Abstract: The Marxist Social Theory and the Challenges of Our Time -- The Concept of Class Interest -- The Conception of Culture According to Karl Marx -- The Problem of Explanation in Karl Marx’s Capital -- The Methodological Foundations of Marx’s Theory of Class: A Reconstruction -- Structuralism as an Intellectual Current -- Marxism, Functionalism and Systems-Approach -- Methodological Dilemmas of Contemporary Sociology -- Strategy of Theory-Construction in Sociology -- On So-called Historicism in the Social Sciences -- Sociology and Models of Rational Behavior -- Adaptational Superstructure — The Problem of Negative Self-regulation -- Biographical Notes -- Name Index.

Abstract: Modern philosophy has benefited immensely from the intelligence, and sensitivity, the creative and critical energies, and the lucidity of Polish scholars. Their investigations into the logical and methodological foundations of mathematics, the physical and biological sciences, ethics and esthetics, psychology, linguistics, economics and jurisprudence, and the social science- all are marked by profound and imaginative work. To the centers of empiricist philosophy of science in Vienna, Berlin and Cambridge during the first half of this century, one always added the great school of analytic and methodol­ ogical studies in Warsaw and Lwow. To the world centers of Marxist theoretical practice in Berlin, Moscow, Paris, Rome and elsewhere, one must add the Poland of the same era, from Ludwik Krzywicki (1859-1941) onward. American socialists and economists will remember the careful work of Oscar Lange, working among us for many years and then after 1945 in Warsaw, always humane, logical, objective. In this volume, our friend and colleague, Jerzy J. Wiatr, has assembled a representative set of recent essays by Polish social scientists and philosophers. Each of these might lead the reader far beyond this book, to look into the Polish Sociological Bulletin which has been publishing Polish sociological studies in English for several decades, to study other translations of books and papers by these authors, and to reflect upon the interplay of logical, phenomenological, Marxist, empiricist and historical learning in modern Polish social understanding.

Abstract: 1. The Model Muddle: Proposals for an Immodest Realism (1966) -- 2. Reduction, Explanation and Ontology (1962) -- 3. Models, Metaphysics and the Vagaries of Empiricism (1965) -- 4. Metaphysics as Heuristic for Science (1965) -- 5. Matter, Action and Interaction (1973) -- 6. Towards a Critical Materialism (1971) -- 7. The Relation Between Philosophy of Science and History of Science (1977) -- 8. Telos and Technique: Models as Modes of Action (1968) -- 9. From Praxis to Logos: Genetic Epistemology and Physics (1971) -- 10. Pictures, Representation, and the Understanding (1972) -- 11. Perception, Representation, and the Forms of Action: Towards an Historical Epistemology (1973) -- 12. Rules and Representation: The Virtues of Constancy and Fidelity Put in Perspective (1978) -- 13. Action and Passion: Spinoza’s Construction of a Scientific Psychology (1973) -- 14. Nature, Number and Individuals: Motive and Method in Spinoza’s Philosophy (1978) -- 15. Hume’s Concept of Identity and the Principium Individuationis (1961) -- 16. Diderot and the Development of Materialist Monism (1953) -- 17. Art and Technology: Conflicting Models of Education? The Uses of a Cultural Myth (1973) -- 18. Art as Humanizing Praxis (1976) -- Name Index.

Abstract: Marx Wartofsky has been working for many years within an unusual confluence of philosophical problems. He brings to these intersecting problems his comprehensive intelligence, at once imaginative and rigorous, analytic and historical. He is a philosopher's philosopher, but also Everyman's. Wartofsky is philosopher of the natural and the social sciences, of perception, esthetics and the creative arts, of the 18th century French and the 19th century Germans, of politics and morality, ofthe methods and morals of medicine, and it is plain, of all human existence. To a colleague, he seems Jack-of-all-philosophical-trades, and master of them too. The reader soon will learn that Wartofsky is a genial, lucid and relaxed philosophical companion, deeply serious but without noticeable anxiety. I need not highlight these selected epistemological papers gathered as, and about, Models, since Wartofsky's own introductory remarks are helpful and stimulating in that respect. I need only, after 21 years of friendship and collaboration with him, warn the reader to beware of how profound and provocative these papers will show themselves to be beneath their good-humored and swiftly-flowing surface. And I must publicly note the pleasure with which I welcome Marx Wartofsky's volume to our Boston Studies. Boston University R.S.C. Center for the Philosophy and History of Science September 1979 vii TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL PREFACE VII xi AC K NOWLEDGEMENTS xiii INTRODUCTION The Model Muddle: Proposals for an Immodest Realism 1.

Abstract: I. Logical Structure and Axiomatization -- II. The Traditional View -- III. The Ramsey View -- IV. The Ramsey View Emended -- V. Theoretical Functions with Special Forms -- VI. Classical Particle Mechanics -- VII. Identity, Equivalence and Reduction -- VIII. The Dynamics of Theories -- Updated Bibliography.

Abstract: This book is about scientific theories of a particular kind - theories of mathematical physics. Examples of such theories are classical and relativis­ tic particle mechanics, classical electrodynamics, classical thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, hydrodynamics, and quantum mechanics. Roughly, these are theories in which a certain mathematical structure is employed to make statements about some fragment of the world. Most of the book is simply an elaboration of this rough characterization of theories of mathematical physics. It is argued that each theory of mathematical physics has associated with it a certain characteristic mathematical struc­ ture. This structure may be used in a variety of ways to make empirical claims about putative applications of the theory. Typically - though not necessarily - the way this structure is used in making such claims requires that certain elements in the structure play essentially different roles. Some playa "theoretical" role; others playa "non-theoretical" role. For example, in classical particle mechanics, mass and force playa theoretical role while position plays a non-theoretical role. Some attention is given to showing how this distinction can be drawn and describing precisely the way in which the theoretical and non-theoretical elements function in the claims of the theory. An attempt is made to say, rather precisely, what a theory of mathematical physics is and how you tell one such theory from anothe- what the identity conditions for these theories are.

Abstract: I / History of Science -- 1. On the Method of History of Science (1947) -- 2. Science in History (Review of J. D. Bernal’s Science in History) (1956) -- 3. The Logical Problem of the Definition of Irrational Numbers (1927) -- 4. Rationalism in Antiquity (1954) -- 5. The Transformations of the Atomic Concept through the Ages (1969) -- 6. Flicker in the Darkness (Review of Nicole Oresme and the Medieval Geometry of Qualities and Motions) (1969) -- 7. Marcus Marci’s Investigations of the Prism and Their Relation to Newton’s Theory of Color (1932) -- 8. Descartes at Uppsala (Review of R. Lindborg’s Descartes i Uppsala) (1967) -- 9. Newton and the Law of Gravitation (1965) -- 10. Newton’s Views on Aether and Gravitation (1969) -- 11. The Genesis of the Laws of Thermodynamics (1941) -- 12. Joule’s Scientific Outlook (1952) -- 13. An Analysis of Joule’s Experiments on the Expansion of Air (1956) -- 14. The Velocity of Light and the Evolution of Electrodynamics (1956) -- 15. The Evolution of Oersted’s Scientific Concepts (1970) -- 16. The First Phase in the Evolution of the Quantum Theory (1936) -- 17. Max Planck and the Statistical Definition of Entropy (1959) -- 18. Matter and Force after Fifty Years of Quantum Theory (1963) -- 19. Men and Ideas in the History of Atomic Theory (1971) -- 20. Jacques Solomon (1959) -- 21. Quantum Theory in 1929: Recollections from the First Copenhagen Conference (1971) -- 22. Niels Bohr: An Essay Dedicated to Him on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday. October 7, 1945 (1945; 2nd edition 1961) -- 23. The Conception of the Meson Field: Some Reminiscences and Epistemological Comments (1968) -- 24. Nuclear Reminiscences (1972) -- 25. Celestial and Terrestrial Physics in Historical Perspective (1969) -- II / Epistemology -- 1. On the Question of the Measurability of Electromagnetic Field Quantities (with Niels Bohr) (1933) -- 2. Field and Charge Measurements in Quantum Electrodynamics (with Niels Bohr) (1950) -- 3. On Quantum Electrodynamics (Among Essays Dedicated to Niels Bohr on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday) (1955) -- 4. On Quantization of Fields (1963) -- 5. The Evolution of the Idea of Causality (1942) -- 6. Strife about Complementarity (1953) -- 7. Complementarity and Statistics, I and II (1958) -- 8. Misunderstandings about the Foundations of Quantum Theory (1957) -- 9. Foundations of Quantum Theory and Complementarity (1961) -- 10. The Epistemological Conflict between Einstein and Bohr (Dedicated to Max Born on his 80th Birthday) (1963) -- 11. Niels Bohr’s Contribution to Epistemology (1963) -- 12. The Measuring Process in Quantum Mechanics (On the 30th Anniversary of the Meson Theory by Dr. H. Yukawa, 1965) (1965) -- 13. Statistical Causality in Atomic Theory: A General Introduction to Irreversibility (1972 and 1974) -- 14. The Macroscopic Level of Quantum Mechanics (1972) -- 15. Quantum Theory and Gravitation (1966) -- 16. Questions of Method in the Consistency Problem of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- 17. The Method of Physics (1968) -- 18. Some Reflections on Knowledge (1971) -- 19. Epistemology on a Scientific Basis (1971) -- 20. Condillac’s Influence on French Scientific Thought (1972) -- 21. Unphilosophical Considerations on Causality in Physics (1971) -- 22. Irreversibility — a Lay Sermon (On the Occasion of Professor K. Bleuler’s Sixtieth Birthday) (1977) -- 23. Berkeley Redivivus (Review of W. Heisenberg’s Natural Law and the Structure of Matter) (1970) -- 24. The Wave-Particle Dilemma (1973) -- 25. A Voyage to Laplacia (1955) -- III / Theoretical Physics -- 1. On the Energy-Momentum Tensor (1940) -- 2. On the Definition of Spin for a Radiation Field (1942) -- 3. On the Behavior of a Canonical Ensemble during an Adiabatic Transformation (1942) -- 4. On the Isolated and Adiabatic Susceptibilities (1961) -- 5. On the Foundations of Statistical Thermodynamics (1955) -- 6. Questions of Irreversibility and Ergodicity (1962) -- 7a. Dynamical Theory of Nuclear Resonances (1968) -- 7b. Coupling between Compound and Single-Particle Resonances (1968) -- 8. The Structure of Quantum Theory (1968) -- IV / Social Relations of Science -- 1. The Organization of Scientific Research (1948) -- 2. The Atomic Researcher: The Atomic Physicist’s Tasks, Goals and Methods (1968) -- 3. Technical and Social Aspects of the Development of the European Scientific Research Organizations (1970) -- 4. Social and Individual Aspects of the Development of Science (1971) -- Bibliography of the Writings of Léon Rosenfeld -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The decision to undertake this volume was made in 1971 at Lake Como during the Varenna summer school ofthe Italian Physical Society, where Professor Leon Rosenfeld was lecturing on the history of quantum theory. We had long been struck by the unique blend of epistemological, histori­ cal and social concerns in his work on the foundations and development of physics, and decided to approach him there with the idea of publishing a collection of his papers. He responded enthusiastically, and agreed to help us select the papers; furthermore, he also agreed to write a lengthy introduction and to comment separately on those papers that he felt needed critical re-evaluation in the light of his current views. For he was still vigorously engaged in both theoretical investigations of, and critical not reflections on the foundations of theoretical physics. We certainly did conceive of the volume as a memorial to a 'living saint', but rather more practically, as a useful tool to place in the hands of fellow workers and students engaged in wrestling with these difficult problems. All too sadly, fate has added a memorial aspect to our labors. We agreed that in order to make this book most useful for the con­ temporary community of physicists and philosophers, we should trans­ late all non-English items into English.

Abstract: Presuppositions, Problems, Progress -- I: Metaphysics and the Development of Science -- Some Issues Regarding the Completeness of Science and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge -- A Consideration of the Philosophical Implications of the New Physics -- Dialogue on Method -- Presuppositions and limits of Science -- II: Research Programs and the Development of Science -- A Combined Approach to the Dynamics of Theories. How to Improve Historical Interpretations of Theory Change by Applying Set Theoretical Structures -- Reflections on Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programs -- The Lattice of Growth in Knowledge -- Justifying a Theory Versus Giving Good Reasons for Preferring a Theory On the Big Divide in the Philosophy of Science -- Methodology in Non-Empirical Disciplines -- Biographical Notes -- Author Index.

Abstract: TIus is the second, and fmal, volume to derive from the exciting Kronberg conference of 1975, and to show the intelligent editorial care of Gerard Radnitzky and Gunnar Andersson that was so evident in the first book, Progress and Rationality in Science (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 58). Together they set forth central themes in current history and philosophy of the sciences, and in particular they will be seen as also providing obbligatos: research programs, metaphysical inevitabilities, methodological options, logical constraints, historical conjectures. Boston University Center for the R. S. COHEN Philosophy and History of Science M. W. WARTOFSKY July 1979 T T ABLE OF CONTENTS v EDITORIAL EDITORIAL PREFACE PREFACE ix PREFACE PREFACE INTRODUCTION GUNNAR ANDERSSON / Presuppositions, Problems,Progress 3 PART I: METAPHYSICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE NICHOLAS RESCHER / Some Issues Regarding the Completeness of Science and the limits of Scientific Knowledge 19 MAX JAMMER / A Consideration of the Philosophical Implications of the New Physics 41 PAUL FEYERABEND / Dialogue on Method 63 PETER HODGSON / Presuppositions and limits of Science 133 PART II: RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE WOLFGANG STEGMULLER / A Combined Approach to the Dynam­ ics of Theories. How to Improve Historical Interpretations of Theory Change by Applying Set Theoretical Structures 151 JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS / Reflections on Lakatos' Methodology of Scientific Research Programs 187 P A TRICK A.

Abstract: The Philosophy of Hans Reichenbach -- Inference, Practice and Theory -- Relative Frequencies -- The Probabilities of Theories as Frequencies -- Reichenbach, Reference Classes, and Single Case ‘Probabilities’ -- Reichenbach’s Entanglements -- Reichenbach on Convention -- Hans Reichenbach’s Relativity of Geometry -- Elective Affinities: Weyl and Reichenbach -- Reichenbach and Conventionalism -- The Geometry of the Rotating Disk in the Special Theory of Relativity -- Two Lectures on the Direction of Time -- What Might Be Right about the Causal Theory of Time -- Concerning a Probabilistic Theory of Causation Adequate for the Causal Theory of Time -- Why Ask, ‘Why?’?—An Inquiry Concerning Scientific Explanation -- Hans Reichenbach on the Logic of Quantum Mechanics -- Reichenbach and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics -- Reichenbach and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics -- Causal Anomalies and the Completeness of Quantum Theory -- Metaphysical Implications of the Quantum Theory -- Consistency Proofs for Applied Mathematics -- A Generative Model for Translating from Ordinary Language into Symbolic Notation -- Laws, Modalities and Counterfactuals -- Reichenbach’s Theory of Nomological Statements -- Appreciation and Criticism of Reichenbach’s Meta-ethics: Achilles’ Heel of the System? -- Index of Names -- Analytical Index of Subjects.

Abstract: Logical empiricism - not to be confused with logical positivism (see pp. 40-44) - is a movement which has left an indelible mark on twentieth­ century philosophy; Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) was one of its found­ ers and one of its most productive advocates. His sudden and untimely death in 1953 halted his work when he was at the height of his intellectual powers; nevertheless, he bequeathed to us a handsome philosophical inheritance. At the present time, twenty-five years later, we can survey our heritage and see to what extent we have been enriched. The present collection of essays constitutes an effort to do just that - to exhibit the scope and unity of Reichenbach's philosophy, and its relevance to current philosophical issues. There is no Nobel Prize in philosophy - the closest analogue is a volume in The Library of Living Philosophers, an honor which, like the Nobel Prize, cannot be awarded posthumously. Among 'scientific philosophers,' Rudolf Carnap, Albert Einstein, Karl Popper, and Bertrand Russell have been so honored. Had Reichenbach lived longer, he would have shared the honor with Carnap, for at the time of his death a volume on Logical Empiricism, treating the works of Carnap and Reichenbach, was in its early stages of preparation. In the volume which emerged, Carnap wrote, "In 1953, when Reichenbach's creative activity was suddenly ended by his premature death, our movement lost one of its most active leaders.

Abstract: of Ontology II -- 1. System -- 1. Basic Concepts -- 2. System Representations -- 3. Basic Assumptions -- 4. Systemicity -- 5. Concluding Remarks -- 2. Chemism -- 1. Chemical System -- 2. Biochemical System -- 3. Life -- 1. From Chemism to Life -- 2. Biofunction -- 3. Evolution -- 4. Concluding Remarks -- 4. Mind -- 1. Central Nervous System -- 2. Brain States -- 3. Sensation to Valuation -- 4. Recall to Knowledge -- 5. Self to Society -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- 5. Society -- 1. Human Society -- 2. Social Subsystems and Supersystems -- 3. Economy, Culture, and Polity -- 4. Social Structure -- 5. Social Change -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- 6. A Systemic World View -- 6.1. A World of Systems -- 6.2. System Genera -- 6.3. Novelty Sources -- 6.4. Emergence -- 6.5. Systemism Supersedes Atomism and Holism -- 6.6. Synopsis -- Appendix A. System models -- 1. Input-Output Models -- 1.1. The Black Box -- 1.2. Connecting Black Boxes -- 1.3. Control System -- 1.4. Stability and Breakdown -- 2. Grey Box Models -- 2.1. Generalities -- 2.2. Deterministic Automata -- 2.3. Probabilistic Automata -- 2.4. Information Systems -- Appendix B. Change models -- 1 Kinematical Models -- 1.1. Global Kinematics -- 1.2. Analytical Kinematics -- 1.3. Balance Equations -- 1.4. Lagrangian Framework -- 1.5. Kinematical Analogy -- 2. Dynamical Models -- 2.1. Generalities -- 2.2. Formalities -- 2.3. The Pervasiveness of Cooperation and Competition -- 2.4. The Dynamics of Competitive-Cooperative Processes -- 3. Qualitative Change Models -- 3.1. Kinematical: Birth and Death Operators -- 3.2. Dynamical: Random Hits -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: Inaugural Lecture -- Man the Creator and his Triple Telos -- I: Problems of Teleology in the Sciences of Nature and in The Human Sciences -- Final Causality and Teleological System in Aristotle -- The Concept of Evolution and the Phenomenological Teleology -- The Epistemology of the Sciences of Nature in Relation to the Teleology of Research in the Thought of the Later Husserl -- The Teleology of “Theoresis” and “Praxis” in the Thought of Husserl -- The Crisis of Science as a Crisis of Teleological Reason -- “Erlebnis” and “Logos” in Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences -- II: The Telic Principles -- A. Telos and the Constitutive Consciousness -- Perception as a Teleological Process of Cognition -- Interpretation and Self-Evidence -- The Teleology of Consciousness: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty -- Phénoménologie et Téléologie (Reprise des Questions de Fond) -- B. Teleology of the Person and of Human Existence -- Moral Experience and Teleology -- The Person as the Accomplishment of Intentional Acts -- The Transcendence of the Person in Action and Man’s Self-Teleology -- Teleology and Inter subjectivity -- Teleology and Intersubjectivity in Husserl — Reflections -- Teleology and Inter-Subjectivity in Religious Knowledge -- The Phenomenological Horizon and the Metaphysics of the Person According to Giuseppe Zamboni -- The Melancholic Consciousness of Guilt as a Failure of Intersubjectivity -- C. Finiteness and the “Form of All Forms” -- Section I: Telos of History -- The Theory of the Object and the Teleology of History in Edmund Husserl -- The Destruction of Time by History -- Teleology and Philosophical Historiography: Husserl and Jaspers -- The End and Time -- History, Teleology, and God in the Philosophy of Husserl -- Section II: Eschatology and the “Form of All Forms” -- Teleology as “The Form of All Forms” and the Inexhaustibility of Research -- Teleology and the Constitution of Spiritual Forms -- Metaphysics of Beginning and Metaphysics of Foundation -- History as Teleology and Eschatology: Husserl and Heidegger -- Closure -- Conclusion Arezzo -- Complementary Section: Phenomenology in Italy -- A Historical Note on the Presence of Brentano in Sicily and on the First Links of Italian Culture with the Phenomenology of Husserl -- Antonio Banfi, the First Italian Interpreter of Phenomenology -- Bibliography of Husserlian Studies in Italy with an Introduction by Angela Ales Bello.

Abstract: The following bibliography, arranged chronologically, permits the reader to follow the development of phenomenological studies in Italy in parallel with other, contemporary, cultural currents. From this list it can be seen that knowledge of Hussed's work begins in 1923 with the studies of A. Banfi. Phenomenology, however, did not immediately receive a warm welcome. It contrasted with the then dominant neo-idealism (as has been made clear by G. De Ruggiero), but for this very reason it also found adherents among the opponents of idealism. These were either distant heirs of positivism, who accepted Hussed on account of his scientific approach and rigor, or Christian­ oriented thinkers, who, following an initial period of diffidence toward the antimetaphysical attitude of phenomenological analysis, gradually began to use this method as an antiidealist instrument - even though the problem remained of Hussed's own transcendental idealism and the value to be attributed to it. Despite the difficulties encountered on the way, the numerous studies carried out in Italy prior to Wodd War II make it clear that the better known philosophers who have left a mark on Italian culture already had begun to take a discreet interest in phenomenology.

Abstract: 1. Logistic Neopositivism. A critical study -- 2. On the System of the Concepts of Reality. A contribution to logical empiricism -- 3. On the Concept of Reality in Physical Science. Second contribution to logical empiricism -- 4. The Perceptual and Conceptual Components of Everyday Experience -- The Philosophical and Psychological Writings of Eino Kaila -- Index of Names.

Abstract: Philosophically, there is a book which was a tremendous experience for me: Eino Kaila's hychology of the Person­ ality _ His thesis that man lives strictly according to his needs - negative and positive - was shattering to me, but terribly true. And I built on this ground. Ingmar Bergman J 1. This introductory essay is neither intended to be a full presentation nor to be a critical evaluation of the contributions to philosophy made by Eino Kaila. Kaila's work will speak to the reader through the four papers here published in English translation from the German. They belong in the tra­ dition of the Vienna Circle and of logical empiricism. They cover, however, only one period or sector of Kaila's rich and varied life-work. This is the sector best integrated into the mainstream of contemporary philosophic thinking. The primary aim of this essay is to portray an impressive intellectual personality and to make a modest contribution to Finnish and Scandinavian intellectual history. Much of its content may be thought to be of 'local' relevance only. But considering the position which Kaila held in his country and considering his decisive influence on the development of philosophy in Finland, I hope that this local background will also interest an international circle of readers.

Abstract: I. Truth and Its Illicit Surrogates -- II. Some Reminders concerning Truth, Satisfaction, and Reference -- III. On Disquotation and Intensionality -- IV. On Truth, Belief, and Modes of Description -- V. The Pragmatics of Self-Reference -- VI. On Suppositio and Denotation -- VII. Of Time and the Null Individual -- VIII. Existence and Logical Form -- IX. Tense, Aspect, and Modality -- X. Of ‘Of’ -- XI. Events and Actions: Brand and Kim -- XII. Why I Am Not a Montague Grammarian -- XIII. The Truth about Kripke’s “Truth” -- XIV. On Possibilia and Essentiality: Ruth Marcus -- XV. On the Language of Causal Talk: Scriven and Suppes -- XVI. A Reading of Frege on Sense and Designation -- XVII. ‘And’ -- XVIII. Some Protolinguistic Transformations -- XIX. Some Hi?ian Heresies -- XX. Mathematical Nominalism -- XXI. Of Logic, Learning, and Language -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: Richard Martin's thoroughly philosophical as well as thoroughly tech­ nical investigations deserve continued and appreciative study. His sympathy and good cheer do not obscure his rigorous standard, nor do his contemporary sophistication and intellectual independence obscure his critical congeniality toward classical and medieval philosophers. So he deals with old and new; his papers, in his neat self-descriptions, consist of reminders, criticisms, and constructions. They might also be seen as studies in the understanding of truth, ramifying as widely in mathematics, logic, and epistemology as well as metaphysics, as such understanding has required. For us it is a pleasant occasion to welcome Richard Martin's new Boston Studies, and to note his continuously con­ collection to the structive and critical interventions at the Boston Colloquium for the of Science. Philosophy Boston University Center for the R. S. COHEN Philosophy and History of Science M. W. WARTOFSKY July 1979 vii TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL PREFACE vii PREFACE xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xv I. Truth and Its Illicit Surrogates II. Some Reminders concerning Truth, Satisfaction, and Reference 17 III. On Disquotation and Intensionality 30 IV. On Truth, Belief, and Modes of Description 42 V. The Pragmatics of Self-Reference 55 VI. On Suppositio and Denotation 72 VII. Of Time and the Null Individual 82 VIII. Existence and Logical Form 95 IX. Tense, Aspect, and Modality 110 X. Of 'Of' 130 XI. Events and Actions: Brand and Kim 144 XII. Why I Am Not a Montague Grammarian 160 XIII.

Abstract: I/Philosophy, Dialectics, and Historical Materialism -- Dialectic Today -- The Meaning of Marx’s Philosophy -- A Tension in Historical Materialism -- Some One-Sided Conceptions of Social Determinism -- Historical Science and the Philosophy of History -- II/Society, Politics and Revolution -- Homo Politicus -- Political Dictatorship: The Conflict of Politics and Society -- Revolution and Terror -- The Philosophical Concept of Revolution -- III/Culture, Ideas and Religion -- Culture as a Bridge Between Utopia and Reality -- Between Two Types of Modern Culture -- Ideas and Life -- The Withering Away of Religion in Socialism -- Culture and Revolution -- IV/Socialism, Bureaucracy and Self-Management -- Theoretical Foundations for the Idea of Self-Management -- Some Contradictions and Insufficiencies of Yugoslav Self-Managing Socialism -- Institutionalization of the Revolutionary Movement -- Bureaucracy — Reified Organization -- Bureaucracy and Public Communication -- Social Equality and Inequality in the Bourgeois World and in Socialism -- Middle Class Ideology -- Ecstasy and Hangover of a Revolution -- Notes on Contributors by Gajo Petrovi? -- Bibliographical Details of the Essays appearing in this Volume -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This volume of the Boston Studies is a distillation of one of the most creative and important movements in contemporary social theory. The articles repre­ sent the work of the so-called 'Praxis' group in Yugoslavia, a heterogeneous movement of philosophers, sociologists, political theorists, historians, and cul­ tural critics, united by a common approach: that of social theory as a critical and scientific enterprise, closely linked to questions of contemporary practical life. As the introductory essay explains, in its history and analysis of the development of this group, the name Praxis focuses on the heart of Marx's social theory - the conception of human beings as creative, productive makers and shapers of their own history. The journal Praxis, which appeared regularly in Yugoslavia at Zagreb, and also in an International Edition for many years, is the source of many of these articles. The journal had to suspend publication in 1975 because of political pressures in Yugoslavia. Eight members of the group were dismissed from their University posts in Belgrade, after a long struggle in which their colleagues stood by them staunchly. Yet the creativity and productivity of the group continues, by those in Belgrade and elsewhere. Its contributions to the social sciences, and to the very conception of social science as critical and applied theory, remain vivid, timely and innovative. The importance of the theoretical work of the Praxis group is perhaps at its height now.

Abstract: Dispositions and Definitions -- Counterfactuals and Dispositions -- Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic -- In Defense of Dispositions -- Dispositions Revisited -- Dispositions, Grounds, and Causes -- Some Ways of Operationally Introducing Dispositional Predicates with Regard to Scientific and Ordinary Practice -- Dispositional Explanation -- Universals and Dispositions -- Disposition -- A World of Dispositions -- Capacities and Natures -- Powers -- Notes on the Doctrine of Chances -- The Propensity Interpretation of Probability -- Dispositional Probabilities -- Propensities and Probabilities -- Subjunctives, Dispositions, and Chances -- Dispositions and Occurrences -- Dispositions, Occurrences, and Ontology -- Belief and Disposition -- Beliefs as States -- Dispositions, Realism, and Explanation -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This anthology consists of a collection of papers on the nature of dis­ positions and the role of disposition concepts in scientific theories. I have tried to make the collection as representative as possible, except that problems specifically connected with dispositions in various special sciences are relatively little discussed. Most of these articles have been previously published. The papers by Mackie, Essler and Trapp, Fetzer (in Section 11), Levi, and Tuomela appear here for the first time, and are simultaneously published in Synthese 34, No. 4, which is a special issue on dispositions. Of the previously published material it should be emphasized that the papers by Hempel and Fisk have been extensively revised specially for this anthology. The papers are grouped in four sections, partlyon the basis of their content. However, due to the complexity of the issues involved, there is considerable overlap in content between the different sections, especially between Sections land 11. I wish to thank Professors James Fetzer and Carl G. Hempel for helpful advicc in compiling this anthology.

Abstract: Process Philosophy and Quantum Dynamics -- Formal Languages and the Foundations of Physics -- Is the Hilbert space language too rich? -- Generalized Quantum Mechanics -- Quantum Logic -- The Operational Approach to Quantum Mechanics -- Completeness of Quantum Logic -- Quantum Logical Calculi and Lattice Structures -- An Operational Approach to Quantum Probability -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: In two earlier volumes, entitled The Logico-Algebraic Approach to Quan­ tum Mechanics (hereafter LAA I, II), I have presented collections of research papers which trace out the historical development and contem­ porary flowering of a particular approach to physical theory. One might characterise this approach as the extraction of an abstract logico-algebraic skeleton from each physical theory and the reconstruction of the physical theory as construction of mathematical and interpretive 'flesh' (e. g. , measures, operators, mappings etc. ) on this skeleton. The idea is to show how the specific features of a theory that are easily seen in application (e. g. , 'interference' among observables in quantum mechanics) arise out of the character of its core abstract structure. In this fashion both the deeper nature of a theory (e. g. , in what precise sense quantum mechanics is strongly statistical) and the deeper differences between theories (e. g. clas­ sical mechanics, though also a 'mechanics', is not strongly statistical) are penetratingly illuminated. What I would describe as the 'mainstream' logico-algebraic tradition is captured in these two collections of papers (LAA I, II). The abstract, structural approach to the characterisation of physical theory has been the basis of a striking transformation, in this century, in the understanding of theories in mathematical physics. There has emerged clearly the idea that physical theories are most significantly characterised by their abstract structural components.

Abstract: I Metascience: Philosophical Analysis of Scientific Truth -- 1 The Problem of Physical Explanation -- 2 Probability and Causality in Quantum Physics -- 3 Meaning and Scientific Status of Causality -- 4 Methodology of Modern Physics -- 5 Metaphysical Elements in Physics -- 6 Is the Mathematical Explanation of Physical Data Unique? -- II Fundamental Problems of 20th Century Physics -- 7 Probability, Many-Valued Logics and Physics -- 8 On the Frequency Theory of Probability -- 9 Can Time Flow Backwards? -- 10 Causality in Quantum Electrodynamics -- 11 Relativity: An Epistemological Appraisal -- 12 Philosophical Problems Concerning the Meaning of Measurement in Physics -- 13 Bacon and Modern Physics: a Confrontation -- III Science and Human Affairs -- 14 Western Culture, Scientific Method and the Problem of Ethics -- 15 Physical versus Historical Reality -- 16 The New View of Man in His Physical Environment -- 17 Science and Human Affairs -- 18 The New Style of Science -- IV Issues Beyond the Boundaries of Present Science -- 19 Phenomenology and Physics -- 20 Physics and Ontology -- 21 Faith and Physics -- 22 Metaethics -- 23 The Pursuit of Significance -- 24 Note on Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness -- 25 Religious Doctrine and Natural Science -- List of Publications.

Abstract: This book is intended for people interested in physics and its philosophy. for those who regard physics as an essential component of modern culture rather than merely a tool for industry or war. Indeed this volume is addressed to those students, teachers and research workers who enjoy learning, teaching or doing physics, and are in the habit of pausing once in a while to ponder over key physical concepts and hypotheses and to wonder whether received theories are as perfect as textbooks would have us believe and, if not, how they might be improved. Henry Margenau, recently retired from Yale University as Eugene Higgins Professor of Physics and Philosophy, is the most important philosopher of physics of his generation, and indeed one of the most eminent philosophers of science of our century. He introduced and elucidated the notion of the correspondence rule. He claimed and showed, in the heyday of positivism, that physics has metaphysical presuppositions. He was the first to realize that quantum mechanics can do without von Neumann's projection postulat- and that was as far back as 1936. He clarified the physics and the philosophy of Pauli's exclusion principle at a time when it seemed mysterious. He was the first physicist to publish a philosophical paper in a physics journal, which he did as early as 1941. He was also one of the rare scientists who proclaimed the need for a scientific approach to value theory and ethics.

Abstract: 1 / Background -- 1.0.1 Greek Geometry and Philosophy -- 1.0.2 Geometry in Greek Natural Science -- 1.0.3 Modern Science and the Metaphysical Idea of Space -- 1.0.4 Descartes’ Method of Coordinates -- 2 / Non-Euclidean Geometries -- 2.1 Parallels -- 2.2 Manifolds -- 2.3 Projective Geometry and Projective Metrics -- 3 / Foundations -- 3.1 Helmholtz’s Problem of Space -- 3.2 Axiomatics -- 4 / Empiricism, Apriorism, Conventionalism -- 4.1 Empiricism in Geometry -- 4.2 The Uproar of Boeotians -- 4.3 Russell’s Apriorism of 1897 -- 4.4 Henri Poincaré -- 1. Mappings -- 2. Algebraic Structures. Groups -- 3. Topologies -- 4. Differentiable Manifolds -- Notes -- To Chapter 1 -- To Chapter 2 -- 2.1 -- 2.2 -- 2.3 -- To Chapter 3 -- 3.1 -- 3.2 -- To Chapter 4 -- 4.1 -- 4.2 -- 4.3 -- 4.4 -- References.

Abstract: Geometry has fascinated philosophers since the days of Thales and Pythagoras. In the 17th and 18th centuries it provided a paradigm of knowledge after which some thinkers tried to pattern their own metaphysical systems. But after the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries in the 19th century, the nature and scope of geometry became a bone of contention. Philosophical concern with geometry increased in the 1920's after Einstein used Riemannian geometry in his theory of gravitation. During the last fifteen or twenty years, renewed interest in the latter theory -prompted by advances in cosmology -has brought geometry once again to the forefront of philosophical discussion. The issues at stake in the current epistemological debate about geometry can only be understood in the light of history, and, in fact, most recent works on the subject include historical material. In this book, I try to give a selective critical survey of modern philosophy of geometry during its seminal period, which can be said to have begun shortly after 1850 with Riemann's generalized conception of space and to achieve some sort of completion at the turn of the century with Hilbert's axiomatics and Poincare's conventionalism. The philosophy of geometry of Einstein and his contemporaries will be the subject of another book. The book is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides back­ ground information about the history of science and philosophy.

Abstract: Policy-Formation with Issue-Processing and Transformation of Issues -- A Diagrammatic Exposition of the Logic of Collective Action -- Decision-Theoretic Analysis of Rawls’ Original Position -- The Social Contract: Individual Decision or Collective Bargain? -- On Relating Individual and Social Decisions -- Distributive Justice -- Toward a Theory of Sociality -- Evolution and Fine-Grained Environmental Runs -- Power in Electoral Games -- Index of Names.

Abstract: 1. INTRODUCTION In the Spring of 1975 we held an international workshop on the Foundations and Application of Decision Theory at the University of Western Ontario. To help structure the workshop into ordered and manageable sessions we distri­ buted the following statement of our goals to all invited participants. They in turn responded with useful revisions and suggested their own areas of interest. Since this procedure provided the eventual format of the sessions, we include it here as the most appropriate introduction to these collected papers result­ ing from the workshop. The reader can readily gauge the approximation to our mutual goals. 2. STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE (Attached to this statement is a bibliography; names of persons cited in the statement and writing in this century will be found referenced in the biblio­ graphy - certain 'classics' aSide. ) 2. 1. Preamble We understand in the following the Theory of Decisions in a broader sense than is presently customary, construing it to embrace a general theory of decision-making, including social, political and economic theory and applica­ tions. Thus, we subsume the Theory of Games under the head of Decision Theory, regarding it as a particularly clearly formulated version of part of the general theory of decision-making.

Abstract: V / Philosophy of Physics -- 44. The Present State of the Discussion on Relativity (1922) -- 45. The Theory of Motion According to Newton, Leibniz, and Huyghens (1924) -- 46. The Relativistic Theory of Time (1924) -- 47. The Causal Structure of the World and the Difference between Past and Future (1925) -- 48. The Aims and Methods of Physical Knowledge (1929) -- 49. Current Epistemological Problems and the Use of a Three-Valued Logic in Quantum Mechanics (1951) -- 50. The Logical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1952) -- 51. The Philosophical Significance of the Wave-Particle Dualism (1953) -- VI/Probability and Induction -- 52a. The Physical Presuppositions of the Calculus of Probability (1920) -- 52b. Appendix: A Letter to the Editor (1920) -- 53. A Philosophical Critique of the Probability Calculus (1920) -- 54. Notes on the Problem of Causality [A Letter from Erwin, Schrödinger to Hans Reichenbach] (1924) -- 55. Causality and Probability (1930) -- 56. The Principle of Causality and the Possibility of Its Empirical Confirmation (1932) -- 57. Induction and Probability: Remarks on Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935) -- 58. The Semantic and the Object Conceptions of Probability Expressions (1939) -- 59. A Letter to Bertrand Russell (March 28, 1949) -- Bibliography of Writings oF Hans Reichenbach -- Index of Names to Volumes One and Two.

Abstract: 1. Introduction -- 1. Concept Explication -- 2. Objectives and Survey -- 2. Cognitive Rationality -- 1. On the Explication of the Concept of Rationality -- 2. Cognitive Rationality and Patterns of Expectation -- 3. Inductive Reasoning and Inductive Probability Theory -- 3. Logico-Mathematical Preliminaries -- 1. Logical Vocabulary -- 2. Set-theoretical Vocabulary -- 3. Some Elements of Probability Theory -- 4. Formally Rational Expectation in a Paradigmatic Context -- 1. Paradigmatic Contexts -- 2. Two Conditions for Rational Expectation -- 3. A Framework for a Paradigmatic Context -- 4. First Analysis of a Rational Expectation Pattern -- 5. A Framework for a Paradigmatic Context (continued) -- 6. Third Formal Condition for Rational Expectation -- 7. Decidable Contexts -- 5. Generalized Carnapian Systems -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Constitutive Principles and Definition of GC-systems -- 3. General Analysis of GC-systems -- 4. Analysis of Positive Inductive GC-systems (0 〈 ? 〈 oo) -- 5. Analysis of Negative Inductive GC-systems (? 〈 0) -- Appendix to Section 2 (Proof of T2) -- 6. Hintikka and Universalized Carnapian Systems -- 1. Introduction -- 2. NH-systems -- 3. Hintikka-systems (H-systems) -- 4. Some Fundamental Properties of H-systems -- 5. An Urn-model for H-systems -- 6. The Equivalence of NH- and SH-systems: Universalized Carnapian systems (UC-systems) -- 7. Analysis of UC-systems -- 8. Fundamental Discussion Related to Applications -- 9. Finite Parameters for H-systems -- 10. Reformulation of H-systems; k ? ? -- 11. GH-systems and G UC-systems -- 12. Survey of Systems -- Appendix to Section 2 (Proof of T1 ) -- 7. Rational Expectation in Multinomial Contexts -- 1. Carnap’s Intended Application -- 2. The Multinomial Context -- 3. Formally Rational Patterns for Open Multinomial Contexts -- 4. Material Conditions of Adequacy; UC-systems as Expectation Pattern for Open Multinomial Contexts -- 5. Constitutional Distributions for Open Multinomial Contexts -- 6. The Hypergeometric Context -- 8. Some Problems and Related Topics -- 1. PER-systems -- 2. On Weakening WPERR -- 3. *UC*-systems and k ? ? -- 4. Confirmation Theory -- 5. Falsification -- 6. Rules of Acceptance in UC-systems -- 9. Concluding Remarks -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects -- Recurring Symbols -- Conditions/Principles/Axioms -- Definition of Systems.

Abstract: 3 in philosophy, and therefore in metaphilosophy, cannot be based on rules that avoid spending time on pseudo-problems. Of course, this implies that, if one succeeds in demonstrating convincingly the pseudo-character of a problem by giving its 'solution', the time spent on it need not be seen as wasted. We conclude this section with a brief statement of the criteria for concept explication as they have been formulated in several places by Carnap, Hempel and Stegmiiller. Hempel's account ([13J, Chapter 1) is still very adequate for a detailed introduction. The process of explication starts with the identification of one or more vague and, perhaps, ambiguous concepts, the so-called explicanda. Next, one tries to disentangle the ambiguities. This, however, need not be possible at once. Ultimately the explicanda are to be replaced (not necessarily one by one) by certain counterparts, the so-called explicata, which have to conform to four requirements. They have to be as precise as possible and as simple as possible. In addition, they have to be useful in the sense that they give rise to the formulation of theories and the solution of problems. The three requirements of preciseness, simplicity and usefulness. have of course to be pursued in all concept formation.

Abstract: One: Attributes -- One/Attribute-Agreement and the Problem of Universals -- Two/Predication and Universals -- Three/Resemblance and Universals -- Four/Abstract Reference and Universals -- Five/Towards A Realistic Ontology -- Two: Substances -- Six/Two theories of substance -- Seven/The Bundle Theory -- Eight/Bare Substrata -- Nine/Towards A Substance-Theory Of Substance -- Epilogue -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: In this book I address a dichotomy that is as central as any in ontology - that between ordinary objects or substances and the various attributes (Le. , properties, kinds, and relations) we associate with them. My aim is to arrive at the correct philosophical account of each member of the dichotomy. What I shall argue is that the various attempts to understand substances or attri­ butes in reductive terms fail. Talk about attributes, I shall try to show, is just that - talk about attributes; and, likewise, talk about substances is just tha- talk about substances. The result is what many will find a strange combina­ tion of views - a Platonistic theory of attributes, where attributes are univer­ sals or multiply exemplifiable entities whose existence is independent of "the world of flux", and an Aristotelian theory of substance, where substances are basic unities not reducible to metaphysically more fundamental kinds of things. Part One is concerned with the ontology of attributes. After distinguishing three different patterns of metaphysical thinking about attributes, I examine, in turn, the phenomena of predication, resemblance, and higher order quanti­ fication. I argue that none of these phenomena by itself is sufficient to establish the inescapability of a Platonistic interpretation of attributes. Then, I discuss the phenomenon of abstract reference as it is exhibited in the use of abstract singular terms.

Abstract: Introductory Essay -- Phenomenology and Philosophy in Japan -- I / Present Day Phenomenology in Japan -- Husserl’s Manuscript ‘A Nocturnal Conversation’: His Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity -- The Paradox of the Phenomenological Method -- The Potential Plurality of the Transcendental Ego of Husserl and Its Relevance to the Theory of Space -- Philosophy and Phenomenological Intuition -- Is Time Real? -- Phenomenology and Grammar: A Consideration of the Relation Between Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy -- Phänomenologische Betrachtung vom Begriff der Welt -- Wahrheit und Unwahrheit oder Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit: Eine Bemerkung zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit -- II / Phenomenology in the Japanese Inheritance -- The Kyoto School of Philosophy and Phenomenology -- Affective Feeling -- The Concrete World of Action in Nishida’s Later Thought -- Appendix: Selected Bibliography of the Major Phenomenological Works Translated into Japanese and of the Major Phenomenological Writings by Japanese Authors (Hirotaka Tatematsu) -- Index of Names.

Abstract: Galileo’s Scientific Method: a Reexamination -- Some Tactics in Galileo’s Propaganda for the Mathematization of Scientific Experience -- Galileo Galilei and the Doctores Parisienses -- Descartes as Critic of Galileo -- Galileo and the Causes -- Galileo: Causation and the Use of Geometry -- Galileo’s Matter Theory -- The Conception of Science in Galileo’s Work.

Abstract: The essays in this volume (except for the contribution of Dr. Le Grand) are extremely revised versions of papers originally delivered at a workshop on Galileo held in Blacksburg, Virginia in October, 1975. The meeting was organized by Professor Joseph Pitt and sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Religion, The College of Arts and Sciences, and the Division of Research of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The papers that follow deal with problems OIf Galileo's philosophy of science, specific and general problems connected with his methodology, and with historical and conceptual questions concerning the relationship of his work to that of contemporaries and both earlier and later scientists. New perspectives take many forms. In this book the 'newness' has, for the most part, two forms. First, in the papers by Wisan, Shea, Le Grand and Wallace (the concerns will also appear in some of the other contributions), greatly enriched historical discoveries of how Galileo's science and its method­ ology developed are provided. It should be stressed that these papers are attempts to recapture a deep sense of the kind of science Galileo was creating. Other papers in the volume, for example, those by McMullin, Machamer, Butts and Pitt, underscore the importance of this historical venture by discussing various aspects of the philosophical background of Galileo's thought. The historical and philosophical evaluations and analyses compliment one another.

Abstract: Objective Criteria of Scientific Progress? Inductivism, Falsificationism, and Relativism -- I: The LSE Position -- The Popperian Approach to Scientific Knowledge -- The Ways in Which the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes Improves on Popper’s Methodology -- ‘Crucial’ Experiments: A Case Study -- The Objective Promise of a Research Programme -- II: Reflections on the LSE Position -- Popper vs Inductivism -- In Defence of Aristotle: Comments on the Condition of Content Increase -- Evidential Support, Falsification, Heuristics, and Anarchism -- Science and the Search for Truth -- Philosophy of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions -- Towards a New Theory of Scientific Inquiry -- Some Critical Comments on Current Popperianism on the Basis of a Theory of System Sets -- The Problem of Verisimilitude -- Objectivism vs Sociologism -- III: The LSE Reply -- Research Programmes, Empirical Support, and the Duhem Problem: Replies to Criticism -- Corroboration and the Problem of Content-Comparison -- Unified Bibliography for Parts I And III -- IV: Two Brief Rejoinders -- The Gong Show — Popperian Style -- Reply to Watkins -- Biographical Notes -- Author Index.

Abstract: This collection of essays has evolved through the co-operative efforts, which began in the fall of 1974, of the participants in a workshop sponsored by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. The idea of holding one or more small colloquia devoted to the topics of rational choice in science and scientific progress originated in a conversation in the summer of 1973 between one of the editors (GR) and the late Imre Lakatos. Unfortunately Lakatos himself was never able to see this project through, but his thought-provoking methodology of scientific research programmes was ably expounded and defended by his successors. Indeed, this volume continues and deepens the debate inaugurated in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave), a book which grew out of a conference held in 1965. That debate has continued during the years that have passed since that conference. The group of discussions about the place of rationality in science which have been held between those who emphasize the history of science (with Feyerabend and Kuhn as the most prominent exponents) and the critical rationalists (Popper and his followers), with Imre Lakatos defending a middle ground, these discussions were seen by almost all commentators as the most important event in the philosophy of science in the last decade. This problem area constituted the central theme of our Thyssen workshop. The workshop operated in the following manner.

Abstract: Division One / A Program in the Philosophy of Technology -- 1. The Experience of Technology: Human-Machine Relations -- 2. A Phenomenology of Instrumentation: Perception Transformed -- 3. A Phenomenology of Instrumentation: The Instrument as Mediator -- 4. A Phenomenology of Instrumentation: Technics and Telos -- Division Two / Implications of Technology -- 5. The Existential Import of Computer Technology -- 6. Technology and the Transformation of Experience -- 7. Vision and Objectification -- 8. Bach to Rock, a Musical Odyssey -- Division Three / Pioneers in the Philosophy of Technology -- 9. Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technology -- 10. Technology and the Human: Hans Jonas -- 11. The Secular City and the Existentialists -- Index of Names.

Abstract: Depending on how one construes the kinship relations, technology has been either the stepchild of philosophy or its grandfather. In either case, technology has not been taken into the bosom of the family, but has had to wait for attention, care and feeding, while the more unclear elements - science, art, politics, ethics - were being nurtured (or cleaned up). Don Ihde puts technology in the middle of things, and develops a philosophy of technology that is at once distinctive, revealing and thought­ provoking. Typically, philosophy of technology has existed at, or beyond, the margins of the philosophy of science, and therefore the question of technology has come to be posed (when it is) either by historians of technology or by social critics. The philosophy of technology, as analysis and critique of the concepts, methodologies, implicit epistemologies and ontologies of technological praxis and thought, has remained underdeveloped. When philosophy does turn its attention to the insistent presence of technology, it inevitably casts the question in one or another of the dominant modes of philosophical interpretation and reconstruction. Thus, the logic of technological thinking and practice has been a subject of some systematic work (e. g. , in the Praxiology of Kotarbinski and Kotarbinska, among others). And the question of technology's relation to science has been posed in the framework of the nomological model of explanation in the sciences - e. g.

Abstract: 1 / The Hilbert Space Formulation of Quantum Physics -- 1.1 The Hilbert Space -- 1.2 The Lattice of Subspaces of Hilbert Space -- 1.3 Projection Operators -- 1.4 States and Properties of a Physical System -- 2 / The Logical Interpretation of the Lattice Lq -- 2.1 The Quasimodular Lattice Lq -- 2.2 The Relation of Commensurability -- 2.3 The Material Quasi-implication -- 2.4 The Relation between Lattice Theory and Logic -- 3 / The Material Propositions of Quantum Physics -- 3.1 Elements of a Language of Quantum Physics -- 3.2 Argument-rules for Compound Propositions -- 3.3 Commensurability and Incommensurability -- 3.4 The Material Dialog-game -- 4 / The Calculus of Effective Quantum Logic -- 4.1 Formally True Propositions -- 4.2 Formal Dialogs with Material Commensurabilities -- 4.3 The Formal Dialog-game -- 4.4 The Calculus Qeff of Effective Quantum Logic -- 5 / The Lattice of Effective Quantum Logic -- 5.1 The Quasi-implicative Lattice Lqi -- 5.2 Properties of the Lattice Lqi -- 5.3 The Relation between Lqi and the Lattice Li -- 5.4 The Relation between Lqi and the Lattice Lq -- 6 / The Calculus of Full Quantum Logic -- 6.1 Value-definite Material Propositions -- 6.2 The Value-definiteness of Compound Propositions -- 6.3 The Extension of the Calculus Qeff -- 6.4 The Principle of Excluded Middle -- Concluding Remarks: Classical Logic and Quantum Logic.

Abstract: In 1936, G. Birkhoff and J. v. Neumann published an article with the title The logic of quantum mechanics'. In this paper, the authors demonstrated that in quantum mechanics the most simple observables which correspond to yes-no propositions about a quantum physical system constitute an algebraic structure, the most important proper­ ties of which are given by an orthocomplemented and quasimodular lattice Lq. Furthermore, this lattice of quantum mechanical proposi­ tions has, from a formal point of view, many similarities with a Boolean lattice L8 which is known to be the lattice of classical propositional logic. Therefore, one could conjecture that due to the algebraic structure of quantum mechanical observables a logical calculus Q of quantum mechanical propositions is established, which is slightly different from the calculus L of classical propositional logic but which is applicable to all quantum mechanical propositions (C. F. v. Weizsacker, 1955). This calculus has sometimes been called 'quan­ tum logic'. However, the statement that propositions about quantum physical systems are governed by the laws of quantum logic, which differ from ordinary classical logic and which are based on the empirically well-established quantum theory, is exposed to two serious objec­ tions: (a) Logic is a theory which deals with those relationships between various propositions that are valid independent of the content of the respective propositions. Thus, the validity of logical relationships is not restricted to a special type of proposition, e. g. to propositions about classical physical systems.

Abstract: The Infinite in Mathematics and its Elimination (1930) -- Preface -- Analytic Table of Contents -- 1. Basic Facts of Cognition -- II. Symbolism and Axiomatics -- III. Natural Number and Set -- IV. Negative Numbers, Fractions and Irrational Numbers -- V. Set Theory -- VI. The Problem of Complete Decidability of Arithmetical Questions -- VII. The Antinomies -- Remarks on the Controversy about the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics (1931) -- Questions of Logical Principle in the Investigation of the Foundations of Mathematics (ca. 1931) -- Bibliography of the Published Writings of Felix Kaufman -- Bibliography of Works cited in the Present Volume -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The main item in the present volume was published in 1930 under the title Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung. It was at that time the fullest systematic account from the standpoint of Husserl's phenomenology of what is known as 'finitism' (also as 'intuitionism' and 'constructivism') in mathematics. Since then, important changes have been required in philosophies of mathematics, in part because of Kurt Godel's epoch-making paper of 1931 which established the essential in­ completeness of arithmetic. In the light of that finding, a number of the claims made in the book (and in the accompanying articles) are demon­ strably mistaken. Nevertheless, as a whole it retains much of its original interest and value. It presents the issues in the foundations of mathematics that were under debate when it was written (and in some cases still are); , and it offers one alternative to the currently dominant set-theoretical definitions of the cardinal numbers and other arithmetical concepts. While still a student at the University of Vienna, Felix Kaufmann was greatly impressed by the early philosophical writings (especially by the Logische Untersuchungen) of Edmund Husser!' He was never an uncritical disciple of Husserl, and he integrated into his mature philosophy ideas from a wide assortment of intellectual sources. But he thought of himself as a phenomenologist, and made frequent use in all his major publications of many of Husserl's logical and epistemological theses.

Abstract: The ‘Tracing Procedure’ and a Theory of Rational Interaction -- Variety Among Hierarchies of Preference -- Conflict and Structure in Multi-Level Multiple Objective Decision-Making systems -- Inadequacies in the Decision Analysis Model of Rationality -- Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility -- Coordination Theory -- A Piagetian Approach to Decision and Game Theory -- Axiomatizing the Logic of Decision -- On Indeterminate Probabilities -- Irrelevance -- On a Decision Theoretic Method for Social Decisions -- Consensus and Comparison: A Theory of Social Rationality -- Conjoint Measurement: A Brief Survey -- The Minimax Theory and Expected-Utility Reasoning -- Newcomb’s Many Problems -- Newcomb’s Problem, Dominance and Expected Utility -- The Copernican Revelation -- Prolegomena to a Theory of Rational Motives -- Index of Names.

Abstract: 1. INTRODUCTION In the Spring of 1975 we held an international workshop on the Foundations and Application of Decision Theory at the University of Western Ontario. To help structure the workshop into ordered and manageable sessions we distri­ buted the following statement of our goals to all invited participants. They in turn responded with useful revisions and suggested their own areas of interest. Since this procedure provided the eventual format of the sessions, we include it here as the most appropriate introduction to these collected papers result­ ing from the workshop. The reader can readily gauge the approximation to our mutual goals. 2. STATEMENT or OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE (Attached to this statement is a bibliography; names of persons cited in the statement and writing in this century will be found referenced in the biblio­ graphy - certain 'classics' aside. ) 2. 1. Preamble We understand in the following the Theory of Decisions in a broader sense than is presently customary, construing it to embrace a general theory of deciSion-making, induding social, political and economic theory and applica­ tions. Thus, we subsume the Theory of Games under the head of Decision Theory, regarding it as a particularly clearly formulated version of part of the general theory of decision-making.

Abstract: On Clear and Obscure Styles of Philosophical Writing -- Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia -- On the Content and Object of Representations -- Actions and Products. Comments on the Border Area of Psychology, Grammar, and Logic -- Issues in the Logic of Adjectives -- A Survey of Logical and Semantic Problems -- The Reistic or Concretistic Approach -- Comments on the Meaning of Words -- The Controversy Over Designata -- Token-reflexive Words Versus Proper Names -- Connotation and Denotation -- Proposition as the Connotation of Sentence -- Intensional Expressions -- Concerning the So-called Empty Names -- Issues in the Philosophy of Proper Names -- Truth and the Concept of Language -- Ambiguity and the Language of Science -- Significano ‘per se’ and ‘per aliud’ in Anselm -- An Analysis of the Concept of Sign -- The Controversy over the Limits of the Applicability of Logical Methods -- Puzzles of Existence -- Vague Words -- Names and Predicates translated by P. T. Geach -- On the Antinomy of the Liar and the Semantics of Natural Language -- Normal and Non-normal Classes in Current Language -- Normal and Non-Normal Classes Versus the Set-Theoretical and the Mereological Concept of Class -- The Semantics of Open Concepts -- Languages and Theories Adequate to the Ontology of the Language of Science -- A Functional Approach to the Logical Semiotics of Natural Language -- The Principle of Transparency and Semantic Antinomies -- The Semantic Functions of Oblique Speech -- The Semantic Conception of Truth in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences translated by Z. Wójcicka -- The Attribute and the Class translated by B. Stanosz -- Analyticity and Apriority -- Sources of the Texts -- Biographical and Bibliographical Notes.

Abstract: In the Introduction to the Polish-language version of the present book I expressed the hope that Polish studies in semiotics would before long be numerous enough to make possible another anthology on semiotics in Poland containing material published since 1970. That hope has in fact come true. The fact that semiotic research has been gaining momentum in this country is reflected in the growing interest in the discipline, in expanding international contacts, and in the steady increase in the number of publications. Thus, 1972 saw the setting up of the Department of Logical Semiotics, headed by the present writer, at Warsaw University Institute of Phi­ losophy. The seminar on semiotics, which I started in 1961, had met more than two hundred times by the end of 1976; since 1968, meetings have been held jointly with the Polish Semiotic Society. Another semi­ nar, confined to university staff and concerned with logical semiotics, which was inithted in 1970, had met more than fifty times by the end of 1976. The former seminar often plays host to foreign visiting pro­ fessors; so far scholars from Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United States have attended.

Abstract: I: The Trace Theory of Memory -- One / An Introduction to Trace Theory -- Two / Trace Theory Criticized -- II: Broadening The Attack -- One / Another Problem for Trace Theory -- Two / Stimulus-Response and Information Processing Computer Theories of Memory -- III: Trace Theory as Philosophy -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The subject of the following study is theories of memory. The first part is a study of one broad type of theory which is very widely adhered to at this time. It enjoys great popularity among neuro­ physiologists, neuropsychologists, and, more generally, among scientifically oriented people who have directed their attention to questions about memory. Further, this way of looking at the matter is not confined to scientific professionals. Indeed, we can find popularized versions of the view in magazines like Time and Reader's Digest. So in the first part of the book, I will give a presentation of the view in its general form. The theory will be presented in such a way as to reveal the features which make it tempting, which make it seem to be a very natural way to explain the phenomena of memory. (And, clearly, from the number of adherents the view has won, it is tempting, and it does seem to be to go about explaining memory. ) After setting forth a natural way this generalized version of the theory, I will next present material by various authors who hold this view. This will allow the reader to get some idea of the different forms which the theory (the 'memory trace' or 'engram' theory) takes. The last step is a critic­ ism of the theory. In the second part of the book, the attack on trace theory will be strengthened by a further criticism.

Abstract: I. Semantics of Natural Language -- Grammar and Meaning -- Sense and Science -- Variable-Free Semantics for Negations with Prosodic Variation -- Informational Independence in Tntensional Context -- II. Mathematical Logic -- A Note on Distributive Normal Forms -- On the Metaphysics of the Real Line -- A Generalization of the Infinitely Deep Languages of Hintikka and Rantala -- III. Applications of Formal Methods -- On the Possibilities of Information Evaluation of Graphical Communications -- On Formal Aspects of Distributive Justice -- Some Reflections on Method in the Theory of Social Choice -- IV. Philosophical Logic -- A Problem about Permission -- Possible Worlds and Formal Semantics -- Continuity and Similarity in Cross-Identification -- V. Epistemology -- Serious Possibility -- On Knowing, Knowing that One Knows and Consciousness -- Knowing that One Sees -- VI. Philosophical Aesthetics -- Anything Viewed -- VII. History of Philosophy -- The ‘Master Argument’ of Diodorus -- Plato in infinitum remisse incipit esse albus -- A Problem for Kant -- Subjects, Predicates, Isomorphic Representation, and Language Games -- Husserl and Heidegger on the Role of Actions in the Constitution of the World -- Index of Names -- Tabula Gratulatoria.

Abstract: Jaakko Hintikka was born on January 12th, 1929. He received his doctorate from the University of Helsinki under the supervision of Professor G. H. von Wright at the age of 24 in 1953. Hintikka was appointed Professor of philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1959. Since the late 50s, he has shared his time between Finland and the U.S.A. He was appointed Professor of philosophy at Stanford University in 1964. As from 1970 Hintikka has been permanent research professor of the Academy of Finland. He has published 13 books and about 200 articles, not to mention the various editorial and organizational activities he has played an active role in. The present collection of essays has been edited to honour Jaakko Hintikka on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday. By dedicating a Festschrift to Jaakko Hintikka, the contributors wish to pay homage to this remarkable man whom they see not only as a scholar of prodigious energy and insight, but as a friend, colleague and former teacher. The contributors hope the essays collected here will bring pleasure to the man they are intended to honour. All of the essays touch upon topics Hintikka has taken an direct or indirect interest in, ranging from technical problems of mathematical logic and applications of formal methods through philosophical logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and history of philosophy to philosophical aesthetics.

Abstract: I Proof Theory -- Some Facts from the Theory of Proofs and Some Fictions from General Proof Theory -- Proofs and the Meaning and Completeness of the Logical Constants -- Theory of Quantification and ‰-calculi -- Two Kinds of Extensions of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic -- Equality in the Presence of Apartness -- II Infinitary Languages -- Game-Theoretical Semantics and Back-and-Forth -- Infinitary Languages N?? and Generalized Partial Isomorphisms -- III Set Theory and Model Theory -- Generalizing Set-Theoretical Model Theory and an Analogue Theory on Admissible Sets -- Hierarchies of Model Theoretic Definability — An Approach to Second Order Logics -- Open Problems in the Theory of Ultrafilters -- IV Generalized Quantifiers -- The Reals Cannot Be Characterized Topologically with Strictly Local Properties and Countability Axioms -- On the Expressive Power of the Language Using the Henkin Quantifier -- Remarks on Free Quantifier Variables -- V Recursion Theory -- Recursion in 3E and a Splitting Theorem -- Retracts of Post’s Numbering and Effectivization of Quantifiers -- VI Logic and Natural Language -- Quantifiers in Natural Languages: Some Logical Problems, I -- Models for Natural Languages -- Backwards-Looking Operators in Tense Logic and in Natural Language -- VII Philosophical Logic -- Paradoxes in a Semantic Perspective -- Hintikka’s Possible Worlds and Rigid Designators -- On the Content Analysis of Two Normative Notions -- Singular Terms, Existence and Truth: Some Remarks on a First Order Logic of Existence -- VIII Truthlikeness -- On Distance From the Truth as a True Distance -- Truthlikeness in First-Order Languages -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Fourth Scandinavian Logic Symposium and the First Soviet-Finnish Logic Conference were held in JyvaskyIa, Finland, June 29-July 6, 1976. The Conferences were organized by a committee which consisted of the editors of the present volume. The Conferences were supported financially by the Ministry of Education of Finland, by the Academy of Finland, and by the Division of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History of Science. The Philosophical Society of Finland and the Jyvaskyla Summer Festival gave valuable help in various practicalities. 35 papers by authors representing 10 countries were presented at the two meetings. Of those papers 24 appear here. THE EDITORS v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE v PART 1/ PROOF THEORY GEORG KREISEL / Some Facts from the Theory of Proofs and Some Fictions from General Proof Theory 3 DAG PRAWITZ / Proofs and the Meaning and Completeness of the Logical Constants 25 v. A. SMIRNOV / Theory of Quantification and tff-calculi 41 LARS SVENONIUS/Two Kinds of Extensions of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic 49 DIRK VAN DALEN and R. STATMAN / Equality in the Presence of Apartness 95 PART II / INFINITARY LANGUAGES VEIKKO RANTALA / Game-Theoretical Semantics and Back-and- Forth 119 MAARET KAR TTUNEN / Infinitary Languages N oo~.

Abstract: Memories of Hans Reichenbach -- 1. Autobiographical Sketches for Academic Purposes -- 2. Memories of Wendeli Erné, Hans Reichenbach’s Sister -- 3. At the End of School Days: A Look Backward and a Look Forward (1909) -- 4. Letter from Reichenbach to His Four Years Older Brother Bernhard -- 5. From a letter of Bernhard Reichenbach to Maria Reichenbach (1975) -- 6. Memories of Ilse Reichenbach, Hans Reichenbach’s Sister-in-Law -- 7. Memories of Uncle Hans: Nino Erné -- 8. Hans’ Speech at the Funeral of His Father -- 9. Aphorisms of a Docent Formally Admitted to Teach at a University (1924) -- 10. University Student: Carl Landauer -- 11. University Student: Hilde Landauer -- 12. Memories of Hans Reichenbach, 1928 and Later: Sidney Hook -- 13. A Young University Teacher [from a letter of Carl Hempel to Maria Reichenbach, March 21, 1976] -- 14. A Professor in Turkey, 1936: Memories of Matild Kamber -- 15. Concerning Reichenbach’s Appointment to the University of California at Los Angeles: Charles Morris -- 16. Memories of Hans Reichenbach: Rudolf Carnap -- 17. Memories of Hans Reichenbach: Herbert Feigl -- 18. Recollections of Hans Reichenbach: Ernest Nagel -- 19. U.C.L.A.: Donald Kalish -- 20. U.C.L.A.: Paul Wienpahl -- 21. U.C.L.A.: Norman Dalkey -- 22. U.C.L.A.: Hermann F. Schott -- 23. A Blind Student Recalls Hans Reichcnbach: H. G. Burns -- 24. Recollections of Hans Reichenbach: David Brunswick -- 25. U.C.L.A., 1945–1950: Cynthia Schuster -- 26. U.C.L.A., 1949: W. Bruce Taylor -- 27. 1950: Donald A.Wells -- 28. U.C.L.A., 1951–53: Ruth Anna Putnam -- 29. Memories of Hans Reichenbach: Frank Leroi -- 30. Hans Reichenbach’s Definitive Influence on Me: Adolf Grünbaum -- 31. At the Chapel, 1953: Abraham Kaplan -- 32. Hans Reichenbach, a Memoir: Wesley C. Salmon -- 33. Memories of Hans Reichenbach: Maria Reichenbach -- I / Early Writings on Social Problems -- Student Years: Introductory Note to Part I (M.R.) -- 1. The Student (1912–13) -- 2. The Student Body and Catholicism (1912) -- 3. The Free Student Idea: Its Unified Contents (1913) -- 4. Why do we Advocate Physical Culture? (1913) -- 5. The Meaning of University Reform (1914) -- 6. Platform of the Socialist Students’ Party (1918) -- 7. Socializing the University (1918) -- 8. Report of the Socialist Student Party, Berlin and Notes on the Program (1918) -- II / Popular Scientific Articles -- 9. The Nobel Prize for Einstein (1922) -- 10. Relativity Theory in a Matchbox: A Philosophical Dialogue (1922) -- 11. Tycho Brahe’s Sextants (1926) -- 12. The Effects of Einstein’s Theory (1926) -- 13. An Open Letter to the Berlin Funkstunde Corporation (1926) -- 14. Laying the Foundations of Chemistry: The Work of Marcellin Berthelot (1927) -- 15. Memories of Svante Arrhenius (1927) -- 16. A New Model of the Atom (1927) -- 17. On the Death of H. A. Lorentz (1928) -- 18. Philosophy of the Natural Sciences (1928) -- 19. Space and Time: From Kant to Einstein (1928) -- 20. Causality or Probability? (1928) -- 21. The World View of the Exact Sciences (1928) -- 22. New Approaches in Science: Physical Research (1929) -- 23. New Approaches in Science: Philosophical Research (1929) -- 24. New Approaches in Science: Mathematical Research (1929) -- 25. The New Philosophy of Science (1929) -- 26. Einstein’s New Theory (1929) -- 27. Johannes Kepler (1930) -- 28. The Present State of the Sciences: The Exact Natural Sciences (1930) -- 29. One Hundred Against Einstein (1931) -- 30. Is the Human Mind Capable of Giange? (An Interview) (1932) -- III / General Scientific Articles -- 31. Metaphysics and Natural Science (1925) -- 32. Bertrand Russell (1929) -- 33. The Philosophical Significance of Modern Physics (1930) -- 34. The Königsberg Conference on the Epistemology of the Exact Sciences (1930) -- 35. The Problem of Causality in Physics (1931) -- 36. The Physical Concept of Truth (1931) -- 37. Heinrich Scholz’History of Logic (1931) -- 38. Aims and Methods of Modern Philosophy of Nature (1931) -- 39. Kant and Natural Science (1933) -- 40. Carnap’sLogical Structure of the World (1933) -- 41. Theory of Series and Gödel’s Theorems (Sections 17–22) (1948) -- IV / Ethical Analysis -- 42. The Freedom of the Will (1959) -- 43. On the Explication of Ethical Utterances (1959) -- Bibliography of Writings of Hans Reichenbach -- Index of Names.

Abstract: These two volumes form a full portrait of Hans Reichenbach, from the school boy and university student to the maturing and creative scholar, who was as well an immensely devoted teacher and a gifted popular writer and speaker on science and philosophy. We selected the articles for several reasons. Many of them have not pre­ viously been available in English; many are out of print, either in English or in German; some, especially the early ones, have been little known, and deal with subject-matters other than philosophy of science. The genesis and evolu­ tion of Reichenbach's ideas appeared to be of deep interest, and so we in­ cluded papers from four decades, despite occasional redundancy. We were, for example, pleased to include his extensive review article from the encyclo­ pedic Handbuch der Physik of 1929 on 'The Aims and Methods of Physical Knowledge', written at a time of creative collaboration between Reichenbach's Berlin group and the Vienna Circle of Schlick and Carnap. Reichenbach was a pioneer, opening new pathways to the solution of age-old problems in many fields: space, time, causality, induction and probability - philosophical analysis and interpretation of classical physics, relativity and quantum physics - logic, language, ethics, scientific explanation and methodology, critical appreciation and reconstruction of past metaphysical thinkers and scientists from Plato to Leibniz and Kant. Indeed, his own philosophical journey was initiated by his passage from Kant to anti-Kant.

Abstract: Inaugural Lecture -- Pensée et Prédication -- I — The Irreducible / In the Individual or in Human Communication? -- The Unique Individual and His Other -- The Irreducible Alienation of the Self -- A Time to Exist on One’s Own -- Love of Self: Obstacle or Privileged Means of Encountering Another? -- II — The Irreducible Personal Nucleus in Human Communication -- Participation or Alienation? -- The Dialectical Conception of Self-Determination -- Phenomenology of Personalistic Morality -- The Self and the Other in the Thought of Edith Stein -- III — The Irreducible Factor in Human Creativity: Causality, Language, Cognition and Interpretation -- Otherness and Causality -- Le Langage Entre Soi et Autrui -- The ‘Founded Act’ and the Apperception of Others -- Empathy, A Return to Reason -- The Creative Self and the Other in Man’s Self-Interpretation.

Abstract: I/From Constitutive Functions to Constituted Functions -- 1. The Coordination of Pairs -- 2. From Constitutive Functions to Equivalence Classes -- 3. From Regularities to Proportionalities -- 4. An Example of Causal and Spatial Functions -- 5. From Coproperties to Covariations: The Equalization and Estimation of Inequalities -- 6. The Composition of Differences: Unequal Partitions -- 7. An Example of the Composition of the Variations of Variations -- II/The Quantification of Constituted Functions -- 8. The Functional Relation between the Increase and the Decrease of Both Sides of a Rectangle Having a Constant Perimeter — The Transformations of the Perimeter of a Square -- 9. Serial Regularities and Proportions -- 10. The Relation between the Size of a Wheel and the Distance Travelled -- 11. The Establishment of a Functional Relation among Several Variables: Distance Travelled, Wheel Size and Rotational Frequency -- 12. The Inverse Proportional Relationship between Weight W and Distance D (Arm of a Lever) in the Equilibrium of a Balance -- 13. Conclusion of Chapters 8 to 12: The General Evolution of Behaviors -- III/Theoretical Problems -- 14. Analyses to Aid in the Epistemological Study of the Notion of Function -- 15. General Conclusions.

Abstract: Years ago, prompted by Grize, Apostel and Papert, we undertook the study of functions, but until now we did not properly understand the relations between functions and operations, and their increasing interactions at the level of 'constituted functions'. By contrast, certain recent studies on 'constitutive functions', or preoperatory functional schemes, have convinced us of the existence of a sort of logic of functions (springing from the schemes of actions) which is prior to the logic of operations (drawn from the general and reversible coordinations between actions). This preoperatory 'logic' accounts for the very general, and until now unexplained, primacy of order relations between 4 and 7 years of age, which is natural since functions are ordered dependences and result from oriented 'applications'. And while this 'logic' ends up in a positive manner in formalizable structures, it has gaps or limitations. Psychologically, we are interested in understanding the system­ atic errors due to this primacy of order, such ·as the undifferentiation of 'longer' and 'farther', or the non-conservations caused by ordinal estimations (of levels, etc. ), as opposed to extensive or metric evaluations. In a sense which is psychologically very real, this preoperatory logic of constitutive functions represents only the first half of operatory logic, if this can be said, and it is reversibility which allows the construction of the other half by completing the initial one-way structures.

Abstract: One Methodology and History -- I. The Subject Matter of the Methodology of Sciences -- II. The Subject Matter of the Methodology of History -- III. The Scope of the Subject Matter (Domain) of Historical Research -- Two Patterns of Historical Research -- Grounds for Classification -- IV. Pragmatic Reflection -- V. Critical Reflection -- VI. Erudite and Genetic Reflection -- VII. Structural Reflection -- VIII. Logical Reflection -- IX. Dialectical Reflection -- Three the Objective Methodology of History -- X. Historical Facts -- XI. The Process of History (Causality and Determinism) -- XII. The Process of History (Historical Regularities) -- Four the Pragmatic Methodology of History. Theory of Source-Based and Non-Source-Based Knowledge -- XIII. The Nature of Historical Cognition -- XIV. Questions and Answers. a General Reconstruction of Historical Research -- XV. Theory of Source-Based Knowledge -- XVI. Theory of Non-Source-Based Knowledge -- XVII. The Functions of Source-Based and Non-Source-Based Knowledge -- Five the Pragmatic Methodology of History: the Methods of Reconstruction of the Process of History -- XVIII. The Authenticity of Sources and the Reliability of Informants -- XIX. Methods of Establishing Historical Facts -- XX. Quantitative Methods in Historical Research -- XXI. The Procedure of Explanation in Historical Research -- XXII. Construction and Synthesis -- Six the Apragmatic Methodology of History -- XXIII. The Nature and Instruments of Historical Narration -- XXIV. Components of Narratives: Historical Statements and Laws -- XXV. Elements of Historical Narratives: Evaluations -- XXVI. The Methodological Structure of Historical Research -- Index of Names.

Abstract: No discipline has been more praised or more criticized than the writing of history. Cioero claimed that history teaches men how to live. Aris­ totle denied it the very name of science and regwded poetry as the higher wisdom. At various times history has been assigned a command­ ing or a demeaning statIUs in the hierarchy of sciences. Today one can admire the increasing precision and sophistication of the methods used by historia:ns. On the other hand, Thucydides' History of the PeZo­ ponesian War still serves as the ideal model of how to reconstruct the historical past. Even those who deny the possibility of an objective reconstruction of the past would themselves likie to be recorded by historians, "objectively" or not. Dislike of history and fear of its verdict are not incompatible with reverence and awe for its practitioners, the historians. So man's attitude to history is ambiguous. The controversy about history continues. Widely differing issues are at stake. Historians themselves, however, are the least engaged in the struggle. Rarely does a historian decide to open the door of his study and join in the melee about the meaning of history. More often he slams it shut and returns to his studies, oblivious of the fact that with the passage of thne the gap between his scientific work and its audience might widen. The historian does not shun the battle, he merely chooses his own battleground.

Abstract: One/On The Theory Of Systems -- I. Constructional Definition -- II. The General Apparatus -- III. Extralogical Bases -- Two I On Qualities and the Concrete -- IV. Approach to the Problems -- V. The System of the ‘Aufbau’ -- VI. Foundations of a Realistic System -- VII. Concreta and Qualification -- VIII. Size and Shape -- Three/On Order, Measure, and Time -- IX. The Problem of Order -- X. Topology of Quality -- XI. Of Time and Eternity -- Index to Special Symbols.

Abstract: With this third edition of Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appear­ ance, we are pleased to make available once more one of the most in­ fluential and important works in the philosophy of our times. Professor Geoffrey Hellman's introduction gives a sustained analysis and appreciation of the major themes and the thrust of the book, as well as an account of the ways in which many of Goodman's problems and projects have been picked up and developed by others. Hellman also suggests how The Structure of Appearance introduces issues which Goodman later continues in his essays and in the Languages of Art. There remains the task of understanding Good­ man's project as a whole; to see the deep continuities of his thought, as it ranges from logic to epistemology, to science and art; to see it therefore as a complex yet coherent theory of human cognition and practice. What we can only hope to suggest, in this note, is the b. road Significance of Goodman's apparently technical work for philosophers, scientists and humanists. One may say of Nelson Goodman that his bite is worse than his bark. Behind what appears as a cool and methodical analysis of the conditions of the construction of systems, there lurks a radical and disturbing thesis: that the world is, in itself, no more one way than another, nor are we. It depends on the ways in which we take it, and on what we do.

Abstract: 1. Background -- I. Ludwig Feuerbach: Father of German Materialism -- II. Reaction in the Fifties -- 2. The Scientific Materialists and their Works -- III. Karl Vogt: Sounding the Alarm -- IV. Jacob Moleschott: ‘Für das Volk’ -- V. Ludwig Büchner: Summarizer and Spokesman -- VI. Heinrich Czolbe: Irreführender Materialist -- 3. Issues -- VII. Of Philosophy and Science -- VIII. Controversies in Biology -- IX. Materialism and Society -- Concluding Remarks -- Notes.

Abstract: A comprehensive study of German materialism in the second half of the nineteenth century is long overdue. Among contemporary historians the mere passing references to Karl Vogt, Jacob Moleschott, and Ludwig Buchner as materialists and popularizers of science are hardly sufficient, for few individuals influenced public opinion in nineteenth-century Germany more than these men. Buchner, for example, revealed his awareness of the historical significance of his Kraft und Stoff in comments made in 1872, just seventeen years after its original appearance. A philosophical book which has undergone twelve big German editions in the short span of seventeen years, which further has been issued in non-German countries and languages about fifteen to sixteen times in the same period, and whose appearance (although its author was entirely unknown up to then) has called forth an almost unprecedented storm in the press, . . . such a book can be nothing ordinary; the world-calling it enjoys at present must be justified through its wholly special characteristics or by the merits of its form and content. ' Vogt, Moleschott and Buchner explicitly held that their materialism was founded on natural science. But other materialists of the nineteenth century also laid claim to the scientific character of their own thought. It is likely that Marx and Engels would have permitted their brand of materialism to have been called scientific, provided, of course, that 'scientific' was understood in their dialectical meaning of the term. Socialism, Engels maintained, had become a science with Marx.

Abstract: One: Informative Inference -- 1 / Information -- 2 / The Paradoxes of Confirmation -- 3 / Inductivism and Probabilism -- 4 / Inductive Generalization -- Two: Scientific Method -- 5 / Simplicity -- 6 / Bayes and Popper -- 7 / The Copernican Revelation -- 8 / Explanation -- Three: Statistical Decision -- 9 / Support -- 10 / Testing -- 11 / Bayes/Orthodox Comparisons -- 12 / Cognitive Decisions -- Author Index.

Abstract: This book grew out of previously published papers of mine composed over a period of years; they have been reworked (sometimes beyond recognition) so as to form a reasonably coherent whole. Part One treats of informative inference. I argue (Chapter 2) that the traditional principle of induction in its clearest formulation (that laws are confirmed by their positive cases) is clearly false. Other formulations in terms of the 'uniformity of nature' or the 'resemblance of the future to the past' seem to me hopelessly unclear. From a Bayesian point of view, 'learning from experience' goes by conditionalization (Bayes' rule). The traditional stum­ bling block for Bayesians has been to fmd objective probability inputs to conditionalize upon. Subjective Bayesians allow any probability inputs that do not violate the usual axioms of probability. Many subjectivists grant that this liberality seems prodigal but own themselves unable to think of additional constraints that might plausibly be imposed. To be sure, if we could agree on the correct probabilistic representation of 'ignorance' (or absence of pertinent data), then all probabilities obtained by applying Bayes' rule to an 'informationless' prior would be objective. But familiar contra­ dictions, like the Bertrand paradox, are thought to vitiate all attempts to objectify 'ignorance'. BuUding on the earlier work of Sir Harold Jeffreys, E. T. Jaynes, and the more recent work ofG. E. P. Box and G. E. Tiao, I have elected to bite this bullet. In Chapter 3, I develop and defend an objectivist Bayesian approach.

Abstract: of Ontology I -- 1. Ontological Problems -- 2. The Business of Ontology -- 3. Is Ontology Possible? -- 4. The Method of Scientific Ontology -- 5. The Goals of Scientific Ontology -- 6. Ontology and Formal Science -- 7. The Ontology of Science -- 8. Ontological Inputs and Outputs of Science and Technology -- 9. Uses of Ontology -- 10. Concluding Remarks -- 1. Substance -- 1. Association -- 2. Assembly -- 3. Entities and Sets -- 4. Concluding Remarks -- 2. Form -- 1. Property and Attribute -- 2. Analysis -- 3. Theory -- 4. Properties of Properties -- 5. Status of Properties -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- 3. Thing -- 1. Thing and Model Thing -- 2. State -- 3. From Class to Natural Kind -- 4. The World -- 5. Concluding Remarks -- 4. Possibility -- 1. Conceptual Possibility -- 2. Real Possibility -- 3. Disposition -- 4. Probability -- 5. Chance Propensity -- 6. Marginalia -- 7. Concluding Remarks -- 5. Change -- 1. Changeability -- 2. Event -- 3. Process -- 4. Action and Reaction -- 5. Panta Rhei -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- 6. Spacetime -- 1. Conflicting Views -- 2. Space -- 3. Duration -- 4. Spacetime -- 5. Spatiotemporal Properties -- 6. Matters of Existence -- 7. Concluding Remarks -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: In this Introduction' we shall sketch the business of ontology, or metaphysics, and shall locate it on the map of learning. This has to be done because there are many ways of construing the word 'ontology' and because of the bad reputation metaphysics has suffered until recently - a well deserved one in most cases. 1. ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMS Ontological (or metaphysical) views are answers to ontological ques­ tions. And ontological (or metaphysical) questions are questions with an extremely wide scope, such as 'Is the world material or ideal - or perhaps neutral?" 'Is there radical novelty, and if so how does it come about?', 'Is there objective chance or just an appearance of such due to human ignorance?', 'How is the mental related to the physical?', 'Is a community anything but the set of its members?', and 'Are there laws of history?'. Just as religion was born from helplessness, ideology from conflict, and technology from the need to master the environment, so metaphysics - just like theoretical science - was probably begotten by the awe and bewilderment at the boundless variety and apparent chaos of the phenomenal world, i. e. the sum total of human experience. Like the scientist, the metaphysician looked and looks for unity in diversity, for pattern in disorder, for structure in the amorphous heap of phenomena - and in some cases even for some sense, direction or finality in reality as a whole.

Abstract: A -- Some problems of formal methodology -- Approximate truth and truthlikeness -- A multiple sentential logic for empirical theories -- An axiomatic foundation for the logic of inductive generalization -- A two-dimensional continuum of a priori probability distributions on constituents -- Inductive logic and theoretical concepts -- A pragmatic approach to the formalization of empirical theories -- Uncertainty, probability and empirical knowledge -- The concept of empirical data -- Interpretation of theoretical terms: In defence of an empiricist dogma -- Definability problems in the methodology of science -- Laws, identities and reduction -- On logical analysis of methods -- Axiomatization in expected utility theory -- A logical model for game-like situations and the transformation of game-like situations -- Indeterminate probabilities -- Theoretical laws -- Causality, ontology and subsumptive explanation -- On the introduction of intensions into set theory -- Types of information and their role in the methodology of science -- Classification and ranking models in the discrete data analysis -- What have physicists learned from experience about inductive inference? -- B (Papers presented by title) -- Verisimilitude: Popper, Miller and Hattiangadi -- On a general scheme of causal analysis -- Logic of quantum mechanics -- On possibilities and limits of the application of inductive methods -- Correspondence principle and the idealization -- Pragmatic meaning and truth -- Semantic complementarity in quantitative empirical sciences -- Marx’s concept of law of science -- The impossibility theorem for universal theory of prediction -- Scientific knowledge-formation -- The methodology of behavioral theory construction: Nomological-deductive and axiomatic aspects of formalized theory -- Intertheory relations on the formal and semantical level.

Abstract: 1. Correspondence Principle -- 1.1. Bohr’s Principle -- 1.2. The Attitude of Philosophers -- 1.3. A General Methodological Principle in Physics -- 1.4. Descriptive and Normative Versions -- 1.5. Some Logical Difficulties -- Notes to Chapter 1 -- 2. Idealization and Factualization -- 2.1. Scientific Law an an Implication -- 2.2. Factual and Idealizational Laws -- 2.3. Idealization in Science -- 2.4. The Attitude of Philosophers -- 2.5. Idealization and Factualization -- 2.6. Idealization and Essence -- 2.7. Some Controversial Issues -- Notes to Chapter 2 -- 3. Reduction -- 3.1. The Concept of Reduction -- 3.2. Heterogeneous Reduction -- 3.3. Non-Mechanistic Reductionism -- 3.4. Trivial Homogeneous Reduction -- 3.5. Non-Trivial Homogeneous Reduction -- 3.6. Reduction of an Idealizational Law to a Factual One -- Notes to Chapter 3 -- 4. Correspondence Relation -- 4.1. Definition -- 4.2. Simple Implicative Version -- 4.3. Approximative Version -- 4.4. Explanative Version -- 4.5. ‘Dialectical’ Version -- 4.6. Renewed Implicative Version -- 4.7. Some Formal Features -- 4.8. Correspondence Sequence and Correspondence Network -- Notes to Chapter 4 -- 5. The Problem of the Incommensurability and Relations Among Theories -- 5.1. The Claim of Incommensurability -- 5.2. The Problem of Meaning Variance -- 5.3. The Problem of ‘Untranslatable’ Languages -- 5.4. The Problem of the ‘Theory-Ladenness’ of Facts -- 5.5. Various Relations Among Theories -- Notes to Chapter 5 -- 6. The Types of Methodological Empiricism -- 6.1. Inductivism -- 6.2. Hypothetism -- 6.3. Pluralistic Hypothetism -- 6.4. Idealizational Hypothetism -- 6.5. Pluralistic Idealizational Hypothetism -- 6.6. A Confrontation: the Diversity of Methods -- Notes to Chapter 6 -- 7. Revolutions and Continuity -- 7.1. Simple Cumulativism (No Revolutions or One Revolution) -- 7.2. Simple Anticumulativism (Permanent Revolution or Occasional Revolutions Without Continuity) -- 7.3. A Dialectical View (Revolutions and Continuity) -- 7.4. The Threshold of Maturity (Two Kinds of Revolutions) -- 7.5. Periods of Evolution and of Revolution -- 7.6. The Concept of Revolution and Anti-Cumulative Changes -- Notes to Chapter 7 -- 8. Relative and Absolute Truth -- 8.1. Relative Truth -- 8.2. Absolute Truths in Science -- 8.3. Truth-Content and Approximate Truth -- 8.4. The Truth of Idealizational Laws and of Their Factualizations -- 8.5. Relative Truth and Essence -- 8.6. Towards the Absolute Truth -- Notes to Chapter 8 -- 9. Internal and External History of Science -- 9.1. Internal and External Factors -- 9.2. The Problem of the Methodological Historicism -- 9.3. Internal History as an Idealization -- Notes to Chapter 9 -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This book is devoted to the problems of the growth of science. These prob­ lems, neglected for a long time by the philosophers of science, have become in the 60's and 70's a subject of vivid discussion. There are philosophers who stress only the dependence of science upon various sociological, psycho­ logical and other factors and deny any internal laws of the development of knowledge, like approaching the truth. The majority rejects such nihilism and searches for the laws of the growth of science. However, they often overlook the role of the Correspondence Principle which connects the suc­ cessive scientific theories. On the other hand, some authors, while stressing the role of this principle, overlook logical difficulties connected with it, e. g. the problem of the incompatibility of successive theories, of the falsity of some of their assumptions, etc. I believe the Correspondence Principle to be a basic principle of the pro­ gress of contemporary physics and, probably, of every advanced science. How­ ever, this principle must be properly interpreted and the above-mentioned logical difficulties must be solved. Their solution requires, as it seems, revealing the idealizational nature of the basic laws of science, in any case of the quantitative laws of advanced sciences. This point has been recently emphasized by some Polish philosophers, especially in Poznan.

Abstract: 0. Introduction -- 0.1. Logic and Probability -- 0.2. Judgment -- 0.3. Belief and Action -- 0.4. Belief, Judgment and Logic -- 0.5. A Relative View of Belief and Judgment -- I. The Natures of Judgment and Belief -- 1.1. Remarks on the Theory of Judgment -- 1.2. Mentalistic Views of Belief -- 1.3. Mentalistic Views; Distinct Acts of the Mind are Possible -- 1.4. Behavioristic Views. Pragmatism -- 1.5. Other Behavioristic Views -- Notes -- II. Partial Belief -- II.1. Mentalistic Partial Belief -- II.2. The Relation of Belief and Desire -- II.3. Difficulties with this Account -- Notes -- III. Logic And Probability -- III.1. Logic -- III.2. The Probability of Sentences -- III.3. Transparency -- Notes -- IV. Coherence and the Sum Condition -- IV.1. The Concept of Coherence -- IV.2. The Sum Condition Entails the Laws of Probability -- IV.3. Probability Entails the Sum Condition -- Notes -- V. Probability and Infinity -- V.1. Subjectivism and Infinity -- V.2. Extensions of Probabilities -- V.3. Independence -- V.4. Conditional Probability -- V.5. Transparency and Monotonicity -- V.6. Systems with Finite Bases; Indifference -- V.7. Probability and Quantifiers -- Notes -- VI. Infinity and the Sum Condition -- VI.1. Generalization of the Sum Condition -- VI.2. Probability Entails the Generalized Sum Conditions -- VI.3. The Generalized Sum Condition Entails the Laws of Probability -- Appendix on Set Theory and Boolean Algebras -- Appendix on Measure Theory -- Index of Names and Subjects.

Abstract: 1. A WORD ABOUT PRESUPPOSITIONS This book is addressed to philosophers, and not necessarily to those philosophers whose interests and competence are largely mathematical or logical in the formal sense. It deals for the most part with problems in the theory of partial judgment. These problems are naturally formulated in numerical and logical terms, and it is often not easy to formulate them precisely otherwise. Indeed, the involvement of arithmetical and logical concepts seems essential to the philosophies of mind and action at just the point where they become concerned with partial judgment and" belief. I have tried throughout to use no mathematics that is not quite elementary, for the most part no more than ordinary arithmetic and algebra. There is some rudimentary and philosophically important employment of limits, but no use is made of integrals or differentials. Mathematical induction is rarely and inessentially employed in the text, but is more frequent and important in the apP'endix on set theory and Boolean algebra. • As far as logic is concerned, the book assumes a fair acquaintance with predicate logic and its techniques. The concepts of compactness and maximal consistency turn out to have important employment, which I have tried to keep self-contained, so that extensive knowledge of meta­ logical topics is not assumed. In a word, the book presupposes no more logical facility than is customary among working philosophers and graduate students, though it may call for unaccustomed vigor in its application.

Abstract: I. The Nature of the Axiom of Reducibility (1928) -- II. A Logical Analysis of the Concept of Probability (1930) -- III. The Concept of Identity (1936) -- IV. Moritz Schlick’s Significance for Philosophy (1936) -- V. Hypotheses (before 1936?) -- VI. Is Logic a Deductive Theory? (1938) -- VII. The Relevance of Psychology to Logic (1938) -- VIII. What is Logical Analysis? (1939) -- IX. Fiction (1950) -- X. A Note on Existence (1952) -- XI. A Remark on Experience (I950’s) -- XII. The Linguistic Technique (after 1953) -- XIII. Belief and Knowledge (1950’s) -- XIV. Two Accounts of Knowing (1950’s) -- Bibliography of Works by Friedrich Waismann -- Index of Names.

Abstract: 1 Scientific Realism and Psychology -- Notes -- 2 Human Action -- 1. Actions as Achievements -- 2. Actions and Events -- 3. Actions and Action Statements -- Notes -- 3 Mental Episodes -- 1. The Stream of Consciousness and the Myth of the Given -- 2. Sellars’ Analogy Account of Mental Episodes -- 3. Analogy and the Language of Thought -- 4. Rules of Language -- 5. Conceptuality and Mental Episodes -- Notes -- 4 Concept Formation in Psychology -- 1. Psychological Concepts as Theoretico- Reportive Concepts -- 2. Conceptual Functionalism and Postulational Concept Formation -- 3. Theoretical Analyticity and Mental Episodes -- 4. The Indispensability of Mental Episodes -- Notes -- 5 Psychological Dispositions -- 1. A Realist Account of Dispositions -- 2. Propositional Attitudes as Dispositions -- Notes -- 6 Wanting, Intending, and Willing -- 1. Wanting and Intending -- 2. Trying -- 3. A Formalization of First-Order and Second-Order Propositional Attitudes -- Notes -- 7 Conduct Plan and Practical Syllogism -- 1. Conduct Plan -- 2. Practical Syllogism -- 3. Practical Syllogism as a Schema for Understanding Behavior -- 4. Extended Uses of Practical Syllogism -- Notes -- 8 Explanation of Human Action -- 1. Action-Explanations -- 2. Causality and Intentional-Teleological Explanation of Action -- Notes -- 9 Deductive Explanation and Purposive Causation -- 1. Deductive Explanation -- 2. Purposive Causation -- 3. Action-Explanations Reconsidered -- Notes -- 10 Basic Concepts of Action Theory -- 1. Basic Actions and Action Tokens -- 2. Complex Actions -- 3. Intentionality -- Notes -- 11 Propensities and Inductive Explanation -- 1. Propensities -- 2. Screening Off and Supersessance as Explanatory Notions -- 3. Explanatory Ambiguity and Maximal Specificity -- 4. An Analysis of Inductive Explanation -- Notes -- 12 Probabilistic Causation and Human Action -- 1. Probabilistic Causes -- 2. Actions, Propensities, and Inductive- Probabilistic Explanation -- Notes -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: This book presents a unified and systematic philosophical account of human actions and their explanation, and it does it in the spirit of scientific realism. In addition, various other related topics, such as psychological concept formation and the nature of mental events and states, are dis­ cussed. This is due to the fact that the key problems in the philosophy of psychology are interconnected to a high degree. This interwovenness has affected the discussion of these problems in that often the same topic is discussed in several contexts in the book. I hope the reader does not find this too frustrating. The theory of action developed in this book, especially in its latter half, is a causalist one. In a sense it can be regarded as an explication and refin~ment of a typical common sense view of actions and the mental episodes causally responsible for them. It has, of course, not been possible to discuss all the relevant philosophical problems in great detail, even if I have regarded it as necessary to give a brief treatment of relatively many problems. Rather, I have concentrated on some key issues and hope that future research will help to clarify the rest.

Abstract: I / Problems in the Methodology of Science -- Methodology and Systematic Philosophy -- Identity by Sense in Empirical Sciences -- Towards a General Semantics of Empirical Theories -- II / Identifiability Problems -- Identifiability and the Status of Theoretical Terms -- Definability and Identifiability: Certain Problems and Hypotheses -- On Identifiability in Extended Domains -- Prediction and Identifiability -- III / Foundations of Probability and Induction -- An Argument for Comparative Probability -- On the Truthlikeness of Generalizations -- A Third Dogma of Empiricism -- Causal Thinking in Judgment under Uncertainty -- IV / The Concept of Randomness -- A Survey of the Theory of Random Sequences -- Mises Redux -- V / Foundational Problems in Linguistics -- Foundations of Philosophical Pragmatics -- On Problems of Speech Act Theory -- VI / The Prospects of Transformational Grammar -- Transformations and Categories in Syntax -- Consequence of Speaking -- Formal Properties of Phonological Rules -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of pre­ sentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foun­ dational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodol­ ogy and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

Abstract: Section 1 — Testing Theories of Empirical Phenomena -- to Section 1 -- 1.1. Symmetric Tests of the Hypothesis That the Mean of One Normal Population Exceeds That of Another -- 1.2. Statistical Tests as a Basis for ‘Yes—No’ Choices -- 1.3. Prediction and Hindsight as Confirmatory Evidence -- 1.4. On Judging the Plausibility of Theories -- Section 2 — Causes and Possible Worlds -- to Section 2 -- 2.1. Causal Ordering and Identifiability -- 2.2. On the Definition of the Causal Relation -- 2.3. Spurious Correlation: A Causal Interpretation -- 2.4. Cause and Counterfactual (with Nicholas Rescher) -- Section 3 — The Logic of Imperatives -- to Section 3 -- 3.1. The Logic of Rational Decision -- 3.2. The Logic of Heuristic Decision Making -- Section 4 — Complexity -- to Section 4 -- 4.1. Theory of Automata: Discussion -- 4.2. Aggregation of Variables in Dynamic Systems (with Albert Ando) -- 4.3. The Theory of Problem Solving -- 4.4. The Organization of Complex Systems -- Section 5 — Theory of Scientific Discovery -- to Section 5 -- 5.1. Thinking by Computers -- 5.2. Scientific Discovery and the Psychology of Problem Solving -- 5.3. The Structure of Ill-Structured Problems -- 5.4. Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic? -- 5.5. Discussion: The Meno Paradox -- Section 6 — Formalizing Scientific Theories -- to Section 6 -- 6.1. The Axioms of Newtonian Mechanics -- 6.2. Discussion: The Axiomatization of Classical Mechanics -- 6.3. Definable Terms and Primitives in Axiom Systems -- 6.4. A Note on Almost-Everywhere Definability -- 6.5. The Axiomatization of Physical Theories -- 6.6. Ramsey Eliminability and the Testability of Scientific Theories (with Guy J. Groen) -- 6.7. Identifiability and the Status of Theoretical Terms -- Name Index.

Abstract: We respect Herbert A. Simon as an established leader of empirical and logical analysis in the human sciences while we happily think of him as also the loner; of course he works with many colleagues but none can match him. He has been writing fruitfully and steadily for four decades in many fields, among them psychology, logic, decision theory, economics, computer science, management, production engineering, information and control theory, operations research, confirmation theory, and we must have omitted several. With all of them, he is at once the technical scientist and the philosophical critic and analyst. When writing of decisions and actions, he is at the interface of philosophy of science, decision theory, philosophy of the specific social sciences, and inventory theory (itself, for him, at the interface of economic theory, production engineering and information theory). When writing on causality, he is at the interface of methodology, metaphysics, logic and philosophy of physics, systems theory, and so on. Not that the interdisciplinary is his orthodoxy; we are delighted that he has chosen to include in this book both his early and little-appreciated treatment of straightforward philosophy of physics - the axioms of Newtonian mechanics, and also his fine papers on pure confirmation theory.

Abstract: 1/Introduction -- A. General Plan of the Book -- B. Sets and Notation -- C. Kinds and Attributes -- D. Laws and Law-Sentences -- 2/Explanations, Identities, and Theories -- A. Scientific Explanations -- B. Identities -- C. Theories -- 3/Theories with Structured Wholes -- A. Introduction -- B. An Example from Chemistry -- C. The Languages of the Theories -- D. Structures and Homogeneity -- E. Laws of T1 -- 4/Microreductions: Set Theoretical Form -- A. Thing-Identities -- B. Explanations of the Law Sentences of T2 -- C. Attribute-Correlations -- 5/Microreductions with Identities -- A. Thing-Identities -- B. Attribute-Identities -- C. Summary of the Reduction Conditions -- D. Some Possible Objections and Problems -- E. Reasonable Modifications -- 6/Unified Theories and Unified Science -- A. Microreductions and Unified Science -- B. Unified Theories -- C. Unification by Microreduction -- 7/Complications and Obstacles -- A. Variety of Structures and Theories -- B. Hierarchical Structures -- C. Tokenism -- D. Social Theories and Social Structures -- 8/Scientific Progress and Unity of Science -- A. General Aspects of Scientific Progress -- B. Development and Evolution -- C. Problems and Prospects -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The first section of this chapter describes the major goals of this investiga­ tion and the general strategy of my presentation. The remaining three sections review some requisite background material and introduce some terminology and notation used in the book. Section B contains a brief review of some of the ideas and notation of elementary logic and set theory. Section C contains an introductory discussion of kinds and at­ tributes. Section D presents some basic ideas about laws and law­ sentences. A. GENERAL PLAN OF THE BOOK Basic scientific research is directed towards the goals of increasing our knowledge of the wor1d and our understanding of the wor1d. Knowledge increases through the discovery and confirmation of facts and laws. Understanding results from the explanation of known facts and laws, and through the formulation of general, systematic theories. Other things being equal, we tend to feeI that our understanding of a c1ass of phenomena increases as we develop increasingly general and intuitively unified theories of that c1ass of phenomena. It is therefore natural to consider the possibility of one very general, unified theory which, at least in principle, governs all known phenomena. The dream of obtaining such a theory, and the understanding that it would provide, has motivated an enormous amount of research by both scientists and philosophers.

Abstract: I. On the Origin and Significance of the Axioms of Geometry -- Notes [M.S.] -- II. On the Facts Underlying Geometry -- Notes [P.H.] -- III. Numbering and Measuring from an Epistemological Viewpoint -- Notes [P.H.] -- IV. The Facts in Perception -- Appendix 1 -- Appendix 2 -- Appendix 3 -- Notes [M.S.] -- A. Works by Helmholtz -- B. Biographical Materials -- C. Works on Helmholtz -- D. Index to Cited Works (with English translation where known) -- Index of Names.

Abstract: [1977] Hermann von Helmholtz in the History of Scientific Method In 1921, the centenary of Helmholtz' birth, Paul Hertz, a physicist, and Moritz Schlick, a philosopher, published a selection of his papers and lectures on the philosophical foundations of the sciences, under the title Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie. Combining qualities of respect and criticism that Helmholtz would have demanded, Hertz and Schlick scrupulously annotated the texts. Their edition of Helmholtz was of historical influence, comparable to the influence among contemporary mathematicians and philosophers of Hermann Weyl's annotated edition in 1919 of Riemann's great dissertation of 1854 on the foundations of geometry. For several reasons, we are pleased to be able to bring this Schlick/ Hertz edition to the English-reading world: first, and primary, to honor the memory of Hermann von Helmholtz; second, as writings of historical value, to deepen the understanding of mathematics and the natural sciences, as well as of psychology and philosophy, in the 19th centur- for Helmholtz must be comprehended within at least that wide a range; third, with Schlick, to understand the developing empiricist philosophy of science in the early 20th century; and fourth, to bring the contributions of Schlick, Hertz, and Helmholtz to methodological debate in our own time, a half century later, long after the rise and consolidation of logical empiricism, the explosion of physics since Planck and Einstein, and the development of psychology since Freud and Pavlov.

Abstract: Include the Observer in the Wave Function? -- On the Possible Connections between Quantum Mechanics and Gravitation -- The Quantum Probability Calculus -- Quantum Logics and Ideal Measurements of the First Kind -- A First Lecture on Quantum Mechanics -- Essay on the Development of the Statistical Theory of the Calculus of Probability -- The Quantum Mechanical One-System Formalism, Joint Probabilities and Locality -- On Propositions and Physical Systems -- Towards a Proper Quantum Theory -- On the Intuitive Understanding of Non-Locality as Implied by Quantum Theory -- Four Ideas of David Bohm on the Relationship between Quantum Mechanics and Relativity -- The Role of Quantum Mechanics in the Set-up of a Mathematical Government among Molecular Populations -- Hidden Parameters, Hidden Probabilities -- The Recent Attempts to Verify Quantum Mechanics -- Spin Correlation Measurement in Proton-Proton Scattering and Comparison with the Theories of the Local Hidden Variables.

Abstract: The articles collected in this volume were written for a Colloquium on Fifty Years of Quantum Mechanics which was held at the University Louis Pasteur of Strasbourg on May 2-4, 1974, in commemoration of the original work by De Broglie in 1924. It is our hope that this volume will convey to the reader the idea that quantum mechanics, besides being a fundamental tool for scien­ tific workers today, is also a source of a number of questions and thoughts about the interpretation of the foundation of quantum mechanics itself. This gives rise to problems of a philosophical and logical character and has repercussions on other domains such as the theory of gravitation. Besides the papers presented at the Colloquium, an article has been included by D. Bohm and B. Hiley. This compensates, perhaps, for the article of S. Kochen, whose manuscript unfortunately did not reach us in time for inclusion in ~his volume. A few months after this Colloquium we learned of the death of Professor Jauch, who had taken a lively and crucial part in its discussions. We have been extremely saddened by the news of his death, and would like to express our long standing indebtedness to him as a physicist.

Abstract: I. General Problems -- A Plea for Freeing the History of Scientific Discoveries from Myth -- Progress and Rationality in Research: Science from the Viewpoint of Popperian Methodology -- The Problems of Scientific Validation -- Science and Analogy -- Inductive Method and Scientific Discovery -- Scientific Discovery from the Viewpoint of Evolutionary Epistemology -- The Analytical (Quantitative) Theory of Science and its Implications for the Nature of Scientific Discovery -- Difficulties Inherent in a Pedagogy of Discovery in the Teaching of the Sciences -- Discovery and Vocation -- II. Case Studies -- Two Scientific Discoveries: Their Genesis and Destiny -- Logical and Psychological Aspects of the Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood -- The Discovery of Duodenal Ancylostoma and of its Pathogenic Power -- Weber and Maxwell on the Discovery of the Velocity of Light in Nineteenth Century Electrodynamics -- Cognitive Psychology, Scientific Creativity, and the Case Study Method -- Biographical Notes -- Name Index.

Abstract: The 1977 lectures of the International School for the History of Science at Erice in Sicily were devoted to that vexing but inexorable problem, the nature of scientific discovery. With all that has been written, by scientists themselves, by historians and philosophers and social theorists, by psycholo­ gists and psychiatrists, by logicians and novelists, the problem remains elusive. Happily we are able to bring the penetrating lectures from Erice that summer to a wider audience in this volume of theoretical investigations and detailed case studies. The ancient and lovely town of Erice in Northwest Sicily, 750 m above the sea, was famous throughout the Mediterranean for its temple of the goddess of nature, Venus Erycina, said to have been built by Daedalus. As philosophers and historians of the natural sciences, we hope that the stimulating atmo­ sphere of Erice will to some extent be transmitted by these pages. We are especially grateful to that generous and humane physician and historian of science, Dr. Vincenzo Cappelletti, himself a creative scientist, for his collaboration in bringing this work to completion. We admire his intelligent devotion to fostering creative interaction between scientists and historians of science as Director of the School of History of Science within the great Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture at Erice, as well as for his imaginative leadership of the Istituto della Encic10pedia Italiana.

Abstract: I/Mathematical Logic -- Constructions ‘by Finite’ -- Some Eastern Two Cardinal Theorems -- Functional Interpretation and Kripke Models -- Axioms for Intuitionistic Mathematics Incompatible with Classical Logic -- II/Foundations of Mathematical Theories -- Ineffability Properties of Cardinals II -- Non-Standard Analysis -- Some Purely Mathematical Results Inspired by Mathematical Logic -- Interpretability of Elementary Theories -- III/Category Theory -- Categorical Foundations and Foundations of Category Theory -- IV/Computability Theory -- Re Sets Higher Up (Dedicated to J. B. Rosser) -- Computable Numberings -- On the Basic Notions in the Theory of Induction -- Basic Concepts of Computer Science and Logic -- Structural Relations between Programs and Problems -- Algorithmic Logic, a Tool for Investigations of Programs -- V/Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics -- On a Semantical Language Hierarchy in a Constructive Mathematical Logic -- VI/On The Concept of a Set -- Large Sets -- What is the Iterative Conception of Set? -- VII/Philosophy of Logic -- Do-it-yourself Semantics for Classical Sequent Calculi, including Ramified Type Theory -- Some Philosophical Problems of Hintikka’s Possible Worlds Semantics -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of pre­ sentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foun­ dational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodol­ ogy and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

Abstract: Methodology and Metascience -- The Problem of the Rationality of Fallible Methods of Inference -- The Problem of Justifying Analytic Sentences -- Axiomatic Systems from the Methodological Point of View -- The Problem of Probabilistic Justification of Enumerative Induction -- Enumerative Induction and the Theory of Games -- On Testability in Empirical Sciences -- On the Theoretical Sense of the So-Called Observational Terms and Sentences -- The Pragmatic Foundations of Semantics -- Mathematical and Empirical Verifiability -- Meaning and Functional Reason -- On a Certain Condition of Semantic Theory of Knowledge -- On the Difference between Deductive and Non-Deductive Sciences -- On Ostensive Definitions -- The Controversy: Deductivism versus Inductivism -- Concepts and Problems in General Methodology and Methodology of the Practical Sciences -- The Foundations of a Methodological Analysis of Mill’s Methods -- Semantic Representation of the Probability of Formulas in Formalized Theories -- Classification as a Kind of Distance Function. Natural Classifications -- The Physical Magnitude and Experience -- Probabilistic Definition on the Example of the Definition of Genotype -- Analytic Sentences in the Semantic System -- The Model of Empirical Sciences in the Concepts of the Creators of Marxism -- On the Empirical Meaningfulness of Sentences -- A Model-Theoretic Approach to the Problem of Interpretation of Empirical Languages -- Empirical Meaningfulness of Quantitative Statements -- The Problem of Analyticity -- A Method of Deciding between N Statistical Hypotheses -- Interpretations of the Maximum Likelihood Principle -- Two Concepts of Information -- Semantical Criteria of Empirical Meaningfulness -- Basic Concepts of Formal Methodology of Empirical Sciences -- Rational Belief, Probability and the Justification of Inductive Inference.

Abstract: The anthology presents a selection of methodological writings pub­ lished by Polish logicians after World War 11 (the first of them dated 1947). All the papers belong to what may be called Logical Methodology or Logical Theory of Science. The epithet 'logical' characterizes rather the general point of view than the particular methods employed by the authors. Apart from articles which make an essential use of different formal (logical and mathematical) methods, there are many which do not involve any formal apparatus whatsoever. The problems the papers deal with may be characterized as problems of the general methodology of empirical science. The papers do not consider the methodological problems of formal (mathematical) knowledge, and, as a rule, they are concerned with empirical science as a whole and not with some of its specific branches. The topics covered by the selected writings include the main issues and controversies discussed within the contemporary methodology of science. A considerable part of the anthology is con­ cerned with the semantics of empirica1languages and considers problems such as interpretation of observational and theoretical terms, analyticity, empirical meaningfulness, etc. Another group of papers deals with the problem of induction and examines various ways of its justification. Some articles discuss the nature and the status of methodology itself. The materials have been selected so as to make up a whole representative of what has been done in this field in Poland since 1945. The book comprises 33 articles by 20 authors.

Abstract: I/Foundations of The Physical Sciences -- Genesis and Observership -- The Methodology of Physics and Topology -- Axiomatics and the Search for the Foundations of Physics -- II/The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics -- What is Philosophically Interesting about Quantum Mechanics? -- Completeness and Realism in Quantum Mechanics -- III/Foundations of biology -- The Ontological Status of Species as Evolutionary Units -- Theories and Observations of Developmental Biology -- Organic Determinism and Teleology in Biological Research -- Explicit and Implicit Semantic Content of the Genetic Information -- IV/Foundations of Psychology -- Consciousness and the Brain -- Causality and Action -- Methodological Aspects of Analysis of Activity -- V/The Status of Learning Theories -- A Survey of Contemporary Learning Theories -- Conditioning as the Perception of Causal Relations -- Leanable Functions -- VI/Foundations of The Social Sciences -- The Methodology of Social Knowledge and the Problem of the Integration of the Sciences -- VII/Justice and Social Change -- Welfare Inequalities and Rawlsian Axiomatics -- Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: A Rejoinder to Prof. Sen -- Non Linear Social Welfare Functions: A Reply to Prof. Harsanyi -- The Measurement of Social Inequality -- VIII/Rationality in Social Sciences -- Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior -- Towards a Unified Decision Theory: A Non-Bayesian Approach -- On the Rationale of the Bayesian Approach: Comments on Prof. Watkins’s Paper -- The Dual Function of Rationality -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know weIl, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of pre­ sentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foun­ dational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodol­ ogy and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

Abstract: What the Mind’s Eye Tells the Mind’s Brain: A Critique of Mental Imagery -- The Association of Images -- Images, Propositions, and Knowledge -- Mental Imagery and the Problems of Cognitive Representation: A Computer Simulation Approach -- The Separation and Integration of Related Semantic Information -- Interactions Between Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence: The Role of Intuition and Non-Logical Reasoning in Intelligence -- Concerning Imagery -- Holonomy and Structure in the Organization of Perception -- On the Distinction Between the Phenomenal and the Physical Object -- Unconscious Inference and Judgment in Perception -- To Know Your Own Mind -- The Subjective, Experiential Element in Perception -- Can Psychology Do Without Private Data?.

Abstract: Despite the strictures of the extreme Behaviourists, psychologists have been taking an increasing interest in the development of theories concerning the 'mechanisms' internal to humans and animals which permit perceptual, memory, and problem solving behaviour. One consideration which has enormously stimulated an interest in theories of internal cognitive represen­ tation has been progress in the theory and the technology of computing machines, which has opened the promising prospect of computer simulation of human and animal psychological functions. What has developed is the possibility of constructing models of human psychology, realizing them in computer hardware, and testing the resultant machine performance against that of the human subject. A second consideration which helps motivate the construction of models of internal representation is the considerable advances in experimental and theoretical knowledge of the human brain understood from the neuro-anatomical view. The likely profit of adopting a narrowly Behaviourist methodology shrinks in the face of our growing, fine-grained knowledge of cerebral 'wetware'. The purpose of this volume is selectively to exhibit some of the proposals concerning theories of internal representation which have been put forward in recent years. The area of central concern is the resurgence of interest in the role of imagery in cognition which has taken place in the last fifteen years.

Abstract: I / History of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science -- The Sources of Modern Methodology -- Difficulties in the Historiography of Science -- Logical, Ontological and Methodological Aspects of Scientific Revolutions -- The Origins of Traditional Grammar -- Galileo and the Justification of Experiments -- Leibnizian Space-Times and Leibnizian Algebras -- Changing Concepts of the a Priori -- Competing and Complementary Patterns of Explanation in Social Science -- Subjectivity, Objectivity and Ontological Commitment in the Empirical Sciences -- Genealogy of Science and Theory of Knowledge -- II / Historical Perspectives on the Concept of Matter -- Evolution of the Concept of Matter in Science and Philosophy -- Material Causality -- III / Theory Change -- Describing Revolutionary Scientific Change: a Formal Approach -- Accidental (‘Non-Substantial’) Theory Change and Theory Dislodgment -- Theory-Change as Structure-Change: Comments on the Sneed Formalism -- IV / Programme of the 5th Congress (Appendix) -- Programme of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of pre­ sentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foun­ dational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodol­ ogy and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

Abstract: 1. A Category-Theoretic Approach to Systems in a Fuzzy World -- 1. Machines in a Category -- 2. Fuzzy Machines -- 2. Parallelism, Slides, Schemas, and Frames -- 1. Parallelism -- 2. Slides and Schemas -- 3. Frames and Schemas -- 4. Development -- 5. More on Parallelism -- 3. The Fundamental Duality of System Theory -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Networks -- 3. Duality -- 4. Conclusion -- 4. Towards a Systems Methodology of Social Control Processes -- 5. States and Events -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Properties and Predicates -- 3. Definition of a State Function -- 4. Law Statements -- 5. Lagrangian Law Schemata -- 6. State Spaces -- 7. Law Statements and Transformation Formulas -- 8. Events and Processes -- 9. Event Space -- 10. The Category of Events -- 11. Concluding Remarks -- 6. Understanding Social and Economic Change in the United States -- 1. System Dynamics -- 2. Dynamics to Be Represented -- 3. Social and Economic Issues -- 4. Structure of the Model -- 5. Status, Schedule, Procedure -- 7. Pattern Discovery in Activity Arrays -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Sampling Procedure -- 3. Evaluation of Masks -- 4. Reduction of ST-Structures -- 5. Conclusions -- 8. A Purposive Behavior Model -- 9. Complexity and System Descriptions -- 10. Concerns, Comments, and Suggestions -- 1. Educational Concerns -- 2. Useful Mathematical Models -- 3. Problems of Applied Mathematics -- 4. Modeling -- 5. State Modeling of Objects -- 6. Questions.

Abstract: For many years I have believed in a particular style of education for myself. The idea is to focus on matters that you want to learn about, find a modest amount of money, and then organize a symposium of those matters, inviting knowledgeable individuals to participate - and, by extension - to come and help with my education. The Eighth George Hudson Symposium held at Plattsburgh, New York on April 11-12, 1975 was another attempt on my part to learn something. The ostensible reason for the Symposium was explained in the Announce­ ment of the Symposium as follows: Systems Theory is currently one of the exciting areas of intellectual activity, attracting persons from diverse disciplines. In fact, it has almost become the prototype of inter­ disciplinary effort. As such, it needs the interchange of ideas, viewpoints, and opinions as a necessary condition for growth. This Symposium was convened to bring together a number of persons- some of them experts and some beginners - for two days of con­ centrated interaction on Systems Theory. The breadth of the interests of the invited speakers can be noted from their "home" disciplines but space limitations forestall any attempt to document their actual current interests which range from brain function to political institutions to technoethics. The speakers were chosen for their expository and interactive ability as well as for their work in Systems Theory and ample time has been allowed for discussion with them.

Abstract: I / Concepts and Indicators in Humanistic Sociology -- II / Verbal Communications As Indicators of Sociological Variables -- III / Meaning and Measurement in Comparative Studies -- IV / Comparative Social Research and Methodological Problems of Sociological Induction -- V / Causal Interpretation of Statistical Relationships in Social Research -- VI / Inductive Inconsistencies and The Problems of Probabilistic Predictions -- VII / Logical and Empirical Assumptions of Validity of Inductions -- VIII / Empirical Knowledge and Social Values in The Cumulative Development of Sociology -- IX / Cultural Norms As Explanatory Constructs in Theories of Social Behavior -- X / Role and Limits of The ‘Functional Approach’ In Formulation of Theories of Attitudes -- XI / The Logic of Reductive Systematizations of Social and Behavioral Theories -- XII / Values and Knowledge in The Theory of Education: A Paradigm for an Applied Social Science -- Index of Names.

Abstract: One of the more characteristic features of contemporary sociology is an increasing interest in theories. More and more theories are being developed in various areas of social investigation; we observe also an increasing number of verificational studies aimed primarily toward the verification of various theories. The essays presented in this volume deal with theories too, but they approach this problem from a methodological perspective. There­ fore it seems worthwhile in the preface to this volume to make a kind of general declaration about the author's aims and his approach to the subject of his interest, and about his view of the role of methodological reflection in the development of sciences. First let me say what methodology cannot do. It cannot be a substitute for the formulation of substantive theories, nor can it substitute for the empirical studies which confirm or reject such theories. Therefore its impact upon the development of any science, including the social sciences, is only indirect, by its undertaking the analysis of research tools and rules of scientific procedures. It can also propose certain standards for scientific procedures, but the application of these standards is the domain of substan­ tive researchers, and it is the substantive researchers who ultimately develop any science. Nevertheless the potential impact-of methodological reflection, even if only indirect, should not be underestimated.

Abstract: The Statistics of Non-Boolean Event Structures -- Possibility and Probability -- Some Remarks on Hamiltonian Systems and Quantum Mechanics -- The Possibility Structure of Physical Systems -- Quantum Mechanical Physical Quantities as Random Variables -- On the Interference of Probabilities -- Classical and Quantum Probability and Set Theory -- Discussion -- A Generalized Measure and Probability Theory for the Physical Sciences -- Discussion -- Quantum Logic, Convexity, and a Necker-Cube Experiment -- On the Applicability of the Probability Concept to Quantum Theory -- Discussion -- A Mathematical Setting for Inductive Reasoning -- Discussion -- Classical Statistical Mechanics Versus Quantal Statistical Thermodynamics: A Study in Contrasts -- Discussion -- A Semantic Analysis of Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Quantum Theory.

Abstract: In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four decades there have been striking formal advances in our understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which include the development of the relations between semantics and metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories (especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently the emergence of Bayesian statistics as a radical alternative to standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the methods available. The search for principles which would explain why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.

Abstract: I. Philosophical and Scientific Thought -- II. A Psycho-physiological Consideration -- III. Memory. Reproduction and Association -- IV. Reflex, Instinct, Will, Ego -- V. Development of Individuality in a Natural and Cultural Habitat -- VI. The Exuberance of the Imagination -- VII. Knowledge and Error -- VIII. The Concept -- IX. Sensation, Intuition, Phantasy -- X. Adaptation of Thoughts to Facts and to Each Other -- XI. On Thought Experiments -- XII. Physical Experiment and its Leading Features -- XIII. Similarity and Analogy as a Leading Feature of Enquiry -- XIV. Hypothesis -- XV. Problems -- XVI. Presuppositions of Enquiry -- XVII. Pathways of Enquiry -- XVIII. Deduction and Induction Psychologically Viewed -- XIX. Number and Measure -- XX. Physiological Space in Contrast with Metrical Space -- XXI. On the Psychology and Natural Development of Geometry -- XXII. Space and Geometry from the Point of View of Physical Enquiry -- XXIII. Physiological Time in Contrast with Metrical Time -- XXIV. Space and Time Physically Considered -- XXV. Sense and Value of the Laws of Nature -- Index of Names.

Abstract: Imre Lakatos (1922–1974): Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science -- The Lakatosian Revolution -- Immediate Perception -- On Imre Lakatos -- Lakatos One and Lakatos Two: An ppreciation -- William Whewell and the Concept of Scientific Revolution -- How Can One Testimony Corroborate Another? -- Constraints on Science -- Research Programs, Rationality, and Ethics -- Introduction: Culture, Cultural System and Science -- On the Critique of Scientific Reason -- The Young Einstein and The Old Einstein -- An Ethic of Cognition -- Instrumentalism and Its Critique: A Reappraisal -- Imre Lakatos: Some Recollections -- Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of Scientific Rationality? Karl Popper versus Inductivism -- Ancient Geometrical Analysis and Modern Logic -- The Development of Logical Probability -- Descartes’ Rules of Impact and Their Criticism. An Example of the Structure of Processes in the History of Science -- Toulmin and the Rationality of Science -- Participation, ‘Authenticity’ and the Contemporary Vision of Man, Law and Society -- Rational Reconstructions -- A Paradox for the Birds -- Mathematics as a Critical Enterprise -- The Fertility of Theory and the Unit for Appraisal in Science -- The Ambivalence of Scientists -- Method or Madness? -- Novel Predictions as a Criterion of Merit -- Whither Physical Objects? -- Popperian Philosophy of Science as an Antidote Against Relativism -- Conditions of Progress and the Comparability of Theories -- Comments on Two Epistemological Theses of Thomas Kuhn -- Leibniz’s Program for the Development of Logic -- On Compton’s Research Program -- Inquiring Systems and Paradigms -- History, Praxis and the Third World’. Ambiguities in Lakatos’ Theory of Methodology -- Against Some Methods -- The Human Condition: Two Criticisms of Hobbes -- The Relation Between Philosophy of Science and History of Science -- Cosmology and Logic — An Intractable Issue? -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. PAUL K. FEYERABEND ROBERT S. COHEN MARX W. WARTOFSKY TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface VII JOHN WORRALL / Imre Lakatos (1922-1974): Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science JOSEPH AGASSI / The Lakatosian Revolution 9 23 D. M. ARMSTRONG / Immediate Perception w. W. BAR TLEY, III/On Imre Lakatos 37 WILLIAM BERKSON / Lakatos One and Lakatos Two: An Appreciation 39 I. B. COHEN / William Whewell and the Concept of Scientific Revolution 55 L. JONATHAN COHEN / How Can One Testimony Corroborate Another? 65 R. S. COHEN / Constraints on Science 79 GENE D'AMOUR/ Research Programs, Rationality, and Ethics 87 YEHUDA ELKANA / Introduction: Culture, Cultural System and Science 99 PA UL K.

Abstract: The Poverty of Statisticism -- Discussion -- On the Equivalence of Standard Inference Procedures -- Discussion -- Empirical Probability, Objective Statistical Methods, and Scientific Inquiry -- Discussion -- Philosophy of Survey-Sampling Practice -- Discussion -- The Bayesian Influence, or How to Sweep Subjectivism Under the Carpet -- Confidence Intervals vs Bayesian Intervals -- Discussion -- On Tests of Significance -- Discussion -- Statistics and the Philosophers -- Discussion -- Statistical Knowledge and Statistical Inference -- Discussion -- Bayesian Statistics -- Discussion -- A Theory of Statistical Evidence -- Discussion -- Testing Theories and the Foundations of Statistics -- Discussion.

Abstract: In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four decades there have been striking formal advances in our understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which include the development of the relations between semantics and metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories (especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently the emergence of Bayesian statistics as a radical alternative to standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the methods available. The search for principles which would explain why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.

Abstract: I. Orders of Causality -- II. Causality Commentson the Physicalist Theory of Science -- 1. Verification and Elucidation -- 2. Elimination of Metaphysical Formulations by Means of the Physical Language -- 3. The ‘Privileged Position’ of Protocol Propositions and the Physicalist Criterion of Probation -- 4. Obtaining the Protocol Propositions -- 5. The ‘True’ Science -- III. Empiricism and Physicalism -- IV. Forms of Negation of Empirical Propositions -- 1. Forms of Negation -- 2. ‘Complete’ and ‘Incomplete’ Contradictions -- 3. The Obtaining and Verifying of Propositions -- 4. Negation of Constatations -- 5. Incompatibility of ‘Protocol Statements’ -- Postscript -- V. Principles of Logical Empiricism -- 1. Reality Concepts, Metaphysical and Empirical -- 2. Invariant Systems of Statements -- 3. Non-Behaviouristic Verification -- 4. K-Statements and Invariant Systems of Statements -- VI. The Method of Epistemological Analysis -- 1. Analysis of Form and of Content -- 2. Formal Analysis of the Concept of Existence -- 3. Content Analysis of the Concept of Causality -- VII. Probability Inferences as Syntactic Inferential Forms -- 1. Relations of Consequence, Deductive and Probable -- 2. The System of Relations of Probable Consequence -- 3. ‘Probable Consequence’ and ‘Logical Truth’ -- VIII. ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ Use of Statements -- 1. Truth Value and Content -- 2. Conditions to be Satisfied by any Definition of Truth -- 3. ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ Use of Statements -- 4. Negation and Falsity -- 5. Confusion of Positive with Negative Use -- 6. The Recursive Definition of the Concept of Truth -- IX. The New Form of Empirical Knowledge -- 1. The ‘Empirical Continuous’ Form of Knowledge of Classical Physics -- 2. Uncertainty Domains as Prerequisite for the Empirical-Fictitious Form of Knowledge -- 3. Probability Description, a Special Case of the Empirical Fictitious Form of Knowledge -- 4. Probability Functions as Relations between Measured and Fictitious Values -- 5. The Empirical Fictitious Method Conditioned by Measuring Procedures -- 6. The Definition of Probability Functions by Repeated Application of the Empirical-Fictitious Method -- X. The Methological Symmetry of Verification and Falsification -- 1. Like Names for Unlike Concepts -- 2. Empirical Propositions about Finitely and Infinitely -- Many Cases -- 3. Wittgenstein’s Verification Thesis -- 4. Propositions about Finitely and Infinitely Many Cases. The Methodologies of Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Popper -- 5. ‘Asymmetrical’ Falsification Theories -- 6. Criteria of Scientific Progress -- 7. ‘Complete’ and ‘Progressive Partial’ Testability -- XI. Three Sources of Knowledge -- 1. The Triadic Method -- 2. Data of Consciousnes—Logico-Mathematical Constructions — Methods of Empirical Content -- 3. Three concepts of ‘Truth’ and ‘Probability’ -- XII. The Triadic Method -- 1. Elements of Linguistic Representation and the Triadic Method -- 2. The Triadic Analysis of ‘Truth’ -- 3. The Triadic Analysis of ‘Probability’ -- 4. The Triadic Analysis of ‘Number’ -- 5. The Triadic Analysis of ‘Philosophic Expressions’ -- XIII. The Method of Fictitious Predicates -- 1. Scientific and Speculative Philosophy -- 2. ‘Operative’ and ‘Fictitious’ Existence -- I: Predicates as Descriptive Concept-Forms -- 1. The Existence of Logico-Linguistic Forms -- 2. Dispositional Concepts as Fictitious Predicates -- 3. Characterization of Phenomena by Fictitious Quantities -- II: Predicates as Quantities Characterizing States -- 4. Characterizing by Infinite Values of Quantities -- 5. Characterizing Phenomena in Uncertainly Ranges by Means of Fictitious Values (‘Values of Measurement’) -- 6. Logical Analysis of the Concepts ‘Motion’ and ‘Rest’ -- 7. Logical Analysis of the Relativity Principle -- 8. The Clock Paradox -- 9. Conditions, under which the Relativity Principle Does not Hold -- 10. Domains of Uncertainty as a Presupposition for Applying the New Method -- III: Predicates as Probability Quantities -- 11. Analytic-Deductive Inferences. Inferences from Conjunctive Classes of Propositions -- 12. Inferences from Disjunctive Classes of Propositions. Probability Inferences -- 13. Systems of Probability Metric and Their Order -- 14. The Characterization of States by Conjunctive and Disjunctive Classes of Propositions -- 15. Presuppositions of Measurement in Classical and Relativistic Physics -- 16. Description by Ranges of Quantities -- 17. Definition of Probability Quantities by Means of Functions -- 18. Descriptions by Means of Probability and Metrical Quantities -- 19. Uncertainty Domains as Prerequisite for the Method of Fictitious Predicates -- 20. The Definition of Probability Functions by Means of Operators -- 21. Empirical and Fictitious Existence of Predicates -- 22. Theories of Measurement as a Presupposition of Exact-Continuous and of Probability Description -- 23. The Epistemological Conditions for Applying the Method of Fictitious Predicates -- 24. The Probability Field -- 25. Probability Description and Indeterminacy of Phenomena -- 26. The Logical Meaning of Quantisation. First and Second Quantisation -- 27. The Quantisation of Electromagnetic Fields -- IV. Empirical-Fictitious Knowledge -- 28. Active and Fictitious Causality -- 29. Greatest Possible and Least Possible Physical Constants -- 30. The New Form of Knowledge -- 31. The Matrix Field and the Probability Wave Field -- 32. Probability Description in Biology -- Index of Names.

Abstract: It was as a result of having known Juhos personally over many years that I became familiar with his thought. I met him and Viktor Kraft in Vienna soon after the War and through their acquaintance I first came into contact with the tradition of the Vienna Circle. To their conversation .too lowe much as regards the clarification of my own views, even if in the end these took quite a different turn in many essentials. At this point my gratitude goes first of all to Mrs. Lia J uhos for the gen­ erous help she has given me and the editors of the Vienna Circle collection in selecting the contents of this volume. Next, we owe a special debt to Dr. Paul Foulkes for his splendid translation of the text. Finally, I wish to thank Dr. Veit Pittioni for his constant assistance. As Juhos' last student, he was thoro).lghly familiar with his supervisor's mode of thought and has significantly furthered the assembly and execution of this book.

Abstract: Inaugural Lecture: The Initial Spontaneity -- Prologue -- Initial Spontaneity and the Modalities of Human Life -- I / The Modalities of Human Life -- The World-Remoteness of the Text -- Affectivity and the Life World -- Special Contribution to the Debate: On History and the Life-World -- Special Contribution to the Debate: A Return to Experience or How to Kick the Habit -- II / Rupture and Reconstruction -- Man and Values in Ingarden’s Thought -- Continuité et discontinuité des valeurs -- Values and the Life-World in the Problem of the Crisis -- Identité personelle et la temporalité du moi -- Special Contribution to the Debate: Theoria, Praxis, and the Crisis -- III / Alienation-Belonging -- Alienation and the Concept of Modernity -- The Religious Crisis of Our Culture -- Special Contribution to the Debate: Alienation and the Interpretative Framework -- IV / From Reason to Action -- Phénoménologie et esthétique -- Personne, individu et responsabilité chez Edith Stein -- The Quest for Valid Knowledge in the Context of Society -- Special Contribution to the Debate: The Intentional Act and the Human Act, that is, Act and Experience -- Special Contribution to the Debate: The Conversion of Nature and Technology -- V / Complementary Essays -- Culture and Utopia in the Phenomenological Perspective -- Consciousness and Action: Husserl and Marx on Theory and Praxis -- Closing Remarks.

Abstract: I/Space and Time -- 1. Formulation of the Problem -- 2. The Special Theory of Relativity -- 3. The Structure of Physics in the Theory of Relativity -- 4. Space and Time in the Philosophy of Kant -- 5. Critique of the Concept of Time in the Theory of Relativity -- II/Euclidean And Riemannian Geometry -- 1. Formulation of the Problem -- 2. The Foundation of Euclidean Geometry -- 3. The Theory of the Metric Field -- 4. The Foundation of a Physical Geometry -- 5. Summary -- III/The Quantum-Mechanical Measurement Process -- 1. The Uncertainty Relation -- 2. Quantum Theory -- 3. The Measuring Process -- 4. The Cut -- 5. The Function of the Observer in Quantum Theory -- IV/The Concept of Substance -- 1. The Concept of Substance in Classical Physics -- 2. The Concept of Substance in Quantum Theory -- 3. Objectifiability -- 4. Critique of the Concept of Substance in Quantum Theory -- V/The Causal Law -- 1. The Concept of Causality in Philosophy -- 2. The Concept of Causality in Physics -- 3. The Invalidity of the Causal Law in Quantum Theory -- 4. The Problem of Hidden Parameters -- VI/Logic and Quantum Logic -- 1. Formulation of the Problem -- 2. Classical Logic -- 3. The Logic of Commensurable Properties -- 4. The Logic of Incommensurable Properties -- 5. Probability and Quantum Logic -- 6. Summary.

Abstract: Professor Peter Mittelstaedt is a physicist whose primary concern is the foundations of current physical theories. This concern has made him, through his prolonged, incisive and detailed examinations of the structures and overall characteristics of these theories, into a philosopher of physic- of contemporary physics, to be precise, of relativistic theories of space and time, and of the logic of quantum mechanics, in particular. The present book, which expounds his main ideas in these matters, has seen four editions (in German), each including newer results - as indeed does the present translation: see the author's 1975 preface to the English translation. Perhaps this is the place to repeat the author's chief problem and mention his own approach, even though they are expounded in his Intro­ duction. How close is Mittelstaedt to Kant's understanding of science? We are at liberty to choose a framework for thought - a logic and a method­ ology - prior to experience (in the classic sense, to think a priori); yet we choose a framework so as to fit our empirical findings. How is this done? How may it be understood and justified? This is obviously the question of all philosophies that evolve from, and are in reaction to, Kant's system.

Abstract: 1. Introduction: The Paradoxes of Paranoia -- 2. Psychological Background -- 3. Sociological Background -- 4. Methodological Background -- 5. Metaphysical Background -- 6. The Paradoxes of Paranoia Revisited -- 7. Paranoia as a Fixation of an Abstract System -- 8. Clinical Matters -- Appendix I: Cognitive Impairment in Schizophrenia -- Appendix II: Freud’s View of Neurosis and Psychosis -- 9. Conclusion: Towards a General Demarcation of Psychopathology -- Postscript -- Notes -- Annotated Bibliography -- Index of Names.

Abstract: There is a curious parallel between the philosophy of science and psychiatric theory. The so-called demarcation question, which has exercised philosophers of science over the last decades, posed the problem of distinguishing science proper from non-science - in par­ ticular, from metaphysics, from pseudo-science, from the non­ rational or irrational, or from the untestable or the empirically meaningless. In psychiatric theory, the demarcation question appears as a problem of distinguishing the sane from the insane, the well from the mentally ill. The parallelism is interesting when the criteria for what fails to be scientific are seen to be congruent with the criteria which define those psychoses which are marked by cognitive failure. In this book Dr Yehuda Fried and Professor Joseph Agassi - a practicing psychiatrist and a philosopher of science, respectivel- focus on an extreme case of psychosis - paranoia - as an essentially intellectual disorder: that is, as one in which there is a systematic and chronic delusion which is sustained by logical means. They write: "Paranoia is an extreme case by the very fact that paranoia is by definition a quirk of the intellectual apparatus, a logical delusion. " (p. 2.

Abstract: Probleme der Husserlschen Reduktion. Vorlesung gehalten an der Universität Oslo, Oktober/November 1967 -- Roman Ingarden’s Moral Philosophy -- Roman Ingarden’s Literary Theory -- ‘Ingarden’s Phases, Bergson’s durée réelle, and William James’ Stream: Metaphoric Variants or Mutually Exclusive Concepts on the Theme of Time -- R. Ingarden et le ‘vrai’ Bergsonisme -- Die Funktion des konstituierenden Bewusstseins in einem ‘Studium für die Seelenmaler’. Die phänomenologische Studie einer Erzählphase in M. C. Wielands ‘Geschichte des Agathon’ -- Museum Exhibition as a Work of Art and a Subject of ‘Specific Aesthetics’. A Contribution to Ingarden’s System of Aesthetics -- Language and Logic in the Work of Roman Ingarden -- Historicity, Value and Mathematics -- Beyond Ingarden’s Idealism/ Realism Controversy with Husserl — The New Contextual Phase of Phenomenology -- The Letter to Husserl about the VI [Logical] Investigation and ‘Idealism’.

Abstract: Studies on different aspects of Roman Ingarden's Philosophy have been published during the last thirty years. They were meant partly to in­ vestigate the contribution of that thinker to phenomenological philoso­ phy, which was then dominant in WestemEurope, partly to arouse interest in a philosopher who was, at that time, practically unknown. The publication by the present editor of For Roman Ingarden: Nine Essays in Phenomenology, a Festschrift for his 65th birthday, marked the beginning of an interest in his thought. Subsequently, Ingarden has lectured abroad, and a number of his hitherto inaccessible Polish works have been made available, some translated into German and some even into English. This has led to further studies of his thought. However, the majority of the papers published have until now been mainly introductory. This volume offers for the first time a series of systematic studies in Ingardenian philosophy, which, it is hoped, will supply a general framework as well as a foundation for future research in this wide and difficult field.

Abstract: I. Dialectics of the Concrete Totality -- The World of the Pseudoconcrete and Its Destruction -- The Spiritual and Intellectual Reproduction of Reality -- Concrete Totality -- Notes -- II. Economics and Philosophy -- Metaphysics of Everyday life -- Metaphysics of Science and Reason -- Metaphysics of Culture -- Notes -- III. Philosophy and Economy -- Problems of Marx’s Capital -- Man and Thing, Or the Character of Economics -- Notes -- IV. Praxis and Totality -- Praxis -- History and Freedom -- Man -- Notes -- Index of Names.

Abstract: Kosik writes that the history of a text is in a certain sense the history of its interpretations. In the fifteen years that have passed since the fust (Czech) edition of his Dialectics of the Concrete, this book has been widely read and interpreted throughout Europe, in diverse centers of scholarship as well as in private studies. A faithful English language edition is long overdue. This publication of KosIk's work will surely provoke a range of new interpretations. For its theme is the characterization of science and of rationality in the context of the social roots of science and the social critique which an appropriately rational science should afford. Kosik's question is: How shall Karl Marx's understanding of science itself be understood? And how can it be further developed? In his treatment of the question of scientific rationality, Kosik drives bluntly into the issues of gravest human concern, not the least of which is how to avoid the pseudo-concrete, the pseudo-scientific, the pseudo-rational, the pseudo­ historical. Starting with Marx's methodological approach, of "ascending from the abstract to the concrete", Kosik develops a critique of positivism, of phenomenalist empiricism, and of "metaphysical" rationalism, counter­ posing them to "dialectical rationalism". He takes the category of the concrete in the dialectical sense of that which comes to be known by the active transformation of nature and society by human purposive activity.

Abstract: One. Surrender -- 1. There Is a Beginning -- 1. There Is a Beginning -- An Introduction to Surrender-and-Catch -- 2. Surrender and Catch -- 3. Too Literal, Not Literal Enough -- 4. ‘Surrender’ and ‘Catch’ -- 5. -- 6. Surrender as a Response to Our Crisis -- 7. -- 8. Surrender and Religion -- 9. -- 10. (This Book) -- I. Surrenders-To -- 11. Surrender and Rebellion -- 12. -- 13. Surrender and Community Study: The Study of Loma -- 14. -- 15. Surrender and Aesthetic Experience -- 16. -- II. From Surrender-To to Surrender -- 17. Prefatory Note -- 18. Beginning: In Hegel and Today -- 19. -- 20. On the Cunning of Reason in Our Time -- 21. -- 22. Sociology, Phenomenology, and Surrender-and-Catch -- 23. -- 24. Surrender and the Body -- Two. Trying with others -- 25. Recovery: Trying with others -- 26. 1951 -- 27. 1961-2 -- 28. -- 29. 1962-63 -- 30. 1964-65 -- 31. Publishing Papers by Students and Identifying Their Authors -- 32. 1964–65, Concluded -- 33. -- 34. 1965–66 -- 35. 1971 -- 36. And a Letter -- 37. ‘Dear Phantasy’ -- 38. 1971, Concluded -- 39. And there is an End -- Sources and Acknowledgments -- Index of Names -- Index of Topics.

Abstract: Su"ender and catch: give so you can receive, where the giving is your whole self, in a total experience. This is scarcely new on the American scene, and it is ancient knowledge, East and West. The fears of total surrender, the fears of self-revelation and of total abandon, although genuine, are likewise not new. Yet Kurt H. Wolff does attempt something new here, an epistemologi­ cal essay with the help of this old idea: his subtitle is 'experience and inquiry today'. He tries to formulate an integrated view which incorporates in the theory of total experience not only the accepted component- esthetics, religion, the recent American experience - but also a metaphysics, a phenomenology, a theory of perception, a social philosophy and a methodology of the social sciences, even a philosophy of history and psychopathology. Phenomenology (especially Alfred Schutz), the critical Frankfurt school (especially Adorno and Marcuse), sociology (especially Georg Simmel), and existentialism (especially Camus) are tied in together. It all looks topsy-turvy at first. We have here scraps of a diary, fragments of correspondence, a stray adolescent love letter, notes on notes on field work, and notes and comments on tutorial seminars plus long excerpts from students' essays, a stray paper in a learned journal summarizing the core of the book, comments piled on comments and a web of self-references, literary criticisms, and pieces of poetry, plus a rich scholarly apparatus.

Abstract: Symposium: the Unity of Science -- Unified Theories and Unified Science -- Thermodynamics, Statistical Mechanics and the Complexity of Reductions -- Theory Generalization, Problem Reduction and the Unity of Science -- Contributed Papers: Session I -- Galileo and Reasoning Ex Suppositione: The Methodology of the Two New Sciences -- The Erkenntnistheoretiker’s Dilemma: J.B. Stallo’s Attack on Atomism in his Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1881) -- Symposium: Genetics, IQ and Education -- Fictionalism, Functionalism and Factor Analysis -- IQ, Heritability, and Human Nature -- The IQ Controversy and the Philosophy of Education -- Contributed Papers: Session II -- Evolutionary Rationality -- Laws and Meaning Postulates (in van Fraassen’s View of Theories) -- Meaning in Science and Mathematics -- Observationality and the Comparability of Theories -- Symposium: Science Education and the Philosophy of Science -- The Relevance of Philosophy of Science for Science Education -- Metaphorical Models of Mastery: Or, How to Learn to Do the Problems at the End of the Chapter of the Physics Textbook -- Philosophy of Science, History of Science, and Science Education -- Contributed Papers: Session III -- Causes and Deductive Explanation -- On Defending the Covering-Law ‘Model’ Comment: -- Dispositional Explanation and the Covering-Law Model: Response to Laird Addis -- The Likeness of Lawlikeness -- TWO Forms of Determinism -- The Conventionality of Slow-Transport Synchrony -- Symposium: Technology Assessment -- The Bicentenary of Technology Assessment -- Assurance and Agnosticism -- Technology Assessment as a Critique of a Civilization -- Symposium: Velikovsky and the Politics of Science -- The Domination of Astronomy Over Other Disciplines -- Some Comments on Velikovsky’s Methodology -- Velikovsky Versus Academic Lag (The Problem of Hypothesis) -- Symposium: Quantum Logic -- Quantum Logic -- The ‘Logic’ of ‘Quantum Logic’ -- Contributed Papers: Session IV -- Integrating the Philosophy and the Social Psychology of Science, or a Plague on Two Houses Divided -- The Illusions of Experience -- Symposium: Development of the Philosophy of Science -- Some Current Trends in Philosophy of Science: With Special Attention to Confirmation, Theoretical Entities, and Mind-Body -- History and Philosophy of Science: A Marriage of Convenience? -- Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Science -- Symposium: History and Philosophy of Biology -- Reductionism in Biology: Prospects and Problems -- Reduction in Genetics -- Informal Aspects of Theory Reduction -- Reductive Explanation: A Functional Account -- Contributed Papers: Session V -- How Do We Apply Science? -- What Is The Logical Interpretation Of Quantum Mechanics? -- Index of Names.

Abstract: For this book, we have selected papers from symposia and contributed sessions at the fourth biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, held at the University of Notre Dame on November 1-3, 1974. The meeting was lively and well-attended, and we regret that there was no way to record here the many stimulating discussions after the papers and during the informal hours. We also regret that we had in­ sufficient space for all the contributed papers. Even more, some of the symposia were not available: those on systems and decision theory (c. W. Churchman, P. Suppes, I. Levi), and on the Marxist philosophy of science (M. W. Wartofsky, R. S. Cohen, E. N. Hiebert). Unhappily several individual contributions to other symposia were likewise not available: I. Velikovsky in the session on his own work and the politics of science, D. Finkelstein in the session on quantum logic. Memorial minutes were read for Alan Ross Anderson (prepared by Nuel Belnap) and for Imre Lakatos (prepared by Paul Feyerabend). They initiate this volume of philosophy of science in the mid-seventies.

Abstract: The philosophy of biology, some claim, should move to the centre of philosophy of science - a place it has not been accorded since the time of Mach. Physics was the paradigm of science, and its shadow falls across contemporary philosophy of biology in a variety of contexts: reduction, organization and system, biochemical mechanism, and the models of law and explanation which are derived from the Duhem-Popper-Hempel tradition. In this volume, the editors present essays which probe such historical and methodological questions as reducibility, levels of organization, function and teleology, issues emerging from evolutionary theory, and the species problem. The volume offers ample evidence of how good contemporary work in the philosophical understanding of biology has become. The editors aptly combine a deep philosophical appreciation of conceptual issues in biology with an historical understanding of the radical changes in the science of biology since the 19th century

Abstract: I. Islam -- Recommencements de l’algèbre aux XIe et XIIe siècles -- The Influence of Stoic Logic on Al-Ja????’s Legal Theory -- The Beginnings of Islamic Theology -- Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Alfarabi’s Enumeration of the Sciences -- II. The Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries in the Latin West -- The Organization of Sciences and the Relations of Cultures in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries -- La nouvelle idée de nature et de savoir scientifique au XIIe siècle -- Experience, Praxis, Work, and Planning in Bernard of Clairvaux: Observations on the Sermones in Cantica -- III. The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Centuries in the Latin West -- From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning -- Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist -- Reformation and Revolution: Copernicus’s Discovery in an Era of Change -- Réflexions sur les rapports entre théorie et pratique au moyen âge -- Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth-Century Universities: Some Preliminary Comments.

Abstract: Physical Theory and Experiment -- Two Dogmas of Empiricism -- Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes -- Some Fundamental Problems in the Logic of Scientific Discovery -- Background Knowledge and Scientific Growth -- The Duhemian Argument -- A Comment on Grünbaum’s Claim -- Scientific Revolutions as Changes of World View -- Grünbaum on ‘The Duhemian Argument’ -- Quine, Grünbaum, and the Duhemian Thesis -- Duhem, Quine and Grünbaum on Falsification -- Duhem, Quine and a New Empiricism -- Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes -- Is it never Possible to Falsify a Hypothesis Irrevocably? -- The Rationality of Science (From‘Against Method’) -- Index of Names.

Abstract: According to a view assumed by many scientists and philosophers of science and standardly found in science textbooks, it is controlled ex­ perience which provides the basis for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable theories in science: acceptable theories are those which can pass empirical tests. It has often been thought that a certain sort of test is particularly significant: 'crucial experiments' provide supporting empiri­ cal evidence for one theory while providing conclusive evidence against another. However, in 1906 Pierre Duhem argued that the falsification of a theory is necessarily ambiguous and therefore that there are no crucial experiments; one can never be sure that it is a given theory rather than auxiliary or background hypotheses which experiment has falsified. w. V. Quine has concurred in this judgment, arguing that "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not indi­ vidually but only as a corporate body". Some philosophers have thought that the Duhem-Quine thesis gra­ tuitously raises perplexities. Others see it as doubly significant; these philosophers think that it provides a base for criticism of the foundational view of knowledge which has dominated much of western thought since Descartes, and they think that it opens the door to a new and fruitful way to conceive of scientific progress in particular and of the nature and growth of knowledge in general.

Abstract: Prior Probabilities and Counterfactual Conditionals -- Incomplete Descriptions in the Language of Probability Theory -- A Computational Complexity Viewpoint on the Stability of Relative Frequency and on Stochastic Independence -- A Logic for Subjective Belief -- Discussion -- Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals -- Letter by Robert Stalnaker to W. L. Harper -- Ramsey Test Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change (A Response to Stalnaker) -- Toward an Optimization Procedure for Applying Minimum Change Principles in Probability Kinematics -- Simplicity -- Discussion -- Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference -- Discussion -- Probabilities of Conditionals -- Discussion -- Letter by Stalnaker to Van Fraassen -- Letter by Van Fraassen to Stalnaker.

Abstract: In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four decades there have been striking formal advances in our understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which include the development of the relations between semantics and metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories (especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently the emergence of Baysian statistics as a radical alternative to standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the methods available. The search for principles which would explain why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.

Abstract: 1. A Prologue: On Stability and Flux -- References -- 2. Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper -- I. Einstein has Upset the View that Science is Stable -- II. The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires Explanation -- III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than There is -- IV. Popper’s Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of Debates -- V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions -- VI. Rationality is a Means to an End -- References -- Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper’s Philosophy -- Notes -- 3. On Novelty -- I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General -- II. Science and Truth -- III. Popper’s View of Science -- Notes -- Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts -- 4. Replies To Diane: Popper On Learning From Experience81 -- Note -- Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism -- 5. Sensationalism -- 1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge -- 2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism -- 3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience -- 4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense -- 5. Explanation vs. Consent -- 6. The Roots of Scientific Realism -- 7. Conclusion -- 6. When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis? -- I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked? -- II. Can Refutation be Final? -- III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated -- IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports? -- V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection? -- VI.Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports? -- Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations -- 7. Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics -- First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science -- Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance -- I. Conventionalists and the Problem of Induction -- II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman’s Problem -- III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing -- IV. The Need for Constraints is Quite Real -- V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses -- VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail -- VII. Conclusion -- Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement -- 8. Towards A Theory Of ‘Ad Hoc’ Hypotheses -- I. Ad hoc Hypotheses which become Factual Evidence -- II. The Conventional Element in Science -- III. Reducing the Conventions -- IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses -- V. What is a Mess? -- Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism -- 9. The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics -- I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems -- II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated -- III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics -- IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science -- V. Popper’s Theory of Science -- VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use Instances in Different Ways -- VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame-works for Science -- VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics -- IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical Frameworks -- Appendix: What is a Natural Law? -- 10. Questions of Science and Metaphysics -- I. How Do we Select Questions? -- II. We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame-works -- III.The Literature on Questions -- IV.The Literature on the Logic of Questions -- V.The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions -- VI. Collingwood’s Peculiarity -- VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions -- VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions -- IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality -- X.Collingwood in a New Garb -- Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician -- Notes -- 11. The Confusion Between Physics And Metaphysics in the Standard Histories of Sciences -- Appendix: Reply to Commentators -- 12.The Confusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science -- Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom -- Notes -- 13. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology -- I. Kant’s Scandal -- II. Whitehead’s Scandal -- III.The Facts About Induction -- IV.Success and Rationality -- V. The Sociology of Knowledge -- Appendix: Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Autonomism -- 14. Positive Evidence as a Social Institution -- Appendix: The Logic of Technological Development -- 15. Imperfect Knowledge -- I. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Science is Questionable -- II. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Rational Belief is an Error -- III. Imperfect Knowledge-Claims are Qualified by Publicly Accepted Hypotheses -- Notes -- 16. Criteria for Plausible Arguments -- Note -- Appendix: The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism -- 17. Modified Conventionalism -- I. The Problem -- II. Science and Society -- III. Popper’s Problems of Demarcation -- IV. The Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge Revisited -- Appendix: Bartley’s Critique of Popper -- Notes -- 18. Unity and Diversity in Science -- Abstract -- I. Ambivalence Towards Unity: An Impression -- II. The Ethics of Science as a Unifier of Science -- III. Proof as the Unifier of Science -- IV. Manifest Truth as the Unifier of Science -- V. Unity of Science as a Dictator of Unanimity on All Questions -- VI. A Theory of Rational Disagreement -- References -- Appendix on Kant -- 19. Can Religion go Beyond Reason? -- I. Religion and Reason -- II. Dissatisfaction with Science and Religion -- III. Reason and Faith -- IV. The Question of Complementary Relationship -- V. Toward Intellectual Complementation -- VI. Possibilities of Cooperation -- VII. Defects of Both Rationalism and Religion -- VIII. Standards of Rational Thought and Action -- IX. Enlightenment and Self-Reliance -- X. The Sophisticated Religionists: Buber and Polangi -- XI. Science and Universalistic Religion -- Notes -- Appendix on Buber -- 20. Assurance and Agnosticism -- I. The Compleat Agnostic -- II. The Image of Inductive Science -- III. Empirical Facts About Assurance -- IV. The Non-Justificationist Mood -- V. Conversion to Autonomism -- VI. The Assured Agnostic -- Index of Works Cited -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: I. Radical Empiricism and the Anomalies in the Knowledge of Science -- II. Troubles with the Problem of Demarcation -- III. The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification -- IV. Facts and Theories: Radical Empiricism -- V. Facts and Theories: Conventionalism -- VI. Reformation and Counter-reformation: Paradigms and Research Programs -- VII. Revolutions in Science: The Accumulation of Knowledge and the Correspondence of Theories -- VIII. Revolutions in Science: Science and Philosophy -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: Acceptance Revisited -- Cognitive Decision Theory -- A Critique of Epistemic Utilities -- Induction, Consensus, and Catastrophe -- Elements of Induction -- On Sequential Inference -- Cognitive Decisions under Partial Information -- Local and Global Induction -- Hume and the Problem of Local Induction -- A Conspectus of the Neo-Classical Theory of Induction -- Inquiries, Problems, and Questions: Remarks on Local Induction -- On Piecemeal Knowledge-Formation -- Confirmation, Explanation, and the Paradoxes of Transitivity -- A Selected Bibliography of Local Induction -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The local justification of beliefs and hypotheses has recently become a major concern for epistemologists and philosophers of induction. As such, the problem of local justification is not entirely new. Most pragmatists had addressed themselves to it, and so did, to some extent, many classical inductivists in the Bacon-Whewell-Mill tradition. In the last few decades, however, the use of logic and semantics, probability calculus, statistical methods, and decision-theoretic concepts in the reconstruction of in­ ductive inference has revealed some important technical respects in which inductive justification can be local: the choice of a language, with its syntactic and semantic features, the relativity of probabilistic evalua­ tions to an initial body of evidence or background knowledge and to an agent's utilities and preferences, etc. Some paradoxes and difficulties encountered by purely formal accounts of inductive justification, the erosion of the once dominant empiricist position, which most approaches to induction took for granted, and the increasing challenge of noninduc­ tivist epistemolgies have underscored the need of accounting for the methodological problems of applying inductive logic to real life contexts, particularly in science. As a result, in the late fifties and sixties, several related developments pointed to a new, local approach to inductive justification.

Abstract: The Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1936) -- The Logic of Complementarity and the Foundation of Quantum Theory (1972) -- Mathematics as Logical Syntax — A Method to Formalize the Language of a Physical Theory (1937–38) -- Three-Valued Logic and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1944) -- Three-Valued Logic (1957) -- Reichenbach’s Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1958) -- Measures on the Closed Subspaces of a Hilbert Space (1957) -- The Logic of Propositions Which are not Simultaneously Decidable (1960) -- Baer *-Semigroups (1960) -- Axioms for Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics (1961) -- Probability in Physics and a Theorem on Simultaneous Observability (1962) -- Semantic Representation of the Probability of Formulas in Formalized Theories (1963) -- The Structure of the Propositional Calculus of a Physical Theory (1964) -- Boolean Embeddings of Orthomodular Sets and Quantum Logic (1965) -- Logical Structures Arising in Quantum Theory (1965) -- The Calculus of Partial Propositional Functions (1965) -- The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics (1967) -- Logics Appropriate to Empirical Theories (1965) -- The Probabilistic Argument for a Non-Classical Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1966) -- Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1967) -- Baer *-Semigroups and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- Semimodularity and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- On the Structure of Quantum Logic (1969) -- On the Structure of Quantal Proposition Systems (1969) -- The Current Interest in Orthomodular Lattices (1970) -- Integration Theory of Observables (1970) -- Probabilistic Formulation of Classical Mechanics (1970) -- Atomicity and Determinism in Boolean Systems (1971) -- Survey of General Quantum Physics (1972) -- Quantum Logics (1974) -- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logics (1974).

Abstract: The twentieth century has witnessed a striking transformation in the un­ derstanding of the theories of mathematical physics. There has emerged clearly the idea that physical theories are significantly characterized by their abstract mathematical structure. This is in opposition to the tradi­ tional opinion that one should look to the specific applications of a theory in order to understand it. One might with reason now espouse the view that to understand the deeper character of a theory one must know its abstract structure and understand the significance of that struc­ ture, while to understand how a theory might be modified in light of its experimental inadequacies one must be intimately acquainted with how it is applied. Quantum theory itself has gone through a development this century which illustrates strikingly the shifting perspective. From a collection of intuitive physical maneuvers under Bohr, through a formative stage in which the mathematical framework was bifurcated (between Schrödinger and Heisenberg) to an elegant culmination in von Neumann's Hilbert space formulation the elementary theory moved, flanked even at the later stage by the ill-understood formalisms for the relativistic version and for the field-theoretic altemative; after that we have a gradual, but constant, elaboration of all these quantal theories as abstract mathematical struc­ tures (their point of departure being von Neumann's formalism) until at the present time theoretical work is heavily preoccupied with the manip­ ulation of purely abstract structures.

Abstract: Analytical Table of Contents -- 1: The Theory-ladenness of Observation -- 2: An Examination of Some Arguments and Criteria for Radical Meaning Variance -- 3: The Methodological Undesirability of Adopting a Position of Radical Meaning Variance -- 4: The Comparability of Scientific Theories.

Abstract: In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con­ sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in­ vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace­ ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists.