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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (48 p)
    Edition: 2012 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Knack, Stephen When Do Donors Trust Recipient Country Systems?
    Abstract: The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness sets targets for increased use by donors of recipient country systems for managing aid. The target is premised on a view that country systems are strengthened when donors trust recipients to manage aid funds, but undermined when donors manage aid through their own separate parallel systems. This study provides an analytical framework for understanding donors' decisions to trust or bypass country systems. Empirical tests are conducted using data from three OECD-DAC surveys designed to monitor progress toward Paris Declaration goals. Tests show that a donor's use of the recipient country's systems is positively related to: (1) the donor's share of aid provided to the recipient (a proxy for the donor's reputational stake in the country's development); (2) perceptions of corruption in the recipient country (a proxy for the trustworthiness or quality of the country's systems); and (3) public support for aid in the donor country (a proxy for the donor's risk tolerance). Findings are robust to corrections for potential sample selection, omitted variables or endogeneity bias
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (29 p)
    Edition: 2014 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Knack, Stephen Interactions among Donors' Aid Allocations
    Abstract: This study investigates the effects of the World Bank's exogenously-determined income threshold for eligibility for concessionary International Development Association (IDA) loans on the allocations of bilateral donors. The donors might interpret the World Bank's policies and allocations across recipients as informative signals of where their own aid might be used most effectively. Alternatively, other donors might compensate for reduced IDA allocations by increasing their own aid. This paper shows that the signaling effect dominates any crowding out effects. The analysis uses panel data with country fixed effects and finds that aid from the bilateral donor countries is significantly reduced after countries cross the IDA income cutoff, controlling for other determinants of aid. Allocations by other donors are not sensitive to actual IDA disbursements, only to the IDA income threshold. Because crossing the income cutoff for eligibility significantly reduces aid levels from other donors as well as from the World Bank, government officials in recipient countries may have an incentive to manipulate their national accounts data to understate per capita income when it is near the IDA threshold. However, tests for "bunching" of observations just below the income threshold find no evidence to support data manipulation concerns. These findings suggest that graduation from IDA should be an even more gradual process than it already is, to dampen the sharp drops in aid experienced by countries after crossing an arbitrary income threshold
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC, USA : World Bank Group, Development Economics, Development Research Group
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 8889
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Annen, Kurt Better Policies from Policy-Selective Aid
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    Abstract: This paper shows that the increased policy-selectivity of aid allocations observed in recent years provides recipient countries an incentive to improve policies. The paper estimates that a change in the World Banks Country Policy and Institutional Assessment policy index from 1.5 to 2 for a recipient is associated with an increase of about 13 percent in aid. The analysis also finds a modest but statistically significant positive relationship between the share of policy-selective aid in the global aid budget and policy, suggesting that policy-selective aid improves policies. This effect is properly identified, as the share of policy-selective aid in the global aid budget is exogenous to recipient country policy choices. Furthermore, the paper provides a game theoretic model that establishes the link between the policy-selectivity of the global budget and better recipient country policies in equilibrium
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 4
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (45 p)
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Knack, Stephen Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets: Evidence from Firm Surveys in 88 Developing Countries
    Abstract: There is relatively little systematic evidence on the links between procurement systems and outcomes such as competition and corruption levels. This paper adds to the evidence base, using data on almost 34,000 firms from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, in 88 countries that also have procurement systems data from Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments. The analysis finds that in countries with more transparent procurement systems, where exceptions to open competition in tendering must be explicitly justified, firms are more likely to participate in public procurement markets. Moreover, firms report paying fewer and smaller kickbacks to officials in countries with more transparent procurement systems, effective and independent complaint mechanisms, and more effective external auditing systems. These findings-particularly on kickbacks-are robust to the inclusion of many controls and to a range of sensitivity tests. The study finds evidence that better procurement systems matter more for smaller firms' participation in procurement markets and payment of kickbacks to obtain contracts, consistent with the view that information and transactions costs that are incurred in learning about bidding opportunities and fulfilling bidding requirements are more onerous for smaller firms. Falsification tests show that other, non-procurement indicators from the PEFA assessments are not associated with procurement outcomes, and that the PEFA procurement indicators are not strongly associated with other "governance"-related outcomes in firm surveys that are unrelated to procurement
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (33 p)
    Edition: 2010 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Knack, Stephen Aid Quality and Donor Rankings
    Keywords: Entwicklungshilfe ; Geberländer
    Abstract: This paper offers new measures of aid quality covering 38 bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as new insights about the robustness and usefulness of such measures. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the follow-up 2008 Accra Agenda for Action have focused attention on common donor practices that reduce the development impact of aid. Using 18 underlying indicators that capture these practices - derived from the OECD-DAC's Survey for Monitoring the Paris Declaration, the new AidData database, and the DAC aid tables - the authors construct an overall aid quality index and four coherently defined sub-indexes on aid selectivity, alignment, harmonization, and specialization. Compared with earlier indicators used in donor rankings, this indicator set is more comprehensive and representative of the range of donor practices addressed in the Paris Declaration, improving the validity, reliability, and robustness of rankings. One of the innovations is to increase the validity of the aid quality indicators by adjusting for recipient characteristics, donor aid volumes, and other factors. Despite these improvements in data and methodology, the authors caution against overinterpretation on overall indexes such as these. Alternative plausible assumptions regarding weights or the inclusion of additional indicators can still produce marked shifts in the ranking of some donors, so that small differences in overall rankings are not meaningful. Moreover, because the performance of some donors varies considerably across the four sub-indexes, these sub-indexes may be more useful than the overall index in identifying donors’ relative strengths and weaknesses
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 6
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (46 p)
    Edition: 2013 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Knack, Stephen Building or Bypassing Recipient Country Systems
    Keywords: Entwicklungshilfe ; Wirkungsanalyse ; Korruption ; Nonprofit-Management ; Öffentliche Finanzen
    Abstract: The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness sets targets for increased use by donors of recipient country systems for managing aid. It also calls for donors to be more responsive to the quality of recipient country systems: the optimal level of their use, in terms of maximizing the development effectiveness of aid, is believed to vary with their quality. This study investigates the degree to which donors' use of country systems is in fact positively related to their quality, using indicators explicitly endorsed for this purpose by the Paris Declaration and covering the 2005-2010 period. The results of these tests strongly confirm a positive and significant relationship, and show it is robust to corrections for potential sample selection, omitted variables, or endogeneity bias. The result holds even when estimates are informed only by variation over time within each donor-recipient pair in use and quality of country systems. Moreover, donor-specific tests show that use of country systems varies positively with their quality for the vast majority of donors. These findings contradict several other studies that claim there is no relation and imply that donors in this respect are failing to live up to their commitments under the Paris Declaration. The author's interpretation of the available evidence on use of country systems is more favorable: donors' behavior over the measurement period is largely consistent with their commitments in this area. In this respect, at least, donors appear to have modified their aid practices in ways that build rather than undermine administrative capacity and accountability in recipient country governments
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (58 p)
    Edition: 2009 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Knack, Stephen Aid and Trust in Country Systems
    Abstract: The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness sets targets for increased use by donors of recipient country systems for managing aid. A consensus view holds that country systems are strengthened when donors trust recipients to manage aid funds, but undermined when donors manage aid through their own separate parallel systems. This paper provides an analytical framework for understanding donors’ decisions to trust in country systems or instead to micro-manage aid using their own systems and procedures. Where country systems are sufficiently weak, the development impact of aid is reduced by donors’ reliance on them. Trust in country systems will be sub-optimal, however, if donors have multiple objectives in aid provision rather than a sole objective of maximizing development outcomes. Empirical tests are conducted using data from an OECD survey designed to monitor progress toward Paris Declaration goals. Trust in country systems is measured in three ways: use of the recipient’s public financial management systems, use of direct budget support, and use of program-based approaches. The authors show using fixed effects regression that a donor’s trust in recipient country systems is positively related to (1) trustworthiness or quality of those systems, (2) tolerance for risk on the part of the donor’s constituents, as measured by public support for providing aid, and (3) the donor’s ability to internalize more of the benefits of investing in country systems, as measured by the donor’s share of all aid provided to a recipient
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (29 p)
    Edition: 2012 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Knack, Stephen Aid Tying and Donor Fragmentation
    Keywords: Entwicklungshilfekonditionen ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Korruption
    Abstract: This study tests two opposing hypotheses about the impact of aid fragmentation on the practice of aid tying. In one, when a small number of donors dominate the aid market in a country, they may exploit their monopoly power by tying more aid to purchases from contractors based in their own countries. Alternatively, when donors have a larger share of the aid market, they may have stronger incentives to maximize the development impact of their aid by tying less of it. Empirical tests strongly and consistently support the latter hypothesis. The key finding - that higher donor aid shares are associated with less aid tying - is robust to recipient controls, donor fixed effects and instrumental variables estimation. When recipient countries are grouped by their scores on corruption perception indexes, higher shares of aid are significantly related to lower aid tying only in the less-corrupt sub-sample. This finding is consistent with the argument that aid tying can be an efficient response by donors when losses from corruption may rival or exceed losses from tying aid. When aid tying is more costly, as proxied by donor country size and income, it is less prevalent. Aid tying is lower in the Least Developed Countries, consistent with the OECD Development Assistance Committee's recommendation to its members
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  • 9
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 9225
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Knack, Stephen How does the World Bank Influence the Development Policy Priorities of Low-Income and Lower-Middle Income Countries ?
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    Abstract: This study investigates the World Bank's use of lending and non-lending instruments to affect the policy priorities of developing countries. In a typical year, the World Bank lends more than USD 30 billion to its client countries. It also spends approximately USD 200 million on the provision of analytical and advisory products each year. However, insufficiently granular data on the nature, timing, and distribution of these analytical and advisory products and the policy priorities of client countries has made it difficult for policymakers and scholars to understand which World Bank instruments are most useful for effectuating change in the direction of government policy. With new data on the delivery of analytical and advisory products and micro-level survey data from 1,244 public sector officials in 121 developing countries, this study demonstrates that the organization's non-lending instruments are more effective than its lending instruments at influencing the policy priorities of client countries. The World Bank's analytical and advisory products not only affect the direction of government policy, but also its design and implementation
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (28 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Knack, Stephen Sovereign Rents And The Quality of Tax Policy And Administration
    Keywords: Banks and Banking Reform ; Bureaucratic quality ; Country risk ; Debt Markets ; Developing countries ; Development Economics and Aid Effectiveness ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economic development ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Governance ; Governance Indicators ; Health, Nutrition and Population ; Human development ; International bank ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Po ; Private Sector Development ; Rule of law ; Tax ; Tax Law ; Tax policy ; Tax systems ; Taxation and Subsidies ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Bureaucratic quality ; Country risk ; Debt Markets ; Developing countries ; Development Economics and Aid Effectiveness ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economic development ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Governance ; Governance Indicators ; Health, Nutrition and Population ; Human development ; International bank ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Po ; Private Sector Development ; Rule of law ; Tax ; Tax Law ; Tax policy ; Tax systems ; Taxation and Subsidies ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Bureaucratic quality ; Country risk ; Debt Markets ; Developing countries ; Development Economics and Aid Effectiveness ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economic development ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Governance ; Governance Indicators ; Health, Nutrition and Population ; Human development ; International bank ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Po ; Private Sector Development ; Rule of law ; Tax ; Tax Law ; Tax policy ; Tax systems ; Taxation and Subsidies
    Abstract: The availability of windfall revenues from natural resource exports or foreign aid potentially weakens governments' incentives to design efficient tax systems. Cross-country data for developing countries provide evidence for this hypothesis, using a World Bank indicator of "efficiency of revenue mobilization." Aid's negative effects on the quality of tax systems are robust to correcting for potential reverse causality, to changes in the sample, and to alternative estimation methods. Fuel export revenues are also associated with lower-quality tax policy and administration, but this finding is somewhat sensitive to outliers. Non-fuel resource exports, in contrast, show no relationship to the efficiency of revenue mobilization
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