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  • München BSB  (3)
  • Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press  (3)
  • Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest
  • Mathematik  (3)
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  • 1
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9780511598975
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 272 pages)
    DDC: 303.6/9
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    Kurzfassung: Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or 'bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures.
    Anmerkung: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9780511528309
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 390 pages)
    DDC: 302.3/0724
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    Schlagwort(e): Spieltheorie ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Konferenzschrift ; Konferenzschrift
    Kurzfassung: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.
    Anmerkung: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 3
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9781139052283
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 169 pages)
    DDC: 302.3/4
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    Schlagwort(e): Spieltheorie ; Wahlverhalten
    Kurzfassung: This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised.
    Anmerkung: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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