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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (75 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Garcia-Santana, Manuel Understanding Home Bias in Procurement: Evidence from National and Subnational Governments
    Keywords: Border Effects ; Competition Policy ; Economic Integration ; Governance ; International Economics and Trade ; Local Bias ; Local Business Support ; National Bias ; Public Procurement
    Abstract: Are governments locally biased when buying goods and services? Can this home bias explain the low integration of procurement markets? Using one million procurement contracts awarded in France and Spain, this paper explores whether the home bias follows the government's geographical scope: national governments have a national bias, while subnational governments have a local bias. The relative home bias across governments is estimated by comparing how local and non-local establishments sell the same product to national and subnational governments in the same destination. This paper finds that the governments' home bias explains a big part of the high local concentration in procurement
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (90 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als di Giovanni, Julian Buy Big or Buy Small? Procurement Policies, Firms' Financing, and the Macroeconomy
    Keywords: Aggregate Productivity ; Business in Development ; Capital Accumulation ; Financial Friction ; Firm Dynamics ; Governance ; Government Procurement ; International Economics and Trade ; National Governance ; Private Sector Development ; Procurement Rules ; Small and Medium Size Enterprises ; Small Firm Growth Constraint
    Abstract: This paper provides a framework to study how different allocation systems of public procurement contracts affect firm dynamics and long-run macroeconomic outcomes. It builds a novel panel dataset for Spain that merges public procurement data, credit register loan data, and quasi-census firm-level data. The paper provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that procurement contracts act as collateral for firms and help them grow out of their financial constraints. The paper then builds a model of firm dynamics with asset- and earnings-based borrowing constraints and a government that buys goods and services from private sector firms, and uses it to quantify the long-run macroeconomic consequences of alternative procurement allocation systems. The findings show that policies which promote the participation of small firms have sizeable macroeconomic effects, but the net impact on aggregate output is ambiguous. While these policies help small firms grow and overcome financial constraints, which increases output in the long run, these policies also increase the cost of government purchases and reduce saving incentives for large firms, decreasing the effective provision of public goods and output in the private sector, respectively. The relative importance of these forces depends on how the policy is implemented and the type and strength of financial frictions
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