ISBN:
9781108635523
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (370 pages)
Series Statement:
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Parallel Title:
Print version Chandra, Kanchan Why Ethnic Parties Succeed : Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India
DDC:
306.2/6/0954
Abstract:
Offers a theory on the performance of ethnic political parties as a distinct phenomenon
Abstract:
Cover -- Why Ethnic Parties Succeed -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Maps, Figures, and Tables -- List of Abbreviations -- A Note on Terminology -- Acknowledgments -- 1: INTRODUCTION -- I. Definitions -- Ethnic Group and Ethnic Category -- Ethnic Party -- Success -- Patronage-Democracy -- II. Background -- III. Theory -- IV. Method -- V. Data -- VI. Sources -- VII. Overview -- PART I: Theory -- 2: Limited Information and Ethnic Categorization -- I. Background -- II. There Are Typically Multiple Sources of Costless Data about an Individual's Ethnic Identities, while Costless Data about an Individual's Nonethnic Identities Are Scarce -- Name -- Features -- Speech -- Dress -- III. Limited Information Settings Bias Observers toward Schemes of Ethnic Categorization -- IV. Conclusion -- 3: Patronage-Democracy, Limited Information, and Ethnic Favouritism -- I. Theory of Voter and Elite Behaviour in Patronage-Democracies -- I.1. Politicians in Patronage-Democracies Have an Incentive to Collect Rents on Policy Implementation -- I.2. Voters in Patronage-Democracies Have an Incentive to Use Their Votes as Instruments to Extract Material Benefits -- I.3. Benefit-seeking Voters Have an Incentive to Organize Collectively in the Pursuit of Individually Distributed Goods -- I.4. Benefit-selling Candidates Have an Incentive to Target the Distribution of Individual Benefits to Group Members rather than to Free-floating Individuals -- I.5. Voters in Patronage-Democracies Evaluate the Promises of Candidates about the Distribution of Benefits in the Present by Looking at the Record of Past Patronage Transactions by Incumbents. Consequently, Incumbents Seek to Develop Records of Patronage Transactions that Will Help Them Most in the Future
Abstract:
I.6. Voters Surveying the Record of Past Patronage Transactions Are Typically Forced to Distinguish between Individuals under Severe Information Constraints -- I.7. Consequently, Voters Are Biased toward Schemes of Ethnic Categorization in Interpreting How Past Patronage Benefits Have Been Distributed -- I.8. When Voters Are Biased toward an Ethnic Categorization of Beneficiaries, Politicians Will Favour Co-ethnics in Their Distribution of Material Benefits, although They May Also Channel Leftover Benefits to Voters from Other Ethnic Categories -- I.9. The Superior Visibility of Ethnic Identities in Limited Information Environments Also Drives Voters to Obtain Psychic Benefits from Co-ethnic Elites rather than Others -- I.10. Consequently, We Should See a Self-enforcing and Self-reinforcing Equilibrium of Ethnic Favouritism in Patronage-Democracies -- II. Factors Mitigating the Likelihood of Ethnic Favouritism in Patronage-Democracies -- Vesting of Control over the Distribution of Patronage at the Micro Level -- Mediated Democracy -- Aggregate Beneficiaries -- Perfect Homogeneity and Perfect Heterogeneity -- III. Alternative Explanations for Ethnic Head Counts -- Networks -- Historical Institutionalist Arguments -- Culture -- Preexisting Patterns of Identity Salience -- IV. Conclusion -- 4: Counting Heads: WHY ETHNIC PARTIES SUCCEED IN PATRONAGE-DEMOCRACIES -- I. Voters in Patronage-Democracies Formulate Preferences across Political Parties by Counting Heads Belonging to Their "Own" Ethnic Category rather than by Assessing Party Issue Positions -- II. Voters in Patronage-Democracies Are Strategic Actors, Voting for Their Preferred Party Only If It Is Likely to Win or Exercise Influence after the Election, and Not Otherwise
Abstract:
III. Voters in Patronage-Democracies Formulate Expectations about the Likely Electoral Outcome by Counting Heads of Co-Ethnics and Outsiders in the Electorate -- IV. Party Election Strategies in Patronage-Democracies Should Focus on Identifying Advantageous Systems of Ethnic Categorization Rather than on Identifying Advantageous Issue Dimensions -- V. Why Ethnic Parties Succeed in Patronage-Democracies -- VI. The Paradox of Ethnic Party Failure -- 5: Why Parties Have Different Ethnic Head Counts: PARTY ORGANIZATION AND ELITE INCORPORATION -- I. Elite Incorporation in Competitive versus Centralized Party Organizations -- II. Competitive Party Organizations -- III. Centralized Party Organizations -- IV. Conclusion -- PART II: Data -- 6: India as a Patronage-Democracy -- I. Discretionary Control over Jobs, Livelihoods, and Living Conditions -- II. The Capacity of Politicians to Collect Rents -- III. The Sale of State Resources and Services in Return for Votes -- IV. The Availability of Information about Voting Patterns -- V. Conclusion -- 7: The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Scheduled Castes (SCs) -- I. History -- II. The BSP's Primary Target Constituency: Scheduled Castes -- III. The BSP's Message to Scheduled Castes -- IV. Research Design -- V. Alternative Explanations -- Organization -- Language -- Fragmentation -- Chamar Population -- Grievance -- 8: Why SC Elites Join the BSP -- I. The Emergence of Office-seeking Elites among Scheduled Castes -- II. Variation in Representational Opportunities across the Three States -- III. The BSP in Uttar Pradesh: Representational Blockage and Party Formation -- IV. The BSP in Punjab: Representational Blockage and Party Formation -- V. The BSP in Karnataka: Representational "Openness" and Party Failure -- VI. Conclusion -- 9: Why SC Voters Prefer the BSP -- I. Head Counts and Scheduled Caste Voter Preferences
Abstract:
II. Party Positions on Salient Issues and Voter Preferences -- III. Head Counts, Issues, and Scheduled Caste Voter Preferences -- IV. Head Counts and Voter Preferences across Ethnic Categories and across Elections -- V. Conclusion -- 10: Why SC Voter Preferences Translate into BSP Votes -- I. Why We Should Expect Strategic Voting among Scheduled Caste Voters in Uttar Pradesh -- The Value of b1 and b2 for Scheduled Caste Voters -- Estimating p -- II. "Leverage" and Scheduled Caste Voting Behaviour -- III. Testing Additional Observable Implications -- BSP Election Campaign -- Timing of Decision -- Vote Switching in Different Competitive Configurations -- IV. Conclusion -- 11: Explaining Different Head Counts in the BSP and Congress -- I. Explaining Differential Incorporation in the Congress Party -- II. Explaining the Incorporation of Scheduled Castes in the BSP -- 12: Extending the Argument to Other Ethnic Parties in India: THE BJP, THE DMK, AND THE JMM -- I. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) -- Gujarat -- Bihar -- II. The Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) -- III. Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) -- IV. Conclusion -- 13: Ethnic Head Counts and Democratic Stability -- Appendix A: Elite Interviews -- Appendix B: Ethnographies of Election Campaigns -- Appendix C: Content Analysis -- Appendix D: Description of Survey Data -- Appendix E: Description of the Ecological Inference (EI) Method -- I. Use of EI to Generate Constituency-Level Estimates of Scheduled Caste Voting Behaviour -- Assumptions of the EI Method -- Procedure for Obtaining EI Estimates -- II. Using EI Estimates in a Second-Stage Analysis of Strategic Voting -- III. Possibilities for Research on Ethnic Politics -- Appendix F: Method Used to Estimate Ethnic Voting Patterns -- Bibliography -- Government Publications -- Newspapers and Serials -- Party Periodicals and Other Documents
Abstract:
Recorded Texts of Election Rallies, Caste Conventions, and Other Public Meetings -- Books and Articles -- Index
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