ISBN:
9789400763432
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (VIII, 352 p. 4 illus, digital)
Series Statement:
Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy 31
Series Statement:
SpringerLink
Series Statement:
Bücher
Parallel Title:
Druckausg.
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als What makes us moral? on the Capacities and Conditions for Being Moral
Keywords:
Philosophy (General)
;
Ethics
;
Consciousness
;
Philosophy
;
Philosophy (General)
;
Ethics
;
Consciousness
;
Ethik
;
Bedingung
Abstract:
This book addresses the question of what it means to be moral and which capacities one needs to be moral. It questions whether empathy is a cognitive or an affective capacity, or perhaps both. As most moral beings behave immorally from time to time, the authors ask which factors cause or motivate people to translate their moral beliefs into action? Specially addressed is the question of what is the role of internal factors such as willpower, commitment, character, and what is the role of external, situational and structural factors? The questions are considered from various (disciplinary) perspectives
Description / Table of Contents:
Preface; Contents; Chapter 1: What Makes Us Moral? An Introduction; 1.1 Why Be Moral; Why Are We Moral; What Makes Us Moral?; 1.2 Part I: Morality, Evolution and Rationality; 1.3 Part II: Morality and the Continuity Between Human and Nonhuman Primates; 1.4 Part III: Nativism and Non-nativism; 1.5 Part IV: Religion and (Im)Morality; 1.6 Part V: Morality Beyond Naturalism; References; Part I: Morality, Evolution and Rationality; Chapter 2: Rationality and Deceit: Why Rational Egoism Cannot Make Us Moral; 2.1 Human Cooperation and Evolutionary Altruism
Description / Table of Contents:
2.2 Social Preferences Versus Selfish Cooperation2.3 Selfishness and Deceit; 2.4 A Theory of Morality as Disguised Selfishness; 2.5 Cooperation in a World of Selfish Agents; 2.6 Fallible Mind Reading Makes Our Value System Emerge; References; Chapter 3: Two Problems of Cooperation; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 What Is Cooperation?; 3.3 The Descriptive Problem; 3.4 The Normative Problem; 3.5 Connecting the Descriptive and the Normative; 3.6 Implications of the Convergence; References
Description / Table of Contents:
Chapter 4: The Importance of Commitment for Morality: How Harry Frankfurt's Concept of Care Contributes to Rational Choice Theory4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Puzzling Distance Between Morality and Economics; 4.3 Rational Choice Theory and Its Limitations; 4.4 Sen's Concept of Commitment and Beyond; 4.5 Sen's Concept of Meta-rankings; 4.6 Frankfurt on Autonomy and Rationality; A Matter of Caring (Not Desiring Alone); 4.7 Care and Morality: Opportunities for RCT; 4.8 Concluding Remarks; References; Chapter 5: Quantified Coherence of Moral Beliefs as Predictive Factor for Moral Agency
Description / Table of Contents:
5.1 Coherence - From an Intuition to a Quantified Concept5.2 Coherence in Psychology; 5.3 The Suggestion of Paul Thagard; 5.4 Our Definition of Coherence; 5.5 Comparison to the Proposal of Thagard; 5.6 Outlining the (Possible) Causal Role of Coherence; 5.7 Coherence Types of Moral Belief Systems; 5.8 Conclusion; Appendix: Exposition of the Measure and Operationalization; References; Part II: Morality and the Continuity Between Human and Nonhuman Primates; Chapter 6: Animal Morality and Human Morality; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Definition of Morality; 6.3 Clusters of Moral Behaviour
Description / Table of Contents:
6.4 Empathy, Concern for Others, and Helping Behaviour6.5 Behavioural Regularities and Norms; 6.6 Guidance by Norms in Human Morality; 6.7 Motivation by Moral Norms; 6.8 Disapproval and Punishment; 6.9 Animal Morality and Human Morality; 6.10 Animal Ethics and Animal Morality; 6.11 Conclusion; References; Chapter 7: Two Kinds of Moral Competence: Moral Agent, Moral Judge; 7.1 What Makes Us Moral? And the Continuism/ Discontinuism Debate; 7.2 The Epistemic Argument Against the Moral Agency/Moral Judgment Dissociation; 7.2.1 The Epistemic Conditions for Moral Responsibility
Description / Table of Contents:
7.2.2 Moral Knowledge and Acting for Good Reasons
Note:
Description based upon print version of record
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-007-6343-2
URL:
Volltext
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