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  • 1
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Oxford : Oxford University Press USA - OSO
    ISBN: 9780192594082
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 online resource (227 pages)
    Paralleltitel: Erscheint auch als
    DDC: 303.38501
    Schlagwort(e): Prejudices-Philosophy ; Knowledge, Theory of ; Responsibility ; Electronic books
    Kurzfassung: Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense? Endre Begby argues that it is a mistake to think of prejudice as the result of epistemic irresponsibility: prejudiced belief is often epistemically justified. Avoiding harmful prejudice is a matter of ethical responsibility not epistemic responsibility.
    Kurzfassung: Cover -- Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 0.1 Chapter-by-Chapter Overview -- Chapter 1: Prejudice from an Epistemological Point of View -- 1.1 Defining Prejudice -- 1.2 Epistemic Normativity -- 1.3 Justified Belief and Epistemic Rationality -- 1.4 Evidence, Truth, and Knowledge -- 1.5 Belief, Credence, and Acceptance -- 1.6 Conclusion -- Chapter 2: The Psychology of Stereotypes -- 2.1 Prejudices as Stereotypes -- 2.2 The Cognitive Fundamentality of Stereotypes -- 2.2.1 The Role of Stereotypes in Social Cognition -- 2.3 Excursion: Why Not Implicit Bias? -- 2.4 Summary and Look Ahead -- Chapter 3: From Psychology to Philosophy: The Case for a Non-Ideal Epistemology -- 3.1 Dimensions of Non-Ideal Epistemology (i): Endogenous Non-Ideality -- 3.1.1 Objections to Non-Idealized Epistemic Normativity -- 3.2 Dimensions of Non-Ideal Epistemology (ii): Exogenous Non-Ideality -- 3.2.1 Justified Belief under Bad Ideology -- 3.3 Summary and Look Ahead -- Chapter 4: The Epistemology of Prejudice Acquisition -- 4.1 Acquisition by Induction -- 4.1.1 Inductive Overreach? -- 4.1.2 No Justified Induction Whatsoever? -- 4.1.3 The Viability of Induction in Social Cognition -- 4.2 Acquisition by Testimony -- 4.2.1 A Literary Example -- 4.2.2 Beyond Individual Experience: Social Epistemology and Social Evidence -- 4.3 Summary -- Chapter 5: The Epistemology of Prejudice Maintenance -- 5.1 Cognitive Inflexibility and the "Prejudiced Frame of Mind" -- 5.2 Solomon Goes to University -- 5.2.1 Social Stereotypes as Generic Judgments -- 5.2.2 Tallying the Evidence -- 5.3 Harry goes to Hogwarts -- 5.4 New Evidence in Light of Old Beliefs -- 5.4.1 How Much Resistance? -- 5.5 Summary -- Chapter 6: Evidential Preemption -- 6.1 Evidential Preemption: The Very Idea -- 6.1.1 Motivating Testimony.
    Anmerkung: Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    Buch
    Buch
    Oxford : Oxford University Press
    ISBN: 9780192885258
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: VIII, 218 Seiten , 22 cm
    Paralleltitel: Erscheint auch als Begby, Endre Prejudice
    DDC: 303.38501
    RVK:
    Schlagwort(e): Prejudices Philosophy ; Knowledge, Theory of ; Responsibility ; Ethics & moral philosophy ; Ethik und Moralphilosophie ; PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology ; PSYCHOLOGY / Interpersonal Relations ; PSYCHOLOGY / Social Psychology ; Philosophie: Epistemologie und Erkenntnistheorie ; Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge ; Social, group or collective psychology ; Sozialpsychologie ; Vorurteil
    Kurzfassung: Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense are they defective? Many will be false and harmful, but philosophers have further argued that prejudiced belief is defective also in the sense that it could only arise from distinctive kinds of epistemic irrationality: we could acquire or retain our prejudiced beliefs only by violating our epistemic responsibilities. It is also assumed that we are only morally responsible for the harmsthat prejudiced beliefs cause because, in forming these beliefs in the first place, we are violating our epistemic responsibilities. In Prejudice, Endre Begby argues that these common convictions are misguided. His discussion shows in detail that there are many epistemically justified pathways toprejudiced belief, and that it is a mistake to lean on the concept of epistemic responsibility to articulate our ethical responsibilities. Doing so unreasonably burdens victims of prejudice with having to show that their victimizers were in a position to know better. Accordingly, Begby provides an account of moral responsibility for harm which does not depend on finding grounds for epistemic blame. This view is supported by a number of examples and case studies at individual, collective, andinstitutional levels of decision making. Additionally, Begby develops a systematic platform for "non-ideal epistemology" which would apply to a wide range of other social and epistemic phenomena of current concern, such as fake news, conspiracy theories, science scepticism, and more
    Anmerkung: Originally published: 2021 , Interessenniveau: 06, Professional and scholarly: For an expert adult audience, including academic research. (06)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 3
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Oxford : Oxford University Press
    ISBN: 9780191887130
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (224 pages) , Illustrations (colour)
    Ausgabe: First edition.
    Serie: Oxford scholarship online
    DDC: 303.38501
    RVK:
    Schlagwort(e): Prejudices Philosophy
    Kurzfassung: Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense? Endre Begby argues that it is a mistake to think of prejudice as the result of epistemic irresponsibility: prejudiced belief is often epistemically justified. Avoiding harmful prejudice is a matter of ethical responsibility not epistemic responsibility.
    Anmerkung: This edition also issued in print: 2021 , Includes bibliographical references and index
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 4
    Artikel
    Artikel
    Dazugehörige Bände/Artikel
    In:  The Routledge companion to hermeneutics (2015), Seite 612-622 | year:2015 | pages:612-622
    ISBN: 9780415644587
    Sprache: Unbestimmte Sprache
    Titel der Quelle: The Routledge companion to hermeneutics
    Publ. der Quelle: London [u.a.] : Routledge, 2015
    Angaben zur Quelle: (2015), Seite 612-622
    Angaben zur Quelle: year:2015
    Angaben zur Quelle: pages:612-622
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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