Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
Edition:
Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
Parallel Title:
Jacoby, Hanan G Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity
Keywords:
Accounting
;
Adverse Selection
;
Communities & Human Settlement
;
Contract Law
;
Contracts
;
Debt Markets
;
E-Business
;
Economic Theory and Research
;
Effects
;
Efficiency
;
Equity
;
Family Labor
;
Finance and Financial Sector Development
;
Incentive Problems
;
Incentives
;
Information
;
Investment and Investment Climate
;
Labor Allocation
;
Labor Policies
;
Law and Development
;
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
;
Monitoring
;
Municipal Housing and Land
;
Political Economy
;
Private Sector Development
;
Social Protections and Labor
;
Urban Development
;
Urban Housing
;
Accounting
;
Adverse Selection
;
Communities & Human Settlement
;
Contract Law
;
Contracts
;
Debt Markets
;
E-Business
;
Economic Theory and Research
;
Effects
;
Efficiency
;
Equity
;
Family Labor
;
Finance and Financial Sector Development
;
Incentive Problems
;
Incentives
;
Information
;
Investment and Investment Climate
;
Labor Allocation
;
Labor Policies
;
Law and Development
;
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
;
Monitoring
;
Municipal Housing and Land
;
Political Economy
;
Private Sector Development
;
Social Protections and Labor
;
Urban Development
;
Urban Housing
;
Accounting
;
Adverse Selection
;
Communities & Human Settlement
;
Contract Law
;
Contracts
;
Debt Markets
;
E-Business
;
Economic Theory and Research
;
Effects
;
Efficiency
;
Equity
;
Family Labor
;
Finance and Financial Sector Development
;
Incentive Problems
;
Incentives
;
Information
;
Investment and Investment Climate
;
Labor Allocation
;
Labor Policies
;
Law and Development
;
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
;
Monitoring
;
Municipal Housing and Land
;
Political Economy
;
Private Sector Development
;
Social Protections and Labor
;
Urban Development
;
Urban Housing
Abstract:
Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants
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