Kurzfassung: I. Statement of the Problem -- II. Eidetics and its Limits -- III. Existential Structures of Disproportion -- IV. Eidetics, Existence, and Experience -- V. Symbol, Hermeneutic, and Conflict of Interpretation -- VI. Philosophical Reflection as Hermeneutics -- VII. Phenomenology and the Sciences of Language: Further Extensions -- VIII. Conclusions -- Selected Bibliography.

Kurzfassung: The path Husserl entered upon at the beginning of his philosophical writ­ ings turned out to be the beginning of a long, tedious way. Throughout his life he constantly comes to grips with the fundamental problems which set him upon this path. Beginning with the logical level of meaning, laboring through the idealism of the transcendental phenomenology of the period between Ideas I to the Meditations, in search for the ever more originary, he finally arrived at the level of the Lebenswelt. It was this later focus on the ever more originary, the source, the foundation of meaning which led him finally to the horizon of meaning and the genesis of meaning in the Lebenswelt period. This later period allows for a quasi wedding of his phenomenology with some adaptation of existentialism. But this union called for an adaptation of Husserl's logistic prejudice. The period of the Lebenswelt allows many of the later phenomenologists to speak of the failure of the brackets in their extreme exclusion and to allow for a link between man and his world in the Lebenswelt. This link is at the source of the ontological investigations and theories which arise from the phenomenological movement. However, there is the possibility of many tensions in such an endeavor since the study of being can be most abstract and most concrete.

Kurzfassung: I: The stages in general -- II: Gestation -- III: Infancy -- IV: Childhood -- V: The primary school years -- VI: Adolescence -- VII: Youth -- VIII: Early Manhood -- IX: Maturity -- X: Later middle age -- XI: Old age -- XII: Senescence.

Kurzfassung: 1: Marx’s Critique Of Religion -- Religion and the Unity of Marx’s Thought -- The Beginning and End of Critisism -- From Natural Religion to the Religion of Civil Society -- The Substance and Functions of Religion -- 2: Engels’ Critique of Religion -- Engels’ Role in the Critisism of Religion -- From the Inception of Religion to its Transcendence -- The Masks and Disguises of Religion -- The Unity of Engels’ Critique of Religion -- 3: Lenin’s Critique of Religion -- The Origins, Development, Substance, and Functions of Religion -- Religion and the Unity of Marx, Engels, and Lenin -- Shamefaced Idealism, God-Building, and the Disadvantages of Improved Religion -- 4: Kautsky’s Critique of Religion -- Toward a Developed Materialist Theory of Religion -- Religion from Biblical Times to the Twentieth Century -- The Substance and Functions of Religion -- Kautsky: Stalwart Marxist or Renegade? -- Conclusion.

Kurzfassung: In view of the enormous number of works on Marxism in general and in light of the many books and articles touching on the relationship of Marxism to religion in particular, it may fairly be asked why yet another such work should be produced. My reply is that in eliciting answers to the kinds of questions posed by the methodology I have used, it was necessary to go to the primary sources almost exclusively. This is not to bemoan a sad fate but to affirm that there are notable deficiencies in the secondary sources relevant to my topic. By way of general indictment, I contend that the major difficulty with existing studies of the Marxist critique of religion is that their authors, whether expositors or critics, have failed both to specify their own presuppositions concerning religion and to approach the subject with an adequate comprehension of its many dimensions. Since, in most cases, the reader is equally unprepared, anthropologically, sociologically, psychologically, and historically, for clear and informed thought in this vast and nebulous area, the result has been widespread confusion. As if this were not enough, numerous writers with little more than polemical interests have compounded the confusion by failing to distinguish between religion in general and their own brands of faith in particular. Others have not discriminated between the concepts of metaphysics and the supernatural items of religious belief.

Kurzfassung: Berliner Erinnerungen 1933/34 -- „Raum“ und „Zeit“ als „Formen der Anschauung“ und als „Formale Anschauungen“ in Kants kritischer Theorie -- Zur Begriffsbildung der politischen Theorie -- Nietzsche und die Musik -- The System and the Phenomena: The Kant-Interpretations of Nicolai Hartmann and P. F. Strawson -- The Philosopher’s Thraldom. Alogical Sources of Philosophic Thought -- Durchgang und Aufbruch. Zu Max Müllers Sprach-Werk-Erläuterungen -- Selbstüberwindungen, ohne Ende? -- Mixed Pickles -- Rationalistische Verflachungen im modernen bürgerlichen Bewußtsein -- Probleme einer Geschichte der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung -- Kunst und Normalität. Zur Frage der Bewertung von künstlerischen Produktionen Geisteskranker -- Wirklichkeit als moralische Welt: Lessing zum Beispiel -- Der Begriff „Gehalt“ in Goethes Autobiographie „Dichtung und Wahrheit“ -- Some Observations on Kraus’s Impact Then and Now -- Die Philosophie der Landschaft in Brechts „Buckower Elegien“ -- Bibliographie Hermann Wein 1937–1972 -- Nachsatz.

Kurzfassung: So the philosopher's way to be is the source (Quelle) of his values and of his basic model; it is an important way of understanding thrall. It appears, now, that the thought of this paper could be simplified. The primary notion is the philosopher's "way to be." Style, locus of interest, nisus and way of thought can then be seen as growing out of this, as particular aspects or expressions of it. This entire paper then would be an attempt to come to grips with the primary notion. How is a "way to be" related to what is normally called a philo­ sopher's views or theories (the formulable core)? Is it not irrelevant as non-implicatory fact, like biographical details or social background? I do not think so. A philosopher's way to be is not external fact to the formulable core of his thought. It is not "internal" either in the logical sense. It is what allows us to comprehend his explicit views.

Kurzfassung: The Author’s Abstracts 1900/01 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume One in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Vol. 24 (1900), pp. 511–12 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume Two in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, Vol. 25 (1901), pp. 260–63 -- A Draft of a “Preface” to the Logical Investigations, 1913 -- I. Eugen Fink’s Editorial Remarks -- II. Husserl’s Text.

Kurzfassung: TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS A DRAFT OF A PREFACE TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS ( 1913) Edited by EUGEN FINK Translated with Introductions by PHILIP J. BOSSERT and CURTIS H. PETERS • MARTINUS NIJHOFF THE HAGUE 1975 © I975 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-I3: 978-90-247-1711-8 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-1655-1 DOl: 10. 1007/978-94-010-1655-1 TO HERBERT SPIEGELBERG ESTEEMED SCHOLAR, MENTOR, FRIEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to express our thanks to H. L. Van Breda, director of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain), for his approval and encouragement of this project, and to Professor Dr. Gerhart Husserl, Professor Dr. Eugen Fink and the editors of Tijdschrift voor Philosophie for their permission to undertake it. We also owe a debt of appreciation to Dr. Karl Schuhmann of the Catholic University of Louvain and to Dr. Elmar Holenstein, Dr. Edi Marbach and Mr. Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain) for their help in reading the original manuscripts and for putting their excellent knowledge of the Husserl "Nachlass" preserved at the Archives at our disposal. We especially wish to thank Professor Herbert Spiegelberg whose careful and critical reading of our manuscript at an earlier stage resulted in numerous suggestions for its improvement; and, last but not least, our wives, Jane and Pam, for their help in preparing the typescripts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Translator's Introductions XI I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION XI II. THEMATIC INTRODUCTION XX III.

Kurzfassung: I. The Commentary to the Sentences -- II. The Logic of Rationate Being -- III. An Epistemology of Critical Realism -- IV. The Metaphysics of Being -- V. An Anthropology of the “Imago Dei” -- VI. The Contemplation of God as Man’s Natural End -- VII. The Value of Theological Language -- VIII. The Logic of Theological Language -- IX. Did St. Thomas Modify his Theory of Analogy?.

Kurzfassung: Introduction: The Seeming Contingency of the Question concerning the Body and the Necessity for an Ontological Analysis of the Body -- I: The Philosophical Presuppositions of the Biranian Analysis of the Body -- 1. The Philosophical Presuppositions of Biranian Ontology -- 2. The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories -- 3. The Theory of the Ego and the Problem of the Soul -- II:The Subjective Body -- III: Movement and Sensing -- 1. The Unity of our Senses and the Problem of the Relationship between our Images and our Movements -- 2. The Unity of the Body Interpreted as a Unity of Knowledge. Habit and Memory -- 3. The Individuality of Human Reality as Sensible Individuality -- IV: The Twofold Usage of Signs and the Problem of the Constitution of One’s own Body -- V: Cartesian Dualism -- VI: A Critique of the Thought of Maine de Biran. The Problem of Passivity -- VII: Conclusion. The Ontological Theory of the Body and the Problem of Incarnation. The Flesh and the Spirit -- Index of Authors -- Index of Terms.

Kurzfassung: THE SEEMING CONTINGENCY OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE BODY AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BODY When we disclose and bring forth, within ontological investigations aimed at making possible the elaboration of a phenomenology of the ego, a prob­ lematic concerning the body, we may well seem, with respect to the general direction of our analysis, to elaborate only a contingent and accidental specification of such an analysis and to forget its true goal.! Up to the present, we pursued the clarification of the being of the ego [2] on the level of absolute subjectivity and in the form of an ontological analysis. Is it not possible that the reasons which motivated the project of conducting the investigations relative to the problem of the ego within a sphere of abso­ lute immanence may cease to be valid because we might be led to believe that the body also constitutes the object of these investigations and belongs to a first reality whose study is the task of fundamental ontology? Actually, does not the body present itself to us as a transcendent being, as an inhabi­ tant of this world of ours wherein subjectivity does not reside? If, con­ sequently, the body must constitute the theme of our philosophical reflec­ tion, is it not on condition that the latter submit to a radical modification and cease to be turned toward subjectivity in order to be a reflection on.

Kurzfassung: I. Soul and Mathematicals -- II. Posidonius and Neoplatonism -- III. The Subdivisions of Theoretical Philosophy -- IV. The Origin of the Quadrivium -- V. Speusippus in Iamblichus -- VI. A New Fragment of Aristotle -- VII. Metaphysica Generalis in Aristotle? -- Conclusion -- Index of Names -- Index of Passages in Greek and Latin Authors.

Kurzfassung: The first edition of this book appeared in 1953; the second, revised and enlarged, in 1960. The present, third edition is essentially a reprint of the second, except for the correction of a few misprints and the following remarks, which refer to some recent publications* and replace the brief preface to the second edition. Neither Eudemus nor Theophrastus, so I said (p. 208£. ) knew a branch of theoretical philosophy the object of which would be something called 0'. 1 ~ 0'. 1 andwhich branch wouldbedistinct from theology. And there is no sign that they found such a branch (corresponding to what was later called metaphysica generalis) in Aristotle. To the names of Eudemus and Theophrastus we now can add that of Nicholas of Damascus. In 1965 H. J. Drossaart Lulofs published: Nicolaus Damascenus On the Philosophy of Aristotle (Leiden: Brill), Le. fragments of his m:pr. njc; 'ApLO''t'o't'&AOUC; qJLAOO'OqJLiXC; preserved in Syriac together with an English trans­ lation. In these fragments we find a competent presentation of Aristotle's theoretical philosophy, in systematic form. Nicholas subdivides Aristotle's theoretical philosophy into theology, physics, and mathematics and seems to be completely unaware of any additional branch of philosophy the object of which would be 0'. 1 ~ 0'. 1 distinct from theology with its object (the divine).

Kurzfassung: one -- 1) Multidisciplinary Context of Sociology and Social Psychology -- 2) Problems of Theory and Method : Sensitizing Concepts, Personal Documents -- two -- 3) Verstehen and Related Constructs -- 4) Role-Taking and Related Concepts -- 5) Processes Involved in, and Related to, Role-Taking -- 6) Imagination -- three -- 7) Imaginative Participation in History -- 8) Imaginative Participation in Literature and Drama -- 9) Imaginative Participation in Psychiatry -- Conclusion.

Kurzfassung: I am Czech. In 1948 I graduated from ancient Charles' University at Prague. In 1970 I came to Canada, the country of my choice, from New Zealand where I had taught two years at the University of Canter­ bury in Christchurch. This work was begun after I left Europe. It is intended as contribution to contemporary sociological and social psy­ chological theory, or theories. For a very long time in my native country I was intellectually a Jack­ of-alI-trades. Before coming to sociology I spent two decades of study and research in the fields of philosophy, history and imaginative literature. Looking back I view this not as wasted time, but as an extraordinary introduction to the study of society, of man in society and of society in man. There are many links between these areas of scientific inquiry which I would not have been able to make had I not had this multi­ disciplinary experience. In each of my lives, past and present, I have been for a number of reasons marginal to my fellow men, marginal in several respects. In my native land I refused to conform to the line of the ruling political party. I became a "non-person" in all that implies in a totalitarian regime.

Kurzfassung: Introduction: The Problem, its Background, and a Sketch of its Treatment -- I. Production and Radical Creation -- A. Novelty Proper -- B. Novelty Proper and Creative Acts -- C. Value and Creativity -- II. Spontaneity: The Paradox and the Possibility of Explanation -- A. General Remarks about Explanation -- B. The Paradox of Creativity -- C. The Reality of Spontaneity and the Challenge of Determinism -- D. Intelligibility and the Resources of Language -- III. Language and the Aesthetic Structure of Novelty -- A. Originative Speech as Oblique Expression -- B. Speech and Metaphors -- C. Metaphors and the Intelligibility of Created Objects -- IV. Fundamental Paradox and Intelligibility -- A. The Absurd -- B. Two Loci of the Absurd -- C. The Second Model of Intelligibility -- D. The Possibility of a Third Model of Intelligibility.

Kurzfassung: Over the past two decades, the number of studies of creativity has in­ creased enormously. Although these studies represent a wide variety of perspectives, the largest proportion of them falls within the province of the social and behavioral sciences. Perhaps this is due to the impetus of experimental psychologists, who recognized the special problems that arise when originality is treated under a general theory of cognition. But what­ ever the reason, human creativity has come to be viewed as one of the major concerns of the twentieth century. It has been referred to as the most pressing problem of our time. In spite of the importance of the topic, few philosophers have either analyzed or speculated systematically about creativity, as a distinct topic. This neglect may be the expression of a tacit and sometimes explicit con­ viction that creativity must be taken for granted and not subjected to analytic scrutiny. In any case, the determination of so many behavioral and social scientists not to fall behind in the search for understanding creativity has led to a proliferation of publications that are unrelated to one another and that lack dearly ordered and reflective consideration of what creativity is. Too few writers have either acknowledged or examined what they presuppose about creative acts, about human activity, and a­ bout the nature of explanation when they focus on so complex a phenome­ non as creativity.

Kurzfassung: Section I / Value and Explanation: Historical Roots -- Some Basic Explanations of Disease: An Historian’s Viewpoint -- Diseases Versus Healths: Some Legacies in the Philosophies of Modern Medical Science -- Section II / Philosophy of Science in Transition to a Philosophy of Medicine -- Concepts of Function and Mechanism in Medicine and Medical Science (Hommage à Claude Bernard) -- Organs, Organisms and Disease: Human Ontology and Medical Practice -- Comments on “Concepts of Function and Mechanism in Medicine and Medical Science” and “Organs, Organisms and Disease” -- Section III / Ethics and Medicine -- How Virtues Become Vices: Values, Medicine and Social Context -- Moral Philosophy and Medical Perplexity: Comments on “How Virtues Become Vices” -- Section IV / Concepts in Medical Theory -- The Concepts of Health and Disease -- On Disease: Theories of Disease and the Ascription of Disease: Comments on “The Concepts of Health and Disease” -- Section V / Body and Self: Phenomenological Perspectives -- Context and Reflexivity: The Genealogy of Self -- Comments on “Context and Reflexivity” -- The Lived-Body as Catalytic Agent: Reaction at the Interface of Medicine and Philosophy -- Comments on “The Lived-Body as Catalytic Agent” -- Section VI / The Role of Philosophy in the Biomedical Sciences: Contribution or Intrusion? -- Round-Table Discussion -- Notes on Contributors.

Kurzfassung: This volume inaugurates a series concerning philosophy and medicine. There are few, if any, areas of social concern so pervasive as medicine and yet as underexamined by philosophy. But the claim to precedence of the Proceedings of the First Trans-Disciplinary Symposium on Philos­ ophy and Medicine must be qualified. Claims to be "first" are notorious in the history of scientific as well as humanistic investigation and the claim that the First Trans-Disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine has no precedent is not meant to be put in bald form. The editors clearly do not maintain that philosophers and physicians have not heretofore discussed matters of mutual concern, nor that individual philosophers and physicians have never taken up problems and concepts in medicine which are themselves at the boundary or interface of these two disciplines - concepts like "matter," "disease," "psyche. " Surely there have been books published on the logic and philosophy of medi­ 1 cine. But the formalization of issues and concepts in medicine has not received, at least in this century, sustained interest by professional phi­ losophers. Groups of philosophers have not engaged medicine in order to explicate its philosophical presuppositions and to sort out the various concepts which appear in medicine. The scope of such an effort takes the philosopher beyond problems and issues which today are subsumed under the rubric "medical ethics.

Kurzfassung: The philosophy of biology, some claim, should move to the centre of philosophy of science - a place it has not been accorded since the time of Mach. Physics was the paradigm of science, and its shadow falls across contemporary philosophy of biology in a variety of contexts: reduction, organization and system, biochemical mechanism, and the models of law and explanation which are derived from the Duhem-Popper-Hempel tradition. In this volume, the editors present essays which probe such historical and methodological questions as reducibility, levels of organization, function and teleology, issues emerging from evolutionary theory, and the species problem. The volume offers ample evidence of how good contemporary work in the philosophical understanding of biology has become. The editors aptly combine a deep philosophical appreciation of conceptual issues in biology with an historical understanding of the radical changes in the science of biology since the 19th century

Kurzfassung: 1: Introduction: Tasks and Problems -- 1. The Foundations of Normative Systems and Institutions -- 2. Practical Thinking -- 3. Our Six Types of Philosophical Problems -- 4. Practical Language -- 5. Conventions on Quotation Marks -- I The Logico-Ontological Structure of the Representational Image of Practical Thinking -- 2: Practical Thinking: Dramatis Personae -- 3: Propositional Structure and Propositional Implication -- 4: Imperatives and Prescriptions -- 5: Imperative Designated Values: Orthotes and Anarthotes -- 6: Intentions and Intending -- 7: Deontic Judgments and Their Implicational Structure -- 8: Deontic Truth -- 9: A Formal System for the Quantificational Logic with Identity of Propositions, Practitions, and Deontic Judgments -- II The Meta-Psychology of Practical Thinking: The Action Schema -- 10: The Internal Causality of Practical Thinking -- 11: Oughts and the Reasonableness of Action -- III The Metaphysics of Practical Thinking: The Reality of Doing and of Deontic Properties -- 12: Events and the Structure of Doing -- 13: The Autonomy of Practical Thinking and the Non-Natural Character of Practical Noemata -- Index of Names -- Index of Topics.

Kurzfassung: Philosophy is the search for the large patterns of the world and of the large patterns of experience, perceptual, theoretical, . . . , aesthetic, and practical - the patterns that, regardless of specific contents, characterize the main types of experience. In this book I carry out my search for the large patterns of practical experience: the experience of deliberation, of recognition of duties and their conflicts, of attempts to guide other person's conduct, of deciding to act, of influencing the physical world with one's doings, and the like. This is the experience that makes possible our social life, the formulation of plans for teamwork, the building of institutions, the development of nations, and the adoption of the ideal of morality. Here I develop a network of theories about the most fundamental aspects of practical thinking: what is thought in such thinking; what makes that thinking correct; what makes it practical; and the structure of the doings that accrue to the world when such thinking is effective. I have attempted to build each theory in sufficient detail, so that it il­ luminates its subject matter with a certain degree of fullness. But I have also aimed at producing an harmonious system of theories, so that the grand pattern of practical thinking can be admired, not only for the beauty of the separate structures of its parts, but also for its architectonic unity. Chapter 1 gives the details of the many facets of this project and discusses some methodological techniques.

Kurzfassung: I Historical Perspectives -- Compossibility and Incompossibility in Leibniz -- Hume and the Discipline of Phenomenology: An Historical Perspective -- Royce and the Reductions -- Wittgenstein’s “Phenomenological Reduction” -- The Occasion and Novelty of Husserl’s Phenomenology of Essence -- Martin Heidegger as a Phenomenologist -- II Systematic Perspectives -- Marriage, Parenthood and Life in Community: A Phenomenological View -- The Monads Have Windows -- Das Noema als reelles Moment -- Eine Tragödie: Wallensteins und unser aller böser Geist -- “Alms for Oblivion”: An Essay on Objective Time and Experienced Time -- Truth Within Phenomenological Speech -- The Phenomenology of Speaking -- Sym-philosophizing in an Ethics Class -- Phenomenological Aspects of Probability -- III Bibliographical Perspectives -- Apologia pro Bibliographia Mea -- Herbert Spiegelberg, Bibliography of Published Works 1930–1974.

Kurzfassung: Professor H. L. Van Breda had hoped to write this preface, but his recent, unexpected and untimely death has left that task in my hands. Although my remarks will not be as eloquent and insightful as his surely would have been, some few words are clearly in order here; for the phenomenological community has not only lost the leadership of Fr. Van Breda these last years, but also the scholarship and leadership of Aron Gurwitsch and Alden Fisher - both contributors to this volume - as well as that of Dorion Cairns and John Wild. Our leaders are fewer now but Herbert Spiegelberg is still very obviously one of them. This volume thus presents the work of some of the past and presently recognized leaders in phenomenology - e. g. Gurwitsch, Straus, and Fisher - but, more important perhaps, it also presents the work of some of those who are sure to be future leaders of our community of phenomenological philosophers, if in fact they have not already achieved this status. Most, if not all, of the contribu­ tors to this volume are in some way or another indebted to Herbert Spiegelberg and his work in phenomenology.

Kurzfassung: I. Pascal’s Three Orders as the Basis of a Scale of Values -- II. Pascal’s Ambivalent Attitude toward Natural Morality -- 1. The Pensées and Minor Works -- 2. The Provinciales -- III. Pascal’s Authoritarian Approach to Ethics in the Provinciales -- IV. Pascal’s Rejection of Contemporary Aristocratic Morality -- V. Problems Inherent in the Three Orders as Applied to Moral Questions -- VI. Pascal’s Teleological Approach to Ethics in the Pensées -- VII. Conclusion: Moral Value as a Perspective of the Three Orders.

Kurzfassung: The aim of these studies is to show how Pascal's moral outlook reflects the influence on his thought of the basic doctrine of the three orders. This does not mean that an attempt is made to classify all Pascal's moral judgements in order to relate them to that doctrine. The intention is rather to dIstinguish the different moral stances Pascal takes, and to ascertain how far the apparent inconsistencies between them can be explained, if not reconciled, in the light of the orders. It is made clear at the outset how the three orders form the framework of Pascal's scale of values, with the different orders representing at once categories of moral value and orders of being. The peculiar nature of this scale, in which moral and ontological values coalesce, calls for a double criterion, or variable, to allow for differences both of degree and of kind. Since the criterion of rank in the scale is reality, the assigning of value becomes largely a question of perspective: a quality from a given order taken by itself is real, and has moral value, but when compared with a quality from a higher order it loses both its reality and its worth.

Kurzfassung: I. Marxism -- Communism and the New Marxists -- Contemporary Problems of Dialectical Materialism -- Marxist Philosophy in Czechoslovakia : The Lessons from Prague -- Marxist Philosophy in Yugoslavia : ThePraxis Group -- II. Religion -- Reluctant Bedfellows : The Catholic Church and the Polish State, 1918–1939 -- The Catholic Church and the Soviet Government in Soviet Occupied East Europe, 1939–1940 -- The Suppressed Church: Ukrainian Catholics in the Soviet Union -- Muslim Religious Dissent in the U.S.S.R. -- Religious Dissent in the U.S.S.R.: Lithuanian Catholics.

Kurzfassung: Since the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, two of the most significant but at the same time least understood areas of that revolution's cultural impact have been philosophy and religion. The impact has of course been massive, not only in the Soviet Union but, after the second World War, in Soviet­ dominated Eastern Europe as well. Yet the consequences of Communism for philosophy and religion throughout the Soviet orbit are far from having the simplicity suggested by the stereotypes of a single, monolithic 'Marxism' and a consistent, crushing assault on the Church and on re­ ligious faith. Unquestionably Marxism is the ruling philosophy throughout Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union, 'Marxism-Leninism' or 'dialectical ma­ terialism' is the official and the only tolerated philosophy, and most of the other countries of Eastern Europe follow the Soviet lead in philosophy as in other fields. But in the latter countries Marxism was imposed only after W orId War II, and its deVelopment has not always copied the Soviet model. Original thinkers in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary have thought their own way through the writings of Marx and his followers, and have arrived at Marxist positions which are consider­ ably at variance with the Soviet interpretations - and often with each other. Moreover in recent years the Soviet philosophers themselves have been unable to ignore the theoretical questions raised by the other East of Marxism in the West.

Kurzfassung: Acceptance Revisited -- Cognitive Decision Theory -- A Critique of Epistemic Utilities -- Induction, Consensus, and Catastrophe -- Elements of Induction -- On Sequential Inference -- Cognitive Decisions under Partial Information -- Local and Global Induction -- Hume and the Problem of Local Induction -- A Conspectus of the Neo-Classical Theory of Induction -- Inquiries, Problems, and Questions: Remarks on Local Induction -- On Piecemeal Knowledge-Formation -- Confirmation, Explanation, and the Paradoxes of Transitivity -- A Selected Bibliography of Local Induction -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Kurzfassung: The local justification of beliefs and hypotheses has recently become a major concern for epistemologists and philosophers of induction. As such, the problem of local justification is not entirely new. Most pragmatists had addressed themselves to it, and so did, to some extent, many classical inductivists in the Bacon-Whewell-Mill tradition. In the last few decades, however, the use of logic and semantics, probability calculus, statistical methods, and decision-theoretic concepts in the reconstruction of in­ ductive inference has revealed some important technical respects in which inductive justification can be local: the choice of a language, with its syntactic and semantic features, the relativity of probabilistic evalua­ tions to an initial body of evidence or background knowledge and to an agent's utilities and preferences, etc. Some paradoxes and difficulties encountered by purely formal accounts of inductive justification, the erosion of the once dominant empiricist position, which most approaches to induction took for granted, and the increasing challenge of noninduc­ tivist epistemolgies have underscored the need of accounting for the methodological problems of applying inductive logic to real life contexts, particularly in science. As a result, in the late fifties and sixties, several related developments pointed to a new, local approach to inductive justification.

Kurzfassung: Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility -- Presuppositions -- Incomplete Assertion and Belnap Connectives -- Dimensions of Truth -- Speaking of Nothing -- The Structure of Efficacy -- Harris and Chomsky at the Syntax-Semantics Boundary -- Some Transformational Extensions of Montague Grammar -- Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts -- Comments: Lakoff’s Fuzzy Propositional Logic -- On the Semantics of Negation -- Verbs of Bitching.

Kurzfassung: In 1973 a workshop was held at The University of Western Ontario on topics of common interest to philosophers and linguists. This volume con­ tains most of the papers presented at the workshop. Also included are previously unpublished essays by R. Dougherty and H. Lasnik as well as a comment on G. Lakoff's paper by B. van Fraassen. K. Donnellan's paper was presented at the workshop and subsequently appeared in The Philosophical Review. We thank the editors of this journal for permission to publish the paper here. The papers by D. Lewis, R. Stalnaker, G. Lakoff, B. Partee and H. Herzberger appeared earlier in Journal of Philosophical Logic by arrangement of the editors with B. van Fraassen and D. Reidel Publishing Company. The editors thank the officers of The University of Western Ontario for making the workshop possible and Pauline Campbell for making the workshop work. THE EDITORS DAVID LEWIS COUNTERFACTUALS AND COMPARATIVE POSSIBILITY* In the last dozen years or so, our understanding of modality has been much improved by means of possible-world semantics: the project of analyzing modal language by systematically specifying the conditions under which a modal sentence is true at a possible world. I hope to do the same for counterfactual conditionals. I write A 0-C for the counter­ factual conditional with antecedent A and consequent C. It may be read as 'H it were the case that A, then it would be the case that C' or some more idiomatic paraphrase thereof.

Kurzfassung: Section One Dialogue with Analysis -- The Copula Supplement -- Thought, Language and Philosophy -- Grammar and Metaphysics -- Beyond the Doubt of a Shadow, with an addendum by Samuel Todes, Shadows in Knowledge: Plato’s Misunderstanding of Shadows, and of Knowledge as Shadow-free -- Section Two Transcendental Themes -- Meinong the Phenomenologist -- The “Critique of Pure Reason” as Transcendental Phenomenology -- History, Phenomenology and Reflection -- Reflection on Planned Operations -- Section Three Existential Themes -- Some Perplexities in Nietzsche -- Desire, Need, and Alienation in Sartre -- The Look, the Body, and the Other -- The Significance of Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Language -- Notes on Contributors.

Kurzfassung: Phenomenology in the United States is in a state of ferment and change. Not all the changes are happy ones, however, for some of the most prominent philosophers of the first generation of phenomenologists have died: in 1959 Alfred Schutz, and within the past two years John \Vild, Dorion Cairns, and Aron Gur­ witsch. These thinkers, though often confronting a hostile intel­ lectual climate, were nevertheless persistent and profoundly influential-through their own works, and through their students. The two sources associated with their names, The Graduate Faculty of The New School for Social Research, and the circle around John Wild first at Harvard and later at Northwestern and Yale, produced a sizable portion of the now second gener­ ation American phenomenological philosophers. In a way, it was the very hostility of the American philo­ sophical milieu which became an important factor in the ferment now taking place. Although the older, first generation phenome­ nologists were deeply conversant with other philosophical move­ ments here and abroad, their efforts at meaningful dialogue were largely ignored. Determined not to remain isolated from the dominant currents of Anglo-American philosophy in par­ ticular, the second generation opened the way to a dialogue with analytic philosophers, especially through the efforts of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, led by 2 INTRODUCTION such men as James M. Edie and Hubert Dreyfus and, in other respects, Herbert Spiegelberg and Maurice Natanson.

Kurzfassung: I. Radical Empiricism and the Anomalies in the Knowledge of Science -- II. Troubles with the Problem of Demarcation -- III. The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification -- IV. Facts and Theories: Radical Empiricism -- V. Facts and Theories: Conventionalism -- VI. Reformation and Counter-reformation: Paradigms and Research Programs -- VII. Revolutions in Science: The Accumulation of Knowledge and the Correspondence of Theories -- VIII. Revolutions in Science: Science and Philosophy -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Kurzfassung: I. Introduction -- II. Causality and Necessity -- III. Human Agency -- IV. Sensing and Objective Reference -- V. Substance and the Mind-Body Relation -- VI. Propositions, Truth and Signs -- VII. Ethics and Education -- VIII. Aesthetics -- IX. Ethics of Belief -- X. Philosophy of Religion -- XI. Paranormal Phenomena -- XII. Meta-philosophy -- Bibliography of the Writings of C. J. Ducasse -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Kurzfassung: Although a succession of fashions swept the American philosophical scene, C. J. Ducasse was throughout his long career an effective practitioner of analytic philosophy in the classic tradition. As he explained in 1924 "[i]t is only with truths about such questions as the meaning of the term 'true', or 'real', or 'good', and the like . . . that philosophy is concerned. " Such truths are to be discovered inductively by comparing and analyzing concrete cases of the admittedly proper u/le . . . The pressing problems of philosophy are thus in my view primarily problems of def'mition, and moreover, problems of framing def'mitions which must be in formal terms, under penalty of not being otherwise understandable by or acceptable to one or another philosophical school, since the formal elements of thought and tp. ey only are common to all schools. These def'mitions, of course are not to be arbitrary; their relation to the facts of admittedly meaningful linguistic usage is the same as exists between any scientific hypothesis and the facts which it attempts to 1 construe.

Kurzfassung: I. Islam -- Recommencements de l’algèbre aux XIe et XIIe siècles -- The Influence of Stoic Logic on Al-Ja????’s Legal Theory -- The Beginnings of Islamic Theology -- Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Alfarabi’s Enumeration of the Sciences -- II. The Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries in the Latin West -- The Organization of Sciences and the Relations of Cultures in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries -- La nouvelle idée de nature et de savoir scientifique au XIIe siècle -- Experience, Praxis, Work, and Planning in Bernard of Clairvaux: Observations on the Sermones in Cantica -- III. The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Centuries in the Latin West -- From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning -- Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist -- Reformation and Revolution: Copernicus’s Discovery in an Era of Change -- Réflexions sur les rapports entre théorie et pratique au moyen âge -- Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth-Century Universities: Some Preliminary Comments.

Kurzfassung: I / Preliminary Distinctions -- 1. Language and Linguistic Utterances -- 2. Descriptive Statements -- 3. The Use and Mention of Signs -- II / Theories of Meaning -- 1. Realistic Semantic Theories -- 2. Behavioristic Theories of Meaning -- 3. Quine’s Philosophy of Language -- 4. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Language in the Philosophical Investigations -- III / Theories of Grammar -- 1. Traditional Grammar -- 2. Logical Grammar -- 3. Generative Grammar -- IV / Language and Reality -- 1. The Thesis of the Role Language Plays in Experience -- 2. The Role of Vocabulary -- 3. The Role of Grammar -- 4. The Epistemological Problematic of the Relativity Thesis -- Index of Subjects -- Index of Logical Symbols.

Kurzfassung: This book has arisen out of lectures I gave in recent years at the Uni­ versities of Munich and Regensburg, and it is intended to serve as a textbook for courses in the Philosophy of Language. In my lectures I was able to presuppose that the students had taken an introductory course in logic. Some knowledge of logic will also be helpful in studying this book - as it is almost everywhere else in philosophy -, especially in Section 3. 2, but it is no prerequisite. I would like to give my sincere thanks to Prof. Terrell for his excellent translation of the book, which is based on the second, revised and en­ larged German edition. Regensburg, May 1975 FRANZ VON KUTSCHERA INTRODUCTION Language has become one of philosophy's most important and pressing themes during this century. This preoccupation with language has its ori­ gins in the most diverse areas of philosophical inquiry.

Kurzfassung: I. Introduction -- II. The General Conditions of Knowledge: Truth and Confience -- III. The General Conditions of Knowledge: Justification -- IV. The General Conditions of Knowledge: External Conclusiveness -- V. Perceptual Facts -- VI. Perceptual Knowledge -- VII. Memory Knowledge -- VIII. When and Why to Trust One’s Senses and Memory -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Kurzfassung: In this book I present what seem to me (at the moment) to be right an­ swers to some of the main philosophical questions about the topics men­ tioned in the title, and I argue for them where I can. I hope that what I say may be of interest both to those who have already studied these ques­ tions a lot and to those who haven't. There are several important topics in epistemology to which I give little or no attention here - such as the nature of a proposition, the major classifications of propositions (neces­ sary and contingent, a priori and a posteriori, analytic and synthetic, general and particular), the nature of understanding a proposition, the nature of truth, the nature and justification of the various kinds of in­ ference (deductive, inductive, and probably others) -but enough is cover­ ed, to one degree or another, that the book might be of use in a course in epistemology. Earlier versions of some of the material in Chapters II, III, and IV were some of the material in Ginet (1970). An earlier version of the part of Chapter VII on memory-connection was a paper that I profited from reading and discussing in philosophy discussion groups at Cornell Uni­ versity, SUNY at Albany, and Syracuse University in 1972-73. I do not like to admit how long I have been working on this book.

Kurzfassung: Analytical Table of Contents -- 1: The Theory-ladenness of Observation -- 2: An Examination of Some Arguments and Criteria for Radical Meaning Variance -- 3: The Methodological Undesirability of Adopting a Position of Radical Meaning Variance -- 4: The Comparability of Scientific Theories.

Kurzfassung: In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con­ sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in­ vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace­ ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists.

Kurzfassung: I. The Indicative Conditional -- II. Mathematical Theory of Probabilistic Consistency and Universal Probabilistic Soundness -- III. Motives for Wanting to Assure the Soundness of Reasoning: Truth and Probability as Desirable Attributes of Conclusions Reached in Reasoning -- IV. A Hypothesis Concerning Counterfactuals; Probability Change Aspects of Inference -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Kurzfassung: Of the four chapters in this book, the first two discuss (albeit in consider­ ably modified form) matters previously discussed in my papers 'On the Logic of Conditionals' [1] and 'Probability and the Logic of Conditionals' [2], while the last two present essentially new material. Chapter I is relatively informal and roughly parallels the first of the above papers in discussing the basic ideas of a probabilistic approach to the logic of the indicative conditional, according to which these constructions do not have truth values, but they do have probabilities (equal to conditional probabilities), and the appropriate criterion of soundness for inferences involving them is that it should not be possible for all premises of the inference to be probable while the conclusion is improbable. Applying this criterion is shown to have radically different consequences from the orthodox 'material conditional' theory, not only in application to the standard 'fallacies' of the material conditional, but to many forms (e. g. , Contraposition) which have hitherto been regarded as above suspi­ cion. Many more applications are considered in Chapter I, as well as certain related theoretical matters. The chief of these, which is the most important new topic treated in Chapter I (i. e.

Kurzfassung: The Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1936) -- The Logic of Complementarity and the Foundation of Quantum Theory (1972) -- Mathematics as Logical Syntax — A Method to Formalize the Language of a Physical Theory (1937–38) -- Three-Valued Logic and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1944) -- Three-Valued Logic (1957) -- Reichenbach’s Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1958) -- Measures on the Closed Subspaces of a Hilbert Space (1957) -- The Logic of Propositions Which are not Simultaneously Decidable (1960) -- Baer *-Semigroups (1960) -- Axioms for Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics (1961) -- Probability in Physics and a Theorem on Simultaneous Observability (1962) -- Semantic Representation of the Probability of Formulas in Formalized Theories (1963) -- The Structure of the Propositional Calculus of a Physical Theory (1964) -- Boolean Embeddings of Orthomodular Sets and Quantum Logic (1965) -- Logical Structures Arising in Quantum Theory (1965) -- The Calculus of Partial Propositional Functions (1965) -- The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics (1967) -- Logics Appropriate to Empirical Theories (1965) -- The Probabilistic Argument for a Non-Classical Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1966) -- Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1967) -- Baer *-Semigroups and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- Semimodularity and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- On the Structure of Quantum Logic (1969) -- On the Structure of Quantal Proposition Systems (1969) -- The Current Interest in Orthomodular Lattices (1970) -- Integration Theory of Observables (1970) -- Probabilistic Formulation of Classical Mechanics (1970) -- Atomicity and Determinism in Boolean Systems (1971) -- Survey of General Quantum Physics (1972) -- Quantum Logics (1974) -- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logics (1974).

Kurzfassung: The twentieth century has witnessed a striking transformation in the un­ derstanding of the theories of mathematical physics. There has emerged clearly the idea that physical theories are significantly characterized by their abstract mathematical structure. This is in opposition to the tradi­ tional opinion that one should look to the specific applications of a theory in order to understand it. One might with reason now espouse the view that to understand the deeper character of a theory one must know its abstract structure and understand the significance of that struc­ ture, while to understand how a theory might be modified in light of its experimental inadequacies one must be intimately acquainted with how it is applied. Quantum theory itself has gone through a development this century which illustrates strikingly the shifting perspective. From a collection of intuitive physical maneuvers under Bohr, through a formative stage in which the mathematical framework was bifurcated (between Schrödinger and Heisenberg) to an elegant culmination in von Neumann's Hilbert space formulation the elementary theory moved, flanked even at the later stage by the ill-understood formalisms for the relativistic version and for the field-theoretic altemative; after that we have a gradual, but constant, elaboration of all these quantal theories as abstract mathematical struc­ tures (their point of departure being von Neumann's formalism) until at the present time theoretical work is heavily preoccupied with the manip­ ulation of purely abstract structures.

Kurzfassung: 1. A Prologue: On Stability and Flux -- References -- 2. Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper -- I. Einstein has Upset the View that Science is Stable -- II. The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires Explanation -- III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than There is -- IV. Popper’s Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of Debates -- V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions -- VI. Rationality is a Means to an End -- References -- Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper’s Philosophy -- Notes -- 3. On Novelty -- I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General -- II. Science and Truth -- III. Popper’s View of Science -- Notes -- Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts -- 4. Replies To Diane: Popper On Learning From Experience81 -- Note -- Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism -- 5. Sensationalism -- 1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge -- 2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism -- 3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience -- 4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense -- 5. Explanation vs. Consent -- 6. The Roots of Scientific Realism -- 7. Conclusion -- 6. When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis? -- I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked? -- II. Can Refutation be Final? -- III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated -- IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports? -- V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection? -- VI.Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports? -- Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations -- 7. Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics -- First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science -- Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance -- I. Conventionalists and the Problem of Induction -- II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman’s Problem -- III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing -- IV. The Need for Constraints is Quite Real -- V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses -- VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail -- VII. Conclusion -- Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement -- 8. Towards A Theory Of ‘Ad Hoc’ Hypotheses -- I. Ad hoc Hypotheses which become Factual Evidence -- II. The Conventional Element in Science -- III. Reducing the Conventions -- IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses -- V. What is a Mess? -- Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism -- 9. The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics -- I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems -- II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated -- III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics -- IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science -- V. Popper’s Theory of Science -- VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use Instances in Different Ways -- VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame-works for Science -- VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics -- IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical Frameworks -- Appendix: What is a Natural Law? -- 10. Questions of Science and Metaphysics -- I. How Do we Select Questions? -- II. We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame-works -- III.The Literature on Questions -- IV.The Literature on the Logic of Questions -- V.The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions -- VI. Collingwood’s Peculiarity -- VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions -- VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions -- IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality -- X.Collingwood in a New Garb -- Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician -- Notes -- 11. The Confusion Between Physics And Metaphysics in the Standard Histories of Sciences -- Appendix: Reply to Commentators -- 12.The Confusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science -- Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom -- Notes -- 13. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology -- I. Kant’s Scandal -- II. Whitehead’s Scandal -- III.The Facts About Induction -- IV.Success and Rationality -- V. The Sociology of Knowledge -- Appendix: Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Autonomism -- 14. Positive Evidence as a Social Institution -- Appendix: The Logic of Technological Development -- 15. Imperfect Knowledge -- I. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Science is Questionable -- II. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Rational Belief is an Error -- III. Imperfect Knowledge-Claims are Qualified by Publicly Accepted Hypotheses -- Notes -- 16. Criteria for Plausible Arguments -- Note -- Appendix: The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism -- 17. Modified Conventionalism -- I. The Problem -- II. Science and Society -- III. Popper’s Problems of Demarcation -- IV. The Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge Revisited -- Appendix: Bartley’s Critique of Popper -- Notes -- 18. Unity and Diversity in Science -- Abstract -- I. Ambivalence Towards Unity: An Impression -- II. The Ethics of Science as a Unifier of Science -- III. Proof as the Unifier of Science -- IV. Manifest Truth as the Unifier of Science -- V. Unity of Science as a Dictator of Unanimity on All Questions -- VI. A Theory of Rational Disagreement -- References -- Appendix on Kant -- 19. Can Religion go Beyond Reason? -- I. Religion and Reason -- II. Dissatisfaction with Science and Religion -- III. Reason and Faith -- IV. The Question of Complementary Relationship -- V. Toward Intellectual Complementation -- VI. Possibilities of Cooperation -- VII. Defects of Both Rationalism and Religion -- VIII. Standards of Rational Thought and Action -- IX. Enlightenment and Self-Reliance -- X. The Sophisticated Religionists: Buber and Polangi -- XI. Science and Universalistic Religion -- Notes -- Appendix on Buber -- 20. Assurance and Agnosticism -- I. The Compleat Agnostic -- II. The Image of Inductive Science -- III. Empirical Facts About Assurance -- IV. The Non-Justificationist Mood -- V. Conversion to Autonomism -- VI. The Assured Agnostic -- Index of Works Cited -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Kurzfassung: A Tribute -- I. Epistemology -- Chisholm on Sensing and Perceiving -- Testimonial Evidence -- Reason and Consistency -- Epistemic Values and Epistemic Viewpoints -- Confirmation, Explanation and Acceptance -- ‘I Know that I Am in Pain’ is Senseless -- Knowledge and the Self-Presenting -- II. Metaphysics -- Scattered Objects -- Hume on Causation -- Brentanist Relations -- Events as Recurrables -- III. Ethics -- On Doxastic Responsibility -- World Utilitarianism -- Some Definitions for the Theory of Rules -- Suicide: Some Epistemological Considerations -- Bibliography of R. M. Chisholm -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Kurzfassung: AND BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH This collection of essays in honor of Roderick M. Chisholm is the work of his former students. The book was conceived and the original con­ tributors invited by Richard Taylor. We restricted the contributors to former students of Chisholm as a special tribute to his acknowledged as a teacher of philosophy. The profundity of his contributions to genius epistemology and metaphysics are acknowledged throughout the phil­ osophical world. Those who have been present at his lectures and semi­ nars, who have been incited to philosophical cerebration by the clarity and precision of his exposition, know that his impact on contemporary philosophy far exceeds the influence of the written word. It is, we think, appropriate that his students should reserve for themselves the privilege of honoring Chisholm in this way as his 60th birthday draws near. The tribute paid to Chisholm in Taylor's essay conveys a personal impression. I shall, consequently, refrain from personal reminiscence here, and instead, mention some of the highlights of an illustrious life. Chisholm was born on November 27, 1916 in North Attleboro, Massachu­ setts. He married Eleanor F. Parker in 1943 and raised three children with her. He received an A. B. from Brown in 1938, a Ph. D. from Harvard in 1942, and served in the U. S. Army from 1942 to 1946.

Kurzfassung: One To The Things (Essays on Phenomenolology) -- A. On the Meaning of Phenomenology -- 1. “Phenomenology” -- 2. Ways into phenomenology: phenomenology and metaphenomenology -- 3. A new way into phenomenology: the workshop approach -- 4. Phenomenology through vicarious experience -- 5. Existential uses of phenomenology -- 〉B. On the Rights of Phenomenology -- 6. How subjective is phenomenology? -- 7. Phenomenology of direct evidence (self-evidence) -- 8. Criteria in phenomenology -- 9. The Phenomenon of reality and reality -- Two At the Things (Essays in Phenomenology) -- 10. Toward a phenomenology of experience -- 11. A phenomenological analysis of approval -- 12. “We”: A linguistic and phenomenological analysis -- 13. The relevance of phenomenological philosophy for psychology -- 14. The idea of a phenomenological anthropology and Alexander Pfänder’s psychology of man -- 15. Change of perspectives: constitution of a Husserl image -- Index of names -- Index of subjects.

Kurzfassung: Substantial encouragement for this volume came from the editors and readers of the Studies for Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) at Northwestern University Press. But its publi­ cation has been made possible only by the unqualified and un­ abridged acceptance of the Editorial Board of Phaenomen%gica, which at the time was still headed by its founder, the late Professor H. L. Van Breda, who welcomed the manuscript most generously. This makes his untimely passing even more grievous to me. The stylistic copy editing and proof reading were handled ef­ ficiently by Ruth Nichols Jackson, secretary of the Philosophy Department. In the proof reading I also had the able help of my colleague Stanley Paulson. I dedicate this book to the memory of my late brother, Dr. chern. Erwin Spiegelberg, at the time of his death assistant professor at the University of Rio de Janeiro, who preceded me by two years in emigrating from Nazi Germany. When in 1938 he put an end to his life in an apparent depression, he also did so in order not to become a burden to his brothers, who were on the point of following him. Whatever I, more privileged in health and in opportunities in the country of my adoption, have been able to do and achieve since then has been done with a sense of a debt to him and of trying to live and work for him too.

Kurzfassung: I Introduction -- II Intuition and Intelligence -- III Probability Learning -- IV Probability Learning in Children -- V The Intuition of Relative Frequency -- VI Estimating Odds and The Concept of Probability -- VII Combinatorial Analysis -- VIII Summary and Conclusions -- Index of Names.

Kurzfassung: About a year ago I promised my friend Fischbein a preface to his book of which I knew the French manuscript. Now with the printer's proofs under my eyes I like the book even better than I did then, because of, and influenced by, new experiences in the meantime, and fresh thoughts that crossed my mind. Have I been influenced by what I remembered from the manuscript? If so, it must have happened unconsciously. But of course, what struck me in this work a year ago, struck a responsive chord in my own mind. In the past, mathematics teaching theory has strongly been influenced by a view on mathematics as a heap of concepts, and on learning mathematics as concepts attainment. Mathematics teaching practice has been jeopardised by this theoretical approach, which in its most dangerous form expresses itself as a radical atomism. To concepts attainment Fischbein opposes acquisition of intuitions. In my own publications I avoided the word "intuition" because of the variety of its meanings across languages. For some time I have used the term "constitution of mathematical objects", which I think means the same as Fischbein's "acquisition of intuitions" - indeed as I view it, constituting a mental object precedes its conceptualising, and under this viewpoint I tried to observe mathematical activities of young children.

Kurzfassung: I / Aristotle’s Program -- I. The Unprovability of the Law of Non-Contradiction -- II. Arguing ‘by Way of Refutation’ -- II / The First Refutation: General Structure -- I. The Plot of the Argument -- II. On the General Strategy -- III. Where Antiphasis Might Balk -- IV. Where Antiphasis Does Balk: Two Sub-Plots -- V. Summary -- III / ON Antiphasis’ Character and Upbringing -- I. Antiphasis’ Thesis -- II. Some Sophistry -- IV / The First Refutation: The Treatment of Antiphasis -- I. On Contradiction -- II. Uttering and Signifying -- III. Signifying and Defining -- IV. Conclusion -- V / The Second Refutation -- I. On Substances, Essences, and Why We Need Them -- II. Antiphasis’ Commitments as to Essences -- VI / On Sense and Essence -- I. Subjects and Predicates; Essences and Accidents -- II. Essence and Falsehood -- III. Words and Essences -- VII / Conclusion -- Index Locorum -- (a) Plato -- (b) Aristotle -- (c) Other Ancient Authors.

Kurzfassung: This study began as a paper. It got out of hand. It had help doing that. Oswaldo Chateaubriand, Ronald Haver, Paul Horwich, Bernie Katz, Norman Kretzmann, Stanley Martens, Stephen Pink, Michael Stokes, Eleanor Stump, Bill Ulrich, Celia Wolf, and a lot of other people questioned or criticized or helped reformulate one or another of the arguments and interpretations along the way. In spite of (maybe partly because of) their efforts, the book is full of mistakes. At least, induction over previous drafts indicates that irresistibly. But I do not, right now, know of any particular mistakes. All but a couple of the translations are mine (the exceptions are noted). That is not because existing translations are bad, but because some uniformity was essential. The translations often make unpleasant reading. So, often, does Aristotle; I have tried to be literal. A text and translation of the passage on which the book centers is in Appendix III. Footnotes cite literature by author and (sometimes abbreviated) title. Details are in the bibliography. I do not profess to have covered all the literature. An enormous amount of editorial work was done by Margaret Mundy. She was not able to undo the errors that remain. In particular, the footnotes are often numbered oddly: '4', '4a', '4b', etc.

Kurzfassung: I. Methodological Orientation -- Epistemic Logic and the Methods of Philosophical Analysis -- II. The Logic of Existence -- Existential Presuppositions and Their Elimination -- On the Logic of the Ontological Argument: Some Elementary Remarks -- III. The Semantics of Modality -- Modality and Quantification -- The Modes of Modality -- Semantics for Propositional Attitudes -- Existential Presuppositions and Uniqueness Presuppositions -- IV. Conceptual Analyses -- On the Logic of Perception -- Deontic Logic and Its Philosophical Morals -- Note on the Origin of the Different Essays -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Kurzfassung: The papers collected in this volume were written over a period of some eight or nine years, with some still earlier material incorporated in one of them. Publishing them under the same cover does not make a con­ tinuous book of them. The papers are thematically connected with each other, however, in a way which has led me to think that they can naturally be grouped together. In any list of philosophically important concepts, those falling within the range of application of modal logic will rank high in interest. They include necessity, possibility, obligation, permission, knowledge, belief, perception, memory, hoping, and striving, to mention just a few of the more obvious ones. When a satisfactory semantics (in the sense of Tarski and Carnap) was first developed for modal logic, a fascinating new set of methods and ideas was thus made available for philosophical studies. The pioneers of this model theory of modality include prominently Stig Kanger and Saul Kripke. Several others were working in the same area independently and more or less concurrently. Some of the older papers in this collection, especially 'Quantification and Modality' and 'Modes of Modality', serve to clarify some of the main possibilities in the semantics of modal logics in general.

Kurzfassung: I/Approaches to Teleology, Intentionality, and Historical Understanding -- Causal and Historical Explanation -- Against Reductionism and Purism : Tertium Datur -- Is Transcendental Hermeneutics Possible? -- The Intentions of Intentionality -- Comments on Professor Hintikka’s Paper -- Reply to J. N. Findlay -- II/Causality and Intervention -- Causality and Action -- Causality and History -- An Analysis of Causality -- Explanation and Understanding of Human Behavior -- III/Human Action and its Explanation -- Human Abilities and Dynamic Modalities -- On Deciding -- Intention and Practical Inference -- The Causal Theory of Action -- Explanation and Understanding in History -- Inductive Explanation, Propensity, and Action -- IV/Replies to Commentators. Second thoughts on Explanation and Understanding -- Replies -- Determinism and the Study of Man -- Index of Names.

Kurzfassung: I / Reference and Predication -- Identity and Reference -- Back-Reference -- On Predication and Logical Syntax -- Substance Logic -- Prime Matter, Predication, and the Semantics of Feature-Placing -- II / Truth and Meaning -- A counterexample to Tarski-Type Truth-Definitions as Applied to Natural Languages -- On Representing ‘True-in-L’ in L -- Necessity, Quotation, and Truth: An Indexical Theory -- Presuppositional Policies -- The Dilemma between Orthodoxy and Identity -- III / Pragmatics -- Indicative Conditionals -- Conversational Maxims and Rationality -- On Relating Pragmatics, Linguistics, and Non-Semiotic Disciplines -- Towards an Integrated Theory of Grammatical and Pragmatical Meaning -- IV / Methodological Studies -- Problems and Mysteries in the Study of Human Language -- How Empirical is Contemporary Logical Empiricism? -- Basic Aspects of the Theory of Grammatical Form -- V / Language Varieties -- Social Differentiation of Language Structure -- Talking with Children, Piaget Style -- Can Adults Become Genuinely Bilingual? -- VI / Formalizations -- Epistemic Interpretation of Conditionals -- The Role of Categorial Syntax in Grammatical Theory -- On Harris’s Systems of Report and Paraphrase -- Two-Dimensional Propositional Tense Logics -- VII / Points of View -- Levels of Meaning and Moral Discourse -- A Problem in Plato’s Laws -- Discourse as a Means to Enlightenment -- Points of View -- Index of Names.

Kurzfassung: Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1915-1975) was one of the leading intellectuals of Israel and of the world. His work ranged over mathematics, applied logic, communication theory, analytic philosophy, philosophy of science, and linguistics. Creative, patient, attentive, and critical, Bar-Hillel was a superb philosopher. In addition, how humane he was may be learned from the memorial tributes to him which initiate this volume. Bar-Hillel was born in Vienna, and came to Israel, then Palestine, in 1933. He took his M. A. (1938) and Ph. D. (1949) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where his subsequent career continued, as Research Fellow (1949-53), Senior Lecturer in Philosophy (1953-58), Associate Professor of Philosophy (1958-61), and Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Sci­ ence (1961-75). He was often abroad as visiting professor (Berkeley, 1960- 61; Michigan, 1965; La Jolla, 1966-67; Konstanz, 1971; Berlin, 1972), or as a research scholar, notably at the M. lT. Research Laboratory for Elec­ tronics during the early 1950's. Bar-Hillel was the Secretary and guiding spirit of the Organizing Committee for the 3rd International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, held in Jerusalem in 1964. During 1966-68, he was President of the Division of Logic, Method ology and Philosophy of SCience of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, and in 1967 President of the International Union. From 1963 he was a Member of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.

Kurzfassung: I. Introduction -- 1. Preliminary Remarks: (Paulinism in the Middle Ages) -- 2. The Problem of (Justification in Medieval Theology) -- II. Justification in the (Pauline Commentaries) -- 1. The Commentaries -- 2. Conclusions and Analysis -- III. Justification in the early Scholastic Literature -- 1. The Carolingian Period -- 2. Early Scholasticism: Tenth to Twelfth Centuries -- IV. The Completion of the Medieval Doctrine: The Processus Justificationis -- 1. First Statements -- 2. The Completed Doctrine -- 3. The Later Scholastics -- V. Conclusions.

Kurzfassung: One of the pleasures and privileges of scholarship is the opportunity to express one's gratitude to friends and colleagues upon the occasion of a publication. As with many scholarly first books, this present work had its genesis as a doctoral dissertation, and hence my first and most profound acknowledgment must be to Professor S. Harrison Thomson of the University of Colorado, whom I am honored to be able to describe as my mentor. Only my fellow "Old Thomsonians" can appreciate the common debt we owe to this great medievalist who was also a magni­ ficent teacher and counsellor. Presently in retirement, he continues to be our principal inspiration and model of scholarly distinction. I am also greatly indebted to another former mentor and now my senior colleague and chairman at the University of Denver, Professor Allen D. Breck, who, together with Deans Edward A. Lindell and Gerhard H. Mundinger, constantly encouraged and assisted my further progress and read the manuscript in its final stages, offering many valuable sugges­ tions as to style and substance. My university provided me with generous support in the form of research funds and clerical services; I am grateful to. those colleagues who made this assistance possible, as well as to friends at other institutions who shared their knowledge and frequently gave salutary advice.

Kurzfassung: The Basic Question of Philosophy -- Dialectical Materialism -- I. The Object of Dialectical Materialism -- II. The Origins of Diamat -- III. The Leninist Stage in the Development of Diamat -- IV. Matter and Consciousness -- V. The Dialectic of the Cognitive Process -- VI. The Dialectic as Logic and Theory of Knowledge -- VII. The Categories and Laws of the Dialectic -- VIII. Dialectical Materialism and Modern Science -- IX. The Unity of Diamat and Histomat -- X. Diamat and Histomat as Conceptual Tools of the Marxist Party -- XI. Diamat and Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy -- XII. Diamat and the Present -- Matter -- Consciousness -- I. The History of Views on Consciousness -- II. The Material Base and the Ideal Essence of Consciousness -- III. The Activity of Consciousness. Consciousness and Reality -- IV. The Structure of Consciousness. Psyche and Consciousness. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness -- V. The Emergence of Consciousness and Its Biological Prerequisites -- VI. The Social Essence of Consciousness. Individual and Social Consciousness -- Dialectical Logic -- I. The Object of Dialectical Logic and Its Tasks -- II. The History of Dialectical Logic -- III. Dialectic Logic in Bourgeois Philosophy at the Turn of This Century -- IV. Dialectical Logic in Soviet Philosophy -- V. The Basic Principles and Laws of Dialectical Logic -- VI. On the System of Dialectical Categories -- VII. On the Dialectic of Categories -- Psychology -- I. The History of Foreign Psychology -- II. The History of Soviet Psychology -- Science -- I. The Concept of ‘Science’ -- II. The General Characteristics of Science -- III. The Object, Methods and Structure of Scientific Knowledge -- IV. The Social Essence of Science -- V. The Laws of the Development of Science -- VI. Conditions and Tendencies in the Development of Contemporary Science -- Historical Materialism -- I. The Social-Economic Presuppositions of the Emergence of Histomat -- II. The Conceptual Presuppositions of the Emergence of Histomat -- III. Diamat and Histomat. Specificity of the Laws of Social Life -- IV. The Social-Economic Formation -- V. The People as Creator of History -- VI. The Historical Laws and Conscious Human Activity. Necessity and Freedom -- VII. The Leninist Stage in the Development of Histomat -- VIII. Histomat’s Partisanship. Histomat and Modern Bourgeois Sociology -- IX. The Idealist and Reactionary Character of Bourgeois Sociology -- Political Economy -- Ethics -- I. The Origin of the Term and the Notion -- II. The Object and Tasks -- III. The Basic Problems of Ethics and Types of Ethical Theory -- IV. Marxist Ethics -- Esthetics -- I. The History of Esthetics -- II. Esthetics in Russia -- III. Emergence and Development of Marxist Esthetics -- IV. The Esthetic as Object of Esthetics -- Index of Names.

Kurzfassung: The Soviet philosophical scene has experienced remarkable growth since the innovations of the 50's and the renovations of the 60's. This volume of Sovietica is intended by the editors as a finger on the pulse of the Marxist-Leninist corpus philosophicum as we enter the 1970's. Published in the years between 1960 and 1970, the Filosofskaja en­ ciklopedija (FE) has replaced the Kratkij filosofskij slovar' (Short Philo­ sophic Dictionary: 1939, 1941, 1951 and 1954) and the Filosofskij slovar' (Philosophic Dictionary: 1963). It is an impressive work - 2994 pages in five volumes (I, 1960, 504 pp.; II, 1962, 575 pp.; III, 1964, 584 pp.; IV, 1967, 591 pp.; V, 1970, 740 pp.), with the editors and authors representing all the contemporary Soviet philosophers of note. The FE has been extensively reviewed in Kommunist (1972, 5, 119-127) and in Studies in Soviet Thought [beginning with SST 12 (1972) 4]. Restrictions of space have forced us to omit much that was originally to be included. The same limitations have obliged us to deviate from the initial methodological rule which was 'to include only complete, un­ abridged articles' - in order to avoid distortion by selection. Only two articles have been shortened: only the basic portion of 'science' has been included; we have dropped 'natural science', 'sciences on man and society', and 'classification of sciences' (a total of thirteen pages in Russian) - this last with regret and with apologies to Professor Kedrov.

Kurzfassung: Prior Probabilities and Counterfactual Conditionals -- Incomplete Descriptions in the Language of Probability Theory -- A Computational Complexity Viewpoint on the Stability of Relative Frequency and on Stochastic Independence -- A Logic for Subjective Belief -- Discussion -- Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals -- Letter by Robert Stalnaker to W. L. Harper -- Ramsey Test Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change (A Response to Stalnaker) -- Toward an Optimization Procedure for Applying Minimum Change Principles in Probability Kinematics -- Simplicity -- Discussion -- Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference -- Discussion -- Probabilities of Conditionals -- Discussion -- Letter by Stalnaker to Van Fraassen -- Letter by Van Fraassen to Stalnaker.

Kurzfassung: In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four decades there have been striking formal advances in our understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which include the development of the relations between semantics and metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories (especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently the emergence of Baysian statistics as a radical alternative to standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the methods available. The search for principles which would explain why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.

Kurzfassung: Dickinson S. Miller On Analysis, Pragmatism, and Welfare - An Introduction -- Teachers and Teaching -- Fullerton and Philosophy -- A Student’s Impressions of William James -- James and Analysis -- George Santayana -- Is Philosophy a Good Training for the Mind? -- Analysis: The Method of Philosophy at Work -- The Relations of ‘Ought’ and ‘Is’ -- Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It [Revised] -- Is There Not a Clear Solution of the Knowledge-Problem? -- A Debt to James -- Universals -- An Event In Modern Philosophy with Hume -- Hume’s Deathblow to Deductivism -- Moral Truth -- Religion and Human Welfare -- What Religion Has To Do With It -- The Defense of the Faith Today -- Heart and Head -- Democracy and Our Intellectual Plight -- Matthew Arnold, On the Occasion of His Centenary -- Conscience and the Bishops -- James’s Doctrine of ‘The Right to Believe’[Revised] -- Morals, Intelligence, and Welfare -- Published Writings of Dickinson S. Miller -- Publications about Dickinson S. Miller.

Kurzfassung: When I was Dickinson Miller's assistant from 1940 to 1942, I soon realized that I had encountered an unusually powerful, acute, and original mind and a writer whose clear but vivid style matched the high quality of his intelligence. These traits were apparent in his comments about eminent philosophers with whom he had associated - particularly William James but also Santayana, Dewey, Husserl, and Wittgenstein - and in the mutual criticism he demanded of his writing and my first efforts. I was pleased and felt immensely privileged to share in his planning of a book devoted to "analysis, the method of philosophy at work" as in his articles on the knowledge-problem, induction, and free will. In view of the penetration of his articles, such a book seemed long overdue as James had insisted even in 1905. When Miller's projected book on "analysis at work" did not appear by 1956, I consulted him about putting together a collection of his published essays. Such a collection seemed but slight homage to one who had made such a striking contribution to American philosophy in rela­ tion to James and one from whom I had learned so much. He felt, however, that such a collection would be inappropriate and preferred to concentrate on a book, never finished, on "the principles of practical intelligence", the application of intelligence in a "morality of results" for human welfare.

Kurzfassung: I / Introduction -- I. The Pre-Euclidean Theory of Incommensurable Magnitudes -- II. General Methodological Observations -- III. Indispensable Definitions -- II / The Side and the Diameter of the Square -- I. The Received Proof of the Incommensurability of the Side and Diameter of the Square -- II. Anthyphairesis and the Side and Diameter -- III. Impact of the Discovery of Incommensurability -- IV. Summary of the Early Studies -- III / Plato’s Account of the Work Of Theodorus -- I. Formulation of the Problem: ????µ??? -- II. The Role of Diagrams: ??????? -- III. The Ideal of Demonstration: ?????????? -- IV. Why Separate Cases? -- V. Why Stop at Seventeen? -- VI. The Theorems of Theaetetus -- VII. Theodoras’ Style of Geometry -- VIII. Summary of Interpretive Criteria -- IV / A Critical Review of Reconstructions of Theodorus’ Proofs -- I. Reconstruction via Approximation Techniques -- II. Algebraic Reconstruction -- III. Anthyphairetic Reconstruction -- V / The Pythagorean Arithmetic of the Fifth Century -- I. Pythagorean Studies of the Odd and the Even -- II. The Pebble-Representation of Numbers -- III. The Pebble-Methods Applied to the Study of the Odd and the Even -- IV. The Theory of Figured Numbers -- V. Properties of Pythagorean Number Triples -- VI / The Early Study of Incommensurable Magnitudes: Theodorus -- I. Numbers Represented as Magnitudes -- II. Right Triangles and the Discovery of Incommensurability -- III. The Lesson of Theodorus -- IV. Theodorus and Elements II -- VII / The Arithmetic of Incommensurability: Theaetetus and Archytas -- I. The Theorem of Archytas on Epimoric Ratios -- II. The Theorems of Theaetetus -- III. The Arithmetic Proofs of the Theorems of Theaetetus -- IV. The Arithmetic Basis of Theaetetus’ Theory -- V. Observations on Pre-Euclidean Arithmetic -- VIII / The geometry of incommensurability: Theaetetus and Eudoxus -- I. The Theorems of Theaetetus: Proofs of the Geometric Part -- II. Anthyphairesis and the Theory of Proportions -- III. The Theory of Proportions in Elements X -- IV. Theaetetus and Eudoxus -- V. Summary of the Development of the Theory of Irrationals -- IX / Conclusions and Syntheses -- I. The Pre-Euclidean Theory of Incommensurable Magnitudes -- II. The Editing of the Elements -- III. The Pre-Euclidean Foundations-Crises -- Appendices -- A. On the Extension of Theodoras’ Method -- B. On the Anthyphairetic Proportion Theory -- A List of the Theorems in Chapters V-VIII and the Appendices -- Referencing Conventions and Bibliography -- I. Referencing Conventions -- II. Abbreviations used in the Notes and the Bibliography -- III. Bibliography of Works Consulted: Ancient Authors -- IV. Modern Works: Books -- V. Modern Works: Articles -- Index of Names -- Index of Passages Cited from Ancient Works.

Kurzfassung: The present work has three principal objectives: (1) to fix the chronology of the development of the pre-Euclidean theory of incommensurable magnitudes beginning from the first discoveries by fifth-century Pythago­ reans, advancing through the achievements of Theodorus of Cyrene, Theaetetus, Archytas and Eudoxus, and culminating in the formal theory of Elements X; (2) to correlate the stages of this developing theory with the evolution of the Elements as a whole; and (3) to establish that the high standards of rigor characteristic of this evolution were intrinsic to the mathematicians' work. In this third point, we wish to counterbalance a prevalent thesis that the impulse toward mathematical rigor was purely a response to the dialecticians' critique of foundations; on the contrary, we shall see that not until Eudoxus does there appear work which may be described as purely foundational in its intent. Through the examination of these problems, the present work will either alter or set in a new light virtually every standard thesis about the fourth-century Greek geometry. I. THE PRE-EUCLIDEAN THEORY OF INCOMMENSURABLE MAGNITUDES The Euclidean theory of incommensurable magnitudes, as preserved in Book X of the Elements, is a synthetic masterwork. Yet there are detect­ able seams in its structure, seams revealed both through terminology and through the historical clues provided by the neo-Platonist commentator Proclus.

Kurzfassung: I. The History of De Dialectica -- II. A Quantitative Study of the Authorship of De Dialectica -- to the Text -- On Dialectic -- I. Simple Words -- II. Combined Words -- III. Simple and Combined Statements -- IV. The Parts of Dialectic -- V. Signification -- VI. The Origin of Words -- VII. The Force of Words -- VIII. Obscurity and Ambiguity -- IX. Ambiguity -- X. Equivocation -- Indexes -- A. Terms -- B. Words Discussed -- C. Names -- D. Authors Quoted -- II. Index to the Introduction, Translation, and Notes.

Kurzfassung: I first became interested in De dialectica in 1966, while I was doing re­ search on Augustine's knowledge of logic. At the time I made a transla­ tion of the Maurist text and included it as an appendix to my doctoral dissertation (Yale, 1967). In 1971 I thoroughly revised the translation on the basis of the critical text of Wilhelm Crecelius (1857) and I have re­ cently revised it again to conform to Professor Jan Pinborg's new edition. The only previously published translation of the whole of De dialectica . is N. H. Barreau's French translation in the Oeuvres completes de Saint Augustin (1873). Thomas Stanley translated parts of Chapters Six and Nine into English as part of the account of Stoic logic in his History of Philosophy (Pt. VIII, 1656). I offer De dialectica in English in the hope that it will be of some interest to historians of logic and of the liberal arts tradition and to students of the thought of Augustine. In translating I have for the most part been as literal as is consistent with English usage. Although inclusion of the Latin text might have justified a freer translation, for example, the use of modern technical terms, it seemed better to stay close to the Latin. One of the . values in studying a work such as De dialectica is to see familiar topics discussed in a terminology not so familiar. In the translation I follow these conventions.

Kurzfassung: I: Husserl’s Position -- 1. The original realist standpoint -- 2. The concept of philosophy as rigorous science -- 3. Postulates determining the appropriate method of epistemology -- 4. The results of the investigations into outer perception and the constitutive analysis of objects of the real world -- 5. The formal-ontological foundations of the idealist solution -- II: Critical Remarks -- 1. Must the concept of philosophy as rigorous science lead to transcendental idealism ? -- 2. The limits of the applicability of the phenomenological reduction -- 3. Critical remarks on particular results of the analysis of outer perception and the theory of constitution -- 4. Critical remarks on the formal-ontological sources of the Husserlian idealism.

Kurzfassung: Roman Ingarden studied under Husserl before and during the first world war. He belonged to the so-called Gottingen group of Husserl's pupils. Husserl's doctrine was accepted by them and interpreted in a realist vein. Ingarden defended this view all his life. He opposed the development of phenomenology towards idealism. A considerable part of Ingarden's great creative effort is dedicated to the construction of a realist phenomenology and thus, according to him, to continuing the erection of the theoret­ ical structure whose foundations were laid by Husserl in his Logical Investigations. From Ingarden's standpoint the question of idealism versus realism was a crucial one. Ingarden published several studies on Husserl. The first one was written in 1918 and the last one was published posthumously. The present essay was printed in Ingarden's book Z badan nad filozofi:t­ wsp61czesn:t- (Inquiries into Contemporary Philosophy 1963) along with a number of other essays on Husserl and his philoso­ phy. This one is representative for Ingarden's positions. It is a good example of his contribution to an important controversy in the history of phenomenology, and it gives the reader an idea of Ingarden's critique of Husserlian idealism against the background of his argument for realism. Thanks and acknowledgements are due to Mr. J. E. Llewelyn of Edinburgh University. This translation was undertaken in collaboration with him. Arn6r Hannibalsson K6pavogur, Iceland 2I. II.

Kurzfassung: Physical Theory and Experiment -- Two Dogmas of Empiricism -- Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes -- Some Fundamental Problems in the Logic of Scientific Discovery -- Background Knowledge and Scientific Growth -- The Duhemian Argument -- A Comment on Grünbaum’s Claim -- Scientific Revolutions as Changes of World View -- Grünbaum on ‘The Duhemian Argument’ -- Quine, Grünbaum, and the Duhemian Thesis -- Duhem, Quine and Grünbaum on Falsification -- Duhem, Quine and a New Empiricism -- Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes -- Is it never Possible to Falsify a Hypothesis Irrevocably? -- The Rationality of Science (From‘Against Method’) -- Index of Names.

Kurzfassung: According to a view assumed by many scientists and philosophers of science and standardly found in science textbooks, it is controlled ex­ perience which provides the basis for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable theories in science: acceptable theories are those which can pass empirical tests. It has often been thought that a certain sort of test is particularly significant: 'crucial experiments' provide supporting empiri­ cal evidence for one theory while providing conclusive evidence against another. However, in 1906 Pierre Duhem argued that the falsification of a theory is necessarily ambiguous and therefore that there are no crucial experiments; one can never be sure that it is a given theory rather than auxiliary or background hypotheses which experiment has falsified. w. V. Quine has concurred in this judgment, arguing that "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not indi­ vidually but only as a corporate body". Some philosophers have thought that the Duhem-Quine thesis gra­ tuitously raises perplexities. Others see it as doubly significant; these philosophers think that it provides a base for criticism of the foundational view of knowledge which has dominated much of western thought since Descartes, and they think that it opens the door to a new and fruitful way to conceive of scientific progress in particular and of the nature and growth of knowledge in general.

Kurzfassung: Editorial Introduction -- Quine’s Philosophy of Science -- An Introduction to ‘Translation and Meaning’, Chapter Two of Word and Object -- Beginning with Ordinary Things -- Quine’s Empirical Assumptions -- Behavioral Criteria of Radical Translation -- Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation -- Singular Terms and Predication -- Vacuous Names -- Quine’s Syntactical Insights -- On Saying That -- Quine on Modality -- Some Problems about Belief -- Quantifying In -- Logic with Platonism -- On the Consistency of a Slight (?) Modification of Quine’s New Foundations -- Replies -- Publications of W. V. Quine.

Kurzfassung: It is gratifying to see that philosophers' continued interest in Words and Objections has been so strong as to motivate a paperback edition. This is gratifying because it vindicates the editors' belief in the permanent im­ portance of Quine's philosophy and in the value of the papers com­ menting on it which were collected in our volume. Apart from a couple of small corrections, only one change has been made. The list of Professor Quine's writings has been brought up to date. The editors cannot claim any credit for this improvement, however. We have not tried to imitate the Library of Living Philosophers volumes and to include Professor Quine's autobiography in this volume, but we are fortunate to publish here his brand-new auto bibliography. 1975 THE EDITORS TABLE OF CONTENTS V PREFACE 1 EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION 1. 1. C. SMAR T / Quine's Philosophy of Science 3 GILBERT HARMAN / An Introduction to 'Translation and Meaning', Chapter Two of Word and Object 14 ERIK STENIUS / Beginning with Ordinary Things 27 NOAM CHOMSKY / Quine's Empirical Assumptions 53 1AAKKO HINTIKKA / Behavioral Criteria of Radical Translation 69 BARRY STROUD / Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation 82 P. F. STRA WSON / Singular Terms and Predication 97 118 H. P. GRICE / Vacuous Names P. T.

Kurzfassung: I. The Early Thought of Royce -- 1. Moral Theory -- 2. Empirical Theism -- 3. Postulates. The Right to Believe -- 4. Idealism as an Hypothesis Based on Postulates -- 5. Skepticism and the Possibility of Error -- 6. Common Sense and the Problem of Error -- 7. Solution and Conclusion to Absolute Idealism -- 8. Absolute Idealism and the Nature of Error -- 9. The Problem of Evil -- 10. The Conception of God. Critique -- II. The Middle Thought of Royce -- 1. Transition to “The World and the Individual” -- 2. “The World and the Individual”: Introduction -- 3. Realism -- 4. Mysticism -- 5. Critical Rationalism -- 6. The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas -- 7. The Fourth Conception of Being -- 8. The Proof of God’s Existence -- 9. The One, the Many, and the Infinite -- 10. The Temporal and the Eternal -- 11. The Moral Order and the Problem of Evil -- 12. Immortality -- 13. The Conception of God. Summary -- III. The Later Theory of Community -- 1. Transition to “The Problem of Christianity” -- 2. “The Problem of Christianity”: Introduction -- 3. The Moral Burden of the Individual -- 4. Guilt and Atonement -- 5. The Beloved Community -- 6. The Community and the Time-Process -- 7. The Body and Its Members -- 8. The Nature of Interpretation -- 9. The Will to Interpret -- IV. The Later Conception of God -- 1. The World of Interpretation -- 2. The Theoretical and the Practical -- 3. Peirce’s “Neglected Argument” -- 4. The Conception of God -- 5. Elements in Royce’s Later Conception of God Which are Similar to and Continuous with Earlier Conceptions -- 6. Elements in Royce’s Later Conception of God Which are Different from His Earlier Conceptions. Summary.

Kurzfassung: Dr. Jarvis kindly invited me to undertake this Foreword. According to his suggestion, I here intend to complement his work by creating a context for it. To do so, prior notice of a common misrepresentation of Royce and of his contemporary relevance seems needed, before briefly sketching his biography and interest in religion. Finally, to orient the reader to the present study, I will point out Royce's main works and the spirit of the man. In the year 2150 A. D. , what will people be saying about Harvard? If the reported prediction of a self -effacing William James comes true, the common answer will be, "Harvard? Oh, that's the place where Royce taught. " And yet, now that almost a century has passed since Royce began teaching at Harvard, most Americans do not recognize the name "Josiah Royce. " Of those who do, few know him as a significant American philosopher of community. And of these few, far fewer recall either that religious problems first drove Royce to philosophy or that he said such problems "of all human interests, deserve our best efforts and our utmost loyalty. " 1 Little wonder, then, that when Americans survey our "classic" philosophers-Peirce, James, Royce, Santayana, Dewey, Whitehead-few of them respond to Royce as the most explicitly and persistently religious philosopher of them all. Fortunately, however, popularity contests do not accurately weigh the merit of a philosopher.

Kurzfassung: I. Introduction: Hume and Kant and the History of Ideas -- II. Sense, Reason and Imagination -- III. Hume’s “Principles” and Kant’s “Categories” -- IV. Naturalism and Criticism -- V. Hume and Kant on the Philosophy of Religion -- VI. Towards a Theory of “Anthropocentrism” with regard to Naturalism and Criticism.

Kurzfassung: The present work is the product of several years study of the various aspects of Kanfs Critical Philosophy and Hume's naturalism. During that time many individuals have helped with this work and it is hardly possible to set down the names of aH of them. One name does des erve special mention - Prof. Dr. H. Heimsoeth with whom the author has discussed some of the very knotty problems of Kantian Philosophy. Although Hume has been - as Kant freely admits in the Preface to his "Prolegomena" - one of the most decisive influences and turning points in the philosophical development of Kant, the author does not thematize in this work the age-old problem of whether Kant reaHy read, understood and refuted Hume. That it has been, ever since Hume wrote, a favorite pursuit among philosophers to answer hirn, to refute hirn, and to refute Kanfs attempt at refutation of hirn, irrespective of its being convincing or not, must be mentioned with special respect.

Kurzfassung: I: Sexuality and the Fall of Man -- 1. Gnostic Cosmogony -- 2. Christian Gnostics and the Book of Genesis -- 3. Augustinian Orthodoxy and the Original Sin -- II: Virginity and the Monastic Economy of Perfection -- 1. Vita angelica -- 2. Simplicitas -- 3. Contemplation and Prophecy -- 4. Milites Christi -- III: Sponsa Christi: Virginity and Epithalamian Mystery -- 1. The Song of Songs and Christian Exegesis -- 2. Encratism and Marriage -- 3. Epithalamian Gnosis -- IV: Virginity Sexualized -- 1. The Twelfth-Century Context: Ideas and Influences -- 2. Victorine Spiritual Marriage -- 3. St. Bernard and the Song of Songs -- 4. The Katherine Group and Erotic Spirituality -- V: Surviving Elements of Christian Gnosis -- 1. Sin as Sexual -- 2. Traditional Features of Virginity Deontologized -- 3. Virginity and Moral Conflict -- Afterword -- Appendix: The Virgin Mary: Virgin Birth and Immaculate Conception.

Kurzfassung: Apreface is best written last, after a book is done and its author may look back to survey what he hopes he has accomplished and what he must admit he has not. In hindsight virginity by itself has seemed a very large field to till, but with that reflection also comes a sense of misgiving, the awareness that a really comprehensive treatment of that subject would somehow have to encompass an enormous ter­ rain, the whole length and breadth of Christianity's attitude toward sexuality from the earliest times down to the high Middle Ages. It could be argued that no small book could cover so much ground, and I would be the first to agree. As its subtitle is meant to suggest, the present work is, in at least two senses of the word, an essay: both an initial and tentative effort to get at the meaning of an extremely important but as yet unprobed medieval belief in the perfective value of the virginal life; and an interpretive study of a complex subject from a limited point of view, specifically, that in which the virgin appears in devotional literature as the bride of Christ.