ISBN:
9780191925375
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource
,
illustrations
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
DDC:
153.23
Keywords:
Concepts
;
Reason Physiological aspects
;
Innate ideas (Philosophy)
;
Concepts
;
Raison - Aspect physiologique
;
Innéisme
;
PHILOSOPHY
;
Child
;
Developmental
;
PSYCHOLOGY
;
Cognitive Psychology & Cognition
;
Psychology
;
Psychology
Abstract:
This is a broad and authoritative study of a central topic in the study of the mind - the origins of concepts. The authors a comprehensive rethinking of the foundations of the debate between rationalists and empiricists. They draw on a wealth of data across the cognitive sciences to make the case for a rationalist account, concept nativism
Description / Table of Contents:
Cover -- The Building Blocks of Thought : A Rationalist Account of the Origins of Concepts -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface and Guide to the Book -- Acknowledgements -- List of Figures -- Note on Authorship -- Epigraph -- 1: Introduction: Whatever Happened to the Debate over Innate Ideas? -- 1.1 The Rationalism-Empiricism Debate about the Origins of Concepts -- 1.2 Philosophy, Psychology, and the Naturalistic Study of the Mind -- 1.3 An Example: Geometrical Concepts -- Part I: The Rationalism-Empiricism Debate -- 2: What the Rationalism-Empiricism Debate Is Really About
Description / Table of Contents:
2.1 Philosophical Hostility to the Rationalism-Empiricism Debate -- 2.2 The Acquisition Base -- 2.3 Learning Mechanisms and Their Local Acquisition Bases -- 2.4 Domain Specificity and Domain Generality -- 2.5 What Makes One Account More Rationalist (or More Empiricist) Than Another? -- 2.6 Conclusion -- 3: Why the Rationalism-Empiricism Debate Isn't the Nature-Nurture Debate -- 3.1 Is the Rationalism-Empiricism Debate Fundamentally Confused? Nature, Nurture, and Related Issues -- 3.2 The Rationalism-Empiricism Debate in Practice -- 3.3 Conclusion -- 4: The Viability of Rationalism
Description / Table of Contents:
4.1 A Preliminary Case for Rationalism -- 4.2 Objections and Replies -- 4.3 Conclusion -- 5: Abstraction and the Allure of Illusory Explanation -- 5.1 Illusory Explanations of Cognitive Capacities -- 5.2 Abstraction as a Theory of the Origin of General Representation -- 5.3 A New Framework for Theories of Abstraction -- 5.4 Why Our Framework for Understanding Abstraction Is Compatible with Rationalism as Well as Empiricism -- 5.5 Abstraction, Conceptual Structure, and the ABC Model of Conceptual Development -- 5.6 Conclusion
Description / Table of Contents:
6: Concepts, Innateness, and Why Concept Nativism Is about More Than Just Innate Concepts -- 6.1 What Is Innateness? -- 6.2 What Is a Concept? -- 6.3 Concept Nativism Is about More Than Just Innate Concepts -- 6.4 Conclusion -- 7: Conclusion to Part I -- Part II: Seven Arguments for Concept Nativism -- 8: The Argument from Early Development (1) -- 9: The Argument from Early Development (2) -- 10: The Argument from Animals -- 11: The Argument from Universality -- 12: The Argument from Initial Representational Access -- 13: The Argument from Neural Wiring -- 14: The Argument from Prepared Learning
Description / Table of Contents:
15: The Argument from Cognitive and Behavioural Quirks -- 16: Conclusion to Part II -- Part III: Alternative Empiricist Perspectives -- 17: Methodological Empiricism -- 18: Neo-Associationism -- 19: Artificial Neural Networks: From Connectionism to Deep Learning -- 20: Neuroconstructivism -- 21: Perceptual Meaning Analysis -- 22: Embodied Cognition -- 23: Conclusion to Part III -- Part IV: Fodorian Concept Nativism -- 24: The Evolution of Fodor's Case against Concept Learning -- 24.1 The Language of Thought (1975) -- 24.2 "The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy" (1981)
Note:
Includes bibliographical references and index
,
Zielgruppe: Specialized
