ISBN:
9780198898078
Language:
English
Pages:
xix,166 Seiten
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
DDC:
302.35
Keywords:
Gruppe
;
Institution
;
Ethik
;
Moral
Abstract:
Jessica Brown examines groups both as epistemic and as moral agents, offering original accounts of group evidence, group belief, group justified belief, group knowledge, what it is for a group to act or believe for one reason rather than another, and when a group has an excuse for wrongdoing from blameless ignorance.
Abstract:
Organised groups such as governments, corporations, charities and courts are an integral part of our lives. They provide services, sell goods, employ people, raise taxes, wage wars, and issue legal judgements. In our interactions with them, we routinely ascribe them mental states, speaking of what they know, want and intend. And we use these ascriptions in predicting what groups will do and assessing their responsibility for outcomes. For instance, in morally assessing the government's performance in the coronavirus pandemic, we might ask what the government knew about the virus at key decision points. And in attempting to predict Russia's response to the current war in Ukraine, we might ask what Russia believes about the West's resolve to defend Ukraine. This book takes seriously the idea that at least some groups, such as corporations and governments, are genuine agents with mental states on which they act. For instance, in morally assessing a government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic, we are interested in what the government knew at various points as the pandemic developed. And in predicting the outcome of the current war in Ukraine, we might ask what Russia believes about the West’s determination to defend Ukraine. The book examines a range of phenomena central to the epistemic and moral assessment of groups: group evidence, group belief, the basis of group belief, group justified belief, group knowledge, group motivation, and group blameless ignorance. Overall, the book defends a ‘non-summative’ functionalist view of groups. On a non-summative account of group phenomena, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a group to have a property α that some/most/all of its members have that same property. By contrast, on a summative account it is necessary and sufficient for a group to have a property α that some/most/all of its members have that same property. Across the book I provide new arguments for non-summativism and new accounts of key group phenomena many of which have been relatively neglected in existing literature. While I provide independent arguments for a non-summative view of each phenomenon discussed, the conclusions of the chapters are mutually reinforcing. For adopting a non-summative account of one group phenomenon motivates adopting a non-summative account of others.
Abstract:
Cover -- Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1. A Package of Views -- Chapter 2. Group Evidence -- Chapter 3. Group Belief for a Reason -- Chapter 4. Group Belief -- Chapter 5. Group Justified Belief and Knowledge -- Chapter 6. Group Action for a Reason -- Chapter 7. Group Excuse from Blameless Ignorance -- 1: A Package of Views -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Summative and Non-summative Approaches to Group Mental States -- 3. Extending the Debate: Group Evidence, Group Belief/Action for a Reason, and Group Excuse from Ignorance -- 3.1 Group Evidence -- 3.2 Group Belief/Action for a Reason -- 3.3 Group Justified Belief/Knowledge -- 3.4 Group Blameless Ignorance -- 4. Conclusion -- 2: Group Evidence -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Evidence -- 3. Two Approaches to Group Evidence -- 4. Summative Accounts of Group Evidence -- 4.1 Inconsistent Evidence -- 4.2 An Overly Generous Conception of Group Evidence -- 4.3 Tension with the Doxastic Constraint -- 5. A Non-summative Account of Group Evidence -- 6. Lackey's Objections to Joint Acceptance Accounts of Group Evidence -- 7. Conclusion -- 3: Group Belief for a Reason -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Evidence, Reasons, and Basing -- 3. Summative versus Non-summative Approaches -- 4. A Non-summative Account -- 5. Non-summativism and DBC -- 6. Non-summativism, Action, and Assertion -- 7. Conclusion -- 4: Group Belief -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Functionalism -- 3. Lackey's Group Agent Account -- 4. Conclusion -- 5: Group Justified Belief and Knowledge -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Lackey on Group Justified Belief -- 3. Group Belief from Aggregating Member Views: The Perceptual and Inferential Models -- 4. Objections to the Testimonial Model Diffused -- 5. A Testimonial Model -- 6. Comparison of the Three Models -- 7. Different Epistemological Approaches -- 8. Objections.
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