Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource
Edition:
Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
Series Statement:
Policy research working paper 2505
Parallel Title:
Gatti, Roberta Family altruism and incentives
Keywords:
Altruism Econometric models
;
Inheritance and succession Econometric models
;
Altruism Econometric models
;
Inheritance and succession Econometric models
Abstract:
In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding
Note:
"December 2000"--Cover
,
Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38)
,
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 30, 2002
,
Also available in print.
URL:
Volltext
(Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
