ISBN:
9780833087751
,
0833089412
,
0833087754
,
9780833089410
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (xxiv, 142 pages)
Keywords:
United States
;
United States
;
Irregular warfare
;
Afghan War, 2001-
;
Strategy
;
Iraq War, 2003-2011
;
Irregular warfare
;
Afghan War, 2001-
;
Strategy
;
Iraq War, 2003-2011
;
Military & Naval Science
;
Law, Politics & Government
;
POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International)
;
Iraq
;
Irregular warfare
;
Afghan War (2001- )
;
Strategy
;
Iraq War (2003-2011)
;
Military Science - General
;
United States
;
Electronic books
Abstract:
This report contributes to the ongoing debate about the lessons from the past 13 years of war and the requirements for addressing future conflicts. It addresses a particular disconnect in the current debate on the future of national security strategy and the role of landpower caused by an inadequate examination of the national level of strategy made by the U.S. government. The disconnect exists because there has been no systematic effort to collect and analyze insights from those who have been actively engaged in making policy and strategy from 2001 to 2014. A RAND Arroyo Center workshop provided a mechanism for eliciting insights from policymakers and academic experts involved in the formation of national-level strategy and its implementation over the past 13 years. This study analyzes and develops those insights in the context of the debate on future national security strategy. It applies those insights to the future operating environment, which will include irregular and hybrid threats, and identifies critical requirements for land forces and special operations forces to operate successfully in conjunction with other joint, interagency, and multinational partners
Abstract:
This report contributes to the ongoing debate about the lessons from the past 13 years of war and the requirements for addressing future conflicts. It addresses a particular disconnect in the current debate on the future of national security strategy and the role of landpower caused by an inadequate examination of the national level of strategy made by the U.S. government. The disconnect exists because there has been no systematic effort to collect and analyze insights from those who have been actively engaged in making policy and strategy from 2001 to 2014. A RAND Arroyo Center workshop provided a mechanism for eliciting insights from policymakers and academic experts involved in the formation of national-level strategy and its implementation over the past 13 years. This study analyzes and develops those insights in the context of the debate on future national security strategy. It applies those insights to the future operating environment, which will include irregular and hybrid threats, and identifies critical requirements for land forces and special operations forces to operate successfully in conjunction with other joint, interagency, and multinational partners
Note:
"RAND Arroyo Center
,
"This research was ... conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program"--Preface
,
Includes bibliographical references (pages 125-142)
URL:
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