Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (214 S.)
Series Statement:
Metaphysical Research 1
Parallel Title:
Print version On Human Persons
DDC:
306.875
Keywords:
Philosophie Ontologie
;
Electronic books
;
Aufsatzsammlung
;
Aufsatzsammlung
Abstract:
Main description: There is no question: We are all persons. But what exactly are persons? Are we immaterial souls or Cartesian Egos which only contingently have bodies? Or are persons nothing over and above their bodies? Are they essentially or most fundamentally animals, evolved beings of a certain sort? Or are we something other or more than animals, namely constituted beings with a certain capacity that distinguishes persons from everything else? What is necessary, and what is sufficient, for an entity to be classified or (re-)identified as a person? What's the value of an analysis of such (biological or psychological) conditions? What does it contribute to our understanding of ourselves as free agents or as beings wanting to live their individual live? The essays collected in this anthology try to answer these questions. They are primarily concerned with the metaphysics of persons and the criteria of personal identity, but also touch on problems of the theory of action and of practical philosophy.
Description / Table of Contents:
Contents; Contributors; Preface; Eric T. Olson Warum wir Tiere sind*; Lynne Rudder Baker The Difference that Self-Consciousness Makes; Brian Garrett Some Thoughts on Animalism*; Paul Snowdon Objections to Animalism; Kevin J. Corcoran Biology or Psychology? Human Persons and Personal Identity; Käthe Trettin Persons and Other Trope Complexes Reflections on Ontology and Normativity; Blank Page; Michael B. Burke Is My Head a Person?; Klaus Petrus Human Persons Some Conceptual Remarks; Daniel Cohnitz Personal Identity and the Methodology of Imaginary Cases1; Daniel von Wachter Free Agents as Cause
Description / Table of Contents:
Thomas Spitzley Identität und Orientierung
Note:
Description based upon print version of record
DOI:
10.1515/9783110324648
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