ISBN:
9781786434760
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (2 v)
,
cm
Series Statement:
Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
Series Statement:
International library of critical writings in economics
Keywords:
Transaction costs
;
Electronic books
Abstract:
Recommended readings (Machine generated): Williamson, Oliver E. and Scott E. Masten (1995), Transaction Cost Economics, Volume I: Theory and Concepts and Volume II: Policy and Applications, Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, VT, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1985), 'The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features', Chapter 6 in Oliver E. Williamson (ed.), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, New York: The Free Press, 131-62 and references -- Llewellyn, Karl (1931), 'What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective', Yale Law Journal, 40 (May), 704-51 -- Commons, John R. (1934), Institutional Economics, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press -- Barnard, Chester (1938), The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press (fifteenth printing, 1962) -- Coase, Ronald H. (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica N.S., 4, 386-405. Reprinted in Oliver E. Williamson and Sidney Winter (eds) (1991), The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, Development, New York: Oxford University Press, 18-33 -- Commons, John R. (1925), 'Law and Economics', Yale Law Journal, 34, 371-82. -- Hayek, Friedrich (1945), 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', American Economic Review, 35 (4), September, 519-30 -- Coase, Ronald H. (1988), 'The Nature of the Firm: Influence', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (1), Spring, 33-48 -- Coase, Ronald H. (1960), 'The Problem of Social Cost', Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (October), 1-44 -- Arrow, Kenneth J. (1969), 'The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation', in The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: The PPB System, Vol. 1, U.S. Joint Economic Committee, 91st Congress, 1st Session. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 59-73 -- Matthews, R.C.O. (1986), 'The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Economic Growth', Economic Journal, 96 (384), December, 903-18 -- Hodgson, Geoffrey (1988), Economics and Institutions, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press -- Posner, Richard A. (1993), 'The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (1), March, 73-87 -- Coase, Ronald H. (1972), 'Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research', in Victor R. Fuchs (ed.), Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. (Reprinted in The Economics of Transaction Costs, Volume I, Edward Elgar) -- Arrow, Kenneth J. (1974), The Limits of Organization (first edition), New York, NY, USA: W. W. Norton and Company Ltd. -- Simon, Herbert A. (1962), 'The Architecture of Complexity', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106 (6), December, 467-82 -- Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization', American Economic Review, LXII, December, 777-95 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), 'The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations', American Economic Review, 61 (2), May, 112-23.
Abstract:
Klein, Benjamin, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978), 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process', Journal of Law and Economics, XXI (2), October, 297-326 -- Demsetz, Harold (1988), 'The Theory of the Firm Revisited', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (1), Spring, 141-62 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal of Law and Economics, XXII (2), October, 233-61 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1991a), 'Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives', Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (2), June, 269-96 -- Teece, David J. (1982), 'Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, March, 39-63 -- Penrose, Edith Tilton (1959), The Theory of Growth of the Firm, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. -- Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler (1981), 'The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (4), August, 615-41 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1995), 'The Politics and Economics of Redistribution and Inefficiency', Greek Economic Review, 17 (2), December, 115-36 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1983), 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange', American Economic Review, 73 (4), September, 519-40 -- Machiavelli, Niccolo (1952), The Prince, New York: New American Library -- Greif, Avner (1993), 'Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition', American Economic Review, 83 (3), June, 525-48 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1991b), 'Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 159-87 -- Dixit, Avinash (2003), 'Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement', Journal of Political Economy, 111, December, 1293-317 -- Dixit, Avinash (2009), 'Governance Institutions and Economic Activity', American Economic Review, 99 (1), March, 5-24 -- Masten, Scott E. and Jens Prufer (2014), 'On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts', Journal of Legal Studies, 43 (2), June, 359-40 -- Kreps, David M. (1990), 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory', Chapter 4 in James E. Alt and Kenneth J. Shepsle (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 90-143, 240-41 (notes) -- Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691-719 -- Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990), 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), December, 1119-58 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization, New York: The Free Press.
Abstract:
Riordan, Michael H. (1990), 'What is Vertical Integration?', Chapter 5 in Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustafsson and Oliver E. Williamson (eds), The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, London: Sage Publications, 94-111 -- Arrow, Kenneth J. (1975), 'Vertical Integration and Communication', Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (1), Spring, 173-83 -- Tirole, Jean (1988), 'The Theory of the Firm', in The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 15-60 -- Hart, Oliver E. (2009), 'Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (1), February, 267-300 -- Goldberg, Victor P. and John R. Erickson (1987), 'Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke', Journal of Law and Economics, XXX (2), October, 369-98 -- Masten, Scott E. (1988), 'Equity, Opportunism, and the Design of Contractual Relations', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 144 (1), February, 180-95 -- Klein, Benjamin (1992), 'Contracts and Incentives', in Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander (eds), Contract Economics, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 149-72 -- Machlup, Fritz (1967), 'Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial', American Economic Review, 57 (1), March, 1-33 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1968), 'A Dynamic-Stochastic Theory of Managerial Behavior', in Almarin Phillips and Oliver Williamson (eds), Prices: Issues in Theory, Practice, and Public Policy, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, page numbers unavailable -- Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1990), 'Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity', Chapter 3 in James E. Alt and Kenneth J. Shepsle (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 57-89, 234-40 (notes) -- Tullock, Gordon (1967), 'The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopoly, and Theft', Western Economic Journal, 5 (3), June, 224-32 -- Krueger, Anne (1974), 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic Review, 64 (3), June, 291-303 -- Schelling, Thomas C. (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press -- Barzel, Yoram (1982), 'Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets', Journal of Law and Economics, 25 (1), April, 27-48 -- Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), 'Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 24-52 -- Aoki, Masahiko (1990), 'Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm', Journal of Economic Literature, XXVIII (1), March, 1-27 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1991), 'Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization', Strategic Management Journal, 12 (S2), Winter, 75-94 -- Hansmann, Henry (1988), 'Ownership of the Firm', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (2), Fall, 267-304 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (2008), 'Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 24 (2), October, 247-72.
Abstract:
Williamson, Oliver E. (1988), 'Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance', Journal of Finance, 43, July, 567-91 -- Macher, Jeffrey T. and Barak D. Richman (2008), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences', Business and Politics, 10, 1-63 -- Klein, Peter G. and Howard A. Shelanski (1995), 'Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment', Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 11 (2), October, 335-61 -- Crocker, Keith J. and Scott E. Masten (1996), 'Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation', Journal of Regulatory Economics, 9 (1), January, 5-39 -- Masten, Scott E. (1996), Case Studies in Contracting and Organization, New York: Oxford University Press -- Lafontaine, Francine and Margaret Slade (2007), 'Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence', Journal of Economic Literature, 45 (3), September, 629-85 -- Simon, Herbert (1991), 'Organizations and Markets', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (2), Spring, 25-44 -- Klein, Benjamin (1988), 'Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (1), Spring, 199-213 -- Coase, Ronald H. (2000), 'The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors',Journal of Law and Economics, 43 (1), April, 15-31 -- Coase, R.H. (2006), 'The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15 (2), Summer, 255-78 -- Chandler, Alfred D. and Stephen Salsbury (1971), Pierre S. Du Pont and the Making of the Modern Corporation, New York: Harper and Row -- Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon and Daniel Spulber, 2000, 'The Fable of Fisher Body', Journal of Law and Economics, 43 (1), April, 67-104 -- Klein, B. (2007), 'The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body-General Motors', International Journal of the Economics of Business, 14 (1), February, 1-36 -- Joskow, Paul L. (1985), 'Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1 (1), Fall, 33-80 -- Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), 'Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry', Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (1), Spring, 206-13 -- Masten, Scott E. (1984), 'The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVII (2), October, 403-17 -- Anderson, Erin and David C. Schmittlein (1984), 'Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination', RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (3), Autumn, 385-95 -- John, George and Barton A. Weitz (1988), 'Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (2), Fall, 337-50 -- Masten, Scott E., James W. Meehan, Jr. and Edward A. Synder (1991), 'The Costs of Organization', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1), Spring, 1-25.
Abstract:
Forbes, Silke and Mara Lederman (2009), 'Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry', American Economic Review, 99 (5), December, 1831-49 -- Palay, Thomas M. (1984), 'Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting', Journal of Legal Studies, XIII (2), June, 265-87 -- Joskow, Paul L. (1987), 'Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets', American Economic Review, 77 (1), March, 168-85 -- Lyons, Bruce R. (1994), 'Contracts and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Theory', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 3 (2), June, 257-78 -- Mulherin, J. Harold (1986), 'Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1), Spring, 105-17 -- Masten, Scott. E. and Keith J. Crocker (1985), 'Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas', American Economic Review, 75 (5), December, 1083-93 -- Leffler, Keith B. and Randal R. Rucker (1991), 'Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts', Journal of Political Economy, 99 (5), October, 1060-87 -- Crocker, Keith J. and Scott E. Masten (1991), 'Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXIV (1), April, 69-99 -- Pirrong, Stephen Craig (1993), 'Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A Transactions Cost Explanation', Journal of Law and Economics, 36 (2), October, 937-76 -- Masten, Scott E. (2009), 'Long-Term Contracts and Short-Term Commitment: Price Determination for Heterogeneous Freight Transactions', American Law and Economics Review, 11, Spring, 79-111 -- Oyer, Paul (2004), 'Why Do Firms Use Incentives that Have no Incentive Effects?' Journal of Finance, 59 (4), August, 1619-50 -- Ahmadjian, Christina L. and Joanne E. Oxley (2013), 'Vertical Relationships, Hostages, Supplier Performance: Evidence from the Japanese Automotive Industry', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 29, June, 495-513 -- Ahmadjian, Christina L, and Joanne E. Oxley (2006), Using Hostages to Support Exchange: Dependence Balancing and Equity Ties in Japanese Automotive Supply Relationships', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 22 (1), April, 213-33 -- Demsetz, Harold (1968), 'Why Regulate Utilities?' Journal of Law and Economics, 11 (1), 55-65 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - In General and with Respect to CATV', Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (1), Spring, 73-104 -- Goldberg, Victor P. (1976), 'Regulation and Administered Contracts', Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (2), Autumn, 426-48 -- Priest, George L. (1993), 'The Origins of Utility Regulation and the 'Theories of Regulation" Debate', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXVI (1), Part 2, April, 289-323 -- Levy, Brian and Pablo T. Spiller (1994), 'The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10 (2), Fall, 201-46 -- Spiller, Pablo T. (2012), 'Transaction Cost Regulation', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 89, May, 232-42.
Abstract:
Bajari, Patrick, Robert McMillan and Steven Tadelis (2009), 'Auctions versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 25 (2), October, 372-99 -- Bajari, Patrick, Stephanie Houghton and Steven Tadelis (2014), 'Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs', American Economic Review, 104 (4), April, 1831-49 -- North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast (1989), 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England', Journal of Economic History, XLIX (4), December, 803-32 -- Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall (1988), 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1), 132-63 -- Gely, Rafael and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (2), Fall, 263-300 -- Crocker, Keith J. and Scott E. Masten (1988), 'Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length', RAND Journal of Economics, 19 (3), Autumn, 327-43 -- Joskow, Paul (1991), 'The Role of Transaction Costs Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1), Spring, 55-87 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1979), 'Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 127, April, 953-93 -- Kenney, Roy W. and Benjamin Klein (1983), 'The Economics of Block Booking', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (3), October, 497-540 -- Masten, Scott E. and Edward A. Snyder (1993), 'United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXVI (1), Part 1, April, 33-70 -- Liebowitz, Stan J. and Stephen E. Margolis (1995), 'Path-dependence, Lock-in, and History', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11 (1), April, 205-26 -- Furubotn, Eirik G. and Rudolf Richter (1991), 'The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment', in The New Institutional Economics, College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1-32 -- Coase, Ronald H. (1993), 'Coase on Posner on Coase', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (1), March, 96-98 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (1993), 'Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (1), March, 99-118 -- Ronald H. Coase (1991), 'The Institutional Structure of Production', Les Prix Nobel, Nobel Lecture, December 9, 193-202 -- Williamson, Oliver E. (2010), 'Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression', American Economic Review, 100 (3), June, 673-90 -- Ramseyer, J. Mark (1991), 'Indentured Prostitution in Imperial Japan: Credible Commitments in the Commercial Sex Industry', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7 (1), Spring, 89-116 -- Cohen, Dara K., Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, and Barry R. Weingast (2006), 'Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates', Stanford Law Review, 59 (3), 673-760 -- Crocker, Keith J. and Kenneth J. Reynolds (1993), 'The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement', RAND Journal of Economics, 24(1) (Spring), 126-146.
Abstract:
Nickerson, Jackson A. and Brian S. Silverman (2003), 'Why Aren't All Truck Drivers Owner-Operators? Asset Ownership and the Employment Relation in Interstate for-hire Trucking', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 12 (1), Spring, 91-118 -- Arruñada, Benito, Manuel Gonzalez-Dıaz and Alberto Fernandez (2004), 'Determinants of Organizational Form: Transaction Costs and Institutions in the European Trucking Industry', Industrial and Corporate Change, 13 (6), December, 867-82 -- Baumol, William J. and J. Gregory Sidak (1994), Toward Competition in Local Telephony, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press -- Masten, Scott E. (2011), 'Public Utility Ownership in 19th-Century America: The 'Aberrant" Case of Water', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 27(3), October, 604-654 -- Masten, Scott E. (2006), 'Authority and Commitment: Why Universities, Like Legislatures, Are Not Organized As Firms', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15 (3), Fall, 649-84 -- Wright, Joshua D. (2010), 'The Chicago School, Transaction Cost Economics and Antitrust', in Peter G. Klein and Michael E. Sykuta (eds), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 230-43 -- R.H. Coase (1972), 'Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research', in Victor R. Fuchs (ed.), Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 59-73 -- Kenneth J. Arrow (1974), 'Organization and Information', in The Limits of Organization, New York: W.W. Norton, 33-43 -- Herbert A. Simon (1962), 'The Architecture of Complexity', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106 (6), December, 467-82 -- Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization', American Economic Review, LXII, December, 777-95 -- Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978), 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process', Journal of Law and Economics, XXI (2), October, 297-326 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal of Law and Economics, XXII (2), October, 233-61 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1991), 'Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives', Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (2), June, 269-96 -- David J. Teece (1982), 'Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, March, 39-63 -- Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), 'The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (4), August, 615-41 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1983), 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange', American Economic Review, 73 (4), September, 519-40 -- Avner Greif (1993), 'Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition', American Economic Review, 83 (3), June, 525-48 -- Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989), 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England', Journal of Economic History, XLIX (4), December, 803-32 -- Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691-719.
Abstract:
Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), December, 1119-58 -- Michael H. Riordan (1990), 'What Is Vertical Integration?', in Masahiko Aoki , Bo Gustafsson and Oliver E. Williamson (eds), The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, Chapter 5, London: Sage Publications, 94-111 -- Jean Tirole (1988), 'The Theory of the Firm', in Jean Tirole (ed.), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 15-60 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 'The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features', Chapter 6 in Oliver E. Williamson (ed.), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press, 131-62 and references -- Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990), 'Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity', Chapter 3 in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 57-89, notes 234-40 -- David M. Kreps (1990), 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory', Chapter 4 in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 90-143, notes 240-41 -- Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), 'Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 24-52 -- Masahiko Aoki (1990), 'Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm', Journal of Economic Literature, XXVIII (1), March, 1-27 -- Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (1991), 'The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment', in Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (eds), The New Institutional Economics, College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1-32 -- Ronald H. Coase (1991), 'The Institutional Structure of Production', Les Prix Nobel, Nobel Lecture, December 9, 193-202 -- Richard A. Posner (1993), 'The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (1), March, 73-87 -- Ronald H. Coase (1993), 'Coase on Posner on Coase', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (1), March, 96-8 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1993), 'Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (1), March, 99-118 -- Benjamin Klein (1988), 'Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (1), Spring, 199-213 -- Paul L. Joskow (1985), 'Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1 (1), Fall, 33-80 -- Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece (1982), 'Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry', Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (1), Spring, 206-13 -- Scott E. Masten (1984), 'The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVII (2), October, 403-17 -- Erin Anderson and David C. Schmittlein (1984), 'Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination', Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (3), Autumn, 385-95 -- George John and Barton A. Weitz (1988), 'Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (2), Fall, 337-55.
Abstract:
Scott E. Masten, James W. Meehan, Jr. and Edward A. Snyder (1991), 'The Costs of Organization', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1), Spring, 1-25 -- Thomas M. Palay (1984), 'Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting', Journal of Legal Studies, XIII (2), June, 265-87 -- Victor P. Goldberg and John R. Erickson (1987), 'Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke', Journal of Law and Economics, XXX (2), October, 369-98 -- Paul L. Joskow (1987), 'Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets', American Economic Review, 77 (1), March, 168-85 -- J. Harold Mulherin (1986), 'Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1), Spring, 105-17 -- Scott E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker (1985), 'Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas', American Economic Review, 75 (5), December, 1083-93 -- Keith B. Leffler and Randal R. Rucker (1991), 'Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts', Journal of Political Economy, 99 (5), October, 1060-87 -- Keith J. Crocker and Scott E. Masten (1991), 'Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXIV (1), April, 69-99 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1976), 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - In General and with Respect to CATV', Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (1), Spring, 73-104 -- Victor P. Goldberg (1976), 'Regulation and Administered Contracts', Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (2), Autumn, 426-48 -- George L. Priest (1993), 'The Origins of Utility Regulation and the 'Theories of Regulation" Debate', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXVI (1), Part 2, April, 289-323 -- Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller, 'The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation', now published in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10 (2), Fall, 1994, 201-46 -- Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall (1988), 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1), 132-63 -- Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (2), Fall, 263-300 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 127, April, 953-93 -- Roy W. Kenney and Benjamin Klein (1983), 'The Economics of Block Booking', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (3), October, 497-540 -- Scott E. Masten and Edward A. Snyder (1993), 'United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXVI (1), Part 1, April, 33-70.
Abstract:
Transaction cost economics began to take shape about 25 years ago. Although 25 years is comparatively young in the analytical scheme of things, numerous applications have been made and more are in prospect. Volume I deals with theory and concepts and volume II deals with applications and policy. This is an important selection of key articles on transaction cost economics by distinguished scholars including Ronald Coase, Herbert Simon, Kenneth Arrow and Richard A. Posner. This research review addresses key areas such as private ordering and credibility, contracts and organization, internal organization, vertical integration and contracting
Note:
The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings
,
Includes bibliographical references and index
DOI:
10.4337/9781786434760
URL:
Deutschlandweit zugänglich
URL:
Deutschlandweit zugänglich
Permalink
