Kurzfassung: 1. Nature, Culture, and Persons -- 2. The Concept of Consciousness -- 3. Animal and Human Minds -- 4. Action and Causality -- 5. Puzzles about the Causal Explanation of Human Actions -- 6. Cognitivism and the Problem of Explaining Human Intelligence -- 7. Wittgenstein and Natural Languages: an Alternative to Rationalist and Empiricist Theories.

Kurzfassung: viii choice and these include efforts to provide logical frameworks within which wecan make senseof these notions. This series will attempt to bring together work from allof these approaches to the history and philosophy of science and technology in the belief that each has something to add to our understanding. The volumes of this series have emerged either from lectures given by an author while serving as an honorary visiting professor at The City Collegeof New York or from a conference sponsored by that institution. The City College Program in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology oversees and directs these lectures and conferences with the financial aid of the Association for Philosophy ofScience, Psychotherapy, and Ethics. MARTIN TAMNY RAPHAEL STERN TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITO RS' PR EFACE vii PR EFACE xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xiii I. NATUR E, CULTUR E, AND PERSONS 2. THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 20 3. ANIMAL AND HUMAN MINDS 42 4 . ACTION AND CAUSALITY 64 5. PUZZLES ABOUT TH E CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF HUMAN ACTIONS 83 6. COGNITIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 101 7. WITTGENSTEIN AND NATURAL LANGUAGES : AN ALTERNATIV E TO RATIONALIST AND EMPIRICIST THEO RIE S 133 INDEX 163 PREFACE I have tried to make a fresh beginning on the theory of cultural phenomena, largely from the perspectives of Anglo-American analytic philosophy.

Kurzfassung: Introduction: The Sociological Turn -- The Pseudo-Science of Science? -- The Strengths of the Strong Programme -- The Strong Program: A Dialogue -- Problems of Intelligibility and Paradigm Instances -- The Rational and the Social in the History of Science -- A Plague on Both Your Houses -- Two Historiographical Strategies: Ideas and Social Conditions in the History of Science -- The Role of Arational Factors in Interpretive History: The Case of Kant and ESP -- On the Sociology of Belief, Knowledge, and Science -- Scientific and Other Interests -- The Sociology of Reasons: Or Why “Epistemic Factors” are Really “Social Factors”.

Kurzfassung: Although various sections of this work have been published separately in various journals and volumes their separate publication is wholly attributable to the exigencies of life in academia: the work was devised as and is supposed to constitute something of an organic unity. Part II of 'The Cow with the Subtile Nose' was published under the title 'A Creative Use of Language' in New Literary History (Autumn, 1972), pp. 108-18. 'The Cow on the Roof' appeared in The Journal oj Philosophy LXX, No. 19 (November 8, 1973), pp. 713-23. 'A Fine Forehand' appeared in the Journal oj the Philosophy oj Sport, Vol. 1 (September, 1974), pp. 92-109. 'Quote: Judgements from Our Brain' appeared in Perspectives on the Philosophy oj Wittgenstein, ed. by I. Block (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 201-211. 'Art and Sociobiology' appeared in Mind (1981), Vol. XC, pp. 505-520. 'Anything Viewed'appeared in Essays in Honour oj Jaakko Hintikka, ed. by Esa Saarinen, Risto Hilpinen, Illkka Niiniluoto and Merrill Provence Hintikka (Dordrecht, Holland and Boston, Massachusetts: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 285-293. 'How I See Philosophy' appeared in The Owl oj Minerva, ed. by C. J. Bontempo and S. Jack Odell (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975), pp. 223-5. All the remaining parts are also forthcoming in various journals and volumes. I am grateful to Bradley E. Wilson for the preparation of the index.

Kurzfassung: Schutz’s Life Story and the Understanding of his Work -- The Well-informed Citizen: Alfred Schutz and Applied Theory -- Explorations of the Lebenswelt: Reflections on Schutz and Habermas -- Discussion of Wagner, Imber, and Rasmussen -- A. Schutz and F. Kaufmann: Sociology Between Science and Interpretation -- On the Origin of ‘Phenomenological’ Sociology -- Surrender-and-Catch and Phenomenology -- On Surrender, Death, and the Sociology of Knowledge -- The Provisional Homecomer -- Review Section -- Helmut R. Wagner. Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography -- Burke C. Thomason. Making Sense of Reification: Alfred Schutz and Constructionist Theory -- Helmut R. Wagner. Phenomenology of Consciousness and Sociology of the Life-world: An Introductory Study.

Kurzfassung: Content -- Theory and Measurement -- Vom Henker, vom Lügner und von ihrem Ende -- On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism -- Situation Semantics and the “Slingshot” Argument -- Notes on the Well-Made World -- Logical Foundations of Psychoanalytic Theory -- Friedlands Sterne oder Facta und Ficta -- Mathematics, the Empirical Facts, and Logical Necessity -- Quines Ontologiekriterium -- Zufall und Notwendigkeit in Wittgensteins Tractatus -- Moralbegründung ohne Metaphysik -- Probability as a Quasi-Theoretical Concept — J.V. Kries’ Sophisticated Account after a Century -- Valuations for Direct Propositional Logic -- Logical Semantics for Natural Language -- On How the Distinction between History and Philosophy of Science Should Not Be Drawn -- Vagueness and Alternative Logic -- The Rationalist Theory of Double Causality as an Object of Hume’s Criticism -- A Modest Concept of Moral Sense Perception -- Structuralism and Scientific Realism -- Deterministic and Probabilistic Reasons and Causes -- The Meaning of Probability Statements -- Normative Principles of Rational Communication -- Persönliche Anmerkungen.

Kurzfassung: Ethical Issues in the Law of Tort -- Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (Parts 1 and 2) -- The Search for Synthesis in Tort Theory -- Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law -- Tort Liability for Breach of Statute -- Putting Fault Back into Products Liability -- Liability for Failing to Rescue -- Rights, Goals, and Hard Cases.

Kurzfassung: The essays in this volume are the result of a project on Values in Tort Law directed by the Westminster Institute for Ethics and Human Values. We are indebted to the Board of Westminster Col­ lege for its financial support. The project involved two meetings of a mixed group of lawyers and philosophers to discuss drafts of papers and general issues in tort law. Beyond the principal researchers, whose papers appear here, we are grateful to John Bargo, Dick Bronaugh, Craig Brown, Earl Cherniak, Bruce Feldthusen, Barry Hoffmaster and Steve Sharzer for their helpful discussion, and to Nancy Margolis for copy editing. All of these papers except one have appeared before in the journal Law and Philosophy (Vol. 1 No.3, December 1982 and Vol. 2 No.1, Apri11983). Chapman's paper which was previously published in The University of Western Ontario Law Review (Vol. 20 No.1, 1982) appears here with permission. Westminster Institute for Ethics and Human Values, M.D.B. Westminster College, London, Canada B.C. vii INTRODUCTION The law of torts is society's primary mechanism for resolving disputes arising from personal injury and property damage.

Kurzfassung: Understanding and Checking -- Understanding -- Producing Evidence -- Evaluating -- Variety and Unity -- Epistemic Change -- Kinds of Knowledge -- Upshot.

Kurzfassung: One / The Emergence of Appraisive Concepts and their Nature -- 1.0 The Etiology of Values -- 2.0 The Fourfold Root of Appraisal -- 3.0 Modes of Appraisal -- 4.0 Creditation and Qualification -- 5.0 Character and Characterization -- 6.0 Areas of Appraisal Compared -- Two / Critical Characterization -- 7.0 Aesthetic Appraisal Illustrated -- 8.0 Musical Characterization -- 9.0 The Structure of Aesthetic Concepts -- 10.0 Metalinguistic Terms in Evaluation -- 11.0 The Importance of Appraisal -- Notes.

Kurzfassung: The present work addresses itself to the question of the nature of appraisive concepts such as were the subject of investigation in The Concepts of Value* and The Concepts of Criticism. ** Many problems of prime importance in the theory of value could not be adequately treated there without diminishing the basic purpose of those studies which was above all to identify, classify and provide a general theoretical framework for the host of concepts with which we characterize and commend subjects of appraisal in all of the principal areas of human interest. The author might have forestalled the disappointment of some of his critics had he then explicitly promised to consider those problems at a later time. But his reluctance to promise what he might not be in a position to produce outweighed a keen awareness of what the problems are and of their evident seriousness. Although my treatment of such problems has only now been undertaken, in point of time my concern with them antedates by far the em­ pirical explorations of the two texts mentioned. Anyone who undertakes such a study is likely to have come under the in­ fluence of Professor Frank Sibley's 'Aesthetic Concepts't and of later develop­ ments in his analysis of certain appraisive concepts. What do such concepts mean and how do they mean9 These are the questions he treated in such a stimulating fashion.

Kurzfassung: The conceptual bases of plant morphology -- Commentary on Dr. Cusset’s paper -- Principles in plant morphogenesis -- Commentary on Dr. Mohr’s paper: Deterministic and probabilistic approaches to plant development -- A morphogenetic basis for plant morphology -- Mathematical models of plant morphogenesis -- Rules of growth: Some comments on Erickson’s models of plant growth -- Chance and design in the construction of plants -- Commentary on Dr. Tomlinson’s paper.

Kurzfassung: This volume presents the proceedings of a symposium which I organised for the Developmental Section of the Xlllth International Botanical Congress at Sydney, Australia on August 26, 1981. The paper by Professor T. Sachs, which was received too late for inclusion into the symposium at Sydney, was added to these proceedings because of its direct relevancy and importance. The aim of the symposium was to state in an explicit and comprehensive fashion the most basic axioms and principles of plant morphology and morphogenesis. An awareness of these axioms and principles is of paramount importance since they form. the foundations as well as the goal of structural developmental botany. Both teaching and research are predicated on them. The Introduction by the editor briefly examines the meaning of the concepts "axiom", "principle", and "plant construction". The comprehensive paper by Dr. G. Cusset, a unique historical overview, explicates 37 principles of 5 major conceptual systems and many subsystems. The extensive analysis includes a genealogy of ideas and ways of thinking of major authors ranging from philosophers and naturalists of antiquity to recent investigators of plant form and structure. The bibliography of Dr. Cusset I s paper comprises ca. 700 references. The contribution by Professor H. Mohr focusses on modern principles of morphogenesis and provides a penetrating analysis of scientific explanation in developmental biology. The universal principles (laws) described in this paper apply to all living systems, whereas the more specific principles are limited to plants or only higher plants. Professor T.

Kurzfassung: 1 Pleasure-seeking and the aetiology of dependence -- 2 Legislation on drug control and drug abuse -- 3 British experience in the management of opiate dependence -- 4 The antagonist analgesic concept -- 5 Cannabis and dependency -- 6 Alcohol dependence: the ‘lack of control’ over alcohol and its implications -- 7 Dependence and psychoactive drugs -- 8 The nature and treatment of cigarette dependence -- 9 Compulsive overeating.

Kurzfassung: ... there is scarcely any agent which can be taken into the body to which some individuals will not get a reaction satisfactory or pleasurable to them, persuading them to continue its use even to the point of abuse ... Eddy (1965) Dependence is one of the major problems of our modern society both in industrialized and developing nations. There is, however, nothing new in man's dependence on drugs. For many centuries past, there can be few people throughout the world who do not 'overuse', 'misuse' or 'abuse' some drugs. For many the drugs that are 'overused' are caffeine [from tea or coffee), nicotine [from tobacco) or alcohol [from beer, wine or spirits), all socially accepted normal ingredients of everyday life in most communities. For a prescribed medical smaller group 'misuse' concerns commonly substances, such as barbiturates, amphetamines. For an even smaller group there is the less socially acceptable 'abuse' of specific drugs such as morphine and related analgesics, cannabis, or hallucinogens.

Kurzfassung: One. Nature -- I Introduction: The Background -- II Matter -- III Universals: The Forms -- IV Universals: The Qualities -- V The Universe -- Two. Human Nature -- VI Man: Needs and Drives -- VII Man: Perversity -- VIII Mind: Perception -- IX Mind: Conception -- X Morality: The Good -- XI Morality: The Bad -- XII Rhetoric -- XIII Politics -- XIV Art -- XV Religion -- XVI Conclusion: The Foreground.

Kurzfassung: In the following pages I have endeavored to show the impact on philosophy of tech­ nology and science; more specifically, I have tried to make up for the neglect by the classical philosophers of the historic role of technology and also to suggest what positive effects on philosophy the ahnost daily advances in the physical sciences might have. Above all, I wanted to remind the ontologist of his debt to the artificer: tech­ nology with its recent gigantic achievements has introduced a new ingredient into the world, and so is sure to influence our knowledge of what there is. This book, then, could as well have been called 'Ethnotechnology: An Explanation of Human Behavior by Means of Material Culture', but the picture is a complex one, and there are many more special problems that need to be prominently featured in the discussion. Human culture never goes forward on all fronts at the same time. In our era it is unquestionably not only technology but also the sciences which are making the most rapid progress. Philosophy has not been very successful at keeping up with them. As a consequence there is an 'enormous gulf between scientists and philosophers today, a gulf which is as large as it has ever been. ' (1) I can see that with science moving so rapidly, its current lessons for philosophy might well be outmoded tomorrow.

Kurzfassung: 1 General Theory -- 2 Women’s Relationships with Women -- 3 Barriers between Women -- 4 Daughter-Mother Conflict -- 5 Related Issues -- 6 Lowering the Barriers -- References.

Kurzfassung: This book is an exploration of some of the psychological and so­ cial-psychological factors that have created barriers between women. Particular attention is paid to the daughter-mother relationship. The content is based on psychotherapy material, test results and conversations with patients and non-patients across a wide age span. I acquired the material in my various roles as a clinician, researcher and theorist-and, always, as a woman, with whatever special biases and special understandings that might involve. Because much of the book deals with the development of wom­ en's difficulties in relationships with other women, the emphasis will often be on how the growing daughter feels in her relationship with her mother. The mother's feelings will be discussed very little for two reasons: to limit the scope of this book and because much of what applies to the daughter also applies to the mother. It is often due to her own experiences as a daughter that the mother encounters difficulty in rearing her own daughter or feeling com­ fortable about her ability to do so. But it is important for the reader to keep in mind throughout the book that child-rearing is a frighten­ ing, difficult task at least part of the time for virtually every mother. In any long-term relationship, one begins to experience one's own needs, and it is simply human to wish that the other person in the relationship (even an infant or young child) would meet those needs.

Kurzfassung: Consciousness -- ?) The ego §413 -- ß) Subjective idealism § 415 -- A. Consciousness as such -- B. Self-consciousness § 424 -- C. Reason §438 -- Notes -- Index to the Text -- Index to the Introduction and Notes.

Kurzfassung: One: Preliminary Essays -- I. The aesthetic structure of waka -- II. The metaphysical background of the theory of Noh: an analysis of Zeami’s ‘Nine Stages’ -- III. The Way of tea: an art of spatial awareness -- IV. Haiku: an existential event -- Two: Texts, translated by Toshihiko and Toyo Izutsu -- I. Maigetsush? -- II. The Nine Stages -- III. ‘The Process of Training in the Nine Stages’ (Appendix to ‘The Nine Stages’) -- IV. Observations on the Disciplinary Way of Noh -- V. ollecting Gems and Obtaining Flowers -- VI. Record of Nanb? -- VII. The Red Booklet.

Kurzfassung: The Japanese sense of beauty as actualized in innumerable works of art, both linguistic and non-linguistic, has often been spoken of as something strange to, and remote from, the Western taste. It is, in fact, so radically different from what in the West is ordinarily associated with aesthetic experience that it even tends to give an impression of being mysterious, enigmatic or esoteric. This state of affairs comes from the fact that there is a peculiar kind of metaphysics, based on a realization of the simultaneous semantic articulation of consciousness and the external reality, dominating the whole functional domain of the Japanese sense of beauty, without an understanding of which the so-called 'mystery' of Japanese aesthetics would remain incomprehensible. The present work primarily purports to clarify the keynotes of the artistic experiences that are typical of Japanese culture, in terms of a special philosophical structure underlying them. It consists of two main parts: (1) Preliminary Essays, in which the major philosophical ideas relating to beauty will be given a theoretical elucidation, and (2) a selection of Classical Texts representative of Japanese aesthetics in widely divergent fields of linguistic and extra-linguistic art such as the theories of waka-poetry, Noh play, the art of tea, and haiku. The second part is related to the first by way of a concrete illustration, providing as it does philological materials on which are based the philosophical considerations of the first part.

Kurzfassung: Logical Systems and Semantics -- Introducing HPC -- The Kripke, Beth and Topological Interpretations for HPC -- Heyting’s Propositional Calculus and Extensions -- Three Intermediate Logics -- Formulas in One Variable -- Propositional Connectives -- The Interpolation Theorem -- Second Order Propositional Calculus -- Modified Kripke Interpretation -- Theories in HPC 1 -- Theories in HPC 2 -- Completeness of HPC with Respect to RE and Post Structures -- Undecidability Results -- Decidability Results.

Kurzfassung: From the point of view of non-classical logics, Heyting's implication is the smallest implication for which the deduction theorem holds. This book studies properties of logical systems having some of the classical connectives and implication in the neighbourhood of Heyt­ ing's implication. I have not included anything on entailment, al­ though it belongs to this neighbourhood, mainly because of the appearance of the Anderson-Belnap book on entailment. In the later chapters of this book, I have included material that might be of interest to the intuitionist mathematician. Originally, I intended to include more material in that spirit but I decided against it. There is no coherent body of material to include that builds naturally on the present book. There are some serious results on topological models, second order Beth and Kripke models, theories of types, etc., but it would require further research to be able to present a general theory, possibly using sheaves. That would have postponed pUblication for too long. I would like to dedicate this book to my colleagues, Professors G. Kreisel, M.O. Rabin and D. Scott. I have benefited greatly from Professor Kreisel's criticism and suggestions. Professor Rabin's fun­ damental results on decidability and undecidability provided the powerful tools used in obtaining the majority of the results reported in this book. Professor Scott's approach to non-classical logics and especially his analysis of the Scott consequence relation makes it possible to present Heyting's logic as a beautiful, integral part of non-classical logics.

Kurzfassung: I: A topography of the empiricist theories of law -- II: Hobbes’s empiricist theory of morality -- III: The empiricist theories of David Hume and Adam Smith -- IV: Comte and positivism -- V: Herbert Spencer and evolutionism -- VI: Guyau’s philosophy of life -- VII: Durkheim’s sociological ethics -- VIII: Stevenson’s and Hare’s analysis of language -- IX: Scandinavian realism -- X: Scepticism or empiricism? -- XI: The problem of the empiricist explanation of normativity: is there a natural equivalent of ‘duty’? -- XII: The empiricist justification of the claims of morality -- XIII: The hierarchy argument as a justification of morality -- XIV: The congruency argument -- XV: The moral game -- XVI: Conclusion -- Index of Names.

Kurzfassung: a. 'Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within. ' Thus Kant formulates his attitude to morality (Critique of Practical Reason, p. 260). He draws a sharp distinction between these two objects of admiration. The starry sky, he writes, represents my relationship to the natural, empirical world. Moral law, on the other hand, is of a completely different order. It ' . . . begins from my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but which is traceable only by the understanding and with which I discern that I am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary connection (. . . ). ' (p. 260). So Kant sees morality as a separate metaphysical order opposed to the world of empirical phenomena. Human beings belong to both worlds. According to Kant, the personality derives nothing of value from its relationship with the empirical world. His part in the sensuous world of nature places man on a level with any animal which before long must give back to the rest of nature the substances of which it is made.

Kurzfassung: I Science Around 1800: Cognitive and Social Change -- Some Patterns of Change in the Baconian Sciences of the Early 19th Century Germany -- From Celestial Mechanics to Social Physics: Discontinuity in the Development of the Sciences in the Early Nineteenth Century -- 1802 - “Biologie” et Médecine -- Ontologic Foundation of Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Rationalism -- Hermann von Helmholtz: A Physiological Approach to the Theory of Knowledge -- On “Science as a Language” -- The Historical Conditions and Features of the Development of Natural Science in Russia in the First Half of the 19th Century -- The Prussian Professoriate and the Research Imperative, 1790 – 1840 -- European Natural Science. (The Beginning of the 19th Century) -- Science, Knowledge, and the Reproduction of the Social Capacity For Labour -- II Science and Education -- Teaching Method and Justification of Knowledge: C. Ritter - J.H. Pestalozzi -- Possibilities and Limits of the Prussian School Reform at the Beginning of the 19th Century -- Qualitative and Quantitative Aspects of Curricula in Prussian Grammar Schools During the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries and Their Relation to the Development of the Sciences -- Some Aspects of the Development of Mathematics at the University of Halle-Wittenberg in the Early 19th Century -- Justus Grassmann’s School Programs as Mathematical Antecedents of Hermann Grassmann’s 1844 ‘Ausdehnungslehre’ -- On Education as a Mediating Element Between Development and Application: The Plans For the Berlin Polytechnical Institute (1817 – 1850) -- III Mathematics in the Early 19th Century -- Mathematics and the Moral Sciences: The Rise and Fall of the Probability of Judgments, 1785 – 1840 -- Changing Attitudes Toward Mathematical Rigor: Lagrange and Analysis in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries -- The Origins of Pure Mathematics -- Mathematical Physics in France, 1800 – 1835 -- Mathematics in Germany and France in the Early 19th Century: Transmission and Transformation -- Mathematicians in Germany Circa 1800 -- Name Index -- List of Participants.

Kurzfassung: I. Some Characteristic Features of the Passage From the 18th to the 19th Century 1. The following notes grew out of reflections which first led us to send out invitations to, and call for papers for, an interdisciplinary workshop, which took place in Bielefeld from 27th to 30th November, 1979. The status and character of this preface is therefore somewhat ambiguous: on the one hand it does not comment extensively on the articles to follow, on the other hand it could not have been conceived and written in the way it was without knowledge of all the contributions to this volum- which contains revised editions of papers for the workshop - nor without the cooperation of the participants in the above mentioned symposium. Furthermore, although the following may sound slightly programmatic and summary, we hope that it will be sufficiently explicit to provide some key words and concepts useful for further scholarly work. Perhaps the most important result of our efforts is the very structure of these notes: it is aimed at providing methodological orientations for the investigation of what turned out to be a very peculiar period in the history of science. xi H. N. Jahnke and M. Otte (eds.), Epistemological and Social Problems of the Sciences in the Early Nineteenth Century, xi-xlii. Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. xii H. N. JAHNKE ET AL.

Kurzfassung: One: Nuclear Technology -- 1. The History of Nuclear Energy -- 2. Government Regulation of Atomic Power -- 3. Fission Generation of Electricity -- 4. Ethical Problems Raised by Nuclear Technology -- Notes -- Two: Reactor Emissions and Equal Protection -- 1. The Controversy over Low-Level Radiation -- 2. Federal Radiation Standards -- 3. Ethical Problems of Radiation Policy -- 4. Conclusion -- Notes -- Three: Nuclear Wastes and the Argument from Ignorance -- 1. The Social and Economic Costs of Storing Radioactive Wastes -- 2. Philosophical Errors in Analyses of the Waste Problem -- 3. Conclusion -- Notes -- Four: Core Melt Catastrophe and Due Process -- 1. The Price-Anderson Act -- 2. Philosophical Difficulties in the Price-Anderson Act -- 3. Conclusion -- Notes -- Five: Nuclear Economics and the Problem of Externalities -- 1. The Problem of Externalities -- 2. Partially-Compensated Externalities of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle -- 3. The Consequences of the Failure To Compensate -- 4. The Consequences of Recognizing Amenity Rights -- 5. Conclusion -- Notes -- Six: Nuclear Safety and the Naturalistic Fallacy -- 1. The Naturalistic Fallacy -- 2. Commissions of the Fallacy in Government Studies of Nuclear Power -- 3. The Consequences to Public Policy -- 4. New Directions for Technology and Public Policy -- Notes -- Name Index.

Kurzfassung: This book grew out of projects funded by the Kentucky Human­ ities Council in 1974 and. 1975 and by the Environmental Protec­ tion Agency in 1976 and 1977. As a result of the generosity of these two agencies, I was able to study the logical, methodological, and ethical assumptions inherent in the decision to utilize nuclear fission for generating electricity. Since both grants gave me the opportunity to survey public policy-making, I discovered that there were critical lacunae in allegedly comprehensive analyses of various energy technologies. Ever since this discovery, one of my goals has been to fill one of these gaps by writing a well-docu­ mented study of some neglected social and ethical questions regarding nuclear power. Although many assessments of atomic energy written by en­ vironmentalists are highly persuasive, they often also are overly emotive and question-begging. Sometimes they employ what seem to be correct ethical conclusions, but they do so largely in an in­ tuitive, rather than a closely-reasoned, manner. On the other hand, books and reports written by nuclear proponents, often Under government contract, almost always ignore the social and ethical aspects of energy decision-making; they focus instead only on a purely scientific assessment of fission generation of electricity. What the energy debate needs, I believe, are more studies which aim at ethical analysis and which avoid unsubstantiated assertions. I hope that these essays are steps in that direction.

Kurzfassung: I. Teil Lebensrelative Werte -- 1. Abschnitt: Die lebensrelativen Werte und die Dingwirklichkeit -- 2. Abschnitt: Vitalwerte -- II. Teil Absolute Werte -- 1. Abschnitt: Personwerte -- 2. Abschnitt: Ontologische grenzen materialer Werte -- III. Teil Das Seinsverhältnis von Dasein zu Dasein -- 1. Abschnitt: Zur Ontologie des Wertens -- 2. Abschnitt: Das „da“ Schelers.

Kurzfassung: I. The Epistemology of Albert Einstein -- Section A. The Inductive Beginnings of Scientific Investigation -- Section B. The Formation of Primary Concepts according to Einstein. Their Invention -- Section C. The Deductive Process. The Rules of Naturalness and Simplicity -- Section D. The Epistemological Elements of the Special Theory of Relativity. Confirmation of the Theory -- II. A Metaphysical Analysis of Einstein’s View of Reality -- Section A. The Notion of Reality in Albert Einstein -- Section B. The Problem of the Reality of Relations -- Section C. The Grasp of Reality in Mathematico-physical Investigation -- III. The Metaphysical Foundations Of Einstein’s Epistemology -- Section A. The Foundations of Inductive Beginnings -- Section B. The Roots of the Formation of the Primary Concepts -- Section C. Judgment and Reasoning as Related to Scientific Postulation -- Section D. The Confirmation of the Theorems and the Nature of Scientific Proof -- Conclusions -- Appendix. A note on the Discovery of Being.

Kurzfassung: Now how would things be intelligible if they did not proceed from an intelligence? In the last analy­ sis a Primal Intelligence must exist, which is itself Intellection and Intelligibility in pure act, and which is the first principle of intelligibility and essences of things, and causes order to exist in them, as well as an infinitely complex network of regular relationships, whose fundamental mysterious unity our reason dreams of rediscovering in its own way. Such an approach to God's existence is a variant of Thomas Aquinas' fifth way. Its impact was secretly present in Einstein's famous saying: "God does not play dice," which, no doubt, used the word God in a merely figurative sense, and meant only: "nature does not result from a throw of the dice," yet the very fact implicitly postulated the existence of the divine Intellect. Jacques Maritain God's creation is the insistence on the dependence of "epistemology" on ontology; man's acknow­ ledgement of creation is an insistence on the episte­ mological recovery of ontology.

Kurzfassung: I. Biography -- 1. Life and Stoicism -- 2. Teaching -- 3. Writings -- 4. Influence -- II. Life a Game -- 5. Living for Happiness -- 6. Suicide, Euthanasia, Death -- 7. Knowledge for Living -- 8. Rational Self -- III. Logical Topics -- 9. Nature of Logical Studies -- 10. Irrefutability and Epistemological Issues -- 11. Logical Puzzles -- 12. Operators and Kin Matters -- IV. Nature and God -- 13. World Structure -- 14. Providence -- 15. Anthropocentrism -- 16. Proofs of Design -- 17. Cacodicy -- 18. Hymns to God -- 19. Zeus Inoperative? -- V. Value Theory -- 20. Theic Notions -- 21. Good a Protoconcept -- 22. Value Relativity -- 23. Value Criteria and Pleasure -- VI. Pain and Training -- 24. Divisions of Ethics -- 25. Learning Theory -- 26. Rationalization and Erring -- 27. Negative Ethics: A Look -- VII. Preventive Ethics -- 28. Forestall, Resist, Ease -- 29. Control Test -- 30. Anxiety and Fear -- 31. Other Safeguards -- 32. Resistance Methods -- VIII. Remedial Devices -- 33. Examples -- 34. “It’s fate” and Other Tonics -- 35. Loneliness -- 36. Objections -- IX. Social Remarks -- 37. Independence and Outgoingness -- 38. Man as Social -- 39. Troubleshooting and Cosmopolitanism -- 40. Legal Questions -- X. Afterthoughts.

Kurzfassung: Epictetus presents difficulties for the historiall of ideas. He published nothing, while his so-called writings are mostly notes of so me of his discussions taken down haphazardly by a friend. Moreover, about half of the notes are lost, and little is known of his life. All this may go toward explaining the paucity of Epictetus studies; for indeed this is the first book-length commentary published in English devoted only to hirn. All known aspects of his work are here considered and recon­ structed and freshly approached. Eut the emphasis is on his re­ marks in ethics, for the simple reason that ethics was his dominant interest and that his diagnoses of problems in living and tech­ niques for coping with those problems have been insufficiently appreciated. His ethics is primarily pain-oriented: it consists of existential reminders, such as that things are ephemer al and people vulnerable, plus ways of avoiding and easing distress, induding training and thought-analysis, because he believed that people's troubles stern largely from silly habits and precon­ ceptions.

Kurzfassung: I: Introduction -- 1. Problem of Justifying Induction and Proposal for Its Dissolution -- 2. Two Types of Recent Arguments for the Validity of Induction -- 3. Arguments from Paradigm Cases and Uses of Words -- 4. Practical Arguments -- 5. Induction as a Genuine Problem and Study of Peirce and Lewis -- II: Scope of Peirce’s Theory of Induction -- III: The Nature and Validity of Inference -- 1. A General Theory of Inference -- 2. Necessary Inference and Probable Inference -- 3. Validity of Probable Inference -- IV: Probable Inference and Justifying Induction -- 1. Induction and Apagogical Inversion of Statistical Deduction -- 2. Induction As a Valid Probable Inference -- V: Requirements for the Validity of Induction -- 1. General Remakrs -- 2. Peirce on Fair Sampling and Fair Samples -- 3. Principle of Fair Sampling: A New Formulation -- 4. Peirce on Predesignation -- 5. Relevancy of Predesignation for the Validity of Induction -- VI: Probability and the Validity of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Peirce’s Two Empirical Conceptions of Probability -- 3. Peirce’s Objections to the Laplacian Definition of Probability and Criticism -- VII: A Non-Probabilistic Justification of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Self-Correcting Nature of Inductive Method -- 3. Criteria for Defining Truth and Justifying Induction -- 4. Other Arguments for the Necessity of General Validity of Induction -- VIII: Concluding Remarks on Peirce’s Non-Probabilistic Justification on Induction -- IX: Problems in Lewis’s Theory of Induction -- X: Induction and Analysis of Knowledge of Reality -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Empirical Knowledge and “A priori” Concepts -- 3. A Fundamental Principle in Establishing Criteria of Reality -- XI: An “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Problems of Justifying Induction in the Theories of Reality and Knowledge -- 3. Empirical Generalizations as Interpretations of Experience and Principle A -- 4. Analyticity of Principle A -- XII: Implications of Lewis’s “A Priori Analytical Justification of Induction -- 1. From Principle A to Justification of Argument from Past to Future -- 2. Lewis on the Practical Successfulness of Induction -- XIII: Concluding Remarks on Lewis’s “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction -- XIV: Nature of Probability and Rational Credibility -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Empirical Interpretation of Probability -- 3. Logical Interpretation of Probability -- 4. Rational Credibility, Fair Sampling and Logical Probability -- XV: Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- 1. Questions Regarding Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- 2. Degrees of Rational Credibility and Criteria for Determining Them -- 3. Justifying Acceptance of Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- XVI: Conclusion -- 1. Similarity Between Peirce’s and Lewis’s Theories of Induction -- 2. Significances of Peirce’s and Lewis’s Arguments -- 3. Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Justifying Induction -- 4. Bearings upon Practicist and Linguist Arguments -- Appendix I. A Chronological Listing of Peirce’s Papers Directly Bearing upon Induction and Probability -- Appendix II. Proof of the Logical Law of Large Numbers (the Maximum Value Law of Hypergeometric Probability) -- Appendix III. Probabilities of Estimates of Values of Population Parameters -- Selected Bibliography.

Kurzfassung: This book is based on my doctoral dissertation written at Harvard University in the year of 1963. My interest in Peirce was inspired by Professor D. C. Williams and that in Lewis by Professor Roderick Firth. To both of them lowe a great deal, not only in my study of Peirce and Lewis, but in my general approach toward the problems of knowledge and reality. Specifically, I wish to acknowledge Professor Williams for his patient and careful criticisms of the original manuscripts of this book. I also wish to thank Professor Firth and Professor Israel Scheffler for their many suggestive comments regarding my discussions of induc­ tion. However, any error in this study of Peirce and Lewis is completely due to myself. Chung-ying Cheng Honolulu, Hawaii March,1967 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V SUMMARY IX CHAPTER I: Introduction I I. Problem of Justifying Induction and Proposal for Its Dissolution I 2. Two Types of Recent Arguments for the Validity of Induction 3 Arguments from Paradigm Cases and Uses of Words 4 3.

Kurzfassung: I -- 1. Hobbes’s “Table of Absurdity” -- 2. Language and the Structure of Locke’s Essay -- 3. Kant’s “Refutation” of the Ontological Argument -- II -- 4. Isomorphism and Linguistic Waste -- 5. Reason, Morals and Philosophic Irony -- 6. Thought and Language -- 7. An Early Nietzsche Fragment on Language -- III -- 8. Analogy and Equivocation in Hobbes -- 9. On the “Composition” of the Critique. A Brief Comment -- 10. Kant’s Copernican Analogy. A Re-Examination -- Name Index.

Kurzfassung: Although all the essays which make up this volume can be read as independent studies - and were in fact originally written as such - it is my hope that the reader will see that a unitary thread runs through them and that together they tell a story of their own. Written originally in response to certain views and doctrines of linguistic philosophy, the point which I have tried to argue in them is that although linguistic philosophy's impact upon our understanding and conception of philosophy has been profound, its contribution to our understanding of the history of philosophy, including its own history, has unfortunately all too often been disappointing, superficial and misguided. While this seems rather remarkable, especially since the tool which it has fashioned is obviously not without its uses even here, in the light of its negative and restrictive conception of language the results achieved are not after all perhaps surprising or unexpected.

Kurzfassung: Preparatory Considerations -- § 1. Outset from the significations of the word logos: speaking, thinking, what is thought -- § 2. The ideality of language. Exclusion of the problems pertaining to it -- § 3. Language as an expression of “thinking.” Thinking in the broadest sense, as the sense-constituting mental process -- § 4. The problem of ascertaining the essential limits of the “thinking” capable of the significational Function -- § 5. Provisional delimination of logic as apriori theory of science -- § 6. The formal character of logic. The formal Apriori and the contingent Apriori -- § 7. The normative and practical functions of logic -- § 8. The two-sidedness of logic; the subjective and the Objective direction of its thematizing activity -- § 9. The straightforward thematizing activity of the “Objective” or “positive” sciences. The idea of two-sided sciences -- § 10. Historically existing psychology and scientific thematizing activity directed to the subjective -- §11. The thematizing tendencies of traditional logic -- a.Logic directed originally to the Objective theoretical formations produced by thinking -- b.Logic’s interest in truth and the resultant reflection on subjective insight -- c. Result: the hybridism of historically existing logic as a theoretical and normative-practical discipline -- I / The structures and the sphere of objective formal logic -- The way from the tradition to the full idea of formal logic -- 1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics -- § 12. Discovery of the idea of the pure judgment-form -- § 13. The theory of the pure forms of judgments as the first discipline of formal logic -- a.The idea of theory of forms -- b.Universality of the judgment-form; the fundamental forms and their variants -- c.Operation as the guiding concept in the investigation of forms -- § 14. Consequence-logic (logic of non-contradiction) as the second level of formal logic -- § 15. Truth-logic and consequence-logic -- § 16. The differences in evidence that substantiate the separating of levels within apophantics. Clear evidence and distinct evidence -- a.Modes of performing the judgment. Distinctness and confusion -- b.Distinctness and clarity -- c.Clarity in the having of something itself and clarity of anticipation -- § 17. The essential genus, “distinct judgment,” as the theme of “pure analytics” -- § 18. The fundamental question of pure analytics -- § 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to the formal logic of truth. Non-contradiction as a condition for possible truth -- § 20. The principles of logic and their analogues in pure analytics -- § 21. The evidence in the coinciding of “the same” confused and distinct judgment. The broadest concept of the judgment -- § 22. The concept defining the province belonging to the theory of apophantic forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is the judgment in the broadest sense -- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics -- § 23. The internal unity of traditional logic and the problem of its position relative to formal mathematics -- a.The conceptual self-containedness of traditional logic as apophantic analytics -- b.The emerging of the idea of an enlarged analytics, Leibniz’s “mathesis universalis,” and the methodico-technical unification of traditional syllogistics and formal mathematics -- § 24. The new problem of a formal ontology. Characterization of traditional formal mathematics as formal ontology -- § 25. Formal apophantics and formal ontology as belonging together materially, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective themes -- § 26. The historical reasons why the problem of the unity of formal apophantics and formal mathematics was masked -- a.Lack of the concept of the pure empty form -- b.Lack of knowledge that apophantic formations are ideal -- c.Further reasons, particularly the lack of genuine scientific inquiries into origins -- d.Comment on Bolzano’s position regarding the idea of formal ontology -- § 27. The introduction of the idea of formal ontology in the Logische Untersuchungen -- a.The first constitutional investigations of categorial objectivities, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik -- b.The way of the “Prolegomena” from formal apophantics to formal ontology -- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities -- § 28. The highest level of formal logic: the theory of deductive systems; correlatively, the theory of multiplicities -- § 29. The theory of multiplicities and the formalizing reduction of the nomological sciences -- § 30. Multiplicity-theory as developed by Riemann and his successors -- §31. The pregnant concept of a multiplicity-correlatively, that of a “deductive” or “nomological” system-clarified by the concept of “definiteness” -- § 32. The highest idea of a theory of multiplicities: a universal nomological science of the forms of multiplicities -- § 33. Actual formal mathematics and mathematics of the rules of the game -- § 34. Complete formal mathematics identical with complete logical analytics -- § 35. Why only deductive theory-forms can become thematic within the domain of mathesis universalis as universal analytics -- a.Only deductive theory has a purely analytic system-form -- b.The problem of when a system of propositions has a system-form characterizable as analytic -- § 36. Retrospect and preliminary indication of our further tasks -- b. Phenomenological clarification of the two-sidedness of formal logic as formal apophantics and formal ontology -- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments -- § 37. The inquiry concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology; insufficiency of our clarifications up to now -- § 38. Judgment-objects as such and syntactical formations -- § 39. The concept of the judgment broadened to cover all formations produced by syntactical actions -- § 40. Formal analytics as a playing with thoughts, and logical analytics. The relation to possible application is part of the logical sense of formal mathesis -- §41. The difference between an apophantic and an ontological focusing and the problem of clarifying that difference -- § 42. Solution of this problem -- a.Judging directed, not to the judgment, but to the thematic objectivity -- b.Identity of the thematic object throughout changes in the syntactical operations -- c.The types of syntactical object-forms as the typical modes of Something -- d.The dual function of syntactical operations -- e.Coherence of the judging by virtue of the unity of the substrate-object that is being determined. Constitution of the “concept” determining the substrate-object -- f. The categorial formations, which accrue in the determining, as habitual and inter subjective possessions -- g. The objectivity given beforehand to thinking contrasted with the categorial objectivity produced by thinking — Nature as an illustration -- § 43. Analytics, as formal theory of science, is formal ontology and, as ontology, is directed to objects 119 -- § 44. The shift from analytics as formal ontology to analytics as formal apophantics -- a.The change of thematizing focus from object- provinces to judgments as logic intends them -- b.Phenomenological clarification of this change of focus -- ?. The attitude of someone who is judging naïvely-straightforwardly -- ?. In the critical attitude of someone who intends to cognize, supposed objectivities as supposed are distinguished from actual objectivities -- ?. The scientist’s attitude: the supposed, as supposed, the object of his criticism of cognition -- § 45. The judgment in the sense proper to apophantic logic -- § 46. Truth and falsity as results of criticism. The double sense of truth and evidence -- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truth-logic -- § 47. The adjustment of traditional logic to the critical attitude of science leads to its focusing on the apophansis -- § 48. Judgments, as mere suppositions, belong to the region of senses. Phenomenological characterization of the focusing on senses -- § 49. The double sense of judgment (positum, proposition) -- § 50. The broadening of the concept of sense to cover the whole positional sphere, and the broadening of formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice -- §51. Pure consequence-logic as a pure theory of senses. The division into consequence-logic and truth- logic is valid also for the theory of multiplicities, as the highest level of logic -- § 52. “Mathesis pura” as properly logical and as extralogical. The “mathematics of mathematicians” -- § 53. Elucidations by the example of the Euclidean multiplicity -- § 54. Concluding ascertainment of the relationship be-tween formal logic and formal ontology -- ?.The problem -- b.The two correlative senses of formal logic -- c. The idea of formal ontology can be separated from the idea of theory of science -- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic -- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic -- § 55. Is the development of logic as Objective-formal enou...

Kurzfassung: 2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modern sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a naivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate apriori possibilities and necessities.

Kurzfassung: Introduction: The Place of Earth and Gods in Heidegger’s Philosophy -- I. Character of Heidegger’s Philosophy -- II. Heidegger’s Problem of Being -- III. Heidegger’s Stand in the History of Philosophy -- IV. Three Phases of Heidegger’s Thought -- V. Detour from Gods to Earth -- I. Dasein -- I. Approach to the Problem of Dasein -- II. To-be-in-the-world -- III. To-be-in -- IV. World -- V. Space -- VI. Togetherness -- VII. Da as Openness -- VIII. Dread -- IX. Death -- X. Conscience -- XI. Temporality -- II. Being -- I. Heidegger’s Post-Sein und Zeit Works -- II. Dasein -- III. Truth -- IV. Thinking -- V. Language -- VI. Befalling and History -- VII. Subjectivism and Metaphysics -- VIII. Nothingness and Nihilism -- IX. Being and Man -- III. World -- I. Problem of World in Traditional Philosophy -- II. World in the First Phase -- III. World in the Second Phase -- IV. World in the Third Phase -- IV. Earth -- I. Physis -- II. Physis and Logos -- III. Language -- IV. World and Earth -- V. Hölderlin’s Understanding of Nature -- V. Gods -- I. Olympian Deities -- II. Chthonian Religion -- III. Dionysus -- IV. Chaos -- V. Gods and Logos -- VI. Gods as Realities -- VI. Foursome -- VII. Thing -- I. Traditional Understanding of Thing -- II. Artwork as an Assembler -- III. Thing as Assembler -- IV. Subjective and Essential Understanding of Thing -- V. Thing and Space -- VI. Philosophy of Thing -- VIII. Dwelling -- I. Building and Dwelling -- II. Dwelling and Logos -- III. Poet as Prophet -- IV. Festivity -- V. Godly and Godless Man -- Appendix: Heidegger and Christianity.

Kurzfassung: Earth and Gods is an attempt to introduce the reader to Heidegger's fully developed philosophy. The title Earth and Gods gives an im­ pression of not being a general study of Heidegger's philosophy. However, this is not true - the earth and the gods are fundamental ontological symbols of his fully developed philosophy, namely, his third and final phase of thought. This phase repeats the problems of both preceding phases in a fuller and more developed manner; hence, it implies them. The two preceding phases are the phase of Dasein and the phase of Being. These two phases are a natural flow of fundamental problems which reach their final formation and development in the phase of earth and gods. Dasein (the first phase) leads to Being, and Being (the second phase) bursts into fundamental ontological powers of Being (Seinsmiichte) which are earth and sky, gods and mortals (the third phase). Since earth is unthinkable without sky and since gods are gods in the world of mortals - of men, the title Earth and Gods is an abbreviation of these four fundamental powers of Being. Hence, an investigation of earth and gods is an attempt to present Heidegger's philosophy as a whole. Such a presentation provides the reader with the background necessary for a more adequate and efficient understanding of the writings of Heidegger himself. Thus, Earth and Gods may rightly be considered an introduction to Hei­ degger's philosophy.

Kurzfassung: Topologie des Logos und Kant-Interpretation -- § 1. Topologie des Logos -- § 2. Die Entwicklung des Logos. Logos, Dialogos und Synlogos. Katalogos und Analogos -- § 3. Die Logik der Analogia -- § 4. Die Kant-Interpretation als Begreifen des Logos -- Erstes Kapitel. Das Ding an sich und „Die Theorie der Erfahrung -- § 5. Die kritische Methode und die Theorie der Erfahrung -- § 6. Die Erfahrung und die besonderen Gesetze -- § 7. Die Erfahrung überhaupt und die besondere Erfahrung. Natura formaliter spectata und natura materialiter spectata -- § 8. Die besondere Erfahrung als Grunderfahrung -- § 9. Die Grenzen der Erfahrung überhaupt. Das Apriorische und das Aposteriorische -- § 10. Das Problem des Dinges an sich -- § 11. Die Existenz des Dinges an sich -- § 12. Dasein und Sosein. Die Logik für das Ding an sich -- § 13. Der Unterschied der transzendentalen Deduktion in der ersten und zweiten Auflage -- § 14. Die transzendentale Deduktion des reinen Verstandesbegriffen in der ersten Auflage. Das Problem der Affinität -- § 15. Einbildungskraft und Apperzeption -- § 16. Die transzendentale Deduktion in der zweiten Auflage. Verstand und Apperzeption -- § 17. Das Wesen der Einbildungskraft -- § 18. Das Wesen der transzendentalen Deduktion -- Zweites Kapitel. Analogien der Erfahrung und Idee -- § 19. Die Bedeutung des Schematismus -- § 20. Der Schematismus und die Urteilskraft -- § 21. Schema und Analogie -- § 22. Mathematische und dynamische Grundsätze -- § 23. Konstitutiv und regulativ. Die negative Bedeutung der Analogie -- § 24. Die positive Bedeutung der Analogie. Die Eigentümlichkeit der Einheit der Analogia -- § 25. Die Grenzen der Grundsätze und das Wesen der Analogie -- § 26. Die erste Analogie der Erfahrung. Die Grenze dieses Grundsatzes. Das Problem des Nichts bei Kant -- § 27. Die zweite Analogie der Erfahrung -- § 28. Der Kausalitätsbegriff bei Kant. Ein Zirkel in Kants Beweis. Die Grenze des Kausalgesetzes -- § 29. Ursache und Wirkung -- § 30. Die dritte Analogie der Erfahrung. Kant und Newton -- § 31. Die Rekonstruktion des Systems der Kantischen Philosophie -- § 32. Die Vernunft -- § 33. Die erste und zweite Idee -- § 34. Die dynamische Idee und die Logik der Analogie -- Drittes Kapitel. Die Teleologie -- § 35. Das Verhältnis zwischen,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” und,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”. Die Entstehung der,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” -- § 36. Der erste Weg von der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” zur,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”: Anhang zur transzendentalen Dialektik -- § 37. Das prinzip der Vernunftseinheit und die Logik der Analogia -- §38. Die allgemeine Erörterung der Teleologie -- § 39. Der zweite Weg von der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” zur,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”. Vertiefung des Erfahrungsbegriffs -- § 40. Die transzendentale Aesthetik -- § 41. Die Zufälligkeit der Erfahrung. Das Grundproblem der Kantischen Philosophie -- § 42. Affinität und Analogie der Erfahrung. Sosein und Dasein. Die Logik der Analogia als Entwicklung der transzendentalen Logik -- § 43. Die reflektierende Urteilskraft und die Entstehung der Erfahrung. Das übersinnliche Substrat und der intuitive Verstand -- § 44. Der glückliche Zufall und der intuitive Verstand. Zwei Standpunkte der Teleologie -- § 45. Der intuitive Verstand nach der Analogie. Der Als-ob Charakter der Analogie -- § 46. Die allgemeine Analogie auf dem Wege von der Erfahrungüberhaupt zur besonderen Erfahrung. Vier Zweckmäßigkeitsbegriffe.,,Kritik des Geschmacks” und,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” -- § 47. Die organische Zweckmäßigkeit. Teleologie und Mechanismus -- § 48. Die grundsätzliche Teleologie als letzte Einheit der Analogien -- § 49. Das Übersinnliche. Das Problem des Genies. Der Weg von der Natur zur Freiheit -- Anhang. Kant und die moderne Physik -- Viertes Kapitel. Transzendentale Logik und Analogos -- § 50. Wesen und Grenze der transzendentalen Logik -- § 51. Das Wesen der Analogia. Reine Logik, Dialektik und Analogia. Analogia bei Aristoteles, Augustinus und Thomas -- § 52. Analogia bei Kant. Analogie in der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” als Analogia proportionis. Analogie in der,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” als Analogia attributionis -- § 53. Universalitas und Universitas. Das Analytisch-Allgemeine und das Synthesitsch-Allgemeine -- § 54. Die logische Konstruktion der Analogia. Satz des Widerspruchs und Satz des ausgeschlossenen Dritten -- Schluss. Die Transzendentale Topik und die Topologie des Logos -- § 55. Der Standpunkt der Kantischen Philosophie als transzendentale Topik.

Kurzfassung: I: The Foundations of Solipsism -- 1: Sensations and Images -- 2: Language and Sensation -- 3: Imagining Instances -- 4: Comprehension -- 5: Understanding and Synonymy -- 6: Verifiability -- 7: Objections -- II: Causality -- 8: Causes and Counterfactuals -- III: Solipsism Proper -- 9: A Quasi-Axiomatic Solipsistic System -- 10: Alternatives to Solipsism -- 11: Anti-Solipsism -- 12: Further Development of the System: Phenomenalism -- 13: Statements about the Past -- 14: Further Development of the System: Other Minds -- 15: Belief -- Conclusion.

Kurzfassung: Philosophers usually have been anxious to avoid solipsism. A large number of good and great philosophers have tried to refute it. Of course, these philosophers have not always had the same target in mind and, like everything else, solipsism over the centuries has become increasingly elusive and subtle. In this book I undertake to state the position in its most modern and what I take to be its most plausible form. At some points in the history of philosophy the solipsist has been one who denied the existence of everything except himself or even the existence of everything except his own present sensations. At other times, the solipsist instead of doubting these things has merely insisted that there could be no good reason for believing in the existence of anything beyond one's own present sensations. Roughly, this doubt is aimed at reasons rather than at things. A solipsist of this sort appears in Santayana's Scepticism and Animal Faith.

Kurzfassung: 1 Introduction -- 2 The Assumptions of Science -- 3 Nature of Scientific Research -- 4 Scientific Law and the Practice of Science -- 5 The Uncertainty Principle -- 6 Science and Religion -- 7 Science and Education -- 8 Science and Government -- 9 Conclusion.

Kurzfassung: I am becoming increasingly disturbed by the lack of under­ standing of science revealed by politicians, industrialists and the general public. I am also concerned about the widespread mis­ use of the word "scientific" which is more and more being used in situations where it is quite inappropriate. As a result, in some circumstances gross overestimates are made as to what science can do. In other circumstances the real power of science is foolishly underestimated and the contributions which it can make are squandered. Science is God is an attempt to explain just what is meant by the scientific approach and to define more closoJ. y what the word "scientific" indicates. It is deliberately brief and controversial because I want it to be read. In fact, the material dealt with in each single chapter really deserves a whole book to itself. In the future I hope that I may be able to give to each subject such full treatment. Meanwhile I hope that this book will stimulate discussion about science and will increase understanding of it. DAVID F.

Kurzfassung: I. Reaction to Heidegger -- II. Historicism as Humanism -- III. Hegel and Goethe -- IV. Meaning in History -- V. History as a Natural Happening.

Kurzfassung: This brief survey of Professor Karl LOwith's analysis of the modem histori­ cal consciousness is the outgrowth of a year's study at the University of Heidelberg while Professor L6with was still an active member of the faculty. An early version, in the form of a dissertation, was submitted to the History Department of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A. Numerous friends and colleagues have helped me at various stages of this work and I am indebted to them even though I cannot name them all indi­ vidually. However special thanks must be accorded to Professor W. J. Bos­ senbrook of Wayne State University for introducing me to the entire prob­ lem of anti-historicism and to Professor LOwith's work. I am also greatly indebted to Professor John Barlow of Indiana University for his patient assistance with the translations, however the final responsibility for all renditions rests, of course, solely with the author.

Kurzfassung: Russell and the linguistic philosophy -- I. The quest for logical form -- Reference and meaning -- Two senses of “logical form” -- Logical form, propositional constituents, and reconstructionism -- The “logically perfect” language -- The theory of acquaintance -- Proper names -- The “minimum vocabulary” -- Summary and conclusion -- II. The uses of reconstructionism -- The theory of descriptions -- The analysis of class-symbols -- The logical construction of physical objects -- Conclusion -- III. Critique of Russell’s philosophy of language -- The theory of acquaintance -- The doctrine of logical form -- Philosophical analysis as elucidation of ontological structure -- Selected Bibliography.

Kurzfassung: RUSSELL AND THE LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY I t is generally acknowledged that Bertrand Russell played a vital role in the so-called "revolution" that has taken place in twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy, the revolution that has led many philo­ sophers virtually to equate philosophy with some variety - or varieties - of linguistic analysis. His contributions to this revolution were two­ fold: (I) together with G. E. Moore he led the successful revolt against the neo-Hegelianism of Idealists such as Bradley and McTaggert; (2) again with Moore he provided much of the impetus for a somewhat revolutionary way of doing philosophy. (I) and (2) are, of course, close­ ly related, since the new way of philosophizing could be said to consti­ tute, in large part, the revolt against Idealism. Be this as it may, how­ ever, the important fact for present consideration is that Russell was a major influence in turning Anglo-American philosophy in the direction it has subsequently taken - toward what may be termed, quite general­ ly, the "linguistic philosophy. " Unfortunately, though his importance as a precursor of the linguistic philosophy is well-known, the precise sense in which Russell himself can be considered a "philosopher of language" has not, to the present time, been sufficiently clarified. Useful beginnings have been made toward an investigation of this question, but they have been, withal, only begin­ nings, and nothing like an adequate picture of Russell's overall philoso­ phy of language is presently available.

Kurzfassung: One -- I. The Historical Significance of the Letters -- II. The Metaphysics of Hierarchy -- III. The Hierarchic Design of the Letters -- IV. The Models of Order in the Eighth and Ninth Letters -- Two The Letters of PS.-Dionysius -- The Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius.

Kurzfassung: N eoplatonism begins explicitly with Plotinus in the third century of our era. The later Neoplatonism of the fifth and six century schools at Athens and Alexandria was both the continuation of the philosophy of Plotinus and also a pagan ideology. When these schools were closed, despite attempts at compromise at Alexandria and as a result of direct and indirect political pressures and actions, pagan ideology died. Many philosophers, such as Isidore, Asclepiodotus, Damascius, and Olym­ piodorus, must have foreseen the danger to philosophy, and their extant writings are sprinkled with forebodings. Would the death of pagan ideology, in the form of pagan worship and the Homeric and Orphic traditions, bring about the death of all genuine philosophy as well? One answer to this great question is found in the enigmatic writings of Ps. -Dionysius the Areopagite. Purposing to be the writings of the Athenian convert of St. Paul, they fall within the province of a multitude of so-called "pseudepigraphic" Christian writings. 1. GENERAL ARGUMENT I embarked on the study of Ps. -Dionysius' Letters with two goals in mind: (r) to grasp in clear detail the unknown author's philosophic intentions in writing his famous Corpus and the way in which he set about writing, and (2) to attempt to see with precision the reason for the absence of a political philosophy in Christian Platonism. The Letters provided a richness of detail and information bearing on the first subject which was wholly unexpected.

Kurzfassung: I -- II -- III -- Concluding Remarks -- A Short Bibliography.

Kurzfassung: At opposite ends of over two millenia Hegel and Aristotle, virtually alone of the great European thinkers, consciously attempted to criticize and develop the thought of their predecessors into systems of their own. Both were thus committed in principle to the view that philosophy in each age of civilization is at once a product, a criticism, and a recon­ struction of the values and insights of its own past; that the fertile mind can only beget anew when it has acknowledged and understood a line of ancestors which has led to its begetting; that the thinker as little as the artist can start with a clean slate and a blankly open-minded atti­ tude to the world which he finds within him and before him. Man is by definition rational; philosophy is his continuous impulse to grasp and appraise a single universe of which he finds himself a part; philosophy therefore contains its history as a constituent element of its own nature, and the developmental character of philosophy must - unless human reason is, unthinkably and unarguably, a mere delusion - in some sense reflect, or even be in some sense identical with, an essentially develop­ mental universe - that is roughly the common creed of Aristotle and Hegel. Both of them further believed, as Plato had believed, that what is most real and intelligible in that universe is eo ipso most good.

Kurzfassung: Introduction: The Problems of Contemporary Philosophy -- A. Tradition and Innovation in Contemporary Philosophy -- B. The Process of Differentiation in Philosophy -- C. A Look Ahead -- I / The Philosophy of Self-Evidence: Franz Brentano -- A. Mental Phenomena and Knowledge -- B. The Theory of Being -- C. The Theory of Moral Knowledge -- D. Knowledge of God -- E. Evaluation -- II / Methodological Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl -- A. The Absolute Character of Truth -- B. The Problem of Universals -- C. Intentionality, Judgment and Knowledge (The Phenomenology of Consciousness) -- D. The Phenomenological Intuiting of Essences (Die phänomenologische Wesensschau) -- E. Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy -- F. Evaluation -- III / Applied Phenomenology: Max Scheler -- A. Gnoseology and Phenomenology -- B. The Theory of Sympathy -- C. Value and Person -- D. Religious Philosophy and Theology -- E. Man’s Place in the Stratified Structure of the World -- F. Evaluation -- IV / Existential Ontology: Martin Heidegger -- A. The Philosophy of Existence in General and its Historical Relationship to Western Thought -- B. The Ontology of Finite Dasein -- C. Evaluation -- V / The Philosophy of Existence: Karl Jaspers -- A. Philosophical World-Orientation, Illumination of Existence, and Metaphysics -- B. The Being of the Encompassing, and Truth -- C. Evaluation -- VI / Critical Realism: Nicolai Hartmann -- A. The Metaphysics of Knowledge -- B. The Structure of Being -- C. The Philosophy of Spirit -- D. The Philosophy of Value -- E. Evaluation -- VII / Modern Empiricism: Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle -- A. Reasons for the Rise of Modern Empiricism -- B. Immanence Positivism (Mach, Avenarius) and the Epistemology of Moritz Schlick -- C. Definitions and Explications of Concepts -- D. Statements and the Meaning of Statements -- 1. First Formulation of the Empiricist’s Criterion of Meaning -- E. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge -- F. Semantics and Logical Syntax -- G. Evaluation -- VIII / Foundational Studies and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy -- A. Research in the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics -- B. The Theory of Empirical Scientific Knowledge -- C. Problems of Reality -- D. Ethics -- IX / Ludwig Wittgenstein -- A. Philosophy I -- B. Philosophy II -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Kurzfassung: I. Soul and Mathematicals -- II. Posidonius and Neoplatonism -- III. The Subdivisions of Theoretical Philosophy -- IV. The Origin of the Quadrivium -- V. Speusippus in Iamblichus -- VI. A New Fragment of Aristotle -- VII. Metaphysica generalis in Aristotle ? -- Conclusion -- Index of Names -- Index of Passages in Greek and Latin Authors.

Kurzfassung: Table des Matières -- Transformation des principes généraux en règles positives du droit international -- Remarques sur l’interdiction d’intervention -- Les problèmes de la subjectivité internationale -- Le statut juridique des partisans et des mouvements de résistance armée: évolution historique et aspects actuels -- Die Vereinigten Nationen und das Kriegsrecht -- International Freedom of Information. New Dimensions -- Observations sur une enquête internationale: L’affaire du «Tavignano» -- La souveraineté dans l’histoire du droit des gens. De Vitoria à Vattel -- Norwegian Attitude to International and Foreign Judgments. Recent Developments -- The Evolution of Space Law Continues -- Contribution à l’étude des rapports entre le droit international public et le droit international privé -- Betrachtungen zum Europäischen Niederlassungabkommen vom 13. Dezember 1955 -- Le rôle de la condition des mains propres de la personne lésée dans les réclamations devant les tribunaux internationaux -- Unverbindliche Abmachungen im zwischenstaatlichen Bereich -- La non-reconnaissance des actes contraires au droit -- La motivation et la révision des sentences arbitrales à la Confêrence de la paix de la Haye (1899) et le conflit frontalier entre le Royaume-Uni et le Vénézuéla -- The Problem of the Application of Military Measures by the General Assembly of the United Nations -- Politique et droit dans les Balkans. Etude d’histoire de la diplomatie et du droit international -- The Special Function of the Principle of Restrictive Interpretation -- La règle juridique, le droit subjectif et le sujet de droit en droit international. Essai d’une nouvelle théorie -- Der Primat des Völkerrechts und die Vereinten Nationen -- Bibliographie des travaux scientifiques de Juraj Andrassy.

Kurzfassung: I: The “Ratio Communis” of the Analogous Name -- I. Texts which reject a ratio communis -- II. Texts which imply a ratio communis -- III. The analogy of names -- IV. Some analogous names -- VI. Being is not a Genus -- VII. Resolution and Conclusion -- II: Metaphor and Analogy -- I. Cajetan on metaphor -- II. Analogy vs. Metaphor -- III. Ratio Propria non invenitur nisi in uno -- IV. The signification of names -- V. Ratio communis and ratio propria -- VI. Proprie, Communiter, Metaphorice -- VII. Concluding summary -- III: Metaphor and fundamental ontology -- IV: “Analogy” is analogous -- V: Reply to a Critic -- I. Cajetan and Intrinsic and Extrinsic denomination -- II. Professor Beach as exegete -- III. Professor Beach’s confusion of the Logical and Real -- VI: Is the term soul analogous?.

Kurzfassung: The present volume brings together a number of things I have written on the subject of analogy since the appearance of The Logic of Analogy in 1961. In that book I tried to disengage St Thomas' teaching on analogous names from various subsequent accretions which, in my opinion, had obscured its import. The book was widely reviewed, various points in it were rightly criticized, but its main argument, namely, that analogical signification is a logical matter and must be treated as such, was, if often confronted, left finally, I think, standing. The studies brought together now reflect the same concentration on the teaching of Aquinas. I am not of the opinion that everything important on the question of analogy, and certainly not everything of importance on those problems which elicit the doctrine of analogy, was said by Thomas Aquinas. But it was my decision, for my personal work, first to achieve as much clarity as I could with respect to the teaching of Thomas, and then to go on to other writers, both ancient and modern. I am currently engaged in working out the relations among equivo­ cation, analogy and metaphor in Aristotle. When that study is com­ pleted, I shall turn eagerly to some quite recent contributions to the nature of religious language. In short, the present work, which is by and large a prolongation of my attempt at an exegesis of Thomistic texts, marks the end of one phase of my research into the problem of analogy.

Kurzfassung: I. Inductive Empiricism -- Joseph Neef’s Sensationalistic Empiricism -- George Jardine’s Philosophical Education -- James G. Carter: An Inductive Science of Education -- Thomas Tate: An Inductive Philosophy of Education -- Herbert Spencer: Evolutionism and Progress -- Joseph Payne on the Science and Art of Education -- G. E. Partridge: Scientism and the Philosophy of Education -- II Rationalism -- James P. Wickersham: Rationalistic Principles as Precepts -- Rationalism’s Classic Philosophy of Education -- Herman Harrell Home’s Idealistic Theism -- III. Naturalistic Empiricism -- Chauncey Wright’s Suggestive Naturalism -- John Dewey: Experience as Empirical and Natural -- John Angus MacVannel: Experimentalism and Functionalism -- A Common Prospect -- Bibliographic Note.

Kurzfassung: John Dewey once wrote: "Education is such an important interest of life that . . . we should expect to find a philosophy of education, just as there is a philosophy of art and of religion. We should expect, that is, such a treatment of the subject as would show that the nature of existence renders education an integral and indispensable function of life. " Indeed, such treatments of education are at least as old as Plato's Republic. Even so, it was not until the nineteenth century that the philosophy of education was recognized as a distinct discipline. His­ torically, it has been one thing to treat education in such a manner as Dewey mentions; it has been another thing to do so while deliberately making explicit a discipline with a subject matter which is in some sense distinct from that of other disciplines. The aim, in the present study, has been to study the origins of philosophy of education as a distinct discipline in the United States. In doing so, "origins" are taken to mean, first, that from which the disci­ pline has come, and second, that which initiates, serves as a point of departure for what follows. In searching for origins, I have explored the philosophic considerations of education from which came those distinct conceptions of the philosophy of education that were to serve as points of departure for later considerations of the discipline.

Kurzfassung: I. Some contemporary interpretations of Hume’s theory of imagination -- W. C. Gore’s interpretation -- N. K. Smith’s interpretation -- E. J. Furlong’s interpretation -- Harold Taylor’s interpretation -- Concluding remarks -- II. The elements of Hume’s theory of imagination -- The contents of the mind -- The materials of imagination -- The source of the materials of imagination -- The criteria for recognizing imaginative activity -- Principles governing the imagination -- The nature of imagination -- Imaginative activity and the real -- The function of imagination in cognition -- Concluding remarks -- III. The generic features and basic argument-Structure of Hume’s Philosophy of the Human Understanding -- The primary goal of Hume’s philosophy of the human understanding -- Hume’s basic principles -- Concluding remarks -- IV. Hume’s theory of imagination in the argument of His Philosophy of the Human Understanding (I): The attack on reason -- The attack on abstract reasoning -- The attack on matter-of-fact reasoning -- The combined attack on both types of reasoning -- V. Hume’s theory of imagination in the Argument of His Philosophy of the Human Understanding (II): The attack on sense -- The attack on external sense -- The attack on internal sense -- VI. Conclusion -- A Bibliography of the Most Important Sources.

Kurzfassung: The present work is, as its title indicates, a study of Hume's theory of imagination. Naturally, it is a study of a particular sort. It has a certain scope and limitations, takes a certain line of approach, exhibits certain emphases, has certain ends-in-view, etc. As an initial step in specifying the nature of this study, I shall indicate its central problem, i. e. , that problem to the solution of which the solutions of the various other problems with which it is concerned are merely means. The central problem of this study is that of determining how Hume's theory of im­ agination is related to, or involved in, the generic features and main lines of argument of his philosophy of the human understanding. The expression "philosophy of the human understanding" is obvious­ to allude to a restriction on the scope of this investigation. ly intended Actually, it is a title suggested to me by two of Hume's philosophical writings; and to anyone who is even modestly acquainted with these writings, its reference should be no mystery. Hume published the first two so-called "Books" of his A Treatise of Human Nature in 1739. The first of these two Books was entitled "Of the Human Understanding. " Nine years later, he published a work under the title, An Enquiry Con­ cerning Human Understanding.

Kurzfassung: Preliminary Statement -- One. God and Nature -- A. Nature as Fact for Science -- B. Nature as Meaningful for Man -- C. Nature as Manifestation of God -- D. Nature as Work of God Open to Science -- Two. God and Man -- A. Man in the World with God -- B. Man as Knower -- C. Man as Knower of God -- Three. Man and Man -- A. The Human Self -- B. The State -- C. Art as Partial Hold on the Whole -- Four. Man and God -- A. Religion in General -- B. Christianity as Concrete Religion -- C. Immortality as a Free Possibility to Participate the One -- Concluding Statement -- Selected Bibliography.

Kurzfassung: I. Benjamin Whichcote: A Man of Good-Nature -- II. From Athens to Cambridge -- III. Controversy with a Puritan -- IV. Religion of First-Inscription — The Candle of the Lord (i) -- V. Religion of First-Inscription — Natural Ethics (ii) -- VI. Religion of after-Revelation—Saving Knowledge (i) -- VII. Religion of after-Revelation — Christian Morals (ii) -- VIII. Religion of after-Revelation — The Universal Church (iii) -- IX. The Father of the Christian Platonists of Cambridge -- X. Whichcote and the Intellectual Tradition -- XI. Epilegomena -- Selected Bibliography.

Kurzfassung: The research of Professor J. D. Roberts has interested me for several years. It has interested me because he has been working in a really rich area of intellectual history. Even before Professor Whitehead taught us to speak of the seventeenth century as the "century of genius," many of us looked with wonder on the creativity of the men who produced religious and philosophical literature in that period of contro­ versy and of power. It was, in a most unusual way, a flowering time of the human spirit. The present volume is devoted to one fascinating chapter in the history of ideas. We know now, far better than we knew a generation ago, how incendiary Puritan ideas really were. They had tremendous consequences, many of which continue to this day, in spite of the absurd caricature of Puritanism, which is popularly accepted. The best of Milton's contemporaries were great thinkers as well as great doers.

Kurzfassung: 1. Towards a More Comprehensive Concept of the Person -- 2. Love, Self, and Contemporary Culture -- 3. The Problem of Immortality -- 4. Free Will, Creativity of God, and Order -- 5. Other Persons, Other Things -- 6. The Concept of Rational Animal -- 7. The Self in Mu’tazilah Thought -- 8. Unity: Appearance and Reality in the Light of the Sufi Doctrines of Wahdat-ul-Wujud of Ibn ‘Arabi and Wahdat-ush-Shahud of Shaik Ahmed Sarhandi -- 9. Variants in the Concepts of the Self in the Islamic Tradition -- 10. Is There a Soul or No Soul? The Buddha Refused to Answer. Why? -- 11. ?ankara’s Interpretation of the Self and Its Influence on Later Indian Thought -- 12. Person and Moral Life (A Presentation of the Nature of Person and the Essence of Moral Life in the Philosophy of Prajñ?p?ramit? -- 13. The Self as Discovery and Creation in Western and Indian Philosophy -- 14. The Bhagavad g?t? and the Book of Job on the Problem of the Self -- 15. Pre-existence -- 16. Approaches to the I-consciousness: Its Depths, Normal and Abnormal -- 17. Concern for the Person — Concluding Paper.

Kurzfassung: The general characteristics of the decades after the last World War, so far as the human situation goes, include two phenomena: these decades are marked by man's dissatisfaction with himself, his confession of ignorance of himself, his anxiety about his future, and also his earnest search for the ground of his being, which can give him a feeling of security with reference to his life here and hereafter; they are also marked by man's pride about his achievements in science and tech­ nology, a hope of a better life on earth, and a faith in himself as capable of engineering the individual and society for realizing peace, harmony, and happiness for all men. The contemporary thinking man is conscious of the predicament these two kinds of characteristics have created for him, admits failures, hopes for improvements, and works for them. In carrying out this work, he has to and wants to know what human life is, what the meaning and purpose of life are, and why his struggles and achievements have not succeeded in giving every man a reasonable amount of comfort and happiness. He has come to realize also that the accumulation of material comforts does not necessarily lead to happi­ ness, although happiness for man - except for the monk, fakir, or sannyiisin - is not possible without material comforts. Here we have the problem.

Kurzfassung: I: Berdyaev’s Philosophy of History -- A. Introduction -- B. The “historical” and the philosophy of history -- C. Philosophy of history and metaphysics of history -- D. The philosophy of history and the end of history -- E. Philosophy of history in respect to time -- F. Philosophy of history and the doctrine of godmanhood -- G. Summary -- II: Godmanhood, Freedom and Philosophy of History -- A. Introduction -- B. The doctrine of godmanhood -- C. Godmanhood and the freedom of man -- D. Some consequences of the doctrine of godmanhood -- E. Summary -- III: Existentialism: A Personalist Philosophy of History -- A. Introduction -- B. Personalism: the existent and the ego -- C. Personality is spirit: an existentialism of spirit -- D. Personality: the concrete and universal existent -- E. Personality and existence not isolated from the thou and the we -- F. Personality: the microcosm -- G. Summary -- IV: Epistemology and Philosophy of History Conclusion -- A. Introduction -- B. The rejection of the subject-object relationship -- C. Knowledge not anti-rational, but super-rational -- D. Knowledge an identity -- E. True knowing is communal in character -- F. True knowing is loving and creative in character -- G. Image, symbol and mystical experience: concrete and creative knowing -- H. Summary -- Conclusion -- Bibliography of Sources.

Kurzfassung: BERDYAEV AS A PHILOSOPHER How shall a non-Russian, above all a North American, assimilate the extraordinary assemblage of ideas which is Berdyaev's philosophy? Dr. Richardson does not exaggerate the difficulties. And he introduces us with great care (and what a formidable task it must have been) precisely to what is most strange in this writer, his fusion of historical .. eschatological-metaphysical-mystical-Christian conceptions. By some standards Berdyaev is a theologian rather than a philosopher; for he takes the truth of the Christian revelation for granted and his work can readily be viewed as an elaborate apologetic for one religion against all others and against irreligion. Yet I incline to sympathize with him in his claim to be a philosopher. What an eccentric one, however! There are indeed some partial analogies in the general European tradition. Certainly this Russian is a disciple of Kant, and strong traces of Kantianism survive in him. He also moved away from Kant somewhat as did Fichte, Hegel, and, above all, Schelling in his last period. His sympathetic response to Heracleitos and Boehme recalls Hegel. The interest in Boehme and Schelling is found also in Tillich. Like the late German-American, Berdyaev rejects conceptual in favor of symbolic speech about God. Like Bergson, he stresses intuition and makes a radical distinction between scientific logical analytic thought and the mode of apprehension by which, he believes, metaphysical truth is to be appropriated. Here one thinks also of Heidegger.

Kurzfassung: I. Nature -- I. The Problem of the Exact Sciences -- II: Mathematics and Nature -- III. The Anthropocentric Character of Space, Time, and Motion -- IV. The Analogy of the Grammar of Nature -- II. Common Sense -- V. Berkeley’s Intentions -- VI. The two Kinds of Metaphysics -- VII. Philosophical Scruples: Their Cause and Cure -- VIII. The Rôle of Common Sense -- IX. The Potentiality of Common Sense -- X. Berkeley’s Dialectic -- III. Mystery -- XI. The Mysterious Universe -- XII. The Exact Sciences.

Kurzfassung: In this work I have endeavoured to see Berkeley in his contemporary setting. On the principle that philosophy is ultimately about men, not about abstract problems, I have tried to see Berkeley the philosopher as an expression of Berkeley the man. When this is done, what is perennial in the philosophy may be discerned in and through what is local and temporal. Berkeley then emerges as a pioneer reformer; not so much an innovator as a renovator; one who set out to rescue phi­ losophy from the enthusiasms of the preceding age; one who strove to seat philosophy once more on the broad human and common sense foundations laid by Plato and Aristotle. Critical studies of some of the more striking of Berkeley's epistemo­ logical arguments are legion. They commenced with the young Berke­ ley's first appearance in print, and have continued to this day. But whether they take the form of professions of support for Berkeley, or of bald refutations of Berkeley's supposed fallacies, or whether, like the contemporary "analytical" studies of Moore, Warnock, and Austin, they are subtle exposures of alleged deeply concealed logical muddles, they all tend to share one common characteristic: they select and abstract from the totality of Berkeley, and miss the robust simplicity and universality of Berkeley's intentions. It is the intentions which control the whole, and give the right perspective in which to view the various items.

Kurzfassung: One -- I. The Notion of the Begriffsschrift -- II. Number and Concept -- III. The Hierarchy of Functions -- IV. Wertverlauf and the Problem of Expansion -- Two -- V. The Article ‘On Sense and Reference’ -- VI. Description, Designation, Assertion: Russell, Jones and Bierich on Frege’s Semantics -- VII. Synonymity and Sentential Context -- VIII. The Contamination of Ontics and Semantics -- Summary -- Index of Names.

Kurzfassung: Book One — Introduction -- I — The Approach to Ethics and Morality -- 1. Methodological Considerations -- 2. Moral Integrative Levels -- 3. A Summary Perspective -- Book Two — The Ethical Integrative Series -- II — The Ethics of the Individual -- 1. The Individual Good -- 2. Approaches to the Good -- 3. The Pursuit of the Good -- III — The Ethics of Society -- 1. Morality as Social Structure -- 2. The Covert Moral Structure -- 3. The Overt Moral Structure -- 4. Rights and Duties -- 5. The Law and Legal Procedures -- IV — The Ethics of the Human Species -- 1. From Society to Humanity -- 2. Characteristics of the Human Species -- 3. The Morality of the Human Species -- 4. Moral Encounters with Near-by Species -- V — The Ethics of the Cosmos -- 1. The Cosmic Perspective -- 2. The Cosmic Good -- 3. Truth and Value -- 4. Cosmic Type Responsibility -- 5. Cosmic Confrontation -- 6. Normative Cosmic Ethics -- 7. The Ethics of Man in Relation to the Cosmos -- Book Three — The Moral Situation and Its Outcome -- VI — Ideal Morality -- 1. The Choice of Ideals -- 2. Individual Ideals -- 3. Social Ideals -- 4. Human Ideals -- 5. Cosmic Ideals -- VII — Concrete Morality -- 1. Bad Behavior and Immorality -- 2. Bad Individual Behavior -- 3. Bad Social Behavior -- 4. Bad Species Behavior -- 5. Bad Cosmic Behavior -- VIII — Moral Strategy -- 1. The Uses of Strategy -- 2. The Strategy of Individual Obligation -- 3. The Strategy of Social Obligation -- 4. The Strategy of Human Obligation -- 5. The Strategy of Cosmic Obligation -- Name Index -- Topic Index.

Kurzfassung: No statement, except one, can be made with which all philosophers would agree. The exception is this statement itself. The disagreement has the advantage that it gets all the proposals out into the open where they can be examined, but it has the dis advantage that the cogency of any one philosophy must rely entirely upon that wide public which is unprepared to deal with it. Fortunately, ethics has a more immediate appeal than some other branches of philosophy; yet the history of the topic gives no indication that this circumstance has had the happy results we might have expected. One peculiarity of ethics is that its problems are rarely settled on its own grounds. Ethical problems are for the most part referred to socially established moralities, and moralities are socially established not on the basis of philosophy but rather by some sponsoring insti­ or politics. Such establishments, however, tution, usually religion depend on the prior preparation of ethical proposals by philosophers. For it stands to reason that an ethics cannot be socially established if there is no ethics to establish. Thus philosophers provide the justifi­ cation for socially-established moralities while seeming not to do so.

Kurzfassung: I: Activity and Materialism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Marx and old Materialism -- 3. Idealism as the Basis of Marx’s Materialism -- 4. Marx’s Criticism of Hegel -- 5. Marx and the Young-Hegelians -- 6. Marx’s Dialectical Materialism -- II: Activity and Knowledge -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Marx and Materialism -- 3. Marx and Idealism -- 4. Marx’s Epistemological Method -- 5. Knowledge as Activity -- 6. Marx and Pragmatism -- III: Activity and Philosophy -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Hegel’s Theory of the State -- 3. Marx’s Diagnosis of the State -- 4. The Cure of Society -- IV: Summary and Evaluation -- 1. Materialism -- 2. Epistemology -- 3. Philosophy -- 4. Evaluation -- An English Translation of Marx’s Doctoral Dissertation -- The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature -- Foreword -- One: the Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature in General -- I. The Subject of the Treatise -- II. Judgments Concerning the Relationship of Democritean and Epicurean Physics -- III. Difficulties with Regard to the Identity of the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature -- Two: on the Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Physics in Detail -- I. The Declination of Atoms from a Straight Line -- II. The Qualities of the Atom -- III. Atomoi Archai and Atoma Stoicheia -- IV. Time -- V. The Meteors.

Kurzfassung: This essay attempts to demonstrate the significance of the principle of activity in the philosophy of Karl Marx. The principle of activity in Marx has both a general and a specific meaning. In general the princi­ ple refers to the activist element in Marxian practice motivating both Marx and his contemporary devotees. The specific facet of the principle relates to Marx's philosophy - the principle of activity being that con­ cept which underlies the entire system. Activity for Marx is both a philosophic concept and an element of human experience demanded by his system. Marx, that is, not only theorizes about activity but also illustrates his theory in hislife. Hence, we find the principle of activity both in his writings and in his doings. the words Action, Tiitigkeit, or Praxis to refer to Marx most often used the principle of activity. No major philosopher has fully dealt with the concept of action. We sometimes suppose that action only occurs when we can observe some outward result or motion. Spinoza's definition of action disallows this narrow interpretation of activity. I say that we act when anything is done, either within us or without us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is to say ... when from our nature anything follows, either within us or without, which by that nature alone can be clearly and 1 distinctly understood.

Kurzfassung: One Philosophical Analysis: A General Discussion -- Two Ordinary Language -- Three Meanings, Concepts, and the Uses of Verbal Expressions -- Four Synonymity -- Five Semantic Analysis I -- Six Semantic Analysis II -- Seven Semantic Analysis III. Analysis and Reconstruction -- Eight Deductive Inference and Analysis -- Nine Language and Truth -- Ten Extra-Linguistic Analysis.

Kurzfassung: It is neither far-fetched nor over-modest to assume that some readers will feel that another book on philosophical analysis is superfluous, seeing that there are at present a number of fine books, essays or col­ lections of essays on the subject. Part of the reason which makes me hope that the present book is not superfluous is that its aim is different from that of many of these books or essays. What I myself have at­ tempted to do is to outline my own views regarding the nature and possible types and forms of philosophical analysis: the result of sustained reflection on the subject for the past few years. The methods of analy­ sis that are here regarded as "proper," and in a greater or lesser degree philosophically useful methods are not, in their general features, really anything new. They are advocated or are actually being practised by different contemporary philosophers; and some of them have a long and hallowed history behind them. However, the present work attempts to present these methods in a form or manner which, it is hoped, will make them acceptable, or less inacceptable, to philosophers with widely-divergent attitudes or biases. An important feature of the book is that no one method or type of method is regarded as the proper method or type of method of philosophical analysis to the exclusion of others; in sharp contrast to the views or practice of a considerable number of contemporary philosophers.

Kurzfassung: 1. The Necessity of Metaphysical Solutions -- 2. Language and Metaphysics -- 3. What Metaphysics Can Be -- 4. Properties of the Metaphysical Language -- 5. On What There Is -- 6. How We Know the Essence of What There Is -- 7. Modes of Knowledge and Intuition -- 8. The Verification of Metaphysical Statements -- 9. The Veridicality of Eidetic Intuition -- 10. Functions and Events -- 11. Negation, Conjunction, and Events -- 12. Implication and What There Is -- 13. Functions and Facts -- 14. Functions and Meaning -- 15. Functions and Categories and Universals -- 16. Events and Actual Occasions -- 17. Actual Occasions -- 18. Cosmology -- 19. Commitments and Language -- Name Index.

Kurzfassung: This book is not merely about metaphysics; it is an essay in metaphysics. Furthermore, it is written in the firm conviction that metaphysics is possible and meaningful metaphysical statements can and should be made. However, I felt it necessary to approach the perennial problems of metaphysics through the avenues of linguistic analysis. I have tried not only to infiltrate the position of the linguists but to show that a fifth column already existed there. Yet the objections to metaphysics needed to be met or at least some indication of how they could be met had to be shown. It is never enough to demonstrate that objections are un­ founded - some positive indications of a possible metaphysics had to be offered. This book, as a consequence, tries also to draw at least in broad outline, a metaphysical position that seems to me to be well-founded. In the present state of philoso­ phy in the United States especially, this is sufficient reason for publishing another book in philosophy. I want to express my appreciation to a number of people. To my colleagues at North Carolina I am grateful for stimulating criticisms that often helped me see my way through to solutions. To Professors B. Blanshard (Yale University), and Ledger Wood (Princeton University), I am grateful for reading the manuscript.

Kurzfassung: I. Principal Elements of Navya-ny?ya Logic -- II. Ga?ge?a’s Theory of Pervasion -- Anumitinir?pa?a and Vy?ptiv?da by Ga?ge?op?dhy?ya Transliteration, Translation and Commentary Anumitinir?pa?a and Vy?ptiv?da -- Section I. General observations about inference -- Section II. Theory of pervasion -- I. Five definitions of pervasion as non-deviation -- II. Two definitions of pervasion called Lion-Tiger Definition -- III. Absence limited by a property whose loci are different from its counterpositive -- IV. Preliminary refutation of a series of definitions of pervasion -- V. The conclusive definition of pervasion -- VI. Universal absence -- VII. Pervasion between particulars -- Sanskrit Index -- English Index.

Kurzfassung: The history of Indian logic is roughly divided into three periods: old Nyaya, Buddhist logic and new Nyaya. Each period is characterized by the production of some outstanding Sanskrit text. The main texts of the first and second period have been translated into, and explained in, European languages. But the principal text of the third period, GaIigesa's Tattvacintamal).i, is still not accessible through a Western language. The present book is intended to fill up this gap to some extent. The object of this study is to present both to sanskritists and to logicians an essential part of Indian logic as laid down in the first two sections of the Anumanakhal).c;la of the Tattvacintamal).i. No attention will be paid here to the doctrines of GaIigesa's predecessors and the theories developed by his commentators. Though this study is not con­ cerned with comparative philosophy, Western logic will be employed for the purpose of interpretation. Under Western logic I bring both traditional logic and modern logic, which, in my opinion, form one discipline of reasoning. This may account for my use of some Latin terms belonging to scholastic thought. Transliteration and translation have been made from the text of the Anumitiniriipal).a and Vyaptivada in the Bibliotheca Indica edition of GaIigesa's Tattvacintamal).i (with Mathuranatha's commentary), Part II Anumanakhal).c;la from Anumiti to Biidha, Calcutta, 1892. A photostatic copy ofthat text precedes the transliteration, translation and commentary.

Kurzfassung: Memorial Address -- Allocution -- Remarques sur la théorie intuitionniste des espaces linéaires -- Some Remarks about Synonymity and the Theorem of Beth -- Beth’s Tableau-Method -- Quelques remarques sur les “Tableaux de Beth” -- Une hypothèse sur l’extension des relations finies et sa vérification dans certaines classes particulières (deuxième partie) -- La philosophie géométrique de Henri Poincaré J. J. A.Mooij -- Logique et théorie physique -- L’argument probabiliste pour une logique non classique de la mécanique quantique -- Courant potentiel en magnétogazdynamique -- Nouvelle méthode de résolution de l’équation de Helmholtz pour une symétrie cylindrique -- Recherche en mécanique ondulatoire non linéaire -- Problème de Cauchy dans le modèle de Lee en métrique indéfinie -- Conclusions -- Bibliography of E. W. Beth.

Kurzfassung: I. The Semantic Aspect of Plato’s Theory of Ideas -- 1. The first assumption -- 2. The second assumption -- 3. Metaphysics out of semantics -- II. Aristotle’s Way Out -- 1. Some oblique criticisms of Plato’s semantic assumptions -- 2. Universals and particulars -- III. Examination of the Platonic Assumptions -- 1. An attack by empiricists -- 2. A new approach -- IV. A Constructive Move -- 1. Resemblance -- 2. Universals.

Kurzfassung: The primary purpose of this book is to depict the main features of the classical problem of universals in order to provide a better understand­ ing of the various suggestions made by the moderns towards the solution of that problem. The work is not historical; however, since knowledge of the history of the problem is essential for understanding the import of the new approach, references are given to classical theories and interpretations are offered without any pretension that they are either exhaustive or final. I have tried to argue that the problem, though often appearing in metaphysical guise, is, in fact, part of the more general problem of semantics, i.e., the relation between words and the world. The medieval theory that universals are the meaning of general words is linked here with a recent theory that the meaning of a word is explainable in terms of its function and not in terms of its putative denotation. What comes of this fusion is this: that if the medieval theory that universals are the meaning of general words is in any way credible, then to know the meaning of such words requires close attention to their functions on the ground that words in general do not mirror the world, rather they are tools used to change it.

Kurzfassung: A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- Z.

Kurzfassung: I. The Nature of the Problems and Some Previously Suggested Solutions -- I. An outline of the problems to be considered -- II. An outline of some contemporary writers -- III. A statement of the problems to be solved, and the procedure to be followed -- II. An Examination of the Concept of “Self Evidence” in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching -- I. The nature of the problem, some preliminary considerations, and an outline of the procedure to be followed -- II. S. Thomas’s teaching concerning the concept of “self evidence” in natural law precepts -- III. The role of the Thomistic concept naturalis inclinatio in our knowledge of self-evident natural law precepts -- IV. A critical assessment of some of the precepts suggested by contemporary writers as being self-evident, together with a summary of the main findings of this chapter -- III. The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle -- I. Recapitulation -- II. The problem of the character of precepts which are not self-evident -- III. The problem in the Commentary on the Sentences -- IV. The Problem in the Summa Contra Gentiles -- V. The problem in the Commentary on the Ethics -- IV. The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Summa Theologica -- The History of the text -- Method of presentation to be followed -- V. Some Comments on the Validity and Usefulness of the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Precepts -- I. A statement of the aims of this chapter and an outline of the procedure to be followed -- II. Our assessment of S. Thomas’s teaching on the possibility of “logical extension” in natural law -- III. A final assessment of S. Thomas’s teaching on primary and secondary precepts, and their division -- IV. The validity and value of the distinction between primary and secondary precepts -- VI. The Concept of Variability Among the Secondary Precepts of Natural Law -- I. A discussion on the aims of this chapter and the procedure to be followed -- II. Mere historical changes in positive moral beliefs -- III. Historical changes correlated with the rational development of man -- IV. Changes in natural law due to the intrinsic complexity of certain particular situations -- V. The variability of decisions in particular situations due to the contingency of principles -- VI. Variability in natural law due to the “non-obligatory” character of positively formulated precepts -- VII. Variability in natural law due to changes in the intrinsic structure of society -- Conclusion -- Index of Authors.

Kurzfassung: Never before in the history of mankind has there been a period when hitherto accepted moral principles have been more severely tested. The agonized cry of a world smitten by two major wars in a handful of years leaves no doubt in the minds of many that natural law ethics, ifit is to have relevance and to survive, must provide at least the outline of an answer to the problems of every day living. To date, many hundreds of books and articles have been written setting forth with great eloquence the basic and immutable principles of natural law ethics. But too often these discussions fail to consider, in their agonizing detail, situations where there is a choice between conflicting values, conflicting loyalties, conflicting ideas and duties, each of which has a claim to recognition. It is only in the isolation of the particular case that the frightening dilemmas of natural law can be most clearly experienced. To give just two illustrations.

Kurzfassung: 1 Introduction: Some Concepts and Definitions -- 1.0 Arguments and Argument Forms -- 1.1 Symbolic Logic and its Precursors -- 1.2 Symbolization -- 1.3 Logical Functors and Their Definitions -- 1.4 Tests of Validity Using Truth-tables -- 1.5 Proof and Derivation -- 1.6 The Axiomatic Method -- 1.7 Interpreted and Uninterpreted Systems -- 1.8 The Hierarchy of Logical Systems -- 1.9 The Systems of the Present Book -- 1.10 Abbreviations -- 2 The System P+ -- 2.1 Summary -- 2.2 Rules of Formation of P+ -- 2.3 Rules of Transformation of P+ -- 2.4 Axioms of P+ -- 2.5 Definitions of P+ -- 2.6 Deductions in P+ -- 3 Standard Systems with Negation (PLT, PLT’, PLTF, PPM) -- 3.1 Summary -- 3.2 Rules of Formation of PLT -- 3.3 Rules of Transformation of PLT -- 3.4 Axioms of PLT -- 3.5 Definitions of PLT -- 3.6 Deductions in PLT -- 3.7 The Deduction Theorem -- 3.8 The System PLT’ -- 3.9 Independence of Functors and Axioms -- 4 The System PND. Systems of Natural Deduction -- 4.1 Summary -- 4.2 The Bases of the System PND -- 4.3 Proof and Derivation Techniques in PND -- 4.4 Rules of Formation of PND -- 4.5 The Structure of Proofs in PND -- 4.6 Rules of Transformation of PND -- 4.7 Proofs and Theorems of the System PND -- 4.8 Theorems of the Full System PND -- 4.9 A Decision Procedure for the System PND -- 4.10 A Reduction of PND -- 5 The Consistency and Completeness of Formal Systems -- 5.1 Summary -- 5.2 The Consistency of PLT’ -- 5.3 The Completeness of PLT’ -- 5.4 Metatheorems on P+ -- 6 Some Non-Standard Systems of Propositional Logic -- 6.1 Summary -- 6.2 What is a Non-Standard System? -- 6.3 The Intuitionistic System and the Fitch Calculus (PI and PF) -- 6.4 Rules of Formation of PI -- 6.5 Rules of Transformation of PI -- 6.6 Axioms of PI -- 6.7 Definitions of PI -- 6.8 Deductions in PI -- 6.9 The Propositional Logic of F.B. Fitch -- 6.10 The Johansson Minimum Calculus -- 7 The Lower Functional Calculus -- 7.1 Summary and Remarks -- 7.2 Rules of Formation of LFLT’ -- 7.3 Transformation of LFLT’ -- 7.4 Axioms of LFLT’ -- 7.5 Definitions of LFLT’ -- 7.6 Some Applications and Illustrations -- 7.7 Rules of Transformation of LFLT’ -- 7.8 Axioms of LFLT’ -- 7.9 The Propositional Calculus and LFLT’ -- 7.10 Deductions in LFLT’ -- 8 An Extension of LFLT’ and Some Theorems of the Higher Functional System. The Calculus of Classes -- 8.1 Summary and Modification of the Formation Rules of LFLT’ -- 8.2 The Lower Functional Calculus with Identity -- 8.3 Quantification over Predicate Variables. The System 2FLT’= -- 8.4 Abstraction and the Boolean Algebra -- 8.5 The Boolean Algebra and Propositional Logic -- 9 The Logical Paradoxes -- 9.1 Self Membership -- 9.2 The Russell Paradox -- 9.3 Order Distinctions, Levels of Language, and the Semantic Paradoxes -- 9.4 The Consistency of LFLT’ -- 9.5 The Decision Problem -- 9.6 Consistency and Decision in Higher Functional Systems -- 10 Non-Standard Functional Systems -- 10.1 Summary -- 10.2 Intuitionistic and Johansson Functional Logics -- 10.3 The Fitch Functional Calculus of the First Order with Identity (LFFF=).

Kurzfassung: The present work constitutes an effort to approach the subject of symbol­ ic logic at the elementary to intermediate level in a novel way. The book is a study of a number of systems, their methods, their rela­ tions, their differences. In pursuit of this goal, a chapter explaining basic concepts of modern logic together with the truth-table techniques of definition and proof is first set out. In Chapter 2 a kind of ur-Iogic is built up and deductions are made on the basis of its axioms and rules. This axiom system, resembling a propositional system of Hilbert and Ber­ nays, is called P +, since it is a positive logic, i. e. , a logic devoid of nega­ tion. This system serves as a basis upon which a variety of further sys­ tems are constructed, including, among others, a full classical proposi­ tional calculus, an intuitionistic system, a minimum propositional calcu­ lus, a system equivalent to that of F. B. Fitch (Chapters 3 and 6). These are developed as axiomatic systems. By means of adding independent axioms to the basic system P +, the notions of independence both for primitive functors and for axiom sets are discussed, the axiom sets for a number of such systems, e. g. , Frege's propositional calculus, being shown to be non-independent. Equivalence and non-equivalence of systems are discussed in the same context. The deduction theorem is proved in Chapter 3 for all the axiomatic propositional calculi in the book.

Kurzfassung: Introduction: Greatness of Western Man -- Introduction: Greatness of Western Man -- I: Ordinance -- I Philosophy and Myth -- II Disintegration of Phtsis-is-Logos -- III Concealed Re-Entry of Phtsis-is-Logos Into the Western World -- IV Re-Disclosure of Phtsis-is-Logos in Contemporary Times -- II: Philosophy in Philosophies -- V the Early Greek Philosophers -- VI Plato -- VII Aristotle -- VIII Saint Thomas Aquinas -- IX Rene Descartes -- X George Berkeley -- XI Immanuel Kant -- XII Friedrich Nietzsche -- III: Contemporary Man -- XIII Greatness of Contemporary Man -- XIV Scientism -- XV Technology.

Kurzfassung: The present study is not a series of disconnected essays concerning select­ ed Western philosophies. All its parts belong organically together and constitute one whole. For this reason, the reader is warned not to use it as a reference book for one or another philosopher here treated. The study begins with the declaration of the exposition of fundamental event in Western philosophy which prevails with a different hue in each of the major philosophies and which relates these to pre-philosophical or mythical thought. The study then treats selected Western philosophies se­ parately with the tendency to disclose the major event of philosophy in them. Finally it approaches contemporary man from the perspective of the fundamental event in philosophy. An inquiry into Western man's greatness is maintained here all along as intimately bound up with the historical development of philosophy. Philosophy involves greatness - not one of many philosophies, how­ ever, but Philosophy as such. Philosophy as such is not a composite of the various major philosophies in history; it precedes these, and is present in each one of them in a concealed way. It holds sway over them, and they belong to it. Philosophy rules the thought of thinkers; it is the Ordinance which directs the way of thought, and which is responded to by the thought of the thinkers. In this way, the major philosophies in history are diverse phases which, like the bends and turns of a river, belong to Ordinance - to Nature's thought.

Kurzfassung: I / Metaphysics and Experience -- I. Hocking’s Metaphysics: Analyses and Evaluations -- The Making of a Philosopher: Ernest Hocking’s Early Years -- Solipsism Surmounted -- Hocking’s Place in American Metaphysics -- Hocking and the Dilemmas of Modernity -- Hocking’s Contribution to Metaphysical Idealism -- Idealism and Our Experience of Nature -- Preface to Privacy -- Integrity -- 2. Related Problems: Evil, Selfhood, Existence and Artistic Responsibility -- The Problem of Evil -- Is the Self an Ultimate Category? -- Existence and the Life World -- Word Versus Deed in Plato -- II / Religious Philosophy and the World’s Living Religions -- I. The Problem of Religious Knowledge -- A Half-Century of Hocking’s Reflection -- Empiricism in Religious Philosophy -- Biblical Faith and Philosophic Truth -- The Spirit of Indian Philosophy -- 2. The Ecumenical Spirit in the World’s Living Religions -- Tambaram:Twenty-Five Years After -- The Role and Responsibility of the Christian Mission -- Religious Diversity and Religious Reconception -- Problems of Religious Freedom -- Fellowship of the Spirit -- III / Philosophy, Society and a World Civilization -- I. The Meaning of Contemporary History -- Philosophy, Society and Civilization -- Reflections on the Literature of Whither Mankind -- The Interplay of Physics, Politics and Religion in Today’s World -- Pan-Humanism, Culturism and the Federal Union of Europe -- 2. The Meeting of East and West -- Professor Hocking and East-West Philosophy -- Valid Materialism: A Western Offering to Hocking’s Civilization in the Singular -- Indian Philosophy and the West -- Human Personality in East-West Perspectives -- It is Time to Remind the West -- Conclusion -- History and the Absolute -- The Bibliography of William Ernest Hocking.

Kurzfassung: Gabriel Marcel reminds me that I asked him to write for this book. This is quite true, but not the whole story. During the visit with Ernest Hocking which he describes so eloquently in his essay, "Solips­ ism Surmounted," he learned from Hocking's hostess, Elizabeth Hazard, that I was planning hopefully for a Hocking F estschri/t. On his return to Harvard, where he was preparing his James Lectures, he wrote me offering an essay should these plans develop. Encouraged, I kept his letter while I moved my family to India and settled into a new job. When it was possible to begin work on the book in earnest I then made my request, reminding him of his original offer. I mention this because I discovered that his enthusiasm was to be typical of those who came to know about the project. Charles Moore commented that such a book was "long overdue," and Walter Stace spoke for us all when he said: "I am sure that there is no one in our profession who would not wish to be associated with any project in his honor. " Given the wide range of Hocking's interests and influence, it was difficult to know just how the volume should be organized.

Kurzfassung: I. The Problem of Moral Knowledge -- 1. Contemporary sources of moral skepticism -- 2. Hume and the deductive fallacy -- 3. The meaning of moral obligation -- 4. The criteria of knowledge -- 5. Plan of the book -- II. Duty and Goodness -- 1. Types of theory -- 2. The deontologists’ critique of utilitarianism -- 3. Intuitionistic utilitarianism as a theory of moral knowledge -- 4. The identification of goodness and duty -- 5. The “ought-to-be” argument -- 6. The deductive argument-a restatement -- 7. The appeal to self-evidence -- 8. Reductionistic utilitarianism -- 9. Moral goodness and duty -- 10. Duty and goodness and the “ought” and the “is” -- III. Duty and Rightness -- 1. The intuitionism of the deontologists -- 2. Prichard’s “unreasonable” theory -- 3. The self-evidence of our duties -- 4. The duty to keep promises -- 5. Intuition and generalization -- 6. Rightness and duty -- 7. From rightness to duty -- IV. A New Point of View -- 1. Oxford philosophy -- 2. The revolution in philosophy -- 3. Wittgenstein -- 4. Analysis and moral philosophy -- 5. Analysis and the problem of moral knowledge -- V. Duty and Ordinary Language -- 1. An interpretation of Toulmin’s conclusions -- 2. A reinterpretation of Toulmin’s conclusions -- 3. Good reasons and generally accepted reasons -- 4. Toulmin’s theory and the deductive fallacy -- 5. Does Toulmin escape the deductive fallacy? -- 6. Summary comments on Toulmin’s moral theory -- 7. Nowell-Smith and the problem of moral knowledge -- 8. Wittgenstein and the revolution in philosophy -- VI. A Return to Intuitionism -- 1. The deductive fallacy, skepticism, and intuitionism -- 2. A defense of intuitionism -- 3. Knowledge and a plurality of intuitions -- 4. Intuitive self-evidence and moral knowledge -- VII. Reason and Duty -- 1. Two notions of self-evidence -- 2. Preliminary objections -- 3. Duty and good reasons -- 4. A moral axiom -- 5. A story -- 6. Elaboration and comments -- 7. The principle of personal impartiality -- 8. Egoism and morality -- 9. The deductive fallacy -- VIII. Toward a General Theory of Morality -- 1. Outline of a positive theory of obligation -- 2. Practical qualifications -- 3. Morality and utility -- 4. Goodness and the naturalistic fallacy.

Kurzfassung: As its title indicates, this book is concerned with two different fields of philosophy, ethics and epistemology. The bulk of the argument is devoted to epistemological questions, as these arise within the context of morality. Hence, the conclusions I reach could probably best be described as prolegomena to the elaboration of a theory of ethics. I have plans, which I hope will be realized in the next few years, of elaborating such a theory. I started work on Moral Knowledge in the summer of 1958 with the help of a University Faculty Fellowship, for which I am most grateful. of the research for the book, as well as a good bit of its writing, Much was done in two libraries, The University Library, Berkeley, and the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Members of the staffs of both libraries, by their courtesy and helpfulness, lightened immeasurably the task of my research. lowe a special debt of gratitude to four people-to Mr.

Kurzfassung: I: The Specification of Logic as a Science -- I. Preliminary View of What Logic Is -- II. Relation of Logic to Other Sciences -- III. The Subject of Logic -- II: The Nature of the Subject of Logic -- IV. Rationate Being -- V. Intentions -- VI. Relations -- III: The Intentions of the three Acts of Reason -- VII. The Intention of Universality -- VIII. The Intention of Attribution -- IX. The Intention of Consequence -- Conclusion.

Kurzfassung: Ever since philosophy became conscious of itself, there has been a problem of the relations between the real world which philosophy sought to understand and explain, and the thought by which it sought to explain it. It was found that thought had certain requirements and conditions of its own. If the real world was to be understood through thought, there was a question whether thought and the real correspond­ ed in all respects, and therefore whether they had the same conditions and laws, or whether some of these were peculiar to thought alone. For the solution of this problem it was necessary to study thought and the process of knowing and the conditions which the manner of know­ ing placed upon our interpretation of the real. With a consciousness of the peculiarities of thought and of its laws, philosophers could then more surely make use of it to arrive at the knowledge of the real world which they were seeking, without danger of reading into the real what is peculiar to thought. This necessity gave rise to the science of logic, a science which is still necessary, and for the same reasons. It has an importance in philosophy which it is disastrous to overlook.

Kurzfassung: I. Introduction -- 1. John Grote’s Life -- 2. Writings -- 3. Statement, and Division, of the Problem -- 4. Survey of Sources and of Previous Work on the Problem -- 5. Transition to Next Chapter -- II. Grote’s View of Phenomenalism -- I. Distinction of Terms: ‘Noumenon,’ ‘Phenomenon,’ and ‘Thing in Itself’ -- 2. What Phenomenalism Means -- 3. Phenomenal Reality -- 4. Two Tests of Phenomenalism -- 5. The Phenomenalist Spirit or Mind -- 6. Summary and Foreword to Next Chapter -- III. Grote’s Interpretation of the Relation of Phenomenalism to Philosophy -- 1. Each is Necessary to the Other -- 2. Consciousness as Active and Passive -- 3. Analysis of Sensation -- 4. Time and Space -- 5. The Relationship of Phenomenalism to Philosophy Further Illustrated -- 6. Relationship Through Contrast -- 7. Mind Provides Unity -- 8. Grote Avoids A Basic Blunder in Behaviorism -- 9. Kant’s Abstraction of Phenomenal Reality from Reason -- 10. Abstracting of Consciousness from Phenomena is Unwarranted -- 11. Historical Recapitulation -- 12. Main Contribution of the Chapter, with Comment -- 13. Transition to Next Chapter -- IV. Philosophy As Consciousness and the Ego -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Ferrier’s Treatment of Philosophy and Phenomenalism -- 3. Criticism of Grote and Ferrier on the Basis of Lotze’s Position -- 4. Meaning of ‘Know,’ and ‘Know About,’ in Reference to Phenomenal Reality -- 5. Relativity of Knowledge -- 6. Summary of Main Issues -- V. ‘Philosophy’ and the Scale of Sensation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Importance of the Scale of Sensation -- 3. Two Kinds of Knowledge — ‘Higher’ and ‘Lower’ -- 4. Hamilton, Mill and Reid Compared -- 5. Descartes and Hamilton -- 6. Proper Use of Certain Terms in Relation to the Scale of Sensation -- 7. Critical Reflection on the Foregoing Chapter -- VI. Phenomenalist Logic and Knowledge -- 1. Introductory -- 2. Grote’s Own Position Revealed Through Criticism of Hamilton and Mill -- 3. Phenomenalism Inadequate For A Perfect Scheme of Knowledge -- 4. Critical Observations and Analyses -- VII. The Introspective Method in Knowledge -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Locke’s Psychology -- 3. Hume’s Rationalism -- 4. Berkeley’s Subjectivism -- 5. Spencer’s and Morell’s Evolutionism -- 6. Retrospect and Prospect -- VIII. Immediateness and Reflection -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Purpose of the Chapter in Introducing These Terms -- 3. Meaning of Immediateness and Reflection -- 4. Significance of Immediateness and Reflection in Grote’s Philosophy -- 5. Critical Comment -- 6. Relation to the Following Chapter -- IX. Personalism in Grote’s Writings -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Epistemological Monism -- 3. Monistic, Pluralistic, and Theistic Personalism -- 4. Critique of Materialism -- 5. Critical Comment -- 6. Summary and Transition to Next Chapter -- X. Grote’s Idealism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Grote’s Platonism -- 3. Critique of Utilitarianism -- 4. A Critique of Moral Ideals -- 5. Critical Remarks -- 6. Concluding Note to this Chapter -- Conclusion -- 1. Grote’s Position in the History of Philosophy -- 2. Further Critical Comment -- Appendix: An Exposition of the Miscellaneous Writings of John Grote -- I. “On A Furture State” -- 1. Glorification of body and mind -- 2. Simplicity of style and thought in this article -- 3. Effect of present life on the future -- 4. Manner of individual appearance in a future life is unimportant -- 5. Stress on the importance of both present and future life -- 6. Comment -- II. “On Glossology” -- 1. Concerning terminology -- i. Break in Grote’s projected work on glossology -- ii.’ Phone’ and ‘noem’ -- iii.’ Phonism’ and ‘noematism’ -- iv. Ideas of physical ‘things’ -- v. Stomatism -- vi. ‘Hypophonism’ -- 2. The philosophy of language -- i. Four divisions -- ii. ‘Noematism’ -- iii. ‘Noematoschematism’ -- iv.’ Phonarium’ -- v. ‘Dianoematism’ -- vi. In extreme cases the modification in noematism is very great -- 3. Criticism of Tooke -- 4. Criticism of Trench -- 5. Comment -- III. “Thought vs. Learning” -- 1. A contrast -- 2. Use of one’s own mind is of chief importance -- 3. Thought and learning stagnation -- 4. Comment -- IV. “Pascal and Montaigne” -- 1. A brief comparison -- 2. Pascal’s devotion to religion -- 3. Montaigne’s neopaganism -- 4. Pascal on happiness -- 5. Comment -- V. “On the Dating of Ancient History” -- 1. Dating of events by two methods — epochal and eponymous -- 2. Dynastical reckoning -- 3. Olympiadic dating -- 4. Dating by lunar months -- 5. Dating originating in Christendom -- 6. Other methods of dating -- 7. Present and future methods of dating -- VI. “Origin and Meaning of Roman Names” -- 1. Significance of ‘nomen,’ ‘praenomen,’ and ‘cognomen’ -- 2. Criticism of Plutarch -- 3. Change in a Roman name -- 4. Criticism of Varro’s view -- 5. Present-day names based on Roman rather than on Greek -- VII. Conclusion to Miscellaneous Writings -- Chronological Bibliography of the Writings of John Grote -- General Bibliography.

Kurzfassung: An objective of this book is to discuss some of the contributions made by John Grote to philosophy. This work is an extension of a dissertation written for the doctorate at Boston University. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance in many places to Professor Peter A. Bertocci and the late Professor Edgar S. Brightman both of whom read the entire manuscript in its original form. Also, the author acknowledges the encouraging interest and support of his wife, Helen, whose many suggestions have improved the writing and without whose assistance this work would not have been accomplished. The author assumes complete responsibility for whatever errors or deficiencies appear in the book. All known writings of Grote are listed and the more important ones analyzed. LAUCHLIN D. MACDONALD CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1. JOHN GROTE'S LIFE i. Sketch of his life John Grote will remain best known by reason of the thought formu­ lated in the Exploratio Philosophica, or Rough Notes on Modern I ntellectu­ al Science. To the philosophical world of his own time he was well known as the teacher who ably held the chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge from r855 until the year of his death, r866, to the Knightbridge Professor, William Whewell whose in succession Philosophy of Science is the subject of at least one chapter of the Exploratio Philosophica. Grote's birthplace was Beckenham in Kent, and the date, May 5, r8r3.

Kurzfassung: 1. The Problem -- 2. A Critique of Reason -- 3. Subjectivity -- 4. The Paradox -- 5. The Christian Purpose served by the PostscriptKierkegaar -- 6. The Anti-Christianity of the Postscript -- 7. Index.

Kurzfassung: I Introduction -- 1. Terminology -- 2. Logic, Methodology and Science -- II The Phenomenological Method -- 3. General Remarks -- 4. “Back to the Things Themselves” -- 5. The Object of Phenomenological Investigation -- III Semiotic Methods -- 6. General Remarks -- 7. Formalism -- 8. Rules of Syntactic Meaning -- 9. Semantic Functions and Types -- 10. Semantic Meaning and Verifiability -- 11. Example of Semantic Methods in Practice -- IV The Axiomatic Method -- 12. General Remarks -- 13. The Axiomatic System -- 14. Mathematical Logic -- 15. Definition and Concept Formation -- 16. Example of the Axiomatic Method in Practice -- V Reductive Methods -- 17. General Remarks -- 18. The Structure of the Natural Sciences -- 19. Types of Explanatory Statements -- 20. Induction -- 21. Probability and Statistics -- 22. Historical Method -- Epilogue Guide to Further Reading -- Index of Persons -- Index of Subjects.

Kurzfassung: Professor Bochenski, as he himself points out in the prologue, is a logician; he is best known in England and the United States for his work in the history of logic, and more recently in Soviet and East European philosophy. But he has taught philosophy for many years - in Rome, in Switzerland, and on a number of visits to the United States - and in this book provides an elementary introduction to contemporary work in the field. As a means to this end he has chosen to deal with four alternative methods employed by philosophers in the twentieth century. Philosophical methodology has not attracted much attention, in English­ speaking circles, as a distinct branch of the discipline of philosophy; the term "methodologist", if used at all, would ordinarily be taken to refer to somebody concerned with scientific rather than philosophical method. When, therefore, Professor Bochenski refers, as he frequently does, to "contemporary methodologists", meaning people who debate the re­ spective merits of phenomenology and mathematical logic as ways of approaching the world, the phrase has an odd ring. But philosophical methodology really makes a great deal more sense than scientific method­ ology. In science methodology is almost superfluous; given all the avail­ able information and a reasonably clear idea of what is wanted, there is usually not much ambiguity as to the means of getting it, or not much that could be resolved by mere argument.

Kurzfassung: I Morals and Ethics -- II The Moral Situation -- III Moral Principles -- IV Moral Principles: Hedonism -- V Theological Morals -- VI The Principle of Duty -- VII Self Principles -- VIII Societal Principles -- IX Survival Principles -- X Opportunistic Principles -- XI Ends and Means -- XII Judging the Act -- XIII Judging the Ends — the Good -- XIV Motives and Consequences -- XV Judging The Person -- XVI Justifying Moral Principles -- XVII Nature of Moral Statements -- XVIII Moral Disagreements and Their Resolution -- XIX Freedom and Responsibility -- XX An Example of Making Moral Decisions: Euthanasia -- XXI Man, Morals and The State -- XXII Temptation and Struggle-Conclusion.

Kurzfassung: One / The Preparatory Phase -- I. Franz Brentano (1838–1917): Forerunner of the Phenomenological Movement -- II. Carl Stumpf (1848–1936): Founder of Experimental Phenomenology -- Two / The German Phase of the Movement -- III. The Pure Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) -- IV. The Older Phenomenological Movement -- V. The Phenomenology of Essences: Max Scheler (1874–1928) -- VI. Martin Heidegger (1889-) as a Phenomenologist -- VII. Phenomenology in the Critical Ontology of Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950).

Kurzfassung: The present attempt to introduce the general philosophical reader to the Phenomenological Movement by way of its history has itself a history which is pertinent to its objective. It may suitably be opened by the following excerpts from a review which Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University, the Head of the Division for International Cultural Cooperation, Department of Cultural Activities of Unesco from 1953 to 56, wrote in 1950 from France: The influence of Husserl has revolutionized continental philosophies, not because his philosophy has become dominant, but because any philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method. It is the sine qua non of critical respectability. In America, on the contrary, phenomenology is in its infancy. The aver­ age American student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the "tricks" of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real import of what is said into the kind of analysis with which he is familiar. . . . . . . No doubt, American education will gradually take account of the spread of phenomenological method and terminology, but until it does, American readers of European philosophy have a severe handicap; and this applies not only to existentialism but to almost all current philosophicalliterature.

Kurzfassung: I. Introduction to Franz Brentano’s Philosophy -- 1. Problems of Interpretation -- 2. General -- II. The Early Position -- 1. About the concept of truth. Early criticism of the correspondence theory -- 2. Arguments for the Existence of entia rationis -- III. The Transition -- 1. Analysis of Linguistic Function -- 2. Arguments against the Existence of entia rationis -- IV. The Transition and Background -- 1. Mental Acts -- 2. Judgements -- 3. An attempt to retain the correspondence theory without entia rationis -- V. Late position (critical part) -- 1. Criticism of the correspondence formula res -- 2. Criticism of the correspondence formula intellectus and adequatio -- VI. Late position (positive part) -- 1. Truth -- 2. Evidence -- VII. Ramifications of the analysis of truth -- 1. Self-evident judgements, ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’ -- 2. The relation between self-evident and demonstrable knowledge -- Concluding Remarks -- Appendices.

Kurzfassung: Franz Brentano 1 was an important philosopher, but for a long time his importance was under-estimated. At least in the English speaking countries, he came to be remembered best as the initiator of a philoso­ phical position which he in fact abandoned for good and sufficient 2 reasons. His ultimate and most important contributions passed almost unnoticed. Even such a well-informed and well-prepared book as Passmore's IOO Years 01 Philosophy (Duckworth, 1957), is open to the same comment; Passmore concentrated his attention on the early Brentano, because he regarded his influence on the British philo­ sophical scene as being confined to Brentano's early work. Brentano's pupils, e. g. , Husserl, Meinong, Marty and Twardowski, were often influential and, often enough, they departed from the strict common­ sense and advisedly cautious attitude of their great teacher. Thus even on the continent, the public image of Brentano tended to be incomplete (and sometimes distorted), outside the narrower circle of pupils, followers, and people with special interest. This, or very nearly this, was still the case in 1955, when my contacts with the followers of Twardowski made me turn towards the study of Brentano. Since then there has been a gratifying revival of interest in his work. His early book on Aristotle was reprinted in German and two of his main positions, Psychologie and Wahrheit und Evidenz, are appearing in English translations. Translations into other languages, e. g.

Kurzfassung: The Existence of Augustinian “Metaphysics” -- Mutability and Immutability -- Being and Non-Being -- Self-Identity -- Creation and Formation -- Truth -- Participation -- Analogy -- “Essence” and Creatures -- “ Essence” and God.

Kurzfassung: The properly metaphysical dimension of Augustine's thought has received little special attention among scholars - even "Scholastics. " The Thomist metaphysicians - especially we "Anglo-Saxon" ones - receive first honors for being the most neglectful of all. Why? I t is a puzzling phenomenon particularly in the light of the fact (recognized by almost every Thomist) that the very existence of Thomas the theologian is inconceivable apart from his pre-eminent Christian mentor in the intellectual life, the Bishop of Hippo. It is a puzzling phenomenon because, although the Christian metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas is not the Christian metaphysics of Augustine, these metaphysics could not be simply opposed to one another, else the theologies wherein they exercise the indispensable function of vital rational organs would themselves be discordant. But what respectable "Scholas­ tic" would deny that, in their essential teaching about God and the things of God, the thought of these two masters is remarkably congruent? May I suggest that one of the major reasons for this paradoxical neglect of Augustinian metaphysics on the part of Thomists (above all, in the English-speaking world) is their simplistic assumption that whereas Aquinas was an Aristotelian in phi­ losophy, Augustine was a Platonist, despite the fact that in theology they were substantially at one - as if there could be theological agreement, formally speaking, even where there is metaphysical disagreement, formally speaking.

Kurzfassung: Religious Reformers -- Xenophanes of Colophon -- Heraclitus of Ephesus -- Philosophers of Nature -- The Tranformists -- Anaximander of Miletus -- The Agenetists -- 1. Anaxagoras of Klazomenai -- Epilogue.

Kurzfassung: Again and again and again: PHILOSOPHIA FIAT, QUAE PHILOLOGIA FUIT! As a consequence of certain developments in these last hundred years, ancient philosophy has been slipping from the hands of philosophers to become finally an almost exclusive domain of philologists. This has been happening not only because a tremendous amount of genuinely philological work had to be done, and still is needed, in collecting and textually adjusting the pertinent material, but also because a thorough knowledge and command of the ancient languages has become ever more and more of a rarity among philosophers, unfortunately. From the viewpoint of philosophical culture, this is disastrous. For most philologists are in a state of innocence as far as philosophy is concerned. Of course, they themselves are not aware of it. But the tragicomical fact remains: They have all the answers and do not know the questions. And so, led astray by philosophical miscon­ ceptions, they even commit appalling philological blunders every once in a while.

Kurzfassung: I. Introduction -- II. Socrates’ Moral Problem -- I. Justice: Internal and External -- II. Self-Knowledge and its Problems -- III. On the Nature of the Self -- III. The Problem of Art or Techne -- I. The Analysis of Art -- II. The Whole of Art -- III. Does a Doctrine of the Final Good Exist? -- IV. The Mystical Choice Again, and its Alternative -- V. Summary -- IV. The Problem of Knowledge -- I. On the Earlier Theory of Ideas -- II. The Limits and Conditions of Discourse -- III. The Doctrine and Art of Definition -- IV. Opinion and Image -- V. Knowledge-Theory and Self-Knowledge -- V. The Platonic Universe -- I. The Problem of the Universe of Discourse -- II. The Development of the Platonic Universe -- III. The Unity of the Final Universe -- IV. Knowledge in the New Cosmos -- V. Self-Knowledge and the Microcosm -- VI. Philosophy and Myth -- VI. Conclusion and Criticism -- I. Recapitulation: Ignorance and Self-Knowledge -- II. The Question of Immortality -- III. A Platonic View of the Person.

Kurzfassung: This book is intended to offer an interpretation of an important aspect of Plato's philosophy. The matter to be interpreted will be the Platonic myths and doctrines which bear upon self-knowledge and self-ignorance. It is difficult to say in a word just what sort of thing an interpretation is. Rather than attempting to provide a set of rules or meta-rules supposed to define the ideally perfect interpretation, several distinctions will be suggested. I should like to distinguish the philological scholar from the inter­ preter by saying that the latter uses what the former produces. The function of the scholarly examination of a text is to make an ancient (or foreign) writing available to the contemporary reader. The scholar solves grammatical, lexical, and historical problems and renders his author readable by the person who lacks this scholarly learning and technique. The function of the interpreter is to make use of such available writings in order to render their content more intelligible and useful to a given audience. Thus, he thinks through this content, explains, and re-expresses it in a form which can be easily related to problems, persons, doctrines, or events of another epoch or of another class of readers. At the minimum, the interpretation of a philosophic writing may be thought to prepare its teaching for application to matters which belong in another time or context. Detailed application of a doctrine is, of course, still another thing.