ISBN:
9781139052283
Language:
English
Pages:
1 online resource (x, 169 pages)
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
DDC:
302.3/4
Keywords:
Mathematisches Modell
;
Social choice / Mathematical models
;
Voting / Mathematical models
;
Committees / Mathematical models
;
Game theory
;
Spieltheorie
;
Wahlverhalten
;
Mathematisches Modell
;
Ausschuss
;
Abstimmung
;
Ausschuss
;
Abstimmung
;
Mathematisches Modell
;
Wahlverhalten
;
Spieltheorie
Abstract:
This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
DOI:
10.1017/CCOL0521259649
URL:
Volltext
(URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
URL:
Volltext
(URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521259649
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521259649
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
