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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Paris : OECD Publishing
    Language: English
    Pages: 53 p. , 21 x 29.7cm
    Series Statement: OECD Development Centre Working Papers no.122
    Keywords: Development
    Abstract: This paper sets out a framework within which the problem of corruption may be analysed in any specific country. It does not seek to establish the importance of such activity in a general sense, or seek to propose particular economic policy or institutional programmes that should be pursued in order to reduce the impact on the development process. Rather, the objective is to provide a structure for two distinct areas of analysis. Firstly, it considers the investigation of the determinants of corruption, emphasising the environment in which corruption evolves — whether shaped by international, national or specific institutional factors — and the manner in which the different parties to corruption interact and organise themselves in conducting these activities. Secondly, the paper focuses on the importance of corruption for economic development by considering the different forms of corruption and the characteristics of these forms that are most critical for economic activity ...
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: 31 p. , 21 x 29.7cm
    Series Statement: OECD Development Centre Working Papers no.138
    Keywords: Development
    Abstract: Corruption in customs administrations is a major problem in many African countries. Data from the period 1990-96 are used to examine several hypotheses concerning the determinants of customs fraud in Senegal and Mali. Statistical tests using product-by-product data support the widely held view that high levels of taxation lead to fraud. The findings also show that hiring a pre-shipment inspection company can be an effective tool in fighting corruption, but only if it is accompanied by internal reforms like computerisation of customs procedures. Finally, changes in determinants of corruption, such as levels of taxation, have themselves depended upon broader political changes in each of the two countries ...
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  • 3
    ISBN: 9780691177465 , 9780691228976
    Language: English
    Pages: xii, 406 Seiten , Illustrationen, Diagramme
    Series Statement: The Princeton economic history of the Western world
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Stasavage, David The decline and rise of democracy
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Stasavage, David The Decline and Rise of Democracy
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Stasavage, David The decline and rise of democracy
    DDC: 321.809
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    Keywords: Democracy History ; Political science History ; World politics History ; Politisches System ; Demokratie ; Parlamentarismus ; Governance ; Staat ; Funktion ; Geschichte ; Erde ; Demokratie ; Weltpolitik ; Politische Wissenschaft ; Geschichte ; Demokratie ; Weltpolitik ; Politische Wissenschaft ; Geschichte
    Abstract: Historical accounts of democracy’s rise tend to focus on ancient Greece and pre-Renaissance Europe. The Decline and Rise of Democracy draws from global evidence to show that the story is much richer - democratic practices were present in many places, at many other times, from the Americas before European conquest, to ancient Mesopotamia, to precolonial Africa. Delving into the prevalence of early democracy throughout the world, David Stasavage makes the case that understanding how and where these democracies flourished - and when and why they declined - can provide crucial information not just about the history of governance, but also about the ways modern democracies work and where they could manifest in the future. Drawing from examples spanning several millennia, Stasavage first considers why states developed either democratic or autocratic styles of governance and argues that early democracy tended to develop in small places with a weak state and, counterintuitively, simple technologies. When central state institutions (such as a tax bureaucracy) were absent - as in medieval Europe - rulers needed consent from their populace to govern. When central institutions were strong - as in China or the Middle East - consent was less necessary and autocracy more likely. He then explores the transition from early to modern democracy, which first took shape in England and then the United States, illustrating that modern democracy arose as an effort to combine popular control with a strong state over a large territory. Democracy has been an experiment that has unfolded over time and across the world - and its transformation is ongoing.
    Note: Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
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  • 4
    Article
    Article
    In:  43/1, 2005, S. 53-73
    Language: English
    Angaben zur Quelle: 43/1, 2005, S. 53-73
    Note: David Stasavage
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  • 5
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (54 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Keefer, Philip Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions
    Keywords: Banks and Banking Reform ; Central Bank ; Central Bank Independence ; Central Banks ; Checks ; Contracts ; Credibility ; Credibility Problem ; Currencies and Exchange Rates ; Debt Markets ; Default ; Discount ; Economic Stabilization ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Investments ; Future ; Futures ; Holding ; ICT Applications ; Inflation ; Inflation Rate ; Information and Communication Technologies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Monetary Policy ; Money Supply ; Option ; Political Economy ; Private Sector Development ; Shocks To Income ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Central Bank ; Central Bank Independence ; Central Banks ; Checks ; Contracts ; Credibility ; Credibility Problem ; Currencies and Exchange Rates ; Debt Markets ; Default ; Discount ; Economic Stabilization ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Investments ; Future ; Futures ; Holding ; ICT Applications ; Inflation ; Inflation Rate ; Information and Communication Technologies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Monetary Policy ; Money Supply ; Option ; Political Economy ; Private Sector Development ; Shocks To Income
    Abstract: March 2000 - Does delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies improve policy outcomes? This paper reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation reduces inflation only under specific institutional and political conditions. The government's ability to credibly commit to policy announcements is critical to the successful implementation of economic policies as diverse as capital taxation and utilities regulation. One frequently advocated means of signaling credible commitment is to delegate authority to an agency that will not have an incentive to opportunistically change policies once the private sector has taken such steps as signing wage contracts or making irreversible investments. Delegating authority is suggested as a government strategy particularly for monetary policy. And existing work on the independence of central banks generally assumes that government decisions to delegate are irrevocable. But delegation - in monetary policy as elsewhere - is inevitably a political choice, and can be reversed, contend Keefer and Stasavage. They develop a model of monetary policy that relaxes the assumption that monetary delegation is irreversible. Among the testable predictions of the model are these: · The presence of an independent central bank should reduce inflation only in the presence of political checks and balances. This effect should be evident in both developing and industrial countries. · Political actions to interfere with the central bank should be more apparent when there are few checks and balances. · The effects of checks and balances should be more marked when political decisionmakers are more polarized. The authors test these predictions and find extensive empirical evidence to support each of the observable implications of their model: Central banks are associated with better inflation outcomes in the presence of checks and balances. The turnover of central bank governors is reduced when governors have tenure protections supported by political checks and balances. And the effect of checks and balances is enhanced in more polarized political environments. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to identify the conditions under which regulatory reforms can be effective. The authors may be contacted at pkeeferworldbank.org or d.stasavage@lse.ac.uk
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2542
    Parallel Title: Keefer, Philip Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
    Keywords: Banks and banking, Central ; Inflation (Finance) ; Banks and banking, Central ; Inflation (Finance)
    Abstract: In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies
    Note: Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 19, 2002 , Also available in print.
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 7
    Book
    Book
    New York : Russell Sage Foundation | Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press
    ISBN: 9780691165455 , 9780691178295
    Language: English
    Pages: xv, 266 Seiten , Illustrationen , 25 cm
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    Keywords: Vermögen ; Steuerprogression ; Besteuerungsprinzip ; Steuerbelastung ; Steuergerechtigkeit ; Steuerreform ; Vergleich ; USA ; Europa ; Japan ; Rich people Taxation ; History ; Rich people Taxation ; History ; Income tax History ; Income tax History ; Wealth History ; Wealth History ; Steuer ; Steuersystem ; Steuerpolitik ; Einkommenspolitik ; Einkommensteuer ; Öffentliche Ausgaben ; Soziale Gerechtigkeit ; Einstellung ; Akteur ; USA ; Europa ; USA ; Europa ; Steuer ; Steuerrecht ; Steuerprogression ; Verteilungsgerechtigkeit ; Geschichte 1800-2014
    Abstract: Taxing the Rich draws on unparalleled evidence from twenty countries over the last two centuries to provide the broadest and most in-depth history of progressive taxation available. Scheve and Stasavage explore the intellectual and political debates surrounding the taxation of the wealthy while also providing the most detailed examination to date of when taxes have been levied against the rich and when they haven't. Fairness in debates about taxing the rich has depended on different views of what it means to treat people as equals and whether taxing the rich advances or undermines this norm. Scheve and Stasavage argue that governments don't tax the rich just because inequality is high or rising--they do it when people believe that such taxes compensate for the state unfairly privileging the wealthy. Progressive taxation saw its heyday in the twentieth century, when compensatory arguments for taxing the rich focused on unequal sacrifice in mass warfare. Today, as technology gives rise to wars of more limited mobilization, such arguments are no longer persuasive. Taxing the Rich shows how the future of tax reform will depend on whether political and economic conditions allow for new compensatory arguments to be made. (Publisher's Web site)
    Note: Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 247-259. - Index: Seite 261-266
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