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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (40 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Halpern, Jonathan Designing Direct Subsidies for Water and Sanitation Services Panama
    Keywords: Access To Cred Administrative Cost ; Administrative Costs ; Beneficiaries ; Beneficiary ; Check ; Customers ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Sustainability ; Gender ; Gender and Law ; Housing Subsidy ; Interest ; Investments ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Population ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Rural Development ; Rural Poverty Reduction ; Subsidies ; Subsidization ; Subsidy ; Subsidy Payments ; Tax Law ; Taxation and Subsidies ; Total Costs ; Town Water Supply and Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Urban Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Subsidies ; Water Subsidy ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Worth ; Access To Cred Administrative Cost ; Administrative Costs ; Beneficiaries ; Beneficiary ; Check ; Customers ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Sustainability ; Gender ; Gender and Law ; Housing Subsidy ; Interest ; Investments ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Population ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Rural Development ; Rural Poverty Reduction ; Subsidies ; Subsidization ; Subsidy ; Subsidy Payments ; Tax Law ; Taxation and Subsidies ; Total Costs ; Town Water Supply and Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Urban Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Subsidies ; Water Subsidy ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Worth
    Abstract: May 2000 - An alternative to traditional subsidies for water and sanitation services is direct subsidies - funds governments provide to cover part of the water bill for households that meet certain criteria. Issues associated with such a subsidy are analyzed through a case study of Panama. As an alternative to traditional subsidy schemes in utility sectors, direct subsidy programs have several advantages: they are transparent, they are explicit, and they minimize distortions of the behavior of both the utility and the customers. At the same time, defining practical eligibility criteria for direct subsidy schemes is difficult and identifying eligible households may entail substantial administrative costs. Foster, Gomez-Lobo, and Halpern, using a case study from Panama, discuss some of the issues associated with the design of direct subsidy systems for water services. They conclude that: · There is a need to assess - rather than assume - the need for a subsidy. A key test of affordability, and thus of the need for a subsidy, is to compare the cost of the service with some measure of household willingness to pay. · The initial assessment must consider the affordability of connection costs as well as the affordability of the service itself. Connection costs may be prohibitive for poor households with no credit, suggesting a need to focus subsidies on providing access rather than ongoing water consumption. · A key issue in designing a direct subsidy scheme is its targeting properties. Poverty is a complex phenomenon and difficult to measure. Eligibility must therefore be based on easily measurable proxy variables, and good proxies are hard to find. In choosing eligibility criteria for a subsidy, it is essential to verify what proportion of the target group fails to meet the criteria (errors of exclusion) and what proportion of nontarget groups is inadvertently eligible for the benefits (errors of inclusion). · Administrative costs are roughly the same no matter what the level of individual subsidies, so a scheme that pays beneficiaries very little will tend not to be cost-effective. It is important to determine what proportion of total program costs will be absorbed by administrative expenses. · Subsidies should not cover the full cost of the service and should be contingent on beneficiaries paying their share of the bill. Subsidies for consumption above a minimum subsistence level should be avoided. Subsidies should be provided long enough before eligibility is reassessed to avoid poverty trap problems. · The utility or concessionaire can be helpful in identifying eligible candidates because of its superior information on the payment histories of customers. It will also have an incentive to do so, since it has an interest in improving poor payment records. Thought should therefore be given at the design stage to the role of the service provider in the implementation of the subsidy scheme. · The administrative agency's responsibilities, the sources of funding, and the general principles guiding the subsidy system should have a clear legal basis, backed by regulations governing administrative procedures. · To reduce administrative costs and avoid duplication of effort, it would be desirable for a single set of institutional arrangements to be used to determine eligibility for all welfare and subsidy programs in a given jurisdiction, whether subnational or national. This paper - a product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to evaluate and disseminate lessons of experience in designing policies to improve the quality and sustainability of infrastructure services and to enhance access of the poor to these basic services. The authors may be contacted at vfosterworldbank.org or jhalpern@worldbank.org
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (46 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Halpern, Jonathan Information and Modeling Issues in Designing Water and Sanitation Subsidy Schemes
    Keywords: Administrative Procedures ; Consumption ; Consumption ; Consumption Patterns ; Cred Demand ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Empirical Analysis ; Environment ; Environmental Economics and Policies ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Incentives ; Income ; Information ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Need ; Options ; Poverty ; Private Sector Development ; Revenue ; Standards ; Subsidies ; Tariffs ; Town Water Supply and Sanitation ; Values ; Water ; Water Conservation ; Water Resources ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions ; Water Use ; Willingness To Pay ; Wtp ; Administrative Procedures ; Consumption ; Consumption ; Consumption Patterns ; Cred Demand ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Empirical Analysis ; Environment ; Environmental Economics and Policies ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Incentives ; Income ; Information ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Need ; Options ; Poverty ; Private Sector Development ; Revenue ; Standards ; Subsidies ; Tariffs ; Town Water Supply and Sanitation ; Values ; Water ; Water Conservation ; Water Resources ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions ; Water Use ; Willingness To Pay ; Wtp
    Abstract: May 2000 - Evaluating design alternatives is a first step in introducing optimal water subsidy schemes. The definition of appropriate targeting criteria and subsidy levels needs to be supported by empirical analysis, generally an informationally demanding exercise. An assessment carried out in Panama revealed that targeting individual households would be preferable to geographically based targeting. Empirical analysis also showed that only a small group of very poor households needed a subsidy to pay their water bill. In designing a rational scheme for subsidizing water services, it is important to support the choice of design parameters with empirical analysis that simulates the impact of subsidy options on the target population. Otherwise, there is little guarantee that the subsidy program will meet its objectives. But such analysis is informationally demanding. Ideally, researchers should have access to a single, consistent data set containing household-level information on consumption, willingness to pay, and a range of socioeconomic characteristics. Such a comprehensive data set will rarely exist. G-mez-Lobo, Foster, and Halpern suggest overcoming this data deficiency by collating and imaginatively manipulating different sources of data to generate estimates of the missing variables. The most valuable sources of information, they explain, are likely to be the following: · Customer databases of the water company, which provide robust information on the measured consumption of formal customers but little information on unmeasured consumption, informal customers, willingness to pay, or socioeconomic variables. · General socioeconomic household surveys, which are an excellent source of socioeconomic information but tend to record water expenditure rather than physical consumption. · Willingness-to-pay surveys, which are generally tailored to a specific project, are very flexible, and may be the only source of willingness-to-pay data. However, they are expensive to undertake and the information collected is based on hypothetical rather than real behavior. Where such surveys are unavailable, international benchmark values on willingness to pay may be used. Combining data sets requires some effort and creativity, and creates difficulties of its own. But once a suitable data set has been constructed, a simulation model can be created using simple spreadsheet software. The model used to design Panama's water subsidy proposal addressed these questions: · What are the targeting properties of different eligibility criteria for the subsidy? · How large should the subsidy be? · How much will the subsidy scheme cost, including administrative costs? Armed with the above information, policymakers should be in a position to design a subsidy program that reaches the intended beneficiaries, provides them with the level of financial support that is strictly necessary, meets the overall budget restrictions, and does not waste an excessive amount of funding on administrative costs. This paper - a product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to evaluate and disseminate lessons of experience in designing policies to improve the quality and sustainability of infrastructure services and to enhance the access of the poor to these basic services. The authors may be contacted at vfosterworldbank.org or jhalpern@worldbank.org
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  • 3
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (42 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Halpern, Jonathan Regulatory Reform in Mexico's Natural Gas Industry
    Keywords: Air ; Air Pollution ; Cleaner Fuels ; Diesel ; Driving ; Emission Standards ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Fuel ; Fuel Oil ; Fuels ; Gas Sector ; Industry ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure Regulation ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Oil and Gas Industry ; Petroleum Gas ; Pollution ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Water Resources ; Water and Industry ; Air ; Air Pollution ; Cleaner Fuels ; Diesel ; Driving ; Emission Standards ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Fuel ; Fuel Oil ; Fuels ; Gas Sector ; Industry ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure Regulation ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Oil and Gas Industry ; Petroleum Gas ; Pollution ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Water Resources ; Water and Industry
    Abstract: January 2001 - Liberalization of the natural gas industry is complex because the sector combines activities with natural monopoly characteristics with activities that are potentially competitive. The challenges are compounded when the State opts to retain vertically integrated monopolies in otherwise contestable segments of the industry. Regulatory issues associated with partial liberalization of natural gas markets are analyzed through a case study of Mexico. The natural gas industry combines activities with natural monopoly characteristics with those that are potentially competitive. Pipeline transport and distribution, which have natural monopoly characteristics, require regulation of price and nonprice behavior. Production is a contestable activity, but in a few countries (including Mexico) it remains a state monopoly. Gas marketing is also contestable, but the presence of a dominant, upstream, vertically integrated incumbent may pose significant barriers to entry. Market architecture decisions—such as horizontal structure, regional development, and the degree of vertical integration—are also crucial. Rosellón and Halpern report that Mexico has undertaken structural reform in the energy sector more slowly than many other countries, but it has introduced changes to attract private investment in natural gas transport and distribution. These changes were a response to the rapid growth in demand for natural gas (about 10 percent a year) in Mexico, which was in turn a response to economic development and the enforcement of environmental regulations. The new regulatory framework provides incentives for firms to invest and operate efficiently and to bear much of the risk associated with new projects. It also protects captive consumers and improves general economic welfare. The continued vertical integration of the state-owned company Pemex and its statutory monopoly in domestic production posed a challenge to regulators. Their response in liberalizing trade, setting first-hand sales prices, and regulating natural gas distribution makes the Mexican case an interesting example of regulatory design. As the first phase of investment mobilization and competition for the market in Mexican distribution projects concludes, remaining challenges include consistently and transparently enforcing regulations, coordinating tasks among government agencies, and ensuring expansion of gas transport services and domestic production. A key challenge in the near term will be fostering competition in the market. In strengthening the role of market forces, one issue is Pemex's discretionary discounts on domestic gas and access to transport services, made possible by its monopoly in domestic production and marketing activities and its overwhelming dominance in transport. The main instrument available to the regulator is proscribing Pemex contract pricing, but more durable and tractable instruments should be considered. This paper—a product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region—is part of a larger effort in the region to evaluate and disseminate lessons of experience in designing policies to improve the quality and sustainability of infrastructure services. The authors may be contacted at jrosellondis1.cide.mx or jhalpern@worldbank.org
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  • 4
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2538
    Parallel Title: Rosellán, Juan Designing natural gas distribution concessions in a megacity
    Keywords: Natural gas Transportation ; Natural gas industries ; Natural gas Transportation ; Natural gas industries
    Abstract: Private participation in the development of natural gas distribution networks is often introduced through the award of exclusive concessions for defined geographic zones. Designing such franchises in a megacity poses a challenge in striking a balance between economies of scale (few distributors) and information disclosure for regulation (more distributors). Approaches to making these and related tradeoffs are analyzed through a case study of Mexico City
    Note: "January 2001"--Cover , Includes bibliographical references (p. 24-25) , Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 19, 2002 , Also available in print.
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : World Bank, Energy and Water Department, Water Sanitation Unit, and Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2703
    Parallel Title: Woolf, Fiona Integrating independent power producers into emerging wholesale power markets
    Keywords: Competition ; Contracts ; Electric utilities ; Electric utilities Privatization ; Independent power producers ; Competition ; Contracts ; Electric utilities ; Electric utilities Privatization ; Independent power producers
    Abstract: Policymakers wishing to introduce wholesale competition into the electricity industry must often reconcile existing independent power producer contracts with new market structures and trading arrangements. For the new market arrangements to bring the benefits of competition to consumers, enough participants must be willing to take market risk. A combination of measures (adaptation of specific market rule, contractual alternatives for enhancing market liquidity, contract buyout provisions, transitional mechanisms) offer promise for reconciling existing contracts with new market structures and reducing the magnitude of above-market costs associated with the contracts
    Note: "November 2001 , Title from title screen as viewed on Aug. 24, 2002 , Also available in print.
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  • 6
    Language: Spanish
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (318 p)
    Series Statement: Directions in Development
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Abstract: Si bien los subsidios a usuarios de servicios publicos son comunes tanto en el sector de agua como en el de electricidad, su eficacia para alcanzar y distribuir recursos a las personas mas pobres es objeto de amplio debate. Esta publicacion reune pruebas empiricas sobre el desempeno de los subsidios en diversos paises. El texto pone en evidencia la preponderancia de los subsidios a los usuarios, ofrece una tipologia de las muchas variantes que existen en el mundo en desarrollo y presenta varios indicadores utiles para evaluar la medida en la cual esos subsidios benefician a los pobres, con un enfoque en tres conceptos clave: incidencia en el beneficiario, incidencia del beneficio y valor material. Los hallazgos sobre el desempeno de los subsidios seran de utilidad para los encargados de formular politicas y para los profesionales del sector, quienes contemplan la posibilidad de introducir los subsidios, eliminarlos o modificarlos, y para aquellos que consideran que los subsidios a los usuarios de servicios publicos representan un instrumento de proteccion social
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