ISBN:
9789401021616
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (289p)
,
digital
Edition:
Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
Series Statement:
Theory and Decision Library, An International Series in the Philosophy and Methodology of the Social and Behavioral Sciences 2
Series Statement:
Theory and Decision Library 2
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
Social sciences
;
Social sciences Methodology
;
Sociology—Methodology.
Abstract:
I. Two-Person Games -- Prisoner’s Dilemma — Recollections and Observations -- Structural Properties and Resolutions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game -- On 2×2 Games and Braithwaite’s Arbitration Scheme -- Design and Conduct of Metagame Theoretic Experiments -- Testing Nash’s Solution of the Cooperative Game -- II. N-Person Games -- Test of the Bargaining Set and Kernel Models in Three-person Games -- Test of the Kernel and Two Bargaining Set Models in Four- and Five-person Games -- A Shapley Value for Cooperative Games with Quarrelling -- Coalitions and Payoffs in Three-person Supergames under Multiple-trial Agreements -- The Application of Compromise Solutions to Reporting Games -- ‘General’ Metagames: An Extension of the Metagame Concept.
Abstract:
Game theory could be formally defined as a theory of rational decision in conflict situations. Models of such situations, as they are conceived in game theory, involve (1) a set of decision makers, called players; (2) a set of strategies available to each player; (3) a set of outcomes, each of which is a result of particular choices of strategies made by the players on a given play of the game; and (4) a set of payoffs accorded to each player in each of the possible outcomes. It is assumed that each player is 'individually rational', in the sense that his preference ordering of the outcomes is determined by the order of magnitudes of his (and only his) associated payoffs. Further, a player is rational in the sense that he assumes that every other player is rational in the above sense. The rational player utilizes knowledge of the other players' payoffs in guiding his choice of strategy, because it gives him information about how the other players' choices are guided. Since, in general, the orders of magnitude of the payoffs that accrue to the several players in the several outcomes do not coincide, a game of strategy is a model of a situation involving conflicts of interests.
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6
URL:
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