Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten)
,
Illustrationen
Series Statement:
Policy research working paper 9395
Series Statement:
World Bank E-Library Archive
Series Statement:
Policy research working paper
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als Leaver, Clare Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
Keywords:
2016-2017
;
Leistungsentgelt
;
Zeitlohn
;
Personalbeschaffung
;
Mitarbeiterbindung
;
Lehrkräfte
;
Beamte
;
Grundschule
;
Experiment
;
Ruanda
;
Graue Literatur
Abstract:
This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection
DOI:
10.1596/1813-9450-9395
URL:
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