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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (27 p)
    Edition: 2012 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Ghazala Mansuri Can Participation be Induced?
    Abstract: The World Bank has allocated close to
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (35 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Mansuri, Ghazala Incomplete Contracts And Investment
    Keywords: Asymmetric Information ; Bank Policy ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Contract ; Contract Law ; Contracts ; Debt Markets ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economic Transactions ; Exchange ; Expropriation ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Investment ; Investment Behavior ; Investment Decision ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Labor Policies ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Political Economy ; Private Sector Development ; Real Estate Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Asymmetric Information ; Bank Policy ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Contract ; Contract Law ; Contracts ; Debt Markets ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economic Transactions ; Exchange ; Expropriation ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Investment ; Investment Behavior ; Investment Decision ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Labor Policies ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Political Economy ; Private Sector Development ; Real Estate Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Asymmetric Information ; Bank Policy ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Contract ; Contract Law ; Contracts ; Debt Markets ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economic Transactions ; Exchange ; Expropriation ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Investment ; Investment Behavior ; Investment Decision ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Labor Policies ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Political Economy ; Private Sector Development ; Real Estate Development ; Social Protections and Labor
    Abstract: When contracts are incomplete, relationship-specific investments may be underprovided due to the threat of opportunistic expropriation or holdup. The authors find evidence of such underinvestment on tenanted land in rural Pakistan. Using data from households cultivating multiple plots under different tenure arrangements, they show that land-specific investment is lower on leased plots. This result is robust to the possible effects of asymmetric information in the leasing market. Greater tenure security also increases land-specific investment on leased plots. Moreover, variation in tenure security appears to be driven largely by heterogeneity across landlords, suggesting that reputation may be important in mitigating the holdup problem
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  • 3
  • 4
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (23 Seiten)
    Parallel Title: Elektronische Reproduktion von Jacoby, Hanan G. Watta satta
    DDC: 390
    Keywords: Pakistan ; Ländlicher Raum ; Ehe
    Note: Auch zugänglich unter: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7130 , © World Bank, license: CC BY 3.0 Unported
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, Development Research Group, Finance and Private Sector Development Team & Poverty and Equity Global Practice Group
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 8313
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Gine, Xavier The Impact of Social Mobilization on Health Service Delivery and Health Outcomes: Evidence from Rural Pakistan
    Keywords: Gesundheitswesen ; Soziale Bewegung ; Gesundheit ; Ländlicher Raum ; Pakistan ; Graue Literatur
    Abstract: This paper uses a randomized community development program in rural Pakistan to assess the impact of citizen engagement on the quality of public health services. The program had a strong emphasis on organizing women, who also identified health services as a development priority at baseline. Assessing the program at midline, the paper finds that the mobilization effort alone had a significant impact on the performance of village-based health providers. The study detects economically large improvements in pregnancy and well-baby visits by lady health workers, as well as increased utilization of pre- and post-natal care by pregnant women. In contrast, the quality of supra-village health services did not improve, underscoring the importance of community enforcement and monitoring capacity for improving service delivery
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, Development Research Group, Poverty and Inequality Team
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 8352
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Jacoby, Hanan G Decentralization and Redistribution: Irrigation Reform in Pakistan's Indus Basin
    Keywords: Grundeigentum ; Bewässerung ; Rent-Seeking ; Bürokratie ; Soziale Ungleichheit ; Pakistan ; Graue Literatur
    Abstract: Does decentralizing the allocation of public resources reduce rent-seeking and improve equity? This paper studies a governance reform in Pakistan's vast Indus Basin irrigation system. Using canal discharge measurements across all of Punjab province, the analysis finds that water theft increased on channels taken over by local farmer organizations compared with channels that remained bureaucratically managed, leading to substantial wealth redistribution. The increase in water theft was greater along channels with larger landowners situated upstream. These findings are consistent with a model in which decentralization accentuates the political power of local elites by shifting the arena in which water rights are contested
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : World Bank
    ISBN: 9780821382561 , 9780821389904
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (p. cm)
    Edition: 2015 World Bank eLibrary
    DDC: 338.9
    Keywords: Community development ; Decentralization in government ; Economic development Citizen participation ; Economic development projects Citizen participation ; Community development ; Decentralization in government ; Economic development Citizen participation ; Economic development projects Citizen participation ; Community development ; Decentralization in government ; Economic development ; Economic development projects
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, Development Research Group, Poverty and Inequality Team
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 8351
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Jacoby, Hanan G Governing the Commons? Water and Power in Pakistan's Indus Basin
    Keywords: Energieversorgung ; Bewässerung ; Rent-Seeking ; Bürokratie ; Pakistan ; Graue Literatur
    Abstract: Surface irrigation is a common pool resource characterized by asymmetric appropriation opportunities across upstream and downstream water users. Large canal systems are also predominantly managed by the state. This paper studies water allocation under an irrigation bureaucracy subject to corruption and rent-seeking. Data on the landholdings and political influence of nearly a quarter million irrigators in Pakistan's vast Indus Basin watershed allow the construction of a novel index of lobbying power. Consistent with a model of misgovernance, the decline in water availability and land values from channel head to tail is accentuated along canals having greater lobbying power at the head than at the tail
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 3945
    Parallel Title: Mansuri, Ghazala Migration, school attainment, and child labor
    Keywords: Educational attainment ; Emigrant remittances ; Sexism ; Educational attainment ; Emigrant remittances ; Sexism ; Pakistan Emigration and immigration ; Pakistan Emigration and immigration
    Abstract: "Inequalities in access to education pose a significant barrier to development. It has been argued that this reflects, in part, borrowing constraints that inhibit private investment in human capital by the poor. One promise of the recent proposals to open international labor markets to allow for the temporary economic migration of low-skilled workers from developing to industrial countries is its potential impact on human capital accumulation by the poor. The large remittance flows from migrants to their communities of origin underscores this aspect of migration. However, migration can also transform expectations of future employment and induce changes in household structure that can exert an independent effect on the private returns to investment in human capital. The author explores the relationship between temporary economic migration and investment in child schooling. A key challenge is to deal appropriately with selection into migration. She finds that the potential positive effects of temporary economic migration on human capital accumulation are large. Moreover, the gains are much greater for girls, yielding a very substantial reduction in gender inequalities in access to education. Significantly, though, the gains appear to arise almost entirely from the greater resource flows to migrant households. The author cannot detect any effect of future migration prospects on schooling decisions. More significantly, she does not find any protective effect of migration-induced female headship on schooling outcomes for girls. Rather, female headship appears to protect boys at the cost of girls. "--World Bank web site
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/28/2006 , Also available in print.
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Jacoby, Hanan G Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity
    Keywords: Accounting ; Adverse Selection ; Communities & Human Settlement ; Contract Law ; Contracts ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Effects ; Efficiency ; Equity ; Family Labor ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Incentive Problems ; Incentives ; Information ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Labor Allocation ; Labor Policies ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Monitoring ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Political Economy ; Private Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Urban Development ; Urban Housing ; Accounting ; Adverse Selection ; Communities & Human Settlement ; Contract Law ; Contracts ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Effects ; Efficiency ; Equity ; Family Labor ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Incentive Problems ; Incentives ; Information ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Labor Allocation ; Labor Policies ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Monitoring ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Political Economy ; Private Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Urban Development ; Urban Housing ; Accounting ; Adverse Selection ; Communities & Human Settlement ; Contract Law ; Contracts ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Effects ; Efficiency ; Equity ; Family Labor ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Incentive Problems ; Incentives ; Information ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Labor Allocation ; Labor Policies ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Monitoring ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Political Economy ; Private Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Urban Development ; Urban Housing
    Abstract: Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants
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