to shocks, using microsimulations of different social assistance responses in Albania, Moldova, and North Macedonia. The paper shows that optimal design depends not only on the magnitude of the shock, but also on how the shock affects welfare rankings and on the parameters of the existing social assistance system, including the generosity of the schemes and how well they cover the poor. For given budgets, a universal transfer remains a suboptimal response. However, the extent to which existing programs should be expanded, as designed, to additional beneficiaries depends on the type of shock. When a shock tends to affect households homogeneously, increasing generosity and expanding the existing targeted social assistance program using established welfare metrics to assess eligibility is an effective response. When shocks affect households heterogeneously and bring some of them into extreme poverty, then pre-shock welfare indicators carry little information and policy makers should provide support through a new program or modified eligibility criteria, according to information on who suffered the shock. This analysis points to the importance of planning in advance for future crises and, within this, considering the optimal design of emergency social protection responses
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Social Protection and Labor Discussion Papers
    Keywords: Adaptation to Climate Change ; Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases ; Environment ; Labor Markets ; Social Protections and Assistance ; Social Protections and Labor
    Abstract: This paper reviews the role of Social Protection and Labor in supporting both climate adaptation and mitigation efforts. The Climate Crisis is impacting the poor and vulnerable disproportionally, both as a consequence of climate shocks and through the distributional impacts of climate mitigation policies. The paper discusses how - even without explicit environmental objectives - Social Protection and Labor strengthens resilience against climate shocks. However, integrating crisis-sensitive elements into social protection and labor programs increases substantially their ability to respond to shocks. Social protection and labor programs also facilitate green and Just Transitions by supporting equitable policies and can ease transitions towards Green jobs. Finally, Social protection and labor programs can also directly support mitigation measures by positively affecting behaviors. While investments in climate-related Social Protection and Labor are rapidly expanding, its full potential to support adaptation, decarbonization and mitigation is still to be realized
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (37 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Loayza, Norman V Informality Trends And Cycles
    Keywords: Active Labor ; Business Cycle ; Economic Theory and Research ; Exogenous Variable ; Informal Economies ; Informal Economy ; Informal Employment ; Informal Labor Markets ; Informal Sector ; Labor ; Labor ; Labor Force ; Labor Markets ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Social Protections and Labor ; Active Labor ; Business Cycle ; Economic Theory and Research ; Exogenous Variable ; Informal Economies ; Informal Economy ; Informal Employment ; Informal Labor Markets ; Informal Sector ; Labor ; Labor ; Labor Force ; Labor Markets ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Social Protections and Labor ; Active Labor ; Business Cycle ; Economic Theory and Research ; Exogenous Variable ; Informal Economies ; Informal Economy ; Informal Employment ; Informal Labor Markets ; Informal Sector ; Labor ; Labor ; Labor Force ; Labor Markets ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Social Protections and Labor
    Abstract: This paper studies the trends and cycles of informal employment. It first presents a theoretical model where the size of informal employment is determined by the relative costs and benefits of informality and the distribution of workers' skills. In the long run, informal employment varies with the trends in these variables, and in the short run it reacts to accommodate transient shocks and to close the gap that separates it from its trend level. The paper then uses an error-correction framework to examine empirically informality's long- and short-run relationships. For this purpose, it uses country-level data at annual frequency for a sample of industrial and developing countries, with the share of self-employment in the labor force as the proxy for informal employment. The paper finds that, in the long run, informality is larger in countries that have lower GDP per capita and impose more costs to formal firms in the form of more rigid business regulations, less valuable police and judicial services, and weaker monitoring of informality. In the short run, informal employment is found to be counter-cyclical for the majority of countries, with the degree of counter-cyclicality being lower in countries with larger informal employment and better police and judicial services. Moreover, informal employment follows a stable, trend-reverting process. These results are robust to changes in the sample and to the influence of outliers, even when only developing countries are considered in the analysis
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (21 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Dhillon, Amrita Development And The Interaction of Enforcement Institutions
    Keywords: Adverse Selection ; Asymmetric Information ; Competitiveness and Competition Policies ; Consumers ; Cred Economic Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Equilibrium ; Expected Utility ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Incentives ; Influence ; Insurance and Risk Mitigation ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Microfinance ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Adverse Selection ; Asymmetric Information ; Competitiveness and Competition Policies ; Consumers ; Cred Economic Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Equilibrium ; Expected Utility ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Incentives ; Influence ; Insurance and Risk Mitigation ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Microfinance ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Adverse Selection ; Asymmetric Information ; Competitiveness and Competition Policies ; Consumers ; Cred Economic Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Equilibrium ; Expected Utility ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Incentives ; Influence ; Insurance and Risk Mitigation ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Microfinance ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor
    Abstract: The authors examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties-producers and consumers-interact in a competitive market with one-sided asymmetric information and productivity shocks. They compare an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is enhanced by consumers investing in "connectedness," with a formal mechanism, legal enforcement, the effectiveness of which can be reduced by producers by means of bribes. When legal enforcement is poor, consumers connect more with one another to improve informal enforcement. In contrast, a well-connected network of consumers reduces producers' incentives to bribe. In equilibrium, the model predicts a positive relationship between the frequency of productivity shocks, bribing, and the use of informal enforcement, providing a physical explanation of why developing countries often fail to have efficient legal systems. Firm-level estimations confirm the partial equilibrium implications of the model
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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