ISBN:
9789400741072
Sprache:
Englisch
Seiten:
Online-Ressource (XIX, 205p, digital)
Serie:
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 294
Serie:
SpringerLink
Serie:
Bücher
Paralleltitel:
Buchausg. u.d.T. Radder, Hans, 1949 - The material realization of science
Schlagwort(e):
Philosophy (General)
;
Science (General)
;
Physics
;
Philosophy
;
Philosophy (General)
;
Science (General)
;
Physics
;
Habermas, Jürgen
;
Science
;
Philosophy
;
Habermas, Jürgen 1929-
;
Wissenschaftstheorie
;
Habermas, Jürgen 1929-
;
Wissenschaftstheorie
Kurzfassung:
Hans Radder
Kurzfassung:
This book develops a conception of science as a multi-dimensional practice, which includes experimental action and production, conceptual-theoretical interpretation, and formal-mathematical work. On this basis, it addresses the topical issue of scientific realism and expounds a detailed, referentially realist account of the natural sciences. This account is shown to be compatible with the frequent occurrence of conceptual discontinuities in the historical development of the sciences. Referential realism exploits several fruitful ideas of Jürgen Habermas, especially his distinction between objectivity and truth; it builds on a in-depth analysis of scientific experiments, including their material realization; and it is developed through an extensive case study in the history and philosophy of quantum mechanics. The new postscript explains how the book relates to several important issues in recent philosophy of science and science studies. I highly recommend this book. Radder is probably the first philosopher of science to make productive epistemological use of the notion of experimental system. The postscript is most valuable since it connects his work not only to the topical debates in philosophy of science, but also to history of science and science studies. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin About the first edition: The debate on realism has recently become rather stale by repetition, but Radder introduces original insights and has written a lively and well-argued contribution to it. The book is to be recommended also as a clear introduction to the complex of relevant issues. Mary Hesse, University of Cambridge Radder presents an ingenious approach to the issue of scientific realism and conceptual discontinuity. I believe his idea that conceptual discontinuity presupposes other types of continuity is extremely important. Mark Rowlands, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa Hans Radder is professor of philosophy of science and technology at VU University Amsterdam. He is the author of In and About the World and The World Observed/The World Conceived. He edited The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation and The Commodification of Academic Research: Science and the Modern University, and is coeditor of Science Transformed Debating Claims of an Epochal Break.
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
The Material Realization of Science; Preface to the Revised English Edition; Preface to the First English Edition; Preface to the Dutch Edition; Contents; Introduction; Part I Habermas and the Philosophy of Science; Chapter 1: Habermas's Philosophy of the Natural Sciences; 1.1 Introductory Remarks; 1.2 The Aim of Habermas's Epistemology; 1.3 Two Fundamental Distinctions; 1.3.1 Purposive-Rational and Communicative Action; 1.3.2 Communicative Action and Discourse: Two Forms of Communication; 1.4 The Constitution Theory and the Role of Experiment
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
1.4.1 Objectivity of Experience and the Categorial Structure of Object-Domains1.4.2 The Experiment in the Natural Sciences; 1.5 The Consensus Theory of Truth; 1.5.1 What Is Truth?; 1.5.2 Grounded Consensus as the Criterion of Truth; 1.5.3 The Formal Characteristics of Discourse; 1.5.4 The Ideal Speech Situation; 1.6 Objectivity and Truth; Chapter 2: Habermas on Objectivity and Truth: Analysis and Critique; 2.1 Introductory Remarks; 2.2 The Transcendental Method and the Role of Experiment; 2.2.1 On the Constitution of Objectivity; 2.2.2 The Role of Experiment in Habermas
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
2.3 A Critique of Habermas's Theory of Truth2.3.1 On the Meaning of Truth; 2.3.2 The Inadequacy of the Criterion of Truth; Part II Experimentation and Referential Realism; Chapter 3: Experimentation in the Natural Sciences; 3.1 Introductory Remarks; 3.2 The Theoretical Description of Experiments; 3.3 Experimentation as Material Realization; 3.4 Experimental Production and the Possibility of Realism; Chapter 4: Verifiability and Reference, Relativism and Realism; 4.1 Introductory Remarks; 4.2 Verifiability; 4.3 Conceptual Discontinuity and Scientific Realism; 4.4 A Criterion of (Co)reference
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
4.5 A "Realistic" RealismChapter 5: Specification and Application: Two Case Studies from the History and Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics; 5.1 Introductory Remarks; 5.2 The Correspondence Principle and the Historical Development of Quantum Mechanics; 5.2.1 Bohr 1913: Correspondence as Numerical Agreement; 5.2.2 Correspondence and Conceptual Continuity: 1916-1922; 5.2.3 Numerical and Formal Correspondence: 1923-1925; 5.2.4 Correspondence and Material Realization; 5.2.5 Philosophical Conclusions; 5.3 The Measurement Problem in Quantum Mechanics; 5.3.1 Measurement Problem and Realism
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
5.3.2 The Measurement Problem as a Problem of Correspondence5.3.3 Quantum-Mechanical Measuring Process and Communication; Conclusion; Postscript 2012; 1 Habermas and the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences; 2 Scientific Experimentation; 3 Referential Realism; 3.1 A Realist Ontology; 3.2 A Referentially Realist Epistemology; 3.3 Referential Realism, Constructive Empiricism, and Constructive Realism; 3.4 Referential and Instrumental Realism; 3.5 Referential Realism and "Materialist" Science Studies; 3.6 Referential and Structural Realism; 3.7 Referential Realism and Idealist Antirealism
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
4 Philosophy and History of Quantum Mechanics
Anmerkung:
Description based upon print version of record
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-007-4107-2
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