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  • MPI Ethno. Forsch.  (13)
  • HU Berlin
  • Würzburg UB
  • HBZ
  • Online Resource  (13)
  • Image
  • 2025-2025
  • 1995-1999  (13)
  • 1985-1989
  • 1960-1964
  • 1999  (13)
  • Estache, Antonio  (6)
  • Venables, Anthony  (4)
  • Halpern, Jonathan  (3)
  • American Society for Ethnohistory
  • Edward Elgar Publishing
  • Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques
  • Washington, D.C : The World Bank  (13)
Datasource
  • MPI Ethno. Forsch.  (13)
  • HU Berlin
  • Würzburg UB
  • HBZ
Material
  • Online Resource  (13)
  • Image
Language
Years
  • 2025-2025
  • 1995-1999  (13)
  • 1985-1989
  • 1960-1964
Year
  • 1999  (13)
Author, Corporation
  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (31 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Comparing the Performance of Public and Private Water Companies in the Asia and Pacific Region
    Keywords: E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Education ; Ground Water ; Industry ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure Regulation ; Knowledge for Development ; Labor Policies ; Litres Per Day ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Number Of Connections ; Operational Costs ; Operational Expenses ; Performance Indicators ; Private Operators ; Private Sector Development ; Private Water Companies ; Public Utilities ; Raw Water ; Social Protections and Labor ; Surface Sources ; Surface Water ; Town ; Town Water Supply and Sanitation ; Urban Water Supply and Sanitation ; Utilities ; Water ; Water Conservation ; Water Distribution ; Water Production ; Water Resources ; Water Sector ; Water Services ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions ; Water and Industry ; Wells ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Education ; Ground Water ; Industry ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure Regulation ; Knowledge for Development ; Labor Policies ; Litres Per Day ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Number Of Connections ; Operational Costs ; Operational Expenses ; Performance Indicators ; Private Operators ; Private Sector Development ; Private Water Companies ; Public Utilities ; Raw Water ; Social Protections and Labor ; Surface Sources ; Surface Water ; Town ; Town Water Supply and Sanitation ; Urban Water Supply and Sanitation ; Utilities ; Water ; Water Conservation ; Water Distribution ; Water Production ; Water Resources ; Water Sector ; Water Services ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions ; Water and Industry ; Wells
    Abstract: July 1999 - Efficiency indicators can be useful to regulators assessing the efficiency of an operation and the wedge between tariff and minimum costs. They allow regulators to control for factors over which the operators have no control (such as diversity of water sources, or water quality or user characteristics). Estache and Rossi estimate a stochastic costs frontier for a sample of Asian and Pacific water companies, comparing the performance of public and privatized companies based on detailed firm-specific information published by the Asian Development Bank in 1997. They find private operators of water companies to be more efficient than public operators. Costs in concessioned companies tend to be significantly lower than those in public companies. Estache and Rossi compare the ranking of these companies by efficiency performance (obtained from econometric estimates) with rankings by more standard qualitative and productivity indicators typically used to assess performance. They show that rankings based on standard indicators are not always very consistent. Productivity indicators recognize simple input-output relations, such as the number of workers per client or connection. Frontiers recognize the more complex nature of interactions between inputs and outputs. Cost frontiers show the costs as a function of the level of output (or outputs) and the prices of inputs, and are generally more useful to regulators assessing the wedge between tariff and minimum costs. Production frontiers reveal technical relations between firms' inputs and outputs and provide a useful backup when cost frontiers are difficult to assess for lack of data. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. Antonio Estache may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Argentina's Transport Privatization and Re-Regulation
    Keywords: Airport ; Airport Authority ; Commuters ; Costs ; Infrastructure ; Investments ; Modal Shift ; Port Services ; Rail ; Railroad ; Railways ; Road Transport ; Roads ; Subsidy ; Subway ; Traffic ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Transport Sector ; Trucks ; Airport ; Airport Authority ; Commuters ; Costs ; Infrastructure ; Investments ; Modal Shift ; Port Services ; Rail ; Railroad ; Railways ; Road Transport ; Roads ; Subsidy ; Subway ; Traffic ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Transport Sector ; Trucks
    Abstract: November 1999 - Argentina's policy for reform of the transport sector has been a mix of competition in the market and, through concessions, for the market. Capacity has increased, demand has grown, and prices and services have improved. Public financing has not been eliminated but it has been drastically reduced. When Argentina initiated reform of its transport sector in 1989, it had few models to follow. It was the first Latin American country to privatize its intercity railroad, to explicitly organize intraport competition, and to grant a private concession to operate its subway. It was second (after Japan) to privatize its urban commuter railways and one of the first in the developing world to grant road concessions to private operators. Argentina's experience shows that transport privatization and deregulation provide efficiency gains that can be delivered to users. Despite unexpectedly high residual subsidy requirements, fiscal costs are lower, services have improved, and new investment is taking place. Argentina's decade-long experience shows that the reform process involves learning by doing. Inexperienced new regulators quickly face the challenges in controlling monopoly power and providing long-run incentives for private investment. Designing sustainable reform requires a commitment by government to minimize its role in the sector and to respect its original promises to both users and concessionaires. Argentina has learned the importance of building up the regulatory capacity needed to monitor contracts, especially when initial uncertainty about demand and cost conditions is strong and renegotiation is the probable outcome of daring reform. The government's main challenge in monitoring contracts is to get enough information to reach a balance in its decisions about distributing efficiency gains fairly between consumers and private investors. This is one area in which Argentina may not yet have met the challenge. As the last wave of contract extensions in rail and roads comes to an end, one issue is likely to be the need for better targeting of subsidies for the poor. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. Antonio Estache may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (48 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Venables, Anthony Infrastructure, Geographical Disadvantage, and Transport Costs
    Keywords: Elasticity ; Fixed Costs ; High Transport ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Investment ; International Transport ; Journey ; Journeys ; Quality Of Transport ; Rail ; Road ; Routes ; Trans Transit Routes ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Costs ; Transport Economics ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Travel ; Trips ; True ; Elasticity ; Fixed Costs ; High Transport ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Investment ; International Transport ; Journey ; Journeys ; Quality Of Transport ; Rail ; Road ; Routes ; Trans Transit Routes ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Costs ; Transport Economics ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Travel ; Trips ; True
    Abstract: December 1999 - The median landlocked country has only 30 percent of the trade volume of the median coastal economy. Halving transport costs increases that trade volume by a factor of five. Improving the standard of infrastructure from that of the bottom quarter of countries to that of the median country increases trade by 50 percent. Improving infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa is especially important for increasing African trade. Limão and Venables use three different data sets to investigate how transport depends on geography and infrastructure. Landlocked countries have high transport costs, which can be substantially reduced by improving the quality of their infrastructure and that of transit countries. Analysis of bilateral trade data confirms the importance of infrastructure. Limão and Venables estimate the elasticity of trade flows with regard to transport costs to be high, at about -2.5. This means that: · The median landlocked country has only 30 percent of the trade volume of the median coastal economy. · Halving transport costs increases the volume of trade by a factor of five. · Improving infrastructure from the 75th to the 50th percentile increases trade by 50 percent. Using their results and a basic gravity model to study Sub-Saharan African trade, both internally and with the rest of the world, Limão and Venables find that infrastructure problems largely explain the relatively low levels of African trade. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the effects of geography on economic performance. The authors may be contacted at ngl4columbia.edu or avenables@worldbank.org
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  • 4
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (38 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio The Rise, the Fall, and . . . the Emerging Recovery of Project Finance in Transport
    Keywords: Bank Debt ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Bond ; Capital Structures ; Debt Markets ; Debt Servicing ; Emerging Bond Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Environment ; Environmental Economics and Policies ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Crises ; Financial Intermediation ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Performance ; Good ; Infrastructure Finance ; Interest ; Interest Rate ; Interest Rate Risk ; Investing ; Market ; Pension ; Pension Assets ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Revenues ; Short-Term Debt ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Bank Debt ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Bond ; Capital Structures ; Debt Markets ; Debt Servicing ; Emerging Bond Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Environment ; Environmental Economics and Policies ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Crises ; Financial Intermediation ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Performance ; Good ; Infrastructure Finance ; Interest ; Interest Rate ; Interest Rate Risk ; Investing ; Market ; Pension ; Pension Assets ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Revenues ; Short-Term Debt ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: July 2000 - Many transport projects undertaken during the boom period of the 1990s came to a crashing halt in 1997, and conditions in emerging markets worsened in 1998 and 1999. Many projects failed, victim of everything from overoptimistic forecasts to excessive debt to an inability to refinance bridge loans. As available financing dried up, many projects went bankrupt, had to be renegotiated, or were taken over by the government. What have we learned from all this? Recent developments in emerging financial markets have dramatically changed the appetite for (and terms of) transport infrastructure projects. As a result of defaults in Asia and Russia and devaluations in Asia, Brazil, and Russia, political and currency and exchange risk premia have increased dramatically. Given large needs for sovereign debt financing, infrastructure project finance will be seeking guarantees at the same time as governments are issuing primary securities. Large portfolio outflows in emerging market funds mean that the sources of both equity and debt capital that became available in the mid-1990s are drying up for all but the most creditworthy projects. Moreover, real economic effects from financial events have consequences in the transport sector, since transport is a derived demand. Any decline in real economic activity is felt quickly in traffic levels and revenues. Currency devaluations that help spur exports may generate higher volumes for seaports and air cargo activity. These effects vary by sector, especially over the medium to longer term. Declines in real economic activity make matters especially difficult for toll roads, as drivers shift to free alternatives and reduce the number of trips taken. What does all this mean for project finance in transport? Risks have increased. Debt finance costs more. The available tenor of debt instruments has shortened and more equity is required for projects. The sources and availability of equity finance have changed. Project finance efforts have shifted from new projects to the privatization, rehabilitation, and expansion of existing facilities. And a superclass of sponsors, bankers, and investors has emerged. Failures and mistakes in project finance deals in the 1990s were sharp and persistent. But much has been learned about sound project economics, conservative financial structures, comprehensive sensitivity analysis, the effects of macroeconomic factors, and the need for proper incentives and sound institutional and regulatory arrangements. This paper-a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute-is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org or jstrong@worldbank.org
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  • 5
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (54 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio The Long and Winding Path to Private Financing and Regulation of Toll Roads
    Keywords: Arterial Roads ; Costs ; Demand For Road Transport ; Freight ; Highway ; Highway Systems ; Investments ; Piers ; Rail ; Road ; Road Projects ; Road Sector ; Road Transport ; Toll ; Toll Road ; Toll Roads ; Traffic ; Transport ; Transport Activities ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Urban Roads ; Vehicles ; Arterial Roads ; Costs ; Demand For Road Transport ; Freight ; Highway ; Highway Systems ; Investments ; Piers ; Rail ; Road ; Road Projects ; Road Sector ; Road Transport ; Toll ; Toll Road ; Toll Roads ; Traffic ; Transport ; Transport Activities ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Urban Roads ; Vehicles
    Abstract: July 2000 - This guide to the issues at stake when toll roads are privatized answers many questions that privatization teams and regulators should be asking-providing useful information to project specialists, many of whom are now learning how much they did not know when they started. Road transport has long been the dominant form of transport for freight and passenger movement throughout the world. Because most road projects require investments with long amortization periods and because many projects do not generate enough demand to become self-financing through some type of user fee or toll, the road sector remains in the hands of the public sector to a much greater extent than other transport activities. But governments throughout the world, including those of many poor African and South Asian countries, are commercializing their operations to cut costs, improve user orientation, and increase sector-specific revenue. There seems to be demand for toll roads in specific settings, but the problems met by many of this first generation of road concessions-from Mexico to Thailand-have given toll projects a bad reputation. Many mistakes were made, and tolling is obviously not the best solution for every road. Most of the alternatives aim at improving efficiency (lowering costs). But there are many ways of getting the private sector involved in toll roads, thus reducing public sector financing requirements for the sector. Understanding the context in which toll roads are viable is essential both for their initial success and for effective long-run regulation. Estache, Romero, and Strong provide a broad overview of issues at stake from the viewpoint of both privatization teams and regulators responsible for supervising contractual commitments of private operators and the government, to each other and to users. This paper-a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute-is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org or jstrong@worldbank.org
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  • 6
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (32 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Universal Service Obligations in Utility Concession Contracts and the Needs of the Poor in Argentina's Privatizations
    Keywords: Bank ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Consumer ; Consumers ; Customers ; Debt Markets ; Demand ; Disabilities ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Expenses ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Housing and Human Habitats ; Income ; Income Level ; Industry ; Investment ; Lack Of Interest ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Pensioners ; Population ; Private Sector Development ; Profits ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Savings ; Subsidies ; Supply ; Technology Industry ; Valuable ; Valuation ; Worth ; Bank ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Consumer ; Consumers ; Customers ; Debt Markets ; Demand ; Disabilities ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Expenses ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Housing and Human Habitats ; Income ; Income Level ; Industry ; Investment ; Lack Of Interest ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Pensioners ; Population ; Private Sector Development ; Profits ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Savings ; Subsidies ; Supply ; Technology Industry ; Valuable ; Valuation ; Worth
    Abstract: The structural changes that come with privatization may induce a reconsideration of the regulations defined during the early stages of privatization. - Chisari and Estache summarize the main lessons emerging from Argentina's experience, including universal service obligations in concession contracts. They discuss free-riding risks, moral hazard problems, and other issues that arise when social concerns are delegated to private operators. After reporting on Argentina's experience, Chisari and Estache suggest some guidelines: · Anticipate interjurisdictional externalities. Users' mobility makes targeting service obligations difficult. · Minimize the risks imposed by elusive demand. In providing new services, a gradual policy may work better than a shock. · Realize that unemployment leads to delinquency and lower expected tariffs. Elasticity of fixed and usage charges is important. · Deal with the fact that the poor have limited access to credit. Ultimately, plans that included credit for the payment of infrastructure charges were not that successful. · Coordinate regulatory, employment, and social policy. One successful plan to provide universal service involved employing workers from poor families in infrastructure extension works. · Beware of the latent opportunism of users who benefit from special programs. Special treatment of a sector may encourage free-riding (for example, pensioners overused the telephone until a limit was placed on the number of subsidized phone calls they could make). · Fixed allocations for payment of services do not ensure that universal service obligations will be met. How do you deal with the problem that many pensioners do not pay their bills? · Anticipate that operators will have more information than regulators do. If companies exaggerate supply costs in remote areas, direct interaction with poor users there may lead to the selection of more cost-effective technologies. · Tailored programs are often much more effective than standardized programs. They are clearly more expensive but, when demand-driven, are also more effective. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at ochisariuade.edu or aestache@worldbank.org
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  • 7
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (40 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Halpern, Jonathan Designing Direct Subsidies for Water and Sanitation Services Panama
    Keywords: Access To Cred Administrative Cost ; Administrative Costs ; Beneficiaries ; Beneficiary ; Check ; Customers ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Sustainability ; Gender ; Gender and Law ; Housing Subsidy ; Interest ; Investments ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Population ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Rural Development ; Rural Poverty Reduction ; Subsidies ; Subsidization ; Subsidy ; Subsidy Payments ; Tax Law ; Taxation and Subsidies ; Total Costs ; Town Water Supply and Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Urban Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Subsidies ; Water Subsidy ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Worth ; Access To Cred Administrative Cost ; Administrative Costs ; Beneficiaries ; Beneficiary ; Check ; Customers ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Sustainability ; Gender ; Gender and Law ; Housing Subsidy ; Interest ; Investments ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Population ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Rural Development ; Rural Poverty Reduction ; Subsidies ; Subsidization ; Subsidy ; Subsidy Payments ; Tax Law ; Taxation and Subsidies ; Total Costs ; Town Water Supply and Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Urban Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Subsidies ; Water Subsidy ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Worth
    Abstract: May 2000 - An alternative to traditional subsidies for water and sanitation services is direct subsidies - funds governments provide to cover part of the water bill for households that meet certain criteria. Issues associated with such a subsidy are analyzed through a case study of Panama. As an alternative to traditional subsidy schemes in utility sectors, direct subsidy programs have several advantages: they are transparent, they are explicit, and they minimize distortions of the behavior of both the utility and the customers. At the same time, defining practical eligibility criteria for direct subsidy schemes is difficult and identifying eligible households may entail substantial administrative costs. Foster, Gomez-Lobo, and Halpern, using a case study from Panama, discuss some of the issues associated with the design of direct subsidy systems for water services. They conclude that: · There is a need to assess - rather than assume - the need for a subsidy. A key test of affordability, and thus of the need for a subsidy, is to compare the cost of the service with some measure of household willingness to pay. · The initial assessment must consider the affordability of connection costs as well as the affordability of the service itself. Connection costs may be prohibitive for poor households with no credit, suggesting a need to focus subsidies on providing access rather than ongoing water consumption. · A key issue in designing a direct subsidy scheme is its targeting properties. Poverty is a complex phenomenon and difficult to measure. Eligibility must therefore be based on easily measurable proxy variables, and good proxies are hard to find. In choosing eligibility criteria for a subsidy, it is essential to verify what proportion of the target group fails to meet the criteria (errors of exclusion) and what proportion of nontarget groups is inadvertently eligible for the benefits (errors of inclusion). · Administrative costs are roughly the same no matter what the level of individual subsidies, so a scheme that pays beneficiaries very little will tend not to be cost-effective. It is important to determine what proportion of total program costs will be absorbed by administrative expenses. · Subsidies should not cover the full cost of the service and should be contingent on beneficiaries paying their share of the bill. Subsidies for consumption above a minimum subsistence level should be avoided. Subsidies should be provided long enough before eligibility is reassessed to avoid poverty trap problems. · The utility or concessionaire can be helpful in identifying eligible candidates because of its superior information on the payment histories of customers. It will also have an incentive to do so, since it has an interest in improving poor payment records. Thought should therefore be given at the design stage to the role of the service provider in the implementation of the subsidy scheme. · The administrative agency's responsibilities, the sources of funding, and the general principles guiding the subsidy system should have a clear legal basis, backed by regulations governing administrative procedures. · To reduce administrative costs and avoid duplication of effort, it would be desirable for a single set of institutional arrangements to be used to determine eligibility for all welfare and subsidy programs in a given jurisdiction, whether subnational or national. This paper - a product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to evaluate and disseminate lessons of experience in designing policies to improve the quality and sustainability of infrastructure services and to enhance access of the poor to these basic services. The authors may be contacted at vfosterworldbank.org or jhalpern@worldbank.org
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  • 8
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (42 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Halpern, Jonathan Regulatory Reform in Mexico's Natural Gas Industry
    Keywords: Air ; Air Pollution ; Cleaner Fuels ; Diesel ; Driving ; Emission Standards ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Fuel ; Fuel Oil ; Fuels ; Gas Sector ; Industry ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure Regulation ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Oil and Gas Industry ; Petroleum Gas ; Pollution ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Water Resources ; Water and Industry ; Air ; Air Pollution ; Cleaner Fuels ; Diesel ; Driving ; Emission Standards ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Fuel ; Fuel Oil ; Fuels ; Gas Sector ; Industry ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure Regulation ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Oil and Gas Industry ; Petroleum Gas ; Pollution ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Water Resources ; Water and Industry
    Abstract: January 2001 - Liberalization of the natural gas industry is complex because the sector combines activities with natural monopoly characteristics with activities that are potentially competitive. The challenges are compounded when the State opts to retain vertically integrated monopolies in otherwise contestable segments of the industry. Regulatory issues associated with partial liberalization of natural gas markets are analyzed through a case study of Mexico. The natural gas industry combines activities with natural monopoly characteristics with those that are potentially competitive. Pipeline transport and distribution, which have natural monopoly characteristics, require regulation of price and nonprice behavior. Production is a contestable activity, but in a few countries (including Mexico) it remains a state monopoly. Gas marketing is also contestable, but the presence of a dominant, upstream, vertically integrated incumbent may pose significant barriers to entry. Market architecture decisions—such as horizontal structure, regional development, and the degree of vertical integration—are also crucial. Rosellón and Halpern report that Mexico has undertaken structural reform in the energy sector more slowly than many other countries, but it has introduced changes to attract private investment in natural gas transport and distribution. These changes were a response to the rapid growth in demand for natural gas (about 10 percent a year) in Mexico, which was in turn a response to economic development and the enforcement of environmental regulations. The new regulatory framework provides incentives for firms to invest and operate efficiently and to bear much of the risk associated with new projects. It also protects captive consumers and improves general economic welfare. The continued vertical integration of the state-owned company Pemex and its statutory monopoly in domestic production posed a challenge to regulators. Their response in liberalizing trade, setting first-hand sales prices, and regulating natural gas distribution makes the Mexican case an interesting example of regulatory design. As the first phase of investment mobilization and competition for the market in Mexican distribution projects concludes, remaining challenges include consistently and transparently enforcing regulations, coordinating tasks among government agencies, and ensuring expansion of gas transport services and domestic production. A key challenge in the near term will be fostering competition in the market. In strengthening the role of market forces, one issue is Pemex's discretionary discounts on domestic gas and access to transport services, made possible by its monopoly in domestic production and marketing activities and its overwhelming dominance in transport. The main instrument available to the regulator is proscribing Pemex contract pricing, but more durable and tractable instruments should be considered. This paper—a product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region—is part of a larger effort in the region to evaluate and disseminate lessons of experience in designing policies to improve the quality and sustainability of infrastructure services. The authors may be contacted at jrosellondis1.cide.mx or jhalpern@worldbank.org
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  • 9
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (38 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Venables, Anthony Geographical Disadvantage
    Keywords: Benchmark ; Economic Structures ; Elasticities ; Elasticity ; Exports ; Goods ; High Transport ; Income ; Infrastructure ; Outcomes ; Price Changes ; Prices ; Production ; Theory ; Trade ; Trade Liberalization ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Costs ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Variables ; Welfare ; Benchmark ; Economic Structures ; Elasticities ; Elasticity ; Exports ; Goods ; High Transport ; Income ; Infrastructure ; Outcomes ; Price Changes ; Prices ; Production ; Theory ; Trade ; Trade Liberalization ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Costs ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Variables ; Welfare
    Abstract: What effect does distance have on costs for economies at different locations? Exports and imports of final and intermediate goods bear transport costs that increase with distance. Production and trade depend on factor endowments and factor intensities as well as on distance and the transport intensities of different goods. - The combination of distance, poor infrastructure, and being landlocked by neighbors with poor infrastructure can make transport costs many times higher for some developing countries than for most others. Drawing on two traditions of economic modeling - Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory and von Thunen's work on the isolated state - Venables and Limão analyze the trade and production patterns of countries located at varying distances from an economic center. Predicting a country's production and trade pattern requires knowledge of the country's location, its factor endowment, and the factor intensities and transport intensities of goods. Venables and Limão define transport intensity and show how location and transport intensity should be combined with factor abundance and factor intensity in determining trade flows. A theory based on only one set of those variables, such as factor abundance, will systematically make incorrect predictions. They report that geography and endowments interact in such a way that the world divides up into economic zones with different trade patterns. Countries close to the economic center may specialize in transport-intensive activities; countries further out become diversified, producing and sometimes trading more goods; countries still further out may become import-substituting (replacing some of their imports from the center with local production); in the extreme, regions become autarkic. More remote locations have lower real incomes. Globalization changes the terms of trade, improving the welfare of regions further out from economic centers, though reducing the welfare of closer regions. Where will a new activity, such as assembly of a new product, locate? Remote locations are disadvantaged if the product has high transport intensity (perhaps because of heavy requirements for intermediate inputs). But the costs of remoteness are already incorporated into the factor prices of those regions, which makes them more attractive. Which location is chosen depends, therefore, on how existing activities compare with the new activity in transport intensity and factor intensity. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the location of economic activity. The authors may be contacted at avenablesworldbank.org or ngl4@columbia.edu
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (36 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Venables, Anthony Regional Integration Agreements
    Keywords: Agriculture ; Comparative Advantage ; Consumers ; Country Strategy and Performance ; Development Economics ; Economic Integration ; Economic Performance ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Free Trade ; Free Trade ; Human Capital ; Income ; Income ; Income Levels ; Inequality ; International Economics & Trade ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Outcomes ; Per Capita Income ; Per Capita Incomes ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Production ; Public Sector Development ; Real Income ; Social Protections and Labor ; Theory ; Trade Diversion ; Trade Law ; Trade Policy ; Trade and Regional Integration ; Value ; Value Added ; Welfare ; Agriculture ; Comparative Advantage ; Consumers ; Country Strategy and Performance ; Development Economics ; Economic Integration ; Economic Performance ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Free Trade ; Free Trade ; Human Capital ; Income ; Income ; Income Levels ; Inequality ; International Economics & Trade ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Outcomes ; Per Capita Income ; Per Capita Incomes ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Production ; Public Sector Development ; Real Income ; Social Protections and Labor ; Theory ; Trade Diversion ; Trade Law ; Trade Policy ; Trade and Regional Integration ; Value ; Value Added ; Welfare
    Abstract: December 1999 - Developing countries may be better served by north-south than by south-south free trade agreements. Free trade agreements between low-income countries tend to lead to divergence in member country incomes, while agreements between high-income countries tend to lead to convergence. Venables examines how benefits - and costs - of a free trade area are divided among member countries. Outcomes depend on the member countries' comparative advantage, relative to one another and to the rest of the world. Venables finds that free trade agreements between low-income countries tend to lead to divergence in member country incomes, while agreements between high-income countries tend to lead to convergence. Changes induced by comparative advantage may be amplified by the effects of agglomeration. The results suggest that developing countries may be better served by north-south than by south-south free trade agreements, because north-south agreements increase their prospects for convergence with high-income members of the free trade area. In north-south free trade agreements, additional forces are likely to operate. The agreement may be used, for example, as a commitment mechanism to lock in economic reforms (as happened in Mexico with the North American Free Trade Agreement and in Eastern European countries with the European Union). A free trade agreement may also - through its effect on trade and through foreign direct investment - promote technology transfer to lower-income members. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the effects of regional integration. The author may be contacted at avenablesworldbank.org
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  • 11
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (34 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Venables, Anthony The Geography of International Investment
    Keywords: Debt Markets ; Development ; Economic Geography ; Economic Size ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Exports ; Externalities ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Foreign Direct Investment ; GDP ; Goods ; Income ; Industrial Economies ; Inputs ; International Economics & Trade ; Investment ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets ; Mergers ; Non Bank Financial Institutions ; Private Sector Development ; Production ; Social Protections and Labor ; Theory ; Trade ; Trade and Regional Integration ; Transition Economies ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Value ; Variable Costs ; Debt Markets ; Development ; Economic Geography ; Economic Size ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Exports ; Externalities ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Foreign Direct Investment ; GDP ; Goods ; Income ; Industrial Economies ; Inputs ; International Economics & Trade ; Investment ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets ; Mergers ; Non Bank Financial Institutions ; Private Sector Development ; Production ; Social Protections and Labor ; Theory ; Trade ; Trade and Regional Integration ; Transition Economies ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Value ; Variable Costs
    Abstract: May 2000 - Multinationals have become increasingly important to the world economy. Overseas production by U.S. affiliates is three times U.S. exports, for example. Who is investing where, for sales where? Much foreign direct investment is between high-income countries, but investment in some developing and transition regions, while still modest, grew rapidly in the 1990s. Adjusting for market size, much investment stays close to home; adjusting for distance, much heads toward the countries with the biggest markets. Foreign direct investment is more geographically concentrated than either exports or production. Thus U.S. affiliate production in Europe is 7 times U.S. exports to Europe; that ratio drops to 4 for all industrial countries and to 1.6 for developing countries. Multinational activity in high-income countries is overwhelmingly horizontal, involving production for sale to the host country market. In developing countries, a greater proportion of multinational activity is vertical, involving manufacturing at intermediate stages of production. Thus only 4 percent of U.S. affiliate production in the European Union is sold back to the United States, whereas for developing countries the figure is 18 percent, rising to 40 percent for Mexico. Similarly, less than 10 percent of Japan's affiliate production in the EU is sold back to Japan, compared with more than 20 percent in developing countries. In models of horizontal activity, the decision to go multinational is a tradeoff between the additional fixed costs involved in setting up a new plant and the savings in variable costs (transport costs and tariffs) on exports. In models of vertical activity, direct investment is motivated by differences in factor costs. Tariffs and transport costs both encourage vertical multinational activity (by magnifying differences in factor prices) and discourage it (by making trade between headquarters and an affiliate more expensive). The major outward investors carry out much horizontal investment in large markets. For U.S. investors, this means Europe, especially the United Kingdom; for Japan and Europe, it means the United States. Most EU investments, however, stay within the EU. The major outward investors carry out much of their vertical investment closer to home: the United States, in Mexico; the EU, in Central and Eastern Europe; Japan, in Asia. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the location of economic activity. Anthony J. Venables may be contacted at a.j.venableslse.ac.uk
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  • 12
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (42 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure in the 1990s
    Keywords: Air ; Airports ; Bus ; Costs ; Driving ; Infrastructure Projects ; Private Transport ; Public Works ; Rail ; Railways ; Roads ; Safety ; Toll ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Activity ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Transport Infrastructure ; Transport Infrastructures ; Transport Operators ; Transport Policies ; Transport Projects ; Air ; Airports ; Bus ; Costs ; Driving ; Infrastructure Projects ; Private Transport ; Public Works ; Rail ; Railways ; Roads ; Safety ; Toll ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Activity ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Transport Infrastructure ; Transport Infrastructures ; Transport Operators ; Transport Policies ; Transport Projects
    Abstract: Learning to regulate fairly, effectively, and at arm's length may be the main challenge governments face in attracting private investment and financing to the transport sector. - Governments should increasingly be able to rely on the private sector for help supporting (and financing) the transport sector - especially infrastructure support services for which there is heavy demand - but first they must improve their regulatory tools and sort out the institutional mess surrounding the regulatory process. Some countries have put together creative restructuring models and financing designs that tap potential in the private sector. Roads will continue to need significant public funding, but there are innovative ways (including shadow tolls) to attract private financing for road maintenance and investment. Partnerships between the public and private sectors have remained largely untapped at ports and airports. To attract more private capital to the sector, regulators must know the cost of capital, know how to be fair to captive shippers, and have a better handle on demand - so they have more credibility when conflicts arise. Governments have overemphasized making deals and have generally underestimated the difficulty of taking on their new job as regulators. They are increasingly switching to contract-based regulation, to firm up the commitments of all parties involved, but are not adequately emphasizing contract design that anticipates problems and addresses unpredictable situations. This increases the risk of arbitrary regulatory rulings, which increases regulatory and political risks, which raises the expected rate of return required by potential investors. And all that makes future projects costlier or more difficult, adding to the effects of the 1998-99 financial crisis. As a result of increased risk, the two groups most interested in the sector are: · Large, strong operators in the sector - typically in tandem with local construction companies - that feel confident they can take on regulators in case of conflict. · Risk-takers carving a niche for themselves. Either way, taxpayers and transport users are exposed to government, regulator, or operator failures that result in contract renegotiations (the norm, rather than the exception, in transport infrastructure projects). Gains from privatization might not reach consumers, simply because governments are ignoring the importance of ensuring fair distribution of long-run gains through the early creation of independent and accountable regulatory institutions that work closely with effective competition agencies. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The author may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org
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  • 13
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (46 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Halpern, Jonathan Information and Modeling Issues in Designing Water and Sanitation Subsidy Schemes
    Keywords: Administrative Procedures ; Consumption ; Consumption ; Consumption Patterns ; Cred Demand ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Empirical Analysis ; Environment ; Environmental Economics and Policies ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Incentives ; Income ; Information ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Need ; Options ; Poverty ; Private Sector Development ; Revenue ; Standards ; Subsidies ; Tariffs ; Town Water Supply and Sanitation ; Values ; Water ; Water Conservation ; Water Resources ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions ; Water Use ; Willingness To Pay ; Wtp ; Administrative Procedures ; Consumption ; Consumption ; Consumption Patterns ; Cred Demand ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Empirical Analysis ; Environment ; Environmental Economics and Policies ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Incentives ; Income ; Information ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Need ; Options ; Poverty ; Private Sector Development ; Revenue ; Standards ; Subsidies ; Tariffs ; Town Water Supply and Sanitation ; Values ; Water ; Water Conservation ; Water Resources ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions ; Water Use ; Willingness To Pay ; Wtp
    Abstract: May 2000 - Evaluating design alternatives is a first step in introducing optimal water subsidy schemes. The definition of appropriate targeting criteria and subsidy levels needs to be supported by empirical analysis, generally an informationally demanding exercise. An assessment carried out in Panama revealed that targeting individual households would be preferable to geographically based targeting. Empirical analysis also showed that only a small group of very poor households needed a subsidy to pay their water bill. In designing a rational scheme for subsidizing water services, it is important to support the choice of design parameters with empirical analysis that simulates the impact of subsidy options on the target population. Otherwise, there is little guarantee that the subsidy program will meet its objectives. But such analysis is informationally demanding. Ideally, researchers should have access to a single, consistent data set containing household-level information on consumption, willingness to pay, and a range of socioeconomic characteristics. Such a comprehensive data set will rarely exist. G-mez-Lobo, Foster, and Halpern suggest overcoming this data deficiency by collating and imaginatively manipulating different sources of data to generate estimates of the missing variables. The most valuable sources of information, they explain, are likely to be the following: · Customer databases of the water company, which provide robust information on the measured consumption of formal customers but little information on unmeasured consumption, informal customers, willingness to pay, or socioeconomic variables. · General socioeconomic household surveys, which are an excellent source of socioeconomic information but tend to record water expenditure rather than physical consumption. · Willingness-to-pay surveys, which are generally tailored to a specific project, are very flexible, and may be the only source of willingness-to-pay data. However, they are expensive to undertake and the information collected is based on hypothetical rather than real behavior. Where such surveys are unavailable, international benchmark values on willingness to pay may be used. Combining data sets requires some effort and creativity, and creates difficulties of its own. But once a suitable data set has been constructed, a simulation model can be created using simple spreadsheet software. The model used to design Panama's water subsidy proposal addressed these questions: · What are the targeting properties of different eligibility criteria for the subsidy? · How large should the subsidy be? · How much will the subsidy scheme cost, including administrative costs? Armed with the above information, policymakers should be in a position to design a subsidy program that reaches the intended beneficiaries, provides them with the level of financial support that is strictly necessary, meets the overall budget restrictions, and does not waste an excessive amount of funding on administrative costs. This paper - a product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to evaluate and disseminate lessons of experience in designing policies to improve the quality and sustainability of infrastructure services and to enhance the access of the poor to these basic services. The authors may be contacted at vfosterworldbank.org or jhalpern@worldbank.org
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