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  • Cambridge : Cambridge University Press  (5)
  • Mathematics  (5)
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Year
  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9781108706681
    Language: English
    Pages: 90 Seiten , Diagramme
    Series Statement: Cambridge Elements
    Series Statement: Elements in decision theory and philosophy
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Vanderschraaf, Peter, 1962 - Bargaining theory
    DDC: 302.13
    RVK:
    Keywords: Entscheidungstheorie, allgemein ; Philosophy of science ; SCIENCE / Philosophy & Social Aspects ; Soziale und politische Philosophie ; Spieltheorie
    Abstract: The Nash bargaining problem provides a framework for analyzing problems where parties have imperfectly aligned interests. This Element reviews the parts of bargaining theory most important in philosophical applications, and to social contract theory in particular. It discusses rational choice analyses of bargaining problems that focus on axiomatic analysis, according to which a solution of a given bargaining problem satisfies certain formal criteria, and strategic bargaining, according to which a solution results from the moves of ideally rational and knowledgeable claimants. Next, it discusses the conventionalist analyses of bargaining problems that focus on how members of a society can settle into bargaining conventions via learning and focal points. In the concluding section this Element discusses how philosophers use bargaining theory to analyze the social contract
    Description / Table of Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Motivating problems; 3. Defining the problem; 4. Solution concepts; 5. Rational choice justifications of solutions; 6. Bargaining conventions; 7. The Nash bargaining problem as a tool for analyzing the social contract; Appendix. Braithwaite ranking; Bibliography.
    Note: Interessenniveau: 4CT, für die Hochschulausbildung
    URL: Cover  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 2
    ISBN: 9781108724265
    Language: English
    Pages: xviii, 271 Seiten , Illustrationen, Diagramme
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    DDC: 302.231
    RVK:
    Keywords: Social media ; User-generated content Social aspects ; Einführung ; Einführung
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index , Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
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  • 3
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 0521267579 , 0521022746 , 9780521267571 , 9780521022743
    Language: English
    Pages: ix, 390 Seiten , Illustrationen ; Diagramme
    DDC: 302.30724
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Game theory Congresses ; Negotiation Mathematical models ; Congresses ; Konferenzschrift ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Konferenzschrift ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Konferenzschrift 1983
    Note: Literaturangaben , Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9780511528309
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 online resource (ix, 390 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    DDC: 302.3/0724
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Mathematisches Modell ; Game theory / Congresses ; Negotiation / Mathematical models / Congresses ; Spieltheorie ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Konferenzschrift ; Konferenzschrift ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Spieltheorie ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell
    Abstract: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9781139052283
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 online resource (x, 169 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    DDC: 302.3/4
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Mathematisches Modell ; Social choice / Mathematical models ; Voting / Mathematical models ; Committees / Mathematical models ; Game theory ; Abstimmung ; Spieltheorie ; Wahlverhalten ; Mathematisches Modell ; Ausschuss ; Ausschuss ; Abstimmung ; Mathematisches Modell ; Wahlverhalten ; Spieltheorie
    Abstract: This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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