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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (34 p)
    Edition: 2012 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Andrew Beath Winning Hearts and Minds through Development?
    Abstract: In areas afflicted by civil conflict, development projects can potentially serve an important counterinsurgency function by redressing grievances of marginalized groups and reducing violence. Using a large-scale randomized field experiment in Afghanistan, this paper explores whether the inclusion of villages in the country's largest development program alters perceptions of well-being, attitudes toward government, and violence in surrounding areas. The results indicate that the program generally has a positive effect on all three measures, but has no effects in areas with high levels of initial violence. These findings demonstrate that development programs can buttress government support and limit the onset of insurgencies in relatively secure areas, but that their effectiveness is more constrained in areas where insurgents are already active
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (26 p)
    Edition: 2012 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Andrew Beath Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation
    Abstract: Direct democracy is designed to better align public resource allocation decisions with citizen preferences. Using a randomized field experiment in 250 villages across Afghanistan, this paper compares outcomes of secret-ballot referenda with those of consultation meetings, which adhere to customary decision-making practices. Elites are found to exert influence over meeting outcomes, but not over referenda outcomes, which are driven primarily by citizen preferences. Referenda are also found to improve public satisfaction, whereas elite domination of allocation processes has a negative effect. The results indicate that the use of direct democracy in public resource allocation results in more legitimate outcomes than those produced by customary processes
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (41 p)
    Edition: 2012 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Beath, Andrew Empowering Women
    Abstract: In societies with widespread gender discrimination, development programs that encourage female participation in local governance can potentially redress gender imbalances in economic, political, and social outcomes. Using a randomized field experiment encompassing 500 Afghan villages, this study finds that a development program which incorporates mandated female participation increases female mobility and involvement in income generation, but does not change female roles in family decision-making or attitudes toward the general role of women in society
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  • 4
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (38 p)
    Edition: 2013 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Beath, Andrew Do Elected Councils Improve Governance?
    Abstract: Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves. However, if the distribution is not clearly assigned to either the council or customary leaders, the creation of elected councils increases embezzlement and makes decision-making less inclusive. Requiring that women manage the distribution jointly with customary leaders also increases embezzlement. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, overlapping mandates between new and existing institutions may result in increased rent-seeking
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  • 5
    Language: Undetermined
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (18 p)
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Beath, Andrew The National Solidarity Program: Assessing the Effects of Community-Driven Development in Afghanistan
    Abstract: Over the past two decades, community-based approaches to project delivery have become a popular means for governments and development agencies to improve the alignment of projects with the needs of rural communities and increase the participation of villagers in project design and implementation. This paper briefly summarizes the results of an impact evaluation of the National Solidarity Program, a community-driven development program in Afghanistan that created democratically elected community development councils and funded small-scale development projects. Using a randomized controlled trial across 500 villages, the evaluation finds that the National Solidarity Program had a positive effect on access to drinking water and electricity, acceptance of democratic processes, perceptions of economic wellbeing, and attitudes toward women. Effects on perceptions of local and national government performance and material economic outcomes were, however, more limited or short-lived
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  • 6
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (42 p)
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Beath, Andrew Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
    Abstract: Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences
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