Format:
1 online resource (224 pages)
,
illustrations (colour).
Edition:
First edition
ISBN:
9780191887130
Series Statement:
Oxford scholarship online
Content:
Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense? Endre Begby argues that it is a mistake to think of prejudice as the result of epistemic irresponsibility: prejudiced belief is often epistemically justified. Avoiding harmful prejudice is a matter of ethical responsibility not epistemic responsibility.
Note:
This edition also issued in print: 2021. - Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on February 15, 2021)
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780198852834
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Begby, Endre Prejudice Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2022 ISBN 9780192885258
Language:
English
Subjects:
Philosophy
Keywords:
Vorurteil
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198852834.001.0001
