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  • München BSB  (7)
  • Cambridge : Cambridge University Press  (5)
  • Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press  (1)
  • Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] : MIT Press  (1)
  • Spieltheorie  (7)
  • Economics  (7)
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Material
Language
Subjects(RVK)
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9780511598975
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 online resource (xiv, 272 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
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    DDC: 303.6/9
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    Keywords: Conflict management ; Negotiation ; Fairness ; Game theory ; Spieltheorie ; Teilung ; Konfliktregelung ; Teilung ; Konfliktregelung ; Spieltheorie
    Abstract: Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or 'bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures
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    Description / Table of Contents: 11
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9781139173759
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 online resource (ix, 187 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
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    DDC: 302
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    Keywords: Social interaction ; Game theory ; Interaktion ; Spieltheorie ; Verhaltenswissenschaften ; Soziologie ; Interaktion ; Spieltheorie ; Spieltheorie ; Verhaltenswissenschaften ; Spieltheorie ; Soziologie
    Abstract: This book, first published in 1991, offers an integrative approach to the study of formal models in the social and behavioural sciences. The theory presented here unifies both the representation of the social environment and the equilibrium concept. The theory requires that all alternatives that are available to the players be specified in an explicit and detailed manner, and this specification is defined as a social 'situation'. A situation, therefore, not only consists of the alternatives currently available to the players, but also includes the set of opportunities that might be induced by the players from their current environment. The theory requires that all recommended alternatives be both internally and externally stable; the recommendation cannot be self-defeating and, at the same time, should account for alternatives that were not recommended. In addition to unifying the representation and the solution concept, the theory also extends the social environments accommodated by current game theory
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 3
    ISBN: 0521374251 , 9780521374255 , 0521376890 , 9780521376891
    Language: English
    Pages: ix, 187 Seiten
    DDC: 302 20
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    Keywords: Interaktion ; Interaktion ; Situation ; Soziale Situation ; Sozialpsychologie ; Spieltheorie ; Theorie ; Soziologie ; Spieltheorie ; Verhaltenswissenschaften ; Interaktion ; Interaktion ; Spieltheorie ; Spieltheorie ; Verhaltenswissenschaften ; Spieltheorie ; Soziologie
    Note: Literaturverzeichnis Seite 177-179
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  • 4
    ISBN: 0262010879
    Language: English
    Pages: VII, 127 S.
    DDC: 302/.13 19
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    Keywords: Besluitvorming ; Choix collectif - Modèles mathématiques ; Prise de décision - Modèles mathématiques ; Social choice ; Mathematisches Modell ; Social choice -- Mathematical models ; Decision making -- Mathematical models ; Entscheidungstheorie ; Entscheidungsmodell ; Entscheidungsfindung ; Entscheidungsprozess ; Mathematisches Modell ; Mehrfache Zielsetzung ; Entscheidung bei mehrfacher Zielsetzung ; Spieltheorie ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Mathematisches Modell ; Entscheidungsprozess ; Mathematisches Modell ; Entscheidungsfindung ; Mehrfache Zielsetzung ; Spieltheorie ; Entscheidung bei mehrfacher Zielsetzung ; Entscheidungstheorie ; Entscheidungsmodell ; Mehrfache Zielsetzung
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9780511528309
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 online resource (ix, 390 pages)
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    DDC: 302.3/0724
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    Keywords: Mathematisches Modell ; Game theory / Congresses ; Negotiation / Mathematical models / Congresses ; Spieltheorie ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Konferenzschrift ; Konferenzschrift ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Spieltheorie ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell
    Abstract: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9781139052283
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 online resource (x, 169 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
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    DDC: 302.3/4
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    Keywords: Mathematisches Modell ; Social choice / Mathematical models ; Voting / Mathematical models ; Committees / Mathematical models ; Game theory ; Abstimmung ; Spieltheorie ; Wahlverhalten ; Mathematisches Modell ; Ausschuss ; Ausschuss ; Abstimmung ; Mathematisches Modell ; Wahlverhalten ; Spieltheorie
    Abstract: This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 7
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press
    ISBN: 0521259649 , 9780521259644 , 9780521074650
    Language: English
    Pages: X, 169 S.
    Edition: 1. publ.
    Series Statement: Econometric Society publication 7
    Series Statement: Econometric Society monographs in pure theory
    Series Statement: Econometric Society publication
    DDC: 302.3/4
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    Keywords: Choix collectif - Modèles mathématiques ; Comités - Modèles mathématiques ; Commissies ; Jeux, Théorie des ; Kiesgedrag ; Social choice ; Speltheorie ; Vote - Modèles mathématiques ; Mathematisches Modell ; Committees Mathematical models ; Game theory ; Social choice Mathematical models ; Voting Mathematical models ; Wahlverhalten ; Spieltheorie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Abstimmung ; Ausschuss ; Ausschuss ; Abstimmung ; Mathematisches Modell ; Wahlverhalten ; Spieltheorie
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