ISBN:
9783031101649
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource(XXI, 315 p. 5 illus.)
Edition:
1st ed. 2022.
Series Statement:
Global Issues
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
International relations.
;
Security, International.
;
Peace.
;
Rüstungsbegrenzung
;
Dual-Use-Gut
;
Chemische Waffe
;
Biologische Waffe
;
Kontrolle
;
Völkerrechtlicher Vertrag
;
Implementation
;
Fallstudie
;
Erde
Abstract:
1. Introduction -- 2. Dual Use Chemical and Life Science Research of Potential Concern -- 3. The China Case Study -- 4. The India Case Study -- 5.The Iran Case Study -- 6. The Russian Federation Case Study -- 7. The Syria Case Study -- 8. The United States Case Study -- 9. Regulation of Toxins and Bioregulators Under International Arms Control and Disarmament Instruments -- 10. Conclusions and Recommendations.
Abstract:
‘Unrivalled collection of concrete examples from across the globe of research where potential for weaponisation and opportunities for repression are high, but intent is unclear or could easily be misperceived. A substantial contribution to the current international debate on how we can raise political and legal barriers to prevent States misusing life science advances.’ —Filippa Lentzos, Senior Lecturer in Science and International Security, King's College London, UK ‘Asks the key question of how states and scientists should respond to the current advances in life science research and development to prevent their weaponisation. A must-read for all concerned.’ —Nariyoshi Shinomiya, President National Defense Medical College of Japan ‘Sheds light on the dangerously neglected threats from toxin and bioregulator weapons, and gives stark warning that current failure to regulate rapidly advancing sciences could allow development of new forms of such weapons capable of attacking diverse human life processes.’ —Paul F. Walker, Vice Chair, Arms Control Association, and International Coordinator, CWC Coalition, USA This book explores how revolutionary developments and convergence of the chemical, life and associated sciences are impacting contemporary toxin and bioregulator research, and examines the risks of such research being misused for malign purposes. Investigating illustrative cases of dual use research of potential concern in China, India, Iran, Russia, Syria and the USA, the authors discuss how states can ensure such research and related activities are not utilised in weapons development. Although toxins and bioregulators are, in theory, covered by both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention, this apparent overlap in reality masks a dangerous regulatory gap – with neither Convention implemented effectively to address threats of weaponisation. This book highlights the potentially damaging consequences for international peace and security, and proposes realistic routes for action by states and the scientific community. Michael Crowley is Honorary Visiting Senior Research Fellow at Bradford University, and Research Associate with the Omega Research Foundation, UK. Malcolm R. Dando FRSB is Leverhulme Emeritus Fellow at Bradford University, UK.
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-031-10164-9
Permalink
