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  • 1
    ISBN: 9780833087751 , 0833089412 , 0833087754 , 9780833089410
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxiv, 142 pages)
    Keywords: United States ; United States ; Irregular warfare ; Afghan War, 2001- ; Strategy ; Iraq War, 2003-2011 ; Irregular warfare ; Afghan War, 2001- ; Strategy ; Iraq War, 2003-2011 ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Iraq ; Irregular warfare ; Afghan War (2001- ) ; Strategy ; Iraq War (2003-2011) ; Military Science - General ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: This report contributes to the ongoing debate about the lessons from the past 13 years of war and the requirements for addressing future conflicts. It addresses a particular disconnect in the current debate on the future of national security strategy and the role of landpower caused by an inadequate examination of the national level of strategy made by the U.S. government. The disconnect exists because there has been no systematic effort to collect and analyze insights from those who have been actively engaged in making policy and strategy from 2001 to 2014. A RAND Arroyo Center workshop provided a mechanism for eliciting insights from policymakers and academic experts involved in the formation of national-level strategy and its implementation over the past 13 years. This study analyzes and develops those insights in the context of the debate on future national security strategy. It applies those insights to the future operating environment, which will include irregular and hybrid threats, and identifies critical requirements for land forces and special operations forces to operate successfully in conjunction with other joint, interagency, and multinational partners
    Abstract: This report contributes to the ongoing debate about the lessons from the past 13 years of war and the requirements for addressing future conflicts. It addresses a particular disconnect in the current debate on the future of national security strategy and the role of landpower caused by an inadequate examination of the national level of strategy made by the U.S. government. The disconnect exists because there has been no systematic effort to collect and analyze insights from those who have been actively engaged in making policy and strategy from 2001 to 2014. A RAND Arroyo Center workshop provided a mechanism for eliciting insights from policymakers and academic experts involved in the formation of national-level strategy and its implementation over the past 13 years. This study analyzes and develops those insights in the context of the debate on future national security strategy. It applies those insights to the future operating environment, which will include irregular and hybrid threats, and identifies critical requirements for land forces and special operations forces to operate successfully in conjunction with other joint, interagency, and multinational partners
    Note: "RAND Arroyo Center , "This research was ... conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program"--Preface , Includes bibliographical references (pages 125-142)
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  • 2
    ISBN: 9780833085641 , 0833090003 , 0833085646 , 9780833090003
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 97 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Osburg, Jan Assessing locally focused stability operations
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; United States ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; Armed Forces ; Stability operations ; Military Science - General ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Counterinsurgency ; United States Armed Forces ; Stability operations ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: This report describes how the Army and other services can better measure and assess the progress and outcomes of locally focused stability operations (LFSO), which are defined as the missions, tasks, and activities that build security, governance, and development by, with, and through the directly affected community, in order to increase stability at the local level. A number of issues related to assessing LFSO are identified, along with foundational challenges that include an inherently complex operational environment, limited doctrinal guidance, competing visions of stability, untested assumptions, and redundant or excessive reporting requirements. The report offers solutions to these and other challenges, and provides concrete recommendations and implementation-related guidance for designing and conducting assessments of LFSO. The report concludes with an assessment plan for a notional African LFSO scenario that illustrates the practical application of those insights
    Abstract: This report describes how the Army and other services can better measure and assess the progress and outcomes of locally focused stability operations (LFSO), which are defined as the missions, tasks, and activities that build security, governance, and development by, with, and through the directly affected community, in order to increase stability at the local level. A number of issues related to assessing LFSO are identified, along with foundational challenges that include an inherently complex operational environment, limited doctrinal guidance, competing visions of stability, untested assumptions, and redundant or excessive reporting requirements. The report offers solutions to these and other challenges, and provides concrete recommendations and implementation-related guidance for designing and conducting assessments of LFSO. The report concludes with an assessment plan for a notional African LFSO scenario that illustrates the practical application of those insights
    Note: "RAND Arroyo Center , "This research was sponsored by the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group and was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Force Development and Technology Program"--Preface , Includes bibliographical references (pages 93-97)
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  • 3
    ISBN: 9780833080547 , 0833083414 , 0833080547 , 9780833083418
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xlii, 286 pages)
    Additional Information: Paths to victory: detailed insurgency case studies
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation research report series RR-291/1-OSD
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Paul, Christopher, 1971- Paths to victory
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency Research ; Counterinsurgency Case studies ; Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; Military & Naval Science ; Case studies ; Law, Politics & Government ; Military Science - General ; Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; Research ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Electronic books
    Abstract: When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won
    Abstract: When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense , Companion publication to: Paths to victory: detailed insurgency case studies , Includes bibliographical references (pages 277-286)
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  • 4
    ISBN: 9780833081766 , 0833083643 , 0833081764 , 9780833083647
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 25 pages)
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency Case studies ; Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; Afghanistan ; Military Science - General ; Case studies ; Military & Naval Science ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Counterinsurgency ; Law, Politics & Government ; Electronic books
    Abstract: The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies added 41 new cases to a previously studied set of 30 insurgencies, examining the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding of this research was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly discriminated the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi exercise, in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2013 Afghanistan ranks among the historical COIN winners, but its score is equal to those of the lowest-scoring historical wins. This tenuous position points to several areas in need of improvement, but particularly the need to disrupt the flow of insurgent support and the need for the Afghan government and Afghan security forces to better demonstrate their commitment and motivation. Afghanistan in early 2011 scored in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses, suggesting an overall improvement in COIN progress in that conflict by early 2013. However, conditions may change as coalition forces prepare to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces in 2014
    Abstract: The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies added 41 new cases to a previously studied set of 30 insurgencies, examining the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding of this research was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly discriminated the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi exercise, in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2013 Afghanistan ranks among the historical COIN winners, but its score is equal to those of the lowest-scoring historical wins. This tenuous position points to several areas in need of improvement, but particularly the need to disrupt the flow of insurgent support and the need for the Afghan government and Afghan security forces to better demonstrate their commitment and motivation. Afghanistan in early 2011 scored in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses, suggesting an overall improvement in COIN progress in that conflict by early 2013. However, conditions may change as coalition forces prepare to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces in 2014
    Note: "RAND National Defense Research Institute , "This research was ... conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface , Includes bibliographical references (page 25)
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  • 5
    ISBN: 9780833080981 , 0833084607 , 0833080989 , 9780833084606
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (57 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Paul, Christopher, 1971- RAND security cooperation prioritization and propensity matching tool
    Keywords: Security, International ; Decision making Data processing ; Military assistance, American Planning ; National security International cooperation ; Security, International ; Decision making ; Military assistance, American ; National security ; Security, International ; United States ; Law, Politics & Government ; International Relations ; Military policy ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Decision making ; Data processing ; Diplomatic relations ; National security ; International cooperation ; United States Foreign relations 1989- ; United States Military policy ; United States ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Security cooperation is the umbrella term used to describe a wide range of programs and activities with such goals as building relationships between the United States and partner countries, developing these countries' security capabilities, and facilitating contingency and peacetime access by U.S. forces. With increased pressure on defense spending, the scope and budget for these activities are likely to decrease. Therefore, it will be important for the U.S. Department of Defense to scrutinize and, perhaps, reevaluate current and proposed security cooperation efforts, ensuring that expected benefits align with costs and corresponding policy priorities. Recent RAND research identified practices and contextual factors associated with greater or lesser degrees of success in security cooperation, using 29 historical case studies of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity since the end of the Cold War. The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool applies these findings and results from other existing research to all current and potential security cooperation partners. This customizable diagnostic tool, built in Microsoft Excel®, will help planners preliminarily identify mismatches between the importance of a country to U.S. interests, funding for initiatives, and the propensity for successful U.S. security cooperation with a given country. For each of the world's 195 countries, the tool produces an overall security cooperation propensity score. Planners can then compare these scores with available funding and security cooperation priorities. The tool has the virtues of being systematic, being based on global data, and not relying on subjective assessments. Strategic thinking and nuanced understanding of individual countries remain important, but the tool is useful in helping to identify which countries to scrutinize
    Abstract: Security cooperation is the umbrella term used to describe a wide range of programs and activities with such goals as building relationships between the United States and partner countries, developing these countries' security capabilities, and facilitating contingency and peacetime access by U.S. forces. With increased pressure on defense spending, the scope and budget for these activities are likely to decrease. Therefore, it will be important for the U.S. Department of Defense to scrutinize and, perhaps, reevaluate current and proposed security cooperation efforts, ensuring that expected benefits align with costs and corresponding policy priorities. Recent RAND research identified practices and contextual factors associated with greater or lesser degrees of success in security cooperation, using 29 historical case studies of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity since the end of the Cold War. The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool applies these findings and results from other existing research to all current and potential security cooperation partners. This customizable diagnostic tool, built in Microsoft Excel®, will help planners preliminarily identify mismatches between the importance of a country to U.S. interests, funding for initiatives, and the propensity for successful U.S. security cooperation with a given country. For each of the world's 195 countries, the tool produces an overall security cooperation propensity score. Planners can then compare these scores with available funding and security cooperation priorities. The tool has the virtues of being systematic, being based on global data, and not relying on subjective assessments. Strategic thinking and nuanced understanding of individual countries remain important, but the tool is useful in helping to identify which countries to scrutinize
    Note: "RAND National Defense Research Institute , "This research was ... conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface , Includes bibliographical references (pages 51-57)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [Santa Monica, CA] : RAND Corporation
    ISBN: 9780833080905 , 0833083430 , 0833080903 , 9780833083432
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (11 pages)
    Series Statement: RAND Corporation research report series RR296
    Parallel Title: Print version Pézard, Stéphanie Toward a secure and stable northern Mali
    Keywords: Internal security ; Postwar reconstruction ; Political stability ; Internal security ; Postwar reconstruction ; Political stability ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Mali ; Ethnic relations ; Internal security ; Political stability ; Postwar reconstruction ; Mali Ethnic relations ; Mali ; Electronic books
    Abstract: The 2012 conflict in northern Mali has shown that many assumptions about Mali's political stability, internal cohesion, and military capabilities were deeply flawed. The January 2013 French-led military intervention scattered the insurgents, but the conditions and drivers that brought about the crisis in the first place have yet to be addressed. This report is intended to assist with the post-conflict planning in northern Mali by examining the historical, economic, and social factors that drive conflict in northern Mali and the different groups that have been involved in the conflict. The authors argue that, in the absence of a large international presence, durable security in northern Mali will have to be provided, to a large extent, by local actors. The authors draw on historical examples of rebellions in Mali since 1916 to show how detailed knowledge of the different local actors and their political dynamics can help in finding solutions that will bring lasting security and stability to the region
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (page 11)
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  • 7
    ISBN: 9780833081803 , 0833083457 , 0833081802 , 9780833083456
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxi, 53 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation research report series
    Keywords: United States Information resources management ; United States ; Leaks (Disclosure of information) Prevention ; Security classification (Government documents) Management ; Leaks (Disclosure of information) ; Security classification (Government documents) ; Information resources management ; United States ; United States ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Electronic books
    Abstract: In 2012, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence established the Unauthorized Disclosures Program Implementation Team to prevent and deter the unauthorized disclosures of classified information by all Department of Defense personnel through the implementation of the UD Strategic Plan. RAND was asked to help monitor and assess the potential for effectiveness of this new initiative. Researchers determined that the UD PIT's implementation of the UD Strategic Plan has made important and discernible progress toward its main objectives, but the advances are partial, fragile, and may be impermanent, facing strategic and tactical obstacles. RAND offered 22 recommendations, including ways to sustain and expand the effort, a continued emphasis on top-down support, establishing metrics, improving accountability, and prioritizing responses
    Abstract: In 2012, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence established the Unauthorized Disclosures Program Implementation Team to prevent and deter the unauthorized disclosures of classified information by all Department of Defense personnel through the implementation of the UD Strategic Plan. RAND was asked to help monitor and assess the potential for effectiveness of this new initiative. Researchers determined that the UD PIT's implementation of the UD Strategic Plan has made important and discernible progress toward its main objectives, but the advances are partial, fragile, and may be impermanent, facing strategic and tactical obstacles. RAND offered 22 recommendations, including ways to sustain and expand the effort, a continued emphasis on top-down support, establishing metrics, improving accountability, and prioritizing responses
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense , Includes bibliographical references (pages 49-53)
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation
    ISBN: 9780833080783 , 0833083279 , 0833080784 , 9780833083272
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 76 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation research report series RR-114-ODNI
    Keywords: United States Personnel management ; United States Personnel management ; United States ; United States ; Intelligence service Personnel management ; Intelligence service ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Personnel management ; United States ; United States ; United States ; United States ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: The U.S. intelligence community has a continuing and important role to play in providing the best intelligence and analytic insight possible to aid the nation's leaders in making decisions and taking action. Executing this role will require unprecedented collaboration and information sharing. The personnel throughout the intelligence agencies are essential to accomplishing these tasks. The intelligence community has made significant progress during the past decade in rebuilding its workforce and developing capabilities lost during the 1990s. As decisionmakers look ahead to a future most certainly defined by constrained budgets, it will be important to avoid repeating the post-Cold War drawdown experience and losing capability in a similar way because the consequences of such actions can be long lasting. This report chronicles intelligence community efforts over more than half a decade to improve community-wide workforce planning and management. It describes workforce planning tools that will help decisionmakers maintain a workforce capable of meeting the challenges that lie ahead, even as budgets decline. In addition, the community's collective efforts to take a more strategic approach to workforce planning point to a number of important considerations that serve as guideposts for the future: (1) rebuilding lost capability takes time, (2) resource flexibility is needed, (3) risk is an essential element in workforce planning, (4) systematic planning shores up requirements, and (5) the supply of military personnel is likely to decline. These lessons learned through an era of workforce rebuilding can inform resource decisions today and in the years to come
    Abstract: The U.S. intelligence community has a continuing and important role to play in providing the best intelligence and analytic insight possible to aid the nation's leaders in making decisions and taking action. Executing this role will require unprecedented collaboration and information sharing. The personnel throughout the intelligence agencies are essential to accomplishing these tasks. The intelligence community has made significant progress during the past decade in rebuilding its workforce and developing capabilities lost during the 1990s. As decisionmakers look ahead to a future most certainly defined by constrained budgets, it will be important to avoid repeating the post-Cold War drawdown experience and losing capability in a similar way because the consequences of such actions can be long lasting. This report chronicles intelligence community efforts over more than half a decade to improve community-wide workforce planning and management. It describes workforce planning tools that will help decisionmakers maintain a workforce capable of meeting the challenges that lie ahead, even as budgets decline. In addition, the community's collective efforts to take a more strategic approach to workforce planning point to a number of important considerations that serve as guideposts for the future: (1) rebuilding lost capability takes time, (2) resource flexibility is needed, (3) risk is an essential element in workforce planning, (4) systematic planning shores up requirements, and (5) the supply of military personnel is likely to decline. These lessons learned through an era of workforce rebuilding can inform resource decisions today and in the years to come
    Note: "Prepared for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence , "National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 73-76)
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  • 9
    ISBN: 9780833081094 , 0833083422 , 0833081098 , 9780833083425
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxxvii, 468 pages)
    Additional Information: Paths to victory: lessons from modern insurgencies
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation research report series RR-291/2-OSD
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Paul, Christopher, 1971- Paths to victory
    Keywords: Insurgency Case studies ; Insurgency ; Case studies ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Military Science - General ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; Insurgency ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Detailed overviews of 41 insurgency cases. UK in Palestine, 1944-1947 -- Greece, 1945-1949 -- Indochina, 1946-1954 -- Philippines (Huk Rebellion), 1946-1956 -- Colombia ("La Violencia"), 1948-1958 -- Malaya, 1948-1955 -- Kenya, 1952-1956 -- Algerian Independence, 1954-1962 -- Cyprus, 1955-1959 -- Cuba, 1956-1959 -- Oman (Imamate Uprising), 1957-1959 -- Indonesia (Darul Islam), 1958-1962 -- Tibet, 1956-1974 -- Guatemala, 1960-1996 -- Laos, 1959-1975 -- Namibia, 1960-1989 -- South Africa, 1960-1990 -- South Vietnam, 1960-1975 -- Eritrea, 1961-1991 -- Iraqi Kurdistan, 1961-1975 -- Angolan Independence, 1961-1974 -- Guinea-Bissau, 1962-1974 -- Mozambican Independence, 1962-1974 -- Yemen, 1962-1970 -- Uruguay, 1963-1972 -- Oman (Dhofar Rebellion), 1965-1975 -- Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1965-1980 -- Argentina, 1969-1979 -- Cambodia, 1967-1975 -- Northern Ireland, 1969-1999 -- Jordan, 1970-1971 -- Bangladesh, 1971 -- Philippines (MNLF), 1971-1996 -- Baluchistan, 1973-1978 -- Angola (UNITA), 1975-2002 -- Indonesia (East Timor), 1975-2000 -- Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990 -- Western Sahara, 1975-1991 -- Indonesia (Aceh), 1976-2005 -- Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976-1995 -- Sri Lanka, 1976-2009
    Abstract: Detailed overviews of 41 insurgency cases. UK in Palestine, 1944-1947 -- Greece, 1945-1949 -- Indochina, 1946-1954 -- Philippines (Huk Rebellion), 1946-1956 -- Colombia ("La Violencia"), 1948-1958 -- Malaya, 1948-1955 -- Kenya, 1952-1956 -- Algerian Independence, 1954-1962 -- Cyprus, 1955-1959 -- Cuba, 1956-1959 -- Oman (Imamate Uprising), 1957-1959 -- Indonesia (Darul Islam), 1958-1962 -- Tibet, 1956-1974 -- Guatemala, 1960-1996 -- Laos, 1959-1975 -- Namibia, 1960-1989 -- South Africa, 1960-1990 -- South Vietnam, 1960-1975 -- Eritrea, 1961-1991 -- Iraqi Kurdistan, 1961-1975 -- Angolan Independence, 1961-1974 -- Guinea-Bissau, 1962-1974 -- Mozambican Independence, 1962-1974 -- Yemen, 1962-1970 -- Uruguay, 1963-1972 -- Oman (Dhofar Rebellion), 1965-1975 -- Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1965-1980 -- Argentina, 1969-1979 -- Cambodia, 1967-1975 -- Northern Ireland, 1969-1999 -- Jordan, 1970-1971 -- Bangladesh, 1971 -- Philippines (MNLF), 1971-1996 -- Baluchistan, 1973-1978 -- Angola (UNITA), 1975-2002 -- Indonesia (East Timor), 1975-2000 -- Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990 -- Western Sahara, 1975-1991 -- Indonesia (Aceh), 1976-2005 -- Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976-1995 -- Sri Lanka, 1976-2009
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense , Companion publication to: Paths to victory: lessons from modern insurgencies , Includes bibliographical references (pages 441-468)
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  • 10
    ISBN: 9780833076311 , 083307637X , 0833076310 , 9780833076373
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxvi, 180 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series MG-1180-TSF
    Parallel Title: Print version Reardon, Robert J Containing Iran
    Keywords: Nuclear weapons Government policy ; Nuclear nonproliferation Government policy ; Nuclear weapons ; Nuclear nonproliferation ; Nuclear weapons ; Nuclear nonproliferation ; Nuclear weapons ; Nuclear nonproliferation ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Diplomatic relations ; Nuclear nonproliferation ; Nuclear nonproliferation ; Government policy ; Nuclear weapons ; Nuclear weapons ; Government policy ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; Military Science - General ; United States ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Government ; International ; Iran ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; International Relations ; General ; United States Foreign relations ; Iran Foreign relations ; United States ; Iran ; Electronic books
    Abstract: "Iran's nuclear program is one of the most pressing foreign policy issues for the United States. An Iranian nuclear arsenal could further destabilize an already unsettled region and put important U.S. interests at risk. The United States has a strong interest in preventing such an outcome. There is no evidence that Iran has decided to acquire nuclear weapons. However, Iran does seem intent on acquiring the means to do so quickly. It is an open question whether the United States and its allies would be able to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold, if it so chose, at an acceptable cost. After almost a decade of concerted effort involving economic, diplomatic, and military sources of leverage, there has been little progress toward reversing or substantially slowing Iran's nuclear progress. Despite years of U.S. diplomatic efforts to stall that progress, the Iranians have succeeded in building an extensive enrichment program and likely possess the technical capacity to produce at least one nuclear weapon should they choose to do so. Coercion is unlikely to convince Iran to change course. This study assesses current U.S. policy options on the Iranian nuclear question. It suggests that U.S. goals can be met through patient and forward-looking policymaking. Specifically, the United States can begin to lay the groundwork for an effective containment policy while continuing efforts to forestall Iranian weaponization. A successful containment policy will promote long-term positive political change in Iran while avoiding counterproductive provocation."--Publisher's website
    Abstract: "Iran's nuclear program is one of the most pressing foreign policy issues for the United States. An Iranian nuclear arsenal could further destabilize an already unsettled region and put important U.S. interests at risk. The United States has a strong interest in preventing such an outcome. There is no evidence that Iran has decided to acquire nuclear weapons. However, Iran does seem intent on acquiring the means to do so quickly. It is an open question whether the United States and its allies would be able to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold, if it so chose, at an acceptable cost. After almost a decade of concerted effort involving economic, diplomatic, and military sources of leverage, there has been little progress toward reversing or substantially slowing Iran's nuclear progress. Despite years of U.S. diplomatic efforts to stall that progress, the Iranians have succeeded in building an extensive enrichment program and likely possess the technical capacity to produce at least one nuclear weapon should they choose to do so. Coercion is unlikely to convince Iran to change course. This study assesses current U.S. policy options on the Iranian nuclear question. It suggests that U.S. goals can be met through patient and forward-looking policymaking. Specifically, the United States can begin to lay the groundwork for an effective containment policy while continuing efforts to forestall Iranian weaponization. A successful containment policy will promote long-term positive political change in Iran while avoiding counterproductive provocation."--Publisher's website
    Note: "Supported by the Stanton Foundation , Includes bibliographical references (pages 163-180)
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  • 11
    ISBN: 9780833078506 , 0833083155 , 083307850X , 9780833083159
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxiv, 101 pages)
    Parallel Title: Available in another form
    Parallel Title: Available in another form
    Keywords: Security Assistance Program ; Military assistance, American ; Security Assistance Program ; Military assistance, American ; Military & Naval Science ; Armies ; Law, Politics & Government ; Military assistance, American ; Security Assistance Program ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; United States ; Military relations ; United States Military relations ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: The United States has a long history of helping other nations develop and improve their military and other security forces. However, changing economic realities and the ongoing reductions in overall defense spending related to the end of more than a decade of war will affect the funding available for these initiatives. How can the U.S. Department of Defense increase the effectiveness of its efforts to build partner capacity while also increasing the efficiency of those efforts? And what can the history of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity reveal about which approaches are likely to be more or less effective under different circumstances? To tackle these complex questions and form a base of evidence to inform policy discussions and investment decisions, a RAND study collected and compared 20 years of data on 29 historical case studies of U.S. involvement in building partner capacity. In the process, it tested a series of validating factors and hypotheses (many of which are rooted in "common knowledge") to determine how they stand up to real-world case examples of partner capacity building. The results reveal nuances in outcomes and context, pointing to solutions and recommendations to increase the effectiveness of current and future U.S. initiatives to forge better relationships, improve the security and stability of partner countries, and meet U.S. policy and security objectives worldwide
    Abstract: The United States has a long history of helping other nations develop and improve their military and other security forces. However, changing economic realities and the ongoing reductions in overall defense spending related to the end of more than a decade of war will affect the funding available for these initiatives. How can the U.S. Department of Defense increase the effectiveness of its efforts to build partner capacity while also increasing the efficiency of those efforts? And what can the history of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity reveal about which approaches are likely to be more or less effective under different circumstances? To tackle these complex questions and form a base of evidence to inform policy discussions and investment decisions, a RAND study collected and compared 20 years of data on 29 historical case studies of U.S. involvement in building partner capacity. In the process, it tested a series of validating factors and hypotheses (many of which are rooted in "common knowledge") to determine how they stand up to real-world case examples of partner capacity building. The results reveal nuances in outcomes and context, pointing to solutions and recommendations to increase the effectiveness of current and future U.S. initiatives to forge better relationships, improve the security and stability of partner countries, and meet U.S. policy and security objectives worldwide
    Note: "RAND National Defense Research Institute , "This research was ... conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface , Includes bibliographical references (pages 99-101)
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  • 12
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833052490 , 0833052578 , 0833052497 , 9780833052575
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xlix, 332 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series
    Parallel Title: Print version Dilemmas of intervention
    Keywords: Peace-building ; Nation-building ; Postwar reconstruction ; Peace-building ; Nation-building ; Postwar reconstruction ; Peace-building ; Postwar reconstruction ; peacebuilding ; peacekeeping operations ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Globalization ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Nation-building ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Governments intervening in post-conflict states find themselves beset with numerous challenges and profound dilemmas: it is often unclear how best to proceed because measures that may improve conditions in one respect may undermine them in another. This volume reviews and integrates the scholarly social-science literature relevant to stabilization and reconstruction (S & R), with the goal of informing strategic planning at the whole-of-government level. The authors assert that S & R success depends on success in each of four component domains -- political, social, security, and economic. The authors discuss each domain separately but emphasize their interactions and the idea that the failure of any component can doom S & R as a whole. The authors also focus on a number of dilemmas that intervenors in post-conflict states face -- such as between short- and long-term goals and whether to work through or around the state's central government -- and suggest how these dilemmas can be confronted depending on context
    Abstract: Governments intervening in post-conflict states find themselves beset with numerous challenges and profound dilemmas: it is often unclear how best to proceed because measures that may improve conditions in one respect may undermine them in another. This volume reviews and integrates the scholarly social-science literature relevant to stabilization and reconstruction (S & R), with the goal of informing strategic planning at the whole-of-government level. The authors assert that S & R success depends on success in each of four component domains -- political, social, security, and economic. The authors discuss each domain separately but emphasize their interactions and the idea that the failure of any component can doom S & R as a whole. The authors also focus on a number of dilemmas that intervenors in post-conflict states face -- such as between short- and long-term goals and whether to work through or around the state's central government -- and suggest how these dilemmas can be confronted depending on context
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense , Includes bibliographical references
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  • 13
    ISBN: 9780833047694 , 0833059866 , 0833047698 , 9780833059864
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxiii, 131 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series
    Parallel Title: Print version Glenn, Russell W Band of brothers or dysfunctional family?
    Keywords: Integrated operations (Military science) ; Counterinsurgency ; Armed Forces Stability operations ; Integrated operations (Military science) ; Counterinsurgency ; Armed Forces ; HISTORY ; Military ; Pictorial ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Armed Forces ; Stability operations ; Counterinsurgency ; Integrated operations (Military science) ; military operations ; cooperation ; armed forces ; peacekeeping operations ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Counterinsurgency and other stability operations seldom present a nation with trials that threaten its very survival, barring cases in which that nation is the target of insurgents. Bonds between coalition members are therefore weaker than when threat of annihilation reinforces mutual dependence. Such situations are further complicated by the use of force likely not being the primary implement for attaining ultimate success. Devoid of a preeminent threat and denied primary dependence on armed forces, core coalition objectives tend to be political rather than military in character and include counterinsurgency, nation building, developing government capacity, and providing humanitarian assistance -- activities often associated with stability operations. Armed forces are not staffed or trained to meet the long-term demands of many of these tasks. An alliance or coalition must therefore incorporate participation by other government agencies and -- ultimately -- that of the indigenous government and its population more than is expected during conventional combat operations. Recent contingencies have also seen commercial enterprises, militias, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations become key participants in these undertakings. The result is coalitions of a size seldom seen and with a number of affiliations rarely, if ever, approached before the late 20th century. This monograph investigates the dramatic expansion of challenges confronting alliances and coalitions today and thereafter considers potential solutions that include questioning the conception of what constitutes a coalition in today's world
    Abstract: Counterinsurgency and other stability operations seldom present a nation with trials that threaten its very survival, barring cases in which that nation is the target of insurgents. Bonds between coalition members are therefore weaker than when threat of annihilation reinforces mutual dependence. Such situations are further complicated by the use of force likely not being the primary implement for attaining ultimate success. Devoid of a preeminent threat and denied primary dependence on armed forces, core coalition objectives tend to be political rather than military in character and include counterinsurgency, nation building, developing government capacity, and providing humanitarian assistance -- activities often associated with stability operations. Armed forces are not staffed or trained to meet the long-term demands of many of these tasks. An alliance or coalition must therefore incorporate participation by other government agencies and -- ultimately -- that of the indigenous government and its population more than is expected during conventional combat operations. Recent contingencies have also seen commercial enterprises, militias, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations become key participants in these undertakings. The result is coalitions of a size seldom seen and with a number of affiliations rarely, if ever, approached before the late 20th century. This monograph investigates the dramatic expansion of challenges confronting alliances and coalitions today and thereafter considers potential solutions that include questioning the conception of what constitutes a coalition in today's world
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 109-131)
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  • 14
    ISBN: 9780833049612 , 0833050788 , 9781282940536 , 1282940538 , 9780833050786 , 0833049615
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxx, 153 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series MG-964-OSD
    Parallel Title: Print version Paul, Christopher, 1971- Victory has a thousand fathers
    Keywords: Insurgency Case studies ; Counterinsurgency Case studies ; Insurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Counterinsurgency ; Insurgency ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; Military Science - General ; TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING ; Military Science ; Case studies ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations
    Abstract: Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations
    Note: Includes bibliographical references
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  • 15
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, Calif : Rand
    ISBN: 9780833048288 , 0833048287 , 9780833027436 , 0585245487 , 0833027433 , 9780585245485
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xviii, 174 pages)
    Parallel Title: Print version Byman, Daniel, 1967- Air power as a coercive instrument
    Keywords: Military planning ; Air power ; Air power ; Military planning ; Air power ; Air power ; Air power ; Military planning ; United States ; Air power ; Military doctrine ; TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING ; Military Science ; Air Force ; Coercive force ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power--or any other military instrument--will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers' use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater
    Note: "Project Air Force, Rand , "MR-1061-AF , Includes bibliographical references (pages 161-174)
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  • 16
    ISBN: 9780833043337 , 0833043331 , 9780833026637 , 0585250073 , 0833026631 , 9780585250076
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxiii, 452 pages)
    Parallel Title: Print version Strategic appraisal
    Keywords: Military art and science Automation ; Military art and science ; Military art and science ; Automation ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; HISTORY ; Military ; Biological & Chemical Warfare ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Advances in information technology have led us to rely on easy communication and readily available information--both in our personal lives and in the life of our nation. For the most part, we have rightly welcomed these changes. But information that is readily available is available to friend and foe alike; a system that relies on communication can become useless if its ability to communicate is interfered with or destroyed. Because this reliance is so general, attacks on the information infrastructure can have widespread effects, both for the military and for society. And such attacks can come from a variety of sources, some difficult or impossible to identify. This, the third volume in the Strategic Appraisal series, draws on the expertise of researchers from across RAND to explore the opportunities and vulnerabilities inherent in the increasing reliance on information technology, looking both at its usefulness to the warrior and the need to protect its usefulness for everyone. The Strategic Appraisal series is intended to review, for a broad audience, issues bearing on national security and defense planning
    Note: "Prepared for the United State Air Force , "Project AIR FORCE , "Rand , Includes bibliographical references , Introduction , The American military enterprise in the information age , Right makes might : freedom and power in the information age , Networks, netwar, and information-age terrorism , Information and war : is it a revolution? , Information and warfare : new opportunities for U.S. military forces , U.S. military opportunities : information-warfare concepts of operation , The information revolution and psychological effects , U.S. strategic vulnerabilities : threats against society , Implications of information vulnerabilities for military operations , Military organization in the information age : lessons from the world of business , Arms control, export regimes, and multilateral cooperation , Ethics and information warfare , Defense in a weird world : protection, deterrence, and prevention , Conclusion : The changing role of information in warfare
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