ISBN:
9780833032386
,
0833032380
,
9780833030030
,
0585425388
,
0833030035
,
9780585425382
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (xxxi, 155 pages)
Edition:
[S.l.] HathiTrust Digital Library 2010 Electronic reproduction
Series Statement:
Online Rand research documents
Parallel Title:
Print version Hosmer, Stephen T Conflict over Kosovo
Keywords:
Milošević, Slobodan
;
Milošević, Slobodan
;
Kosovo War, 1998-1999
;
Milošević, Slobodan
;
Milošević, Slobodan
;
Milosevic, Slobodan
;
Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord
;
HISTORY ; General
;
POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International)
;
Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999)
;
Balkan Peninsula
;
Europe / Baltic States
;
HISTORY
;
Regions & Countries - Europe
;
History & Archaeology
;
Kosovo (Republic)
;
History
;
Kosovo (Republic)
;
Electronic books
Abstract:
This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations
Abstract:
This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations
Note:
"Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
,
At head of title: Project Air Force
,
Includes bibliographical references (pages 139-155)
,
Use copy Restrictions unspecified star MiAaHDL
,
Electronic reproduction
,
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
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