Sprache:
Englisch
Seiten:
Online-Ressource (39 p)
,
ill
,
28 cm
Ausgabe:
Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
Serie:
Policy research working paper 2204
Paralleltitel:
Eskeland, Gunnar S Corruption under moral hazard
Schlagwort(e):
Civil service Salaries, etc
;
Econometric models
;
Political corruption Econometric models
;
Civil service Salaries, etc
;
Econometric models
;
Political corruption Econometric models
Kurzfassung:
Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits
Anmerkung:
"October 1999"--Cover
,
Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39)
,
Also available in print.
URL:
Volltext
(Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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