ISBN:
9780833084040
,
0833085530
,
0833084046
,
9780833085535
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (xxiv, 226 pages)
Series Statement:
RAND Corporation research report series RR513
Parallel Title:
Print version Watts, Stephen (Stephen Baldwin) Countering others' insurgencies
Keywords:
Counterinsurgency Government policy
;
Counterinsurgency
;
Counterinsurgency
;
Counterinsurgency
;
Counterinsurgency
;
Counterinsurgency
;
Pakistan
;
Philippines
;
United States
;
Military relations
;
Military & Naval Science
;
Law, Politics & Government
;
Military Science - General
;
Counterinsurgency
;
Counterinsurgency ; Government policy
;
United States Military relations
;
Pakistan Military relations
;
United States Military relations
;
Philippines Military relations
;
United States Military relations
;
United States
;
Pakistan
;
United States
;
Philippines
;
United States
;
Electronic books
Abstract:
This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. "small-footprint" partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report's findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small-footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as "success stories" all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Such a verdict is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; rather, it is meant to highlight that similar U.S. policies with less promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. The majority of insurgencies have taken place in worst-case conditions, and in these environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to end rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships
Abstract:
This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. "small-footprint" partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report's findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small-footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as "success stories" all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Such a verdict is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; rather, it is meant to highlight that similar U.S. policies with less promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. The majority of insurgencies have taken place in worst-case conditions, and in these environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to end rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships
Note:
Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-226)
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