Abstract: Topologie des Logos und Kant-Interpretation -- § 1. Topologie des Logos -- § 2. Die Entwicklung des Logos. Logos, Dialogos und Synlogos. Katalogos und Analogos -- § 3. Die Logik der Analogia -- § 4. Die Kant-Interpretation als Begreifen des Logos -- Erstes Kapitel. Das Ding an sich und „Die Theorie der Erfahrung -- § 5. Die kritische Methode und die Theorie der Erfahrung -- § 6. Die Erfahrung und die besonderen Gesetze -- § 7. Die Erfahrung überhaupt und die besondere Erfahrung. Natura formaliter spectata und natura materialiter spectata -- § 8. Die besondere Erfahrung als Grunderfahrung -- § 9. Die Grenzen der Erfahrung überhaupt. Das Apriorische und das Aposteriorische -- § 10. Das Problem des Dinges an sich -- § 11. Die Existenz des Dinges an sich -- § 12. Dasein und Sosein. Die Logik für das Ding an sich -- § 13. Der Unterschied der transzendentalen Deduktion in der ersten und zweiten Auflage -- § 14. Die transzendentale Deduktion des reinen Verstandesbegriffen in der ersten Auflage. Das Problem der Affinität -- § 15. Einbildungskraft und Apperzeption -- § 16. Die transzendentale Deduktion in der zweiten Auflage. Verstand und Apperzeption -- § 17. Das Wesen der Einbildungskraft -- § 18. Das Wesen der transzendentalen Deduktion -- Zweites Kapitel. Analogien der Erfahrung und Idee -- § 19. Die Bedeutung des Schematismus -- § 20. Der Schematismus und die Urteilskraft -- § 21. Schema und Analogie -- § 22. Mathematische und dynamische Grundsätze -- § 23. Konstitutiv und regulativ. Die negative Bedeutung der Analogie -- § 24. Die positive Bedeutung der Analogie. Die Eigentümlichkeit der Einheit der Analogia -- § 25. Die Grenzen der Grundsätze und das Wesen der Analogie -- § 26. Die erste Analogie der Erfahrung. Die Grenze dieses Grundsatzes. Das Problem des Nichts bei Kant -- § 27. Die zweite Analogie der Erfahrung -- § 28. Der Kausalitätsbegriff bei Kant. Ein Zirkel in Kants Beweis. Die Grenze des Kausalgesetzes -- § 29. Ursache und Wirkung -- § 30. Die dritte Analogie der Erfahrung. Kant und Newton -- § 31. Die Rekonstruktion des Systems der Kantischen Philosophie -- § 32. Die Vernunft -- § 33. Die erste und zweite Idee -- § 34. Die dynamische Idee und die Logik der Analogie -- Drittes Kapitel. Die Teleologie -- § 35. Das Verhältnis zwischen,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” und,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”. Die Entstehung der,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” -- § 36. Der erste Weg von der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” zur,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”: Anhang zur transzendentalen Dialektik -- § 37. Das prinzip der Vernunftseinheit und die Logik der Analogia -- §38. Die allgemeine Erörterung der Teleologie -- § 39. Der zweite Weg von der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” zur,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”. Vertiefung des Erfahrungsbegriffs -- § 40. Die transzendentale Aesthetik -- § 41. Die Zufälligkeit der Erfahrung. Das Grundproblem der Kantischen Philosophie -- § 42. Affinität und Analogie der Erfahrung. Sosein und Dasein. Die Logik der Analogia als Entwicklung der transzendentalen Logik -- § 43. Die reflektierende Urteilskraft und die Entstehung der Erfahrung. Das übersinnliche Substrat und der intuitive Verstand -- § 44. Der glückliche Zufall und der intuitive Verstand. Zwei Standpunkte der Teleologie -- § 45. Der intuitive Verstand nach der Analogie. Der Als-ob Charakter der Analogie -- § 46. Die allgemeine Analogie auf dem Wege von der Erfahrungüberhaupt zur besonderen Erfahrung. Vier Zweckmäßigkeitsbegriffe.,,Kritik des Geschmacks” und,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” -- § 47. Die organische Zweckmäßigkeit. Teleologie und Mechanismus -- § 48. Die grundsätzliche Teleologie als letzte Einheit der Analogien -- § 49. Das Übersinnliche. Das Problem des Genies. Der Weg von der Natur zur Freiheit -- Anhang. Kant und die moderne Physik -- Viertes Kapitel. Transzendentale Logik und Analogos -- § 50. Wesen und Grenze der transzendentalen Logik -- § 51. Das Wesen der Analogia. Reine Logik, Dialektik und Analogia. Analogia bei Aristoteles, Augustinus und Thomas -- § 52. Analogia bei Kant. Analogie in der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” als Analogia proportionis. Analogie in der,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” als Analogia attributionis -- § 53. Universalitas und Universitas. Das Analytisch-Allgemeine und das Synthesitsch-Allgemeine -- § 54. Die logische Konstruktion der Analogia. Satz des Widerspruchs und Satz des ausgeschlossenen Dritten -- Schluss. Die Transzendentale Topik und die Topologie des Logos -- § 55. Der Standpunkt der Kantischen Philosophie als transzendentale Topik.

Abstract: I. Reaction to Heidegger -- II. Historicism as Humanism -- III. Hegel and Goethe -- IV. Meaning in History -- V. History as a Natural Happening.

Abstract: This brief survey of Professor Karl LOwith's analysis of the modem histori­ cal consciousness is the outgrowth of a year's study at the University of Heidelberg while Professor L6with was still an active member of the faculty. An early version, in the form of a dissertation, was submitted to the History Department of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A. Numerous friends and colleagues have helped me at various stages of this work and I am indebted to them even though I cannot name them all indi­ vidually. However special thanks must be accorded to Professor W. J. Bos­ senbrook of Wayne State University for introducing me to the entire prob­ lem of anti-historicism and to Professor LOwith's work. I am also greatly indebted to Professor John Barlow of Indiana University for his patient assistance with the translations, however the final responsibility for all renditions rests, of course, solely with the author.

Abstract: I. The Epistemology of Albert Einstein -- Section A. The Inductive Beginnings of Scientific Investigation -- Section B. The Formation of Primary Concepts according to Einstein. Their Invention -- Section C. The Deductive Process. The Rules of Naturalness and Simplicity -- Section D. The Epistemological Elements of the Special Theory of Relativity. Confirmation of the Theory -- II. A Metaphysical Analysis of Einstein’s View of Reality -- Section A. The Notion of Reality in Albert Einstein -- Section B. The Problem of the Reality of Relations -- Section C. The Grasp of Reality in Mathematico-physical Investigation -- III. The Metaphysical Foundations Of Einstein’s Epistemology -- Section A. The Foundations of Inductive Beginnings -- Section B. The Roots of the Formation of the Primary Concepts -- Section C. Judgment and Reasoning as Related to Scientific Postulation -- Section D. The Confirmation of the Theorems and the Nature of Scientific Proof -- Conclusions -- Appendix. A note on the Discovery of Being.

Abstract: Now how would things be intelligible if they did not proceed from an intelligence? In the last analy­ sis a Primal Intelligence must exist, which is itself Intellection and Intelligibility in pure act, and which is the first principle of intelligibility and essences of things, and causes order to exist in them, as well as an infinitely complex network of regular relationships, whose fundamental mysterious unity our reason dreams of rediscovering in its own way. Such an approach to God's existence is a variant of Thomas Aquinas' fifth way. Its impact was secretly present in Einstein's famous saying: "God does not play dice," which, no doubt, used the word God in a merely figurative sense, and meant only: "nature does not result from a throw of the dice," yet the very fact implicitly postulated the existence of the divine Intellect. Jacques Maritain God's creation is the insistence on the dependence of "epistemology" on ontology; man's acknow­ ledgement of creation is an insistence on the episte­ mological recovery of ontology.

Abstract: I: Introduction -- 1. Problem of Justifying Induction and Proposal for Its Dissolution -- 2. Two Types of Recent Arguments for the Validity of Induction -- 3. Arguments from Paradigm Cases and Uses of Words -- 4. Practical Arguments -- 5. Induction as a Genuine Problem and Study of Peirce and Lewis -- II: Scope of Peirce’s Theory of Induction -- III: The Nature and Validity of Inference -- 1. A General Theory of Inference -- 2. Necessary Inference and Probable Inference -- 3. Validity of Probable Inference -- IV: Probable Inference and Justifying Induction -- 1. Induction and Apagogical Inversion of Statistical Deduction -- 2. Induction As a Valid Probable Inference -- V: Requirements for the Validity of Induction -- 1. General Remakrs -- 2. Peirce on Fair Sampling and Fair Samples -- 3. Principle of Fair Sampling: A New Formulation -- 4. Peirce on Predesignation -- 5. Relevancy of Predesignation for the Validity of Induction -- VI: Probability and the Validity of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Peirce’s Two Empirical Conceptions of Probability -- 3. Peirce’s Objections to the Laplacian Definition of Probability and Criticism -- VII: A Non-Probabilistic Justification of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Self-Correcting Nature of Inductive Method -- 3. Criteria for Defining Truth and Justifying Induction -- 4. Other Arguments for the Necessity of General Validity of Induction -- VIII: Concluding Remarks on Peirce’s Non-Probabilistic Justification on Induction -- IX: Problems in Lewis’s Theory of Induction -- X: Induction and Analysis of Knowledge of Reality -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Empirical Knowledge and “A priori” Concepts -- 3. A Fundamental Principle in Establishing Criteria of Reality -- XI: An “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Problems of Justifying Induction in the Theories of Reality and Knowledge -- 3. Empirical Generalizations as Interpretations of Experience and Principle A -- 4. Analyticity of Principle A -- XII: Implications of Lewis’s “A Priori Analytical Justification of Induction -- 1. From Principle A to Justification of Argument from Past to Future -- 2. Lewis on the Practical Successfulness of Induction -- XIII: Concluding Remarks on Lewis’s “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction -- XIV: Nature of Probability and Rational Credibility -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Empirical Interpretation of Probability -- 3. Logical Interpretation of Probability -- 4. Rational Credibility, Fair Sampling and Logical Probability -- XV: Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- 1. Questions Regarding Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- 2. Degrees of Rational Credibility and Criteria for Determining Them -- 3. Justifying Acceptance of Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- XVI: Conclusion -- 1. Similarity Between Peirce’s and Lewis’s Theories of Induction -- 2. Significances of Peirce’s and Lewis’s Arguments -- 3. Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Justifying Induction -- 4. Bearings upon Practicist and Linguist Arguments -- Appendix I. A Chronological Listing of Peirce’s Papers Directly Bearing upon Induction and Probability -- Appendix II. Proof of the Logical Law of Large Numbers (the Maximum Value Law of Hypergeometric Probability) -- Appendix III. Probabilities of Estimates of Values of Population Parameters -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: This book is based on my doctoral dissertation written at Harvard University in the year of 1963. My interest in Peirce was inspired by Professor D. C. Williams and that in Lewis by Professor Roderick Firth. To both of them lowe a great deal, not only in my study of Peirce and Lewis, but in my general approach toward the problems of knowledge and reality. Specifically, I wish to acknowledge Professor Williams for his patient and careful criticisms of the original manuscripts of this book. I also wish to thank Professor Firth and Professor Israel Scheffler for their many suggestive comments regarding my discussions of induc­ tion. However, any error in this study of Peirce and Lewis is completely due to myself. Chung-ying Cheng Honolulu, Hawaii March,1967 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V SUMMARY IX CHAPTER I: Introduction I I. Problem of Justifying Induction and Proposal for Its Dissolution I 2. Two Types of Recent Arguments for the Validity of Induction 3 Arguments from Paradigm Cases and Uses of Words 4 3.

Abstract: Preparatory Considerations -- § 1. Outset from the significations of the word logos: speaking, thinking, what is thought -- § 2. The ideality of language. Exclusion of the problems pertaining to it -- § 3. Language as an expression of “thinking.” Thinking in the broadest sense, as the sense-constituting mental process -- § 4. The problem of ascertaining the essential limits of the “thinking” capable of the significational Function -- § 5. Provisional delimination of logic as apriori theory of science -- § 6. The formal character of logic. The formal Apriori and the contingent Apriori -- § 7. The normative and practical functions of logic -- § 8. The two-sidedness of logic; the subjective and the Objective direction of its thematizing activity -- § 9. The straightforward thematizing activity of the “Objective” or “positive” sciences. The idea of two-sided sciences -- § 10. Historically existing psychology and scientific thematizing activity directed to the subjective -- §11. The thematizing tendencies of traditional logic -- a.Logic directed originally to the Objective theoretical formations produced by thinking -- b.Logic’s interest in truth and the resultant reflection on subjective insight -- c. Result: the hybridism of historically existing logic as a theoretical and normative-practical discipline -- I / The structures and the sphere of objective formal logic -- The way from the tradition to the full idea of formal logic -- 1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics -- § 12. Discovery of the idea of the pure judgment-form -- § 13. The theory of the pure forms of judgments as the first discipline of formal logic -- a.The idea of theory of forms -- b.Universality of the judgment-form; the fundamental forms and their variants -- c.Operation as the guiding concept in the investigation of forms -- § 14. Consequence-logic (logic of non-contradiction) as the second level of formal logic -- § 15. Truth-logic and consequence-logic -- § 16. The differences in evidence that substantiate the separating of levels within apophantics. Clear evidence and distinct evidence -- a.Modes of performing the judgment. Distinctness and confusion -- b.Distinctness and clarity -- c.Clarity in the having of something itself and clarity of anticipation -- § 17. The essential genus, “distinct judgment,” as the theme of “pure analytics” -- § 18. The fundamental question of pure analytics -- § 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to the formal logic of truth. Non-contradiction as a condition for possible truth -- § 20. The principles of logic and their analogues in pure analytics -- § 21. The evidence in the coinciding of “the same” confused and distinct judgment. The broadest concept of the judgment -- § 22. The concept defining the province belonging to the theory of apophantic forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is the judgment in the broadest sense -- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics -- § 23. The internal unity of traditional logic and the problem of its position relative to formal mathematics -- a.The conceptual self-containedness of traditional logic as apophantic analytics -- b.The emerging of the idea of an enlarged analytics, Leibniz’s “mathesis universalis,” and the methodico-technical unification of traditional syllogistics and formal mathematics -- § 24. The new problem of a formal ontology. Characterization of traditional formal mathematics as formal ontology -- § 25. Formal apophantics and formal ontology as belonging together materially, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective themes -- § 26. The historical reasons why the problem of the unity of formal apophantics and formal mathematics was masked -- a.Lack of the concept of the pure empty form -- b.Lack of knowledge that apophantic formations are ideal -- c.Further reasons, particularly the lack of genuine scientific inquiries into origins -- d.Comment on Bolzano’s position regarding the idea of formal ontology -- § 27. The introduction of the idea of formal ontology in the Logische Untersuchungen -- a.The first constitutional investigations of categorial objectivities, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik -- b.The way of the “Prolegomena” from formal apophantics to formal ontology -- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities -- § 28. The highest level of formal logic: the theory of deductive systems; correlatively, the theory of multiplicities -- § 29. The theory of multiplicities and the formalizing reduction of the nomological sciences -- § 30. Multiplicity-theory as developed by Riemann and his successors -- §31. The pregnant concept of a multiplicity-correlatively, that of a “deductive” or “nomological” system-clarified by the concept of “definiteness” -- § 32. The highest idea of a theory of multiplicities: a universal nomological science of the forms of multiplicities -- § 33. Actual formal mathematics and mathematics of the rules of the game -- § 34. Complete formal mathematics identical with complete logical analytics -- § 35. Why only deductive theory-forms can become thematic within the domain of mathesis universalis as universal analytics -- a.Only deductive theory has a purely analytic system-form -- b.The problem of when a system of propositions has a system-form characterizable as analytic -- § 36. Retrospect and preliminary indication of our further tasks -- b. Phenomenological clarification of the two-sidedness of formal logic as formal apophantics and formal ontology -- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments -- § 37. The inquiry concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology; insufficiency of our clarifications up to now -- § 38. Judgment-objects as such and syntactical formations -- § 39. The concept of the judgment broadened to cover all formations produced by syntactical actions -- § 40. Formal analytics as a playing with thoughts, and logical analytics. The relation to possible application is part of the logical sense of formal mathesis -- §41. The difference between an apophantic and an ontological focusing and the problem of clarifying that difference -- § 42. Solution of this problem -- a.Judging directed, not to the judgment, but to the thematic objectivity -- b.Identity of the thematic object throughout changes in the syntactical operations -- c.The types of syntactical object-forms as the typical modes of Something -- d.The dual function of syntactical operations -- e.Coherence of the judging by virtue of the unity of the substrate-object that is being determined. Constitution of the “concept” determining the substrate-object -- f. The categorial formations, which accrue in the determining, as habitual and inter subjective possessions -- g. The objectivity given beforehand to thinking contrasted with the categorial objectivity produced by thinking — Nature as an illustration -- § 43. Analytics, as formal theory of science, is formal ontology and, as ontology, is directed to objects 119 -- § 44. The shift from analytics as formal ontology to analytics as formal apophantics -- a.The change of thematizing focus from object- provinces to judgments as logic intends them -- b.Phenomenological clarification of this change of focus -- ?. The attitude of someone who is judging naïvely-straightforwardly -- ?. In the critical attitude of someone who intends to cognize, supposed objectivities as supposed are distinguished from actual objectivities -- ?. The scientist’s attitude: the supposed, as supposed, the object of his criticism of cognition -- § 45. The judgment in the sense proper to apophantic logic -- § 46. Truth and falsity as results of criticism. The double sense of truth and evidence -- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truth-logic -- § 47. The adjustment of traditional logic to the critical attitude of science leads to its focusing on the apophansis -- § 48. Judgments, as mere suppositions, belong to the region of senses. Phenomenological characterization of the focusing on senses -- § 49. The double sense of judgment (positum, proposition) -- § 50. The broadening of the concept of sense to cover the whole positional sphere, and the broadening of formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice -- §51. Pure consequence-logic as a pure theory of senses. The division into consequence-logic and truth- logic is valid also for the theory of multiplicities, as the highest level of logic -- § 52. “Mathesis pura” as properly logical and as extralogical. The “mathematics of mathematicians” -- § 53. Elucidations by the example of the Euclidean multiplicity -- § 54. Concluding ascertainment of the relationship be-tween formal logic and formal ontology -- ?.The problem -- b.The two correlative senses of formal logic -- c. The idea of formal ontology can be separated from the idea of theory of science -- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic -- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic -- § 55. Is the development of logic as Objective-formal enou...

Abstract: 2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modern sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a naivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate apriori possibilities and necessities.

Abstract: I -- II -- III -- Concluding Remarks -- A Short Bibliography.

Abstract: At opposite ends of over two millenia Hegel and Aristotle, virtually alone of the great European thinkers, consciously attempted to criticize and develop the thought of their predecessors into systems of their own. Both were thus committed in principle to the view that philosophy in each age of civilization is at once a product, a criticism, and a recon­ struction of the values and insights of its own past; that the fertile mind can only beget anew when it has acknowledged and understood a line of ancestors which has led to its begetting; that the thinker as little as the artist can start with a clean slate and a blankly open-minded atti­ tude to the world which he finds within him and before him. Man is by definition rational; philosophy is his continuous impulse to grasp and appraise a single universe of which he finds himself a part; philosophy therefore contains its history as a constituent element of its own nature, and the developmental character of philosophy must - unless human reason is, unthinkably and unarguably, a mere delusion - in some sense reflect, or even be in some sense identical with, an essentially develop­ mental universe - that is roughly the common creed of Aristotle and Hegel. Both of them further believed, as Plato had believed, that what is most real and intelligible in that universe is eo ipso most good.

Abstract: I. Biography -- 1. Life and Stoicism -- 2. Teaching -- 3. Writings -- 4. Influence -- II. Life a Game -- 5. Living for Happiness -- 6. Suicide, Euthanasia, Death -- 7. Knowledge for Living -- 8. Rational Self -- III. Logical Topics -- 9. Nature of Logical Studies -- 10. Irrefutability and Epistemological Issues -- 11. Logical Puzzles -- 12. Operators and Kin Matters -- IV. Nature and God -- 13. World Structure -- 14. Providence -- 15. Anthropocentrism -- 16. Proofs of Design -- 17. Cacodicy -- 18. Hymns to God -- 19. Zeus Inoperative? -- V. Value Theory -- 20. Theic Notions -- 21. Good a Protoconcept -- 22. Value Relativity -- 23. Value Criteria and Pleasure -- VI. Pain and Training -- 24. Divisions of Ethics -- 25. Learning Theory -- 26. Rationalization and Erring -- 27. Negative Ethics: A Look -- VII. Preventive Ethics -- 28. Forestall, Resist, Ease -- 29. Control Test -- 30. Anxiety and Fear -- 31. Other Safeguards -- 32. Resistance Methods -- VIII. Remedial Devices -- 33. Examples -- 34. “It’s fate” and Other Tonics -- 35. Loneliness -- 36. Objections -- IX. Social Remarks -- 37. Independence and Outgoingness -- 38. Man as Social -- 39. Troubleshooting and Cosmopolitanism -- 40. Legal Questions -- X. Afterthoughts.

Abstract: Epictetus presents difficulties for the historiall of ideas. He published nothing, while his so-called writings are mostly notes of so me of his discussions taken down haphazardly by a friend. Moreover, about half of the notes are lost, and little is known of his life. All this may go toward explaining the paucity of Epictetus studies; for indeed this is the first book-length commentary published in English devoted only to hirn. All known aspects of his work are here considered and recon­ structed and freshly approached. Eut the emphasis is on his re­ marks in ethics, for the simple reason that ethics was his dominant interest and that his diagnoses of problems in living and tech­ niques for coping with those problems have been insufficiently appreciated. His ethics is primarily pain-oriented: it consists of existential reminders, such as that things are ephemer al and people vulnerable, plus ways of avoiding and easing distress, induding training and thought-analysis, because he believed that people's troubles stern largely from silly habits and precon­ ceptions.

Abstract: Introduction: The Problems of Contemporary Philosophy -- A. Tradition and Innovation in Contemporary Philosophy -- B. The Process of Differentiation in Philosophy -- C. A Look Ahead -- I / The Philosophy of Self-Evidence: Franz Brentano -- A. Mental Phenomena and Knowledge -- B. The Theory of Being -- C. The Theory of Moral Knowledge -- D. Knowledge of God -- E. Evaluation -- II / Methodological Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl -- A. The Absolute Character of Truth -- B. The Problem of Universals -- C. Intentionality, Judgment and Knowledge (The Phenomenology of Consciousness) -- D. The Phenomenological Intuiting of Essences (Die phänomenologische Wesensschau) -- E. Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy -- F. Evaluation -- III / Applied Phenomenology: Max Scheler -- A. Gnoseology and Phenomenology -- B. The Theory of Sympathy -- C. Value and Person -- D. Religious Philosophy and Theology -- E. Man’s Place in the Stratified Structure of the World -- F. Evaluation -- IV / Existential Ontology: Martin Heidegger -- A. The Philosophy of Existence in General and its Historical Relationship to Western Thought -- B. The Ontology of Finite Dasein -- C. Evaluation -- V / The Philosophy of Existence: Karl Jaspers -- A. Philosophical World-Orientation, Illumination of Existence, and Metaphysics -- B. The Being of the Encompassing, and Truth -- C. Evaluation -- VI / Critical Realism: Nicolai Hartmann -- A. The Metaphysics of Knowledge -- B. The Structure of Being -- C. The Philosophy of Spirit -- D. The Philosophy of Value -- E. Evaluation -- VII / Modern Empiricism: Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle -- A. Reasons for the Rise of Modern Empiricism -- B. Immanence Positivism (Mach, Avenarius) and the Epistemology of Moritz Schlick -- C. Definitions and Explications of Concepts -- D. Statements and the Meaning of Statements -- 1. First Formulation of the Empiricist’s Criterion of Meaning -- E. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge -- F. Semantics and Logical Syntax -- G. Evaluation -- VIII / Foundational Studies and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy -- A. Research in the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics -- B. The Theory of Empirical Scientific Knowledge -- C. Problems of Reality -- D. Ethics -- IX / Ludwig Wittgenstein -- A. Philosophy I -- B. Philosophy II -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: I -- 1. Hobbes’s “Table of Absurdity” -- 2. Language and the Structure of Locke’s Essay -- 3. Kant’s “Refutation” of the Ontological Argument -- II -- 4. Isomorphism and Linguistic Waste -- 5. Reason, Morals and Philosophic Irony -- 6. Thought and Language -- 7. An Early Nietzsche Fragment on Language -- III -- 8. Analogy and Equivocation in Hobbes -- 9. On the “Composition” of the Critique. A Brief Comment -- 10. Kant’s Copernican Analogy. A Re-Examination -- Name Index.

Abstract: Although all the essays which make up this volume can be read as independent studies - and were in fact originally written as such - it is my hope that the reader will see that a unitary thread runs through them and that together they tell a story of their own. Written originally in response to certain views and doctrines of linguistic philosophy, the point which I have tried to argue in them is that although linguistic philosophy's impact upon our understanding and conception of philosophy has been profound, its contribution to our understanding of the history of philosophy, including its own history, has unfortunately all too often been disappointing, superficial and misguided. While this seems rather remarkable, especially since the tool which it has fashioned is obviously not without its uses even here, in the light of its negative and restrictive conception of language the results achieved are not after all perhaps surprising or unexpected.

Abstract: Russell and the linguistic philosophy -- I. The quest for logical form -- Reference and meaning -- Two senses of “logical form” -- Logical form, propositional constituents, and reconstructionism -- The “logically perfect” language -- The theory of acquaintance -- Proper names -- The “minimum vocabulary” -- Summary and conclusion -- II. The uses of reconstructionism -- The theory of descriptions -- The analysis of class-symbols -- The logical construction of physical objects -- Conclusion -- III. Critique of Russell’s philosophy of language -- The theory of acquaintance -- The doctrine of logical form -- Philosophical analysis as elucidation of ontological structure -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: RUSSELL AND THE LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY I t is generally acknowledged that Bertrand Russell played a vital role in the so-called "revolution" that has taken place in twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy, the revolution that has led many philo­ sophers virtually to equate philosophy with some variety - or varieties - of linguistic analysis. His contributions to this revolution were two­ fold: (I) together with G. E. Moore he led the successful revolt against the neo-Hegelianism of Idealists such as Bradley and McTaggert; (2) again with Moore he provided much of the impetus for a somewhat revolutionary way of doing philosophy. (I) and (2) are, of course, close­ ly related, since the new way of philosophizing could be said to consti­ tute, in large part, the revolt against Idealism. Be this as it may, how­ ever, the important fact for present consideration is that Russell was a major influence in turning Anglo-American philosophy in the direction it has subsequently taken - toward what may be termed, quite general­ ly, the "linguistic philosophy. " Unfortunately, though his importance as a precursor of the linguistic philosophy is well-known, the precise sense in which Russell himself can be considered a "philosopher of language" has not, to the present time, been sufficiently clarified. Useful beginnings have been made toward an investigation of this question, but they have been, withal, only begin­ nings, and nothing like an adequate picture of Russell's overall philoso­ phy of language is presently available.

Abstract: One -- I. The Historical Significance of the Letters -- II. The Metaphysics of Hierarchy -- III. The Hierarchic Design of the Letters -- IV. The Models of Order in the Eighth and Ninth Letters -- Two The Letters of PS.-Dionysius -- The Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius.

Abstract: N eoplatonism begins explicitly with Plotinus in the third century of our era. The later Neoplatonism of the fifth and six century schools at Athens and Alexandria was both the continuation of the philosophy of Plotinus and also a pagan ideology. When these schools were closed, despite attempts at compromise at Alexandria and as a result of direct and indirect political pressures and actions, pagan ideology died. Many philosophers, such as Isidore, Asclepiodotus, Damascius, and Olym­ piodorus, must have foreseen the danger to philosophy, and their extant writings are sprinkled with forebodings. Would the death of pagan ideology, in the form of pagan worship and the Homeric and Orphic traditions, bring about the death of all genuine philosophy as well? One answer to this great question is found in the enigmatic writings of Ps. -Dionysius the Areopagite. Purposing to be the writings of the Athenian convert of St. Paul, they fall within the province of a multitude of so-called "pseudepigraphic" Christian writings. 1. GENERAL ARGUMENT I embarked on the study of Ps. -Dionysius' Letters with two goals in mind: (r) to grasp in clear detail the unknown author's philosophic intentions in writing his famous Corpus and the way in which he set about writing, and (2) to attempt to see with precision the reason for the absence of a political philosophy in Christian Platonism. The Letters provided a richness of detail and information bearing on the first subject which was wholly unexpected.

Abstract: I: The Foundations of Solipsism -- 1: Sensations and Images -- 2: Language and Sensation -- 3: Imagining Instances -- 4: Comprehension -- 5: Understanding and Synonymy -- 6: Verifiability -- 7: Objections -- II: Causality -- 8: Causes and Counterfactuals -- III: Solipsism Proper -- 9: A Quasi-Axiomatic Solipsistic System -- 10: Alternatives to Solipsism -- 11: Anti-Solipsism -- 12: Further Development of the System: Phenomenalism -- 13: Statements about the Past -- 14: Further Development of the System: Other Minds -- 15: Belief -- Conclusion.

Abstract: Philosophers usually have been anxious to avoid solipsism. A large number of good and great philosophers have tried to refute it. Of course, these philosophers have not always had the same target in mind and, like everything else, solipsism over the centuries has become increasingly elusive and subtle. In this book I undertake to state the position in its most modern and what I take to be its most plausible form. At some points in the history of philosophy the solipsist has been one who denied the existence of everything except himself or even the existence of everything except his own present sensations. At other times, the solipsist instead of doubting these things has merely insisted that there could be no good reason for believing in the existence of anything beyond one's own present sensations. Roughly, this doubt is aimed at reasons rather than at things. A solipsist of this sort appears in Santayana's Scepticism and Animal Faith.

Abstract: Introduction: The Place of Earth and Gods in Heidegger’s Philosophy -- I. Character of Heidegger’s Philosophy -- II. Heidegger’s Problem of Being -- III. Heidegger’s Stand in the History of Philosophy -- IV. Three Phases of Heidegger’s Thought -- V. Detour from Gods to Earth -- I. Dasein -- I. Approach to the Problem of Dasein -- II. To-be-in-the-world -- III. To-be-in -- IV. World -- V. Space -- VI. Togetherness -- VII. Da as Openness -- VIII. Dread -- IX. Death -- X. Conscience -- XI. Temporality -- II. Being -- I. Heidegger’s Post-Sein und Zeit Works -- II. Dasein -- III. Truth -- IV. Thinking -- V. Language -- VI. Befalling and History -- VII. Subjectivism and Metaphysics -- VIII. Nothingness and Nihilism -- IX. Being and Man -- III. World -- I. Problem of World in Traditional Philosophy -- II. World in the First Phase -- III. World in the Second Phase -- IV. World in the Third Phase -- IV. Earth -- I. Physis -- II. Physis and Logos -- III. Language -- IV. World and Earth -- V. Hölderlin’s Understanding of Nature -- V. Gods -- I. Olympian Deities -- II. Chthonian Religion -- III. Dionysus -- IV. Chaos -- V. Gods and Logos -- VI. Gods as Realities -- VI. Foursome -- VII. Thing -- I. Traditional Understanding of Thing -- II. Artwork as an Assembler -- III. Thing as Assembler -- IV. Subjective and Essential Understanding of Thing -- V. Thing and Space -- VI. Philosophy of Thing -- VIII. Dwelling -- I. Building and Dwelling -- II. Dwelling and Logos -- III. Poet as Prophet -- IV. Festivity -- V. Godly and Godless Man -- Appendix: Heidegger and Christianity.

Abstract: Earth and Gods is an attempt to introduce the reader to Heidegger's fully developed philosophy. The title Earth and Gods gives an im­ pression of not being a general study of Heidegger's philosophy. However, this is not true - the earth and the gods are fundamental ontological symbols of his fully developed philosophy, namely, his third and final phase of thought. This phase repeats the problems of both preceding phases in a fuller and more developed manner; hence, it implies them. The two preceding phases are the phase of Dasein and the phase of Being. These two phases are a natural flow of fundamental problems which reach their final formation and development in the phase of earth and gods. Dasein (the first phase) leads to Being, and Being (the second phase) bursts into fundamental ontological powers of Being (Seinsmiichte) which are earth and sky, gods and mortals (the third phase). Since earth is unthinkable without sky and since gods are gods in the world of mortals - of men, the title Earth and Gods is an abbreviation of these four fundamental powers of Being. Hence, an investigation of earth and gods is an attempt to present Heidegger's philosophy as a whole. Such a presentation provides the reader with the background necessary for a more adequate and efficient understanding of the writings of Heidegger himself. Thus, Earth and Gods may rightly be considered an introduction to Hei­ degger's philosophy.

Abstract: 1 Introduction -- 2 The Assumptions of Science -- 3 Nature of Scientific Research -- 4 Scientific Law and the Practice of Science -- 5 The Uncertainty Principle -- 6 Science and Religion -- 7 Science and Education -- 8 Science and Government -- 9 Conclusion.

Abstract: I am becoming increasingly disturbed by the lack of under­ standing of science revealed by politicians, industrialists and the general public. I am also concerned about the widespread mis­ use of the word "scientific" which is more and more being used in situations where it is quite inappropriate. As a result, in some circumstances gross overestimates are made as to what science can do. In other circumstances the real power of science is foolishly underestimated and the contributions which it can make are squandered. Science is God is an attempt to explain just what is meant by the scientific approach and to define more closoJ. y what the word "scientific" indicates. It is deliberately brief and controversial because I want it to be read. In fact, the material dealt with in each single chapter really deserves a whole book to itself. In the future I hope that I may be able to give to each subject such full treatment. Meanwhile I hope that this book will stimulate discussion about science and will increase understanding of it. DAVID F.

Abstract: 1. Introductory: Meta-Ethics, Normative Ethics and Morality -- 1. Levels of Theorizing -- 2. Meta-Ethics -- 3. Normative Ethics and Morality -- 4. Inter-relations between Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics -- 5. The plan of this work -- A. Meta-Ethics: A Defence of an Intuitionist Ethic -- 2. Theistic and Naturalistic Meta-Ethical Theories -- 3. Non-Cognitivist Meta-Ethical Theories -- 4. A Positive Approach: Intuitionism and the Nature of the Objective Moral Facts -- 5. Intuitionism: How we Come to Gain Moral Knowledge -- B. Normative Ethics: The Case for Ethical Pluralism -- Introducing Part B. from Meta-Ethics to Normative Ethics -- 6. Intrinsic Goods -- 7: Monistic Theories of Absolute Obligation: Utilitarianism -- 8. Pluralistic Theories of Absolute Obligation: Kant and Natural Law -- 9. A Positive Approach: Prima Facie Duties.

Abstract: The purpose of this work is to develop a general theory of ethics which ex­ plains the logical status of moral judgments and the nature of the general principles which we should adopt and on the basis of which we should act. The enquiry into the logical function of moral judgments is entered into as important in its own right and as a preliminary to the normative enquiry, for it is on the basis of our conclusions in the area of meta-ethics, that we de­ termine the appropriate method of reaching our normative ethic. The ap­ proach followed in the meta-ethical enquiry is that of examining theories of the past and present with a view to seeing why and in what respects they fail, in particular, what features of moral discourse are not adequately explained or accommodated by them. A positive theory which seeks to take full account of these and all other logical features of moral discourse is then developed in terms of a modified intuitionism of the kind outlined by W. D. Ross, 'good' being explained as the name of a consequential property, 'right' in terms of moral suitability, and moral obligations as consisting in our being constrained to act in certain ways by facts we apprehend to constitute moral reasons which constrain us so to act.

Abstract: Reminiscences of Peter -- Natural Kinds -- Inductive Independence and the Paradoxes of Confirmation -- Partial Entailment as a Basis for Inductive Logic -- Are There Non-Deductive Logics? -- Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference -- Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice -- The Meaning of Time -- Lawfulness as Mind-Dependent -- Events and Their Descriptions: Some Considerations -- The Individuation of Events -- On Properties -- A Method for Avoiding the Curry Paradox -- Publications (1934–1969) by Carl G. Hempel -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The eminent philosopher of science Carl G. Hempel, Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University and a Past President of the American Philosophical Association, has had a long and distinguished academic career in the course of which he has been professorial mentor to some of America's most distinguished philosophers. This volume gathers together twelve original papers by Hempel's students and associates into a volume intended to do homage to Hempel on the occasion of his 65th year in 1970. The papers are grouped around the unifying topic of Hempel's own interests in logic and philosophy of science, the great majority dealing with issues on inductive logic and the theory of scientific explanatio- problems to which Hempel has devoted the bulk of his outstandingly fruitful efforts. With the approach of 'Peter' Hempel's 65th birthday, an editorial committee sprang into being by an uncannily spontaneous process to prepare to commemorate this event with an appropriate Festschrift. The editors were pleased to receive unfailingly prompt and efficient coopera­ tion on the part of all contributors. The responsibility of seeing the work through the press was assumed by Nicholas Rescher. The editors are grateful to all concerned for their collaboration. ALAN ROSS ANDERSON PAUL BENACERRAF ADOLF GRUNBAUM GERALD J. MASSEY NICHOLAS RESCHER RICHARD S. RUDNER TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V PAUL OPPENHEIM: Reminiscences of Peter 1 w. v. QUINE: Natural Kinds 5 JAAKKO HINTIKKA: Inductive Independence and the Paradoxes of Confirmation 24 WESLEY c.

Abstract: I Introduction -- II Phenomenology and the Empiricist Tradition -- III Husserl’s Critique of Formal Logic -- IV Subjectivism in Phenomenology -- V Concept of Person and Subjectivity -- VI Phenomenology as Philosophy of Science -- VII Is Phenomenology Ontologically Committed? -- VIII Conclusion.

Abstract: The book is the result of my preoccupation with the phe­ nomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl during my years of post-doctoral studies (approximately since 1960). As the titles of the chapters may suggest, I have dealt with a number of topics relating to Husserlian Phenomenology - themes which are relatively independent but not disconnected. For I have been prone to look upon this movement as presenting more an organic outlook of its own, inspite of its diversity of phases, than as offering certain answers to individual philosophical problems. Accordingly my aim here has been to interpret the meaning and significance of this outlook in its logical, epistemological and metaphysical aspects. In writing these chapters I have been aware of the fact that the phenomenological movement as such still represents some­ thing of a heterodoxy in the world of Anglo-American philosophy to-day. Yet the points of contact between the two are not far­ fetched. In treating the problems from the phenomenological point of view, I have often taken into account the views of the empirical-analytical school in general. It should be clear that instead of confining myself to a bare exposition of the different aspects of Husserlian Phenomenology, I have taken some freedom in interpreting its point of view.

Abstract: I: Methodology: Models and Measurement -- 1. A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences (1960) -- 2. Models of Data (1962) -- 3. A Set of Independent Axioms for Extensive Quantities (1951) -- 4. Foundational Aspects of Theories of Measurement (1958) -- 5. Measurement, Empirical Meaningfulness, and Three-Valued Logic (1959) -- II: Methodology: Probability and Utility -- 6. The Role of Subjective Probability and Utility in Decision-Making (1956) -- 7. The Philosophical Relevance of Decision Theory (1961) -- 8. An Axiomatization of Utility Based on the Notion of Utility Differences (1955) -- 9. Behavioristic Foundations of Utility (1961) -- 10. Some Formal Models of Grading Principles (1966) -- 11. Probabilistic Inference and the Concept of Total Evidence (1966) -- III: Foundations of Physics -- 12. Axioms for Relativistic Kinematics with or without Parity (1959) -- 13. Probability Concepts in Quantum Mechanics (1961) -- 14. The Role of Probability in Quantum Mechanics (1963) -- 15. The Probabilistic Argument for a Nonclassical Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1966) -- IV: Foundations of Psychology -- 16. Stimulus-Sampling Theory for a Continuum of Responses (1960) -- 17. On an Example of Unpredictability in Human Behavior (1964) -- 18. Behaviorism (1965) -- 19. On the Behavioral Foundations of Mathematical Concepts (1965) -- 20. Towards a Behavioral Foundation of Mathematical Proofs (1965) -- 21. The Psychological Foundations of Mathematics (1967) -- 22. On the Theory of Cognitive Processes (1966) -- 23. Stimulus-Response Theory of Finite Automata (1969) -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The twenty-three papers collected in tbis volume represent an important part of my published work up to the date of this volume. I have not arranged the paper chronologically, but under four main headings. Part I contains five papers on methodology concerned with models and measurement in the sciences. This part also contains the first paper I published, 'A Set of Independent Axioms for Extensive Quantities', in Portugaliae Mathematica in 1951. Part 11 also is concerned with methodology and ineludes six papers on probability and utility. It is not always easy to separate papers on probability and utility from papers on measurement, because of the elose connection between the two subjects, but Artieles 6 and 8, even though they have elose relations to measurement, seem more properly to belong in Part 11, because they are concerned with substantive questions about probability and utility. The last two parts are concerned with the foundations of physics and the foundations of psychology. I have used the term foundations rather than philosophy, because the papers are mainly concerned with specific axiomatic formulations for particular parts of physics or of psychology, and it seems to me that the termfoundations more appropriately describes such constructive axiomatic ventures. Part 111 contains four papers on the foundations of physics. The first paper deals with foundations of special relativity and the last three with the role ofprobability in quantum mechanics.

Abstract: Editor’s Introduction -- Three Logics of Belief -- The Consistency of Rational Belief -- Conjunctivitis -- Induction. A Discussion of the Relevance of the Theory of Knowledge to the Theory of Induction (with a Digression to the Effect that neither Deductive Logic nor the Probability Calculus has Anything to Do with Inference) -- Justification, Explanation, and Induction -- Probability and Evidence -- Dracula meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief -- Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief: A Selected Bibliography -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The papers collected in this volume were originally presented at a sym­ posium held at the University of Pennsylvania in December of 1968. Each of the papers has been revised in light of the discussions that took place during this symposium. None of the papers has appeared in print previously. The extensive bibliography that appears at the end of the volume was originally distributed during the symposium and was revised on the basis of many helpful suggestions made by those who participated. The symposium was made possible by a grant from The National Science Foundation and funds contributed by the Philosophy Depart­ ment of the University of Pennsylvania. On behalf of the contributors to this volume, I would like to express my thanks to these organizations for their generous support. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the Graduate Philosophy Students Organization at the University of Penn­ sylvania for the considerable assistance they gave me during the sym­ posium. My thanks, also, to Judith Sofranko and Lynn Luckett for their very responsible efforts in the preparation of the manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank Professor James Cornman for his invaluable advice and encouragement.

Abstract: Reply to Hilary Putnam’s ‘An Examination of Grünbaum’s Philosophy of Geometry’ -- Causality Requirements and the Theory of Relativity -- Comments on ‘Causality Requirements and the Theory of Relativity’ -- Matter, Space and Logic -- Is Logic Empirical? -- On the Philosophical Significance of the Correspondence Argument -- On Distinguishing Types of Measurement -- Hypotheses in Newton’s Philosophy -- The Role of Models in Theoretical Physics -- The Problem of Truth -- Symmetry in Physics -- Verification or Proof — An Undecided Issue? -- Ernst Mach’s Biological Theory of Knowledge -- Theories and Hypotheses in Biology: Theoretical Entities and Functional Explanation -- Comments on ‘Theories and Hypotheses in Biology’ -- Comments: Theoretical Entities Versus Theories -- The Unity of Physics -- Supplementary Comments to Weizsäcker’s Paper.

Abstract: In this fifth volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, we have gathered papers about the logic and methods of the natural sciences. Along with the individual pieces, there are several which have originated as commentaries but are now supplementary contributions: those by Stachel and Putnam. Grlinbaum's long essay developed from a paper first suggested for our Colloquium some years ago, and we are glad of the occasion to publish it here. Several of the papers were not first presented to our Colloquium but they are the work of friends and scholars who have contributed to our discussions along similar lines. We are grateful to them for allowing us to publish their papers: L Bernard Cohen, Hilary Putnam, Mihailo Markovic. And we are also grateful to C. F. von Weizsacker for his paper, recently presented to the Boston philosophical and scientific community as a lecture at M. LT. With these few exceptions, the fifth volume presents work which was partially supported by a grant from the U. S. National Science Foundation to Boston University. Such support will conclude with the fourth volume of philosophical studies of psychology, the social sciences, history, and the inter-relationships of the sciences with ethics and metaphysics. Unimportant circumstances made it necessary to publish that fourth volume after this fifth volume, and perhaps this will mildly suggest that neither science nor the philosophy of science needs to be constrained by orthodoxy of procedure.

Abstract: Time in Hegel’s Phenomenology -- Hegel Revisited -- On Hegel’s Theory of Alienation and its Historic Force -- Are There Infallible Explanations? -- Substance, Subject and Dialectic -- Hegel as Panentheist -- The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty.

Abstract: Preparatory Considerations -- I / The Structures and the Sphere of Objective Formal Logic -- 1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics -- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics -- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities -- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments -- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truthlogic -- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic -- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic -- 2. Initial questions of transcendental-logic: problems concerning fundamental concepts -- 3. The idealizing presuppositions of logic and the constitutive criticism of them -- 4. Evidential criticism of logical principles carried back to evidential criticism of experience -- 5. The subjective grounding of logic as a problem belonging to transcendental philosophy -- 6. Transcendental phenomenology and intentional psychology. The problem of transcendental psychologism -- 7. Objective logic and the phenomenology of reason -- Conclusion -- Appendix I / Syntactical Forms and Syntactical Stuffs; Core-Forms and Core-Stuffs -- § 1. The articulation of predicative judgments -- § 2. Relatedness to subject-matter in judgments -- § 3. Pure forms and pure stuffs -- § 4. Lower and higher forms. Their sense-relation to one another -- § 5. The self-contained functional unity of the self-sufficient apophansis. Division of the combination-forms of wholes into copulatives and conjunctions -- § 6. Transition to the broadest categorial sphere -- a. Universality of the combination-forms that we have distinguished -- b. The distinctions connected with articulation can be made throughout the entire categorial sphere -- c. The amplified concept of the categorial proposition contrasted with the concept of the proposition in the old apophantic analytics -- § 7. Syntactical forms, syntactical stuffs, syntaxes -- § 8. Syntagma and member. Self-sufficient judgments, and likewise judgments in the amplified sense, as syntagmas -- § 9. The “judgment-content” as the syntactical stuff of the judgment qua syntagma -- § 10. Levels of syntactical forming -- § 11. Non-syntactical forms and stuffs — exhibited within the pure syntactical stuffs -- § 12. The core-formation, with core-stuff and core-form -- § 13. Pre-eminence of the substantival category. Substantivation -- § 14. Transition to complications -- § 15. The concept of the “term” in traditional formal logic -- Appendix II / The Phenomenological Constitution of the Judgment. Originally Active Judging and Its Secondary Modifications -- § 1. Active judging, as generating objects themselves, contrasted with its secondary modifications -- § 2. From the general theory of intentionality -- a. Original consciousness and intentional modification. Static intentional explication. Explication of the “meaning” and of the meant “itself.” The multiplicity of possible modes of consciousness of the Same -- b. Intentional explication of genesis. The genetic, as well as static, originality of the experiencing manners of givenness. The “primal instituting” of “apperception” with respect to every object-category -- c. The time-form of intentional genesis and the constitution of that form. Retentional modification Sedimentation in the inconspicuous substratum (unconsciousness) -- § 3. Non-original manners of givenness of the judgment -- a. The retentional form as the intrinsically first form of “secondary sensuousness”. The livingly changing constitution of a many-membered judgment -- b. Passive recollection and its constitutional effect for the judgment as an abiding unity -- c. The emergence of something that comes to mind apperceptionally is analogous to something coming to mind after the fashion of passive recollection -- § 4. The essential possibilities of activating passive manners of givenness -- § 5. The fundamental types of originally generative judging and of any judging whatever -- § 6. Indistinct verbal judging and its function -- § 7. The superiority of retentional and recollectional to apperceptional confusion; secondary evidence in confusion -- Appendix III / The Idea of a “Logic of Mere Non-Contradiction” or a “Logic of Mere Consequence” -- § 1. The goal of formal non-contradiction and of formal consequence. Broader and narrower framing of these concepts -- § 2. Relation of the systematic and radical building of a pure analytics, back to the theory of syntaxes -- § 3. The characterization of analytic judgments as merely “elucidative of knowledge” and as “tautologies” -- § 4. Remarks on “tautology” in the logistical sense, with reference to §§ 14–18 of the main text. (By Oskar Becker.).

Abstract: called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas-as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modem sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modem times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a na!ivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate a priori possibilities and necessities.

Abstract: I. Teil Lebensrelative Werte -- 1. Abschnitt: Die lebensrelativen Werte und die Dingwirklichkeit -- 2. Abschnitt: Vitalwerte -- II. Teil Absolute Werte -- 1. Abschnitt: Personwerte -- 2. Abschnitt: Ontologische grenzen materialer Werte -- III. Teil Das Seinsverhältnis von Dasein zu Dasein -- 1. Abschnitt: Zur Ontologie des Wertens -- 2. Abschnitt: Das „da“ Schelers.

Abstract: I. What Abelard Means by Logic -- II. The Problem of Meaning -- III. The Meaning of Universal Nouns -- IV. The Meaning of the Proposition -- V. The ‘Argumentatio’ -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Work and Influence of Wernicke -- The Symptom Complex of Aphasia: A Psychological Study on an Anatomical Basis -- Anatomy and the Higher Functions of the Brain -- What is Perception? -- Knowledge, Language and Rationality. Statement of the Problem -- Comments: Language and Knowledge, by Stephen Toulmin -- A Parallelism Between Wittgensteinian and Aristotelian Ontologies -- Wolniewicz on Wittgenstein and Aristotle -- The Computer as Gadfly -- The Subject of Cultural Creation -- Dialectical Materialism and the Philosophy of Praxis -- Theory in History -- Understanding and Participant Observation in Cultural and Social Anthropology -- Comments: Theory and Practice of Participant-Observation, by Judith B. Agassi -- Comments: Participant-Observation and the Collection of Data, by Sidney W. Mintz -- Patterns of Use of Science in Ethics -- Comments by Ruth Anna Putnam -- Comments on Abraham Edel’s ‘Patterns of Use of Science in Ethics’, by John Ladd -- On Empirical Knowledge -- Comments on ‘On Empirical Knowledge’, by John Compton -- Causal Connection -- Some Comments to ‘Causal Connection’, by M. M. Schuster -- Causality and the Notion of Necessity -- Unity and Diversity in Science -- On Methods of Refutation in Metaphysics.

Abstract: The fourth volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science consists mainly of papers which were contributed to our Colloquium during the past few years. The volume represents a wide range of interests in contem­ porary philosophy of science: issues in the philosophy of mind and of language, the neurophysiology of perceptual and linguistic behavior, philosophy of history and of the social sciences, and studies in the fun­ damental categories and methods of philosophy and the inter-relation­ ships of the sciences with ethics and metaphysics. Papers on the logic and methods of the natural sciences, including biological, physical and mathematical topics appear in the fifth volume of our series. We have included in the present volume the first English translation of the classic and fundamental work on aphasia by Carl Wernicke, together with a lucid and appreciative guide to his work by Dr. Norman Geschwind. The papers were not written to form a coherent volume, nor have they been edited with such a purpose. They represent current work-in­ progress, both in the United States and in Europe. Although most of the authors are philosophers, it is worth noting that we have essays of philosophical significance here written by a sociologist, an anthropologist, a political scientist, and by three neurophysiologists. We hope that collaboration among working scientists and working philosophers may develop further.

Abstract: Truth and Meaning -- Semantics for Propositional Attitudes -- Some Problems about Belief -- Quantifiers, Beliefs, and Sellars -- The Unanticipated Examination in View of Kripke’s Semantics for Modal Logic -- On the Logic and Ontology of Norms -- Comments on von Wright’s ‘Logic and Ontology of Norms’ -- Scattered Topics in Interrogative Logic -- Åqvist’s Corrections-Accumulating Question-Sequences -- Some Problems of Inductive Logic -- Comments on Ackermann’s ‘Problems’ -- Induction and Intuition: Comments on Ackermann’s ‘Problems’ -- Rejoinder to Skyrms and Salmon -- Confirmation and Translation -- An Analysis of Relativised Modalities -- The System S9 -- Calculi of Pure Strict Implication -- Mood and Language-Game -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The purpose of this brief introduction is to describe the origin of the papers here presented and to acknowledge the help of some of the many individuals who were involved in the preparation of this volume. Of the eighteen papers, nine stem from the annual fall colloquium of the Depart­ ment of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario held in London, Ontario from November 10 to November 12, 1967. The colloquium was entitled 'Philosophical Logic'. After some discussion, the editors decided to retain that title for this volume. Von Wright's paper 'On the Logic and Ontology of Norms' is printed here after some revision. A. R. Anderson commented on the paper at the colloquium, but his comments here are based upon the revised version of the von Wright paper. The chairman of the session at which von Wright's paper was read and discussed was T. A. Goudge. Aqvist's paper 'Scattered Topics in Interrogative Logic', and Belnap's comments, 'Aqvist's Cor­ rections-Accumulating Question-Sequences', are printed as delivered. The chairman of the Aqvist-Belnap session was R. E. Butts. Wilfrid Sellars' paper 'Some Problems about Belief' is printed as delivered at the col­ loquium, but 'Quantifiers, Beliefs, and Sellars' by Ernest Sosa is a revision of his comments at the colloquium. That session was chaired by G. D. W. Berry. Ackermann's paper 'Some Problems oflnductive Logic', as well as Skyrms' comments, are printed as delivered.

Abstract: The Logic of Scientific Knowledge -- Levels of Knowledge and Stages in the Process of Knowledge -- I. Differences Between the Problems, ‘Sensation-Thought’ and ‘Empirical-Theoretical’ -- II. Basis of the Division of the Sentences of the Language of Science into Levels -- III. The Semantic System: Admissible Objects of Thought and Modes of Expression -- IV. Empirical and Theoretical Objects of Science -- V. Sentences Which Express Facts and Sentences Which Formulate Laws -- VI. Stages in the Process of Knowledge -- VII. Types of Explanation of Empirical Connections -- VIII. Stages in the Process of Knowledge, II -- Problems of the Logical-Methodological Analysis of Relations Between the Theoretical and Empirical Planes of Scientific Knowledge -- I. The Traditional Inductivist Approach to the Problem of the Relations Between Theoretical and Empirical Knowledge and its Limitations -- II. Critique of the Neopositivist Approach to the Analysis of the Relations Between the Theoretical and Empirical Levels of Scientific Knowledge -- III. Contemporary Logic of Science on the Relations Between Theoretical and Empirical Knowledge: The Connection of the Theoretical and Empirical Levels of Knowledge in the Structure of Hypothetical-Deductive Theory -- IV. Contemporary Logic of Science on the Relations Between Empirical and Theoretical Knowledge: The Problem of the Establishment of Logical Correspondence Between Theoretical and Empirical Knowledge -- Logical and Physical Implication -- The Deductive Method as a Problem of the Logic of Science -- I. Introduction -- II. Deduction and Deductive Inference -- III. Deductive System and Deductive Theory -- IV. Types of Deductive Systems -- V. Problems of the Logical-Epistemological Analysis of the Deductive Sphere of Knowledge -- Probability Logic and its Role in Scientific Research -- I. Introduction -- II. Systems of Probability Logic -- III. Probability Logic and Statistical Inference -- IV. Probability Logic and the Problem of the Selection of Hypotheses -- V. Probability Logic and the Problem of Confirmation of Hypotheses -- The Basic Forms and Rules of Inference by Analogy -- I. The General Schema of Inferences by Analogy -- II. Traditional Analogy -- III. Causal and Substantial Analogy -- IV. Analogy of Consequence -- IV. Analogy of Correlation -- VI. Functional-Structural and Structural-Functional Analogy -- On the Types of Definition and Their Importance for Science -- I. Preliminary Remarks -- II. Types of Definition -- III. The Problem of Definitions in Formal Systems -- IV. On the Importance of Definitions in Science -- Idealization as a Method of Scientific Knowledge -- I. The Abstraction of Identity -- II. Idealization -- III. Some Methodological Considerations -- The Statistical Interpretation of Fact and the Role of Statistical Methods in the Structure of Empirical Knowledge -- I. The Nature of Empirical Knowledge and the Principle of Verification -- II. The Statistical Nature of the Object and the Structure of the Construction of Empirical Knowledge -- Index of Names.

Abstract: I. Some contemporary interpretations of Hume’s theory of imagination -- W. C. Gore’s interpretation -- N. K. Smith’s interpretation -- E. J. Furlong’s interpretation -- Harold Taylor’s interpretation -- Concluding remarks -- II. The elements of Hume’s theory of imagination -- The contents of the mind -- The materials of imagination -- The source of the materials of imagination -- The criteria for recognizing imaginative activity -- Principles governing the imagination -- The nature of imagination -- Imaginative activity and the real -- The function of imagination in cognition -- Concluding remarks -- III. The generic features and basic argument-Structure of Hume’s Philosophy of the Human Understanding -- The primary goal of Hume’s philosophy of the human understanding -- Hume’s basic principles -- Concluding remarks -- IV. Hume’s theory of imagination in the argument of His Philosophy of the Human Understanding (I): The attack on reason -- The attack on abstract reasoning -- The attack on matter-of-fact reasoning -- The combined attack on both types of reasoning -- V. Hume’s theory of imagination in the Argument of His Philosophy of the Human Understanding (II): The attack on sense -- The attack on external sense -- The attack on internal sense -- VI. Conclusion -- A Bibliography of the Most Important Sources.

Abstract: The present work is, as its title indicates, a study of Hume's theory of imagination. Naturally, it is a study of a particular sort. It has a certain scope and limitations, takes a certain line of approach, exhibits certain emphases, has certain ends-in-view, etc. As an initial step in specifying the nature of this study, I shall indicate its central problem, i. e. , that problem to the solution of which the solutions of the various other problems with which it is concerned are merely means. The central problem of this study is that of determining how Hume's theory of im­ agination is related to, or involved in, the generic features and main lines of argument of his philosophy of the human understanding. The expression "philosophy of the human understanding" is obvious­ to allude to a restriction on the scope of this investigation. ly intended Actually, it is a title suggested to me by two of Hume's philosophical writings; and to anyone who is even modestly acquainted with these writings, its reference should be no mystery. Hume published the first two so-called "Books" of his A Treatise of Human Nature in 1739. The first of these two Books was entitled "Of the Human Understanding. " Nine years later, he published a work under the title, An Enquiry Con­ cerning Human Understanding.

Abstract: I: The “Ratio Communis” of the Analogous Name -- I. Texts which reject a ratio communis -- II. Texts which imply a ratio communis -- III. The analogy of names -- IV. Some analogous names -- VI. Being is not a Genus -- VII. Resolution and Conclusion -- II: Metaphor and Analogy -- I. Cajetan on metaphor -- II. Analogy vs. Metaphor -- III. Ratio Propria non invenitur nisi in uno -- IV. The signification of names -- V. Ratio communis and ratio propria -- VI. Proprie, Communiter, Metaphorice -- VII. Concluding summary -- III: Metaphor and fundamental ontology -- IV: “Analogy” is analogous -- V: Reply to a Critic -- I. Cajetan and Intrinsic and Extrinsic denomination -- II. Professor Beach as exegete -- III. Professor Beach’s confusion of the Logical and Real -- VI: Is the term soul analogous?.

Abstract: The present volume brings together a number of things I have written on the subject of analogy since the appearance of The Logic of Analogy in 1961. In that book I tried to disengage St Thomas' teaching on analogous names from various subsequent accretions which, in my opinion, had obscured its import. The book was widely reviewed, various points in it were rightly criticized, but its main argument, namely, that analogical signification is a logical matter and must be treated as such, was, if often confronted, left finally, I think, standing. The studies brought together now reflect the same concentration on the teaching of Aquinas. I am not of the opinion that everything important on the question of analogy, and certainly not everything of importance on those problems which elicit the doctrine of analogy, was said by Thomas Aquinas. But it was my decision, for my personal work, first to achieve as much clarity as I could with respect to the teaching of Thomas, and then to go on to other writers, both ancient and modern. I am currently engaged in working out the relations among equivo­ cation, analogy and metaphor in Aristotle. When that study is com­ pleted, I shall turn eagerly to some quite recent contributions to the nature of religious language. In short, the present work, which is by and large a prolongation of my attempt at an exegesis of Thomistic texts, marks the end of one phase of my research into the problem of analogy.

Abstract: I: Berdyaev’s Philosophy of History -- A. Introduction -- B. The “historical” and the philosophy of history -- C. Philosophy of history and metaphysics of history -- D. The philosophy of history and the end of history -- E. Philosophy of history in respect to time -- F. Philosophy of history and the doctrine of godmanhood -- G. Summary -- II: Godmanhood, Freedom and Philosophy of History -- A. Introduction -- B. The doctrine of godmanhood -- C. Godmanhood and the freedom of man -- D. Some consequences of the doctrine of godmanhood -- E. Summary -- III: Existentialism: A Personalist Philosophy of History -- A. Introduction -- B. Personalism: the existent and the ego -- C. Personality is spirit: an existentialism of spirit -- D. Personality: the concrete and universal existent -- E. Personality and existence not isolated from the thou and the we -- F. Personality: the microcosm -- G. Summary -- IV: Epistemology and Philosophy of History Conclusion -- A. Introduction -- B. The rejection of the subject-object relationship -- C. Knowledge not anti-rational, but super-rational -- D. Knowledge an identity -- E. True knowing is communal in character -- F. True knowing is loving and creative in character -- G. Image, symbol and mystical experience: concrete and creative knowing -- H. Summary -- Conclusion -- Bibliography of Sources.

Abstract: BERDYAEV AS A PHILOSOPHER How shall a non-Russian, above all a North American, assimilate the extraordinary assemblage of ideas which is Berdyaev's philosophy? Dr. Richardson does not exaggerate the difficulties. And he introduces us with great care (and what a formidable task it must have been) precisely to what is most strange in this writer, his fusion of historical .. eschatological-metaphysical-mystical-Christian conceptions. By some standards Berdyaev is a theologian rather than a philosopher; for he takes the truth of the Christian revelation for granted and his work can readily be viewed as an elaborate apologetic for one religion against all others and against irreligion. Yet I incline to sympathize with him in his claim to be a philosopher. What an eccentric one, however! There are indeed some partial analogies in the general European tradition. Certainly this Russian is a disciple of Kant, and strong traces of Kantianism survive in him. He also moved away from Kant somewhat as did Fichte, Hegel, and, above all, Schelling in his last period. His sympathetic response to Heracleitos and Boehme recalls Hegel. The interest in Boehme and Schelling is found also in Tillich. Like the late German-American, Berdyaev rejects conceptual in favor of symbolic speech about God. Like Bergson, he stresses intuition and makes a radical distinction between scientific logical analytic thought and the mode of apprehension by which, he believes, metaphysical truth is to be appropriated. Here one thinks also of Heidegger.

Abstract: I. Soul and Mathematicals -- II. Posidonius and Neoplatonism -- III. The Subdivisions of Theoretical Philosophy -- IV. The Origin of the Quadrivium -- V. Speusippus in Iamblichus -- VI. A New Fragment of Aristotle -- VII. Metaphysica generalis in Aristotle ? -- Conclusion -- Index of Names -- Index of Passages in Greek and Latin Authors.

Abstract: Table des Matières -- Transformation des principes généraux en règles positives du droit international -- Remarques sur l’interdiction d’intervention -- Les problèmes de la subjectivité internationale -- Le statut juridique des partisans et des mouvements de résistance armée: évolution historique et aspects actuels -- Die Vereinigten Nationen und das Kriegsrecht -- International Freedom of Information. New Dimensions -- Observations sur une enquête internationale: L’affaire du «Tavignano» -- La souveraineté dans l’histoire du droit des gens. De Vitoria à Vattel -- Norwegian Attitude to International and Foreign Judgments. Recent Developments -- The Evolution of Space Law Continues -- Contribution à l’étude des rapports entre le droit international public et le droit international privé -- Betrachtungen zum Europäischen Niederlassungabkommen vom 13. Dezember 1955 -- Le rôle de la condition des mains propres de la personne lésée dans les réclamations devant les tribunaux internationaux -- Unverbindliche Abmachungen im zwischenstaatlichen Bereich -- La non-reconnaissance des actes contraires au droit -- La motivation et la révision des sentences arbitrales à la Confêrence de la paix de la Haye (1899) et le conflit frontalier entre le Royaume-Uni et le Vénézuéla -- The Problem of the Application of Military Measures by the General Assembly of the United Nations -- Politique et droit dans les Balkans. Etude d’histoire de la diplomatie et du droit international -- The Special Function of the Principle of Restrictive Interpretation -- La règle juridique, le droit subjectif et le sujet de droit en droit international. Essai d’une nouvelle théorie -- Der Primat des Völkerrechts und die Vereinten Nationen -- Bibliographie des travaux scientifiques de Juraj Andrassy.

Abstract: I. Nature -- I. The Problem of the Exact Sciences -- II: Mathematics and Nature -- III. The Anthropocentric Character of Space, Time, and Motion -- IV. The Analogy of the Grammar of Nature -- II. Common Sense -- V. Berkeley’s Intentions -- VI. The two Kinds of Metaphysics -- VII. Philosophical Scruples: Their Cause and Cure -- VIII. The Rôle of Common Sense -- IX. The Potentiality of Common Sense -- X. Berkeley’s Dialectic -- III. Mystery -- XI. The Mysterious Universe -- XII. The Exact Sciences.

Abstract: In this work I have endeavoured to see Berkeley in his contemporary setting. On the principle that philosophy is ultimately about men, not about abstract problems, I have tried to see Berkeley the philosopher as an expression of Berkeley the man. When this is done, what is perennial in the philosophy may be discerned in and through what is local and temporal. Berkeley then emerges as a pioneer reformer; not so much an innovator as a renovator; one who set out to rescue phi­ losophy from the enthusiasms of the preceding age; one who strove to seat philosophy once more on the broad human and common sense foundations laid by Plato and Aristotle. Critical studies of some of the more striking of Berkeley's epistemo­ logical arguments are legion. They commenced with the young Berke­ ley's first appearance in print, and have continued to this day. But whether they take the form of professions of support for Berkeley, or of bald refutations of Berkeley's supposed fallacies, or whether, like the contemporary "analytical" studies of Moore, Warnock, and Austin, they are subtle exposures of alleged deeply concealed logical muddles, they all tend to share one common characteristic: they select and abstract from the totality of Berkeley, and miss the robust simplicity and universality of Berkeley's intentions. It is the intentions which control the whole, and give the right perspective in which to view the various items.

Abstract: I. Benjamin Whichcote: A Man of Good-Nature -- II. From Athens to Cambridge -- III. Controversy with a Puritan -- IV. Religion of First-Inscription — The Candle of the Lord (i) -- V. Religion of First-Inscription — Natural Ethics (ii) -- VI. Religion of after-Revelation—Saving Knowledge (i) -- VII. Religion of after-Revelation — Christian Morals (ii) -- VIII. Religion of after-Revelation — The Universal Church (iii) -- IX. The Father of the Christian Platonists of Cambridge -- X. Whichcote and the Intellectual Tradition -- XI. Epilegomena -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: The research of Professor J. D. Roberts has interested me for several years. It has interested me because he has been working in a really rich area of intellectual history. Even before Professor Whitehead taught us to speak of the seventeenth century as the "century of genius," many of us looked with wonder on the creativity of the men who produced religious and philosophical literature in that period of contro­ versy and of power. It was, in a most unusual way, a flowering time of the human spirit. The present volume is devoted to one fascinating chapter in the history of ideas. We know now, far better than we knew a generation ago, how incendiary Puritan ideas really were. They had tremendous consequences, many of which continue to this day, in spite of the absurd caricature of Puritanism, which is popularly accepted. The best of Milton's contemporaries were great thinkers as well as great doers.

Abstract: 1. Towards a More Comprehensive Concept of the Person -- 2. Love, Self, and Contemporary Culture -- 3. The Problem of Immortality -- 4. Free Will, Creativity of God, and Order -- 5. Other Persons, Other Things -- 6. The Concept of Rational Animal -- 7. The Self in Mu’tazilah Thought -- 8. Unity: Appearance and Reality in the Light of the Sufi Doctrines of Wahdat-ul-Wujud of Ibn ‘Arabi and Wahdat-ush-Shahud of Shaik Ahmed Sarhandi -- 9. Variants in the Concepts of the Self in the Islamic Tradition -- 10. Is There a Soul or No Soul? The Buddha Refused to Answer. Why? -- 11. ?ankara’s Interpretation of the Self and Its Influence on Later Indian Thought -- 12. Person and Moral Life (A Presentation of the Nature of Person and the Essence of Moral Life in the Philosophy of Prajñ?p?ramit? -- 13. The Self as Discovery and Creation in Western and Indian Philosophy -- 14. The Bhagavad g?t? and the Book of Job on the Problem of the Self -- 15. Pre-existence -- 16. Approaches to the I-consciousness: Its Depths, Normal and Abnormal -- 17. Concern for the Person — Concluding Paper.

Abstract: The general characteristics of the decades after the last World War, so far as the human situation goes, include two phenomena: these decades are marked by man's dissatisfaction with himself, his confession of ignorance of himself, his anxiety about his future, and also his earnest search for the ground of his being, which can give him a feeling of security with reference to his life here and hereafter; they are also marked by man's pride about his achievements in science and tech­ nology, a hope of a better life on earth, and a faith in himself as capable of engineering the individual and society for realizing peace, harmony, and happiness for all men. The contemporary thinking man is conscious of the predicament these two kinds of characteristics have created for him, admits failures, hopes for improvements, and works for them. In carrying out this work, he has to and wants to know what human life is, what the meaning and purpose of life are, and why his struggles and achievements have not succeeded in giving every man a reasonable amount of comfort and happiness. He has come to realize also that the accumulation of material comforts does not necessarily lead to happi­ ness, although happiness for man - except for the monk, fakir, or sannyiisin - is not possible without material comforts. Here we have the problem.

Abstract: I. Inductive Empiricism -- Joseph Neef’s Sensationalistic Empiricism -- George Jardine’s Philosophical Education -- James G. Carter: An Inductive Science of Education -- Thomas Tate: An Inductive Philosophy of Education -- Herbert Spencer: Evolutionism and Progress -- Joseph Payne on the Science and Art of Education -- G. E. Partridge: Scientism and the Philosophy of Education -- II Rationalism -- James P. Wickersham: Rationalistic Principles as Precepts -- Rationalism’s Classic Philosophy of Education -- Herman Harrell Home’s Idealistic Theism -- III. Naturalistic Empiricism -- Chauncey Wright’s Suggestive Naturalism -- John Dewey: Experience as Empirical and Natural -- John Angus MacVannel: Experimentalism and Functionalism -- A Common Prospect -- Bibliographic Note.

Abstract: John Dewey once wrote: "Education is such an important interest of life that . . . we should expect to find a philosophy of education, just as there is a philosophy of art and of religion. We should expect, that is, such a treatment of the subject as would show that the nature of existence renders education an integral and indispensable function of life. " Indeed, such treatments of education are at least as old as Plato's Republic. Even so, it was not until the nineteenth century that the philosophy of education was recognized as a distinct discipline. His­ torically, it has been one thing to treat education in such a manner as Dewey mentions; it has been another thing to do so while deliberately making explicit a discipline with a subject matter which is in some sense distinct from that of other disciplines. The aim, in the present study, has been to study the origins of philosophy of education as a distinct discipline in the United States. In doing so, "origins" are taken to mean, first, that from which the disci­ pline has come, and second, that which initiates, serves as a point of departure for what follows. In searching for origins, I have explored the philosophic considerations of education from which came those distinct conceptions of the philosophy of education that were to serve as points of departure for later considerations of the discipline.

Abstract: Preliminary Statement -- One. God and Nature -- A. Nature as Fact for Science -- B. Nature as Meaningful for Man -- C. Nature as Manifestation of God -- D. Nature as Work of God Open to Science -- Two. God and Man -- A. Man in the World with God -- B. Man as Knower -- C. Man as Knower of God -- Three. Man and Man -- A. The Human Self -- B. The State -- C. Art as Partial Hold on the Whole -- Four. Man and God -- A. Religion in General -- B. Christianity as Concrete Religion -- C. Immortality as a Free Possibility to Participate the One -- Concluding Statement -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: One -- I. The Notion of the Begriffsschrift -- II. Number and Concept -- III. The Hierarchy of Functions -- IV. Wertverlauf and the Problem of Expansion -- Two -- V. The Article ‘On Sense and Reference’ -- VI. Description, Designation, Assertion: Russell, Jones and Bierich on Frege’s Semantics -- VII. Synonymity and Sentential Context -- VIII. The Contamination of Ontics and Semantics -- Summary -- Index of Names.

Abstract: Inhaltsangabe -- Edmund Husserls Briefe an Roman Ingarden -- I. Schreiben vom Oktober 1915 -- II. Brief an Hofrat Roman Ingarden (Vater von Professor Roman Ingarden) vom 2. Februar 1917 -- III. Brief vom 13. Februar 1917 -- IV. Brief vom 20. Juni 1917 -- V. Brief vom 8. Juli 1917 -- VI. Brief vom 5. April 1918 -- VII. Brief vom 27. April 1918 -- VIII. Brief vom 16. November 1919 -- IX. Brief vom 12. März 1920 -- X. Brief vom 18. Juli 1920 -- XI. Brief vom 20. August 1920 -- XII. Brief vom 12. Dezember 1920 -- XIII. Brief vom 30. Dezember 1920 -- XIV. Brief vom 28. März 1921 -- XV. Brief vom 20. Juni 1921 -- XVI. Brief vom 6. August 1921 -- XVII. Brief vom 25. November 1921 -- XVIII. Brief vom 14. Dezember 1922 -- XIX. Brief vom 31. August 1923 -- XX. Brief vom 25. Februar 1924 -- XXI. Brief vom 16. Juni 1924 -- XXII. Brief vom 27. September 1924 -- XXIII. Brief vom 9. Dezember 1924 -- XXIV. Brief gegen Weihnachten 1924 -- XXV. Brief vom 27. Juni 1925 -- XXVI. Brief vom 10. Dezember 1925 -- XXVII. Brief vom 16. April 1926 -- XXVIII. Brief vom 9. April 1927 -- XXIX. Brief vom 29. Juni 1927 -- XXX. Brief vom 19. September 1927 -- XXXI. Brief vom 26. Dezember 1927 -- XXXII. Brief vom 23. Februar 1928 -- XXXIII. Brief vom 6. Mai 1928 -- XXXIV. Brief vom 13. Juli 1928 -- XXXV. Brief vom 18. Oktober 1928 -- XXXVI. Brief vom 23. Dezember 1928 -- XXXVII. Brief vom 31. Dezember 1928 -- XXXVIII. Brief vom 9. Januar 1928 -- XXXIX. Brief vom 16. März 1929 -- XL. Brief vom 24. März 1929 -- XLI. Brief vom 26. Mai 1929 -- XLII. Brief vom 2. Dezember 1929 -- XLIII. Brief vom 2. Dezember 1929 -- XLIV. Brief vom 19. März 1930 -- XLV. Brief vom 19. November 1930 -- XLVI. Brief vom 21. Dezember 1930 -- XL VII. Brief vom 31. Dezember 1930 -- XLVIII. Brief vom 5. Februar 1931 -- XLIX. Brief vom 16. Februar 1931 -- L. Brief vom 19. April 1931 -- LI. Brief vom 15. Mai 1931 -- LII. Brief vom 21. Mai 1931 -- LIII. Brief vom 8. Juli 1931 -- LIV. Brief vom 31. August 1931 -- LV. Brief vom 13. November 1931 -- LVI. Brief vom 25. November 1931 -- LVII. Brief vom 17. Dezember 1931 -- LVIII. Brief vom 10. Februar 1932 -- LIX. Brief vom 7. April 1932 -- LX. Brief vom 11. Juni 1932 -- LXI. Brief vom 19. August 1932 -- LXII. Brief vom 16. Oktober 1932 -- LXIII. Brief vom 21. Oktober 1932 -- LXIV. Brief vom 11. Oktober 1933 -- LXV. Brief vom 2. November 1933 -- LXVI. Brief vom 20. November 1933 -- LXVII. Brief vom 23. November 1933 -- LXVIII. Brief vom 13. Dezember 1933 -- LXIX. Brief vom 13. April 1934 -- LXX. Brief vom 31. Juli 1934 -- LXXI. Brief vom 25. August 1934 -- LXXII. Brief vom 7. Oktober 1934 -- LXXIII. Brief vom 26. November 1934 -- LXXIV. Brief vom 21. Dezember 1934 -- LXXV. Brief vom 15. März 1935 -- LXX VI. Brief vom 13. Mai 1935 -- LXXVII. Brief vom 10. Juli 1935 -- LXXVIII. Brief vom 23. Oktober 1935 -- LXXIX. Brief vom 14. Januar 1936 -- LXXX. Brief vom 16. Mai 1936 -- LXXXI. Brief vom 2. Februar 1936 -- LXXXII. Brief vom 15. Februar 1936 -- LXXXIII. Brief vom 31. Dezember 1936 -- LXXXIV. Brief vom 15. April 1937 -- LXXXV. Brief vom 23. Juli 1937 -- LXXXVI. Brief vom 24. Februar 1938 -- LXXXVII. Brief vom 20. März 1938 -- LXXXVIII. Brief vom 21. April 1938 -- LXXXIX. Todesanzeige vom 27. April 1938 -- Roman Ingarden -- Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl -- Erläuterungen zu den Briefen Husserls.

Abstract: I / Recent Developments in Philosophical Logic -- II / Self-Referential Statements -- III / Modal Renderings of Intuitionistic Propositional Logic -- IV / A Contribution to Modal Logic -- V / Epistemic Modality: The Problem of a Logical Theory of Belief Statements -- VI / Many-Valued Logic -- VII / Venn Diagrams for Plurative Syllogisms -- VIII / Can There Be Random Individuals? -- IX / The Logic of Existence -- X / Nonstandard Quantificational Logic -- XI / Probability Logic -- XII / Chronological Logic -- XIII / Topological Logic -- XIV / Assertion Logic -- XV / The Logic of Preference -- XVI / Deontic Logic -- XVII / Discourse on a Method -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The aim of the book is to introduce the reader to some new areas oflogic which have yet to find their way into the bulk of modern logic books written from the more orthodox direction of the mainstream of develop­ ments. Such a work seems to me much needed, both because of the in­ trinsic value and increasing prominence of the nonstandard sector of logic, and because this particular sector is of the greatest interest from the standpoint of philosophical implications and applications. This book unites a series of studies in philosophical logic, drawing for the most part on material which I have contributed to the journal liter­ ature of the subject over the past ten years. Despite the fact that some of these essays have been published in various journals at different times, they possess a high degree of thematic and methodological unity. All of these studies deal with material of substantial current interest in philo­ sophical logic and embody a fusion of the modern techniques of logical and linguistic-philosophical analysis for the exploration of areas of logic that are of substantial philosophical relevance.

Abstract: The Relation between Induction and Probability I–II -- A Treatise on Probability -- Logic, Part II (abridged) -- Mr. Johnson on the Logical Foundations of Science I–II (abridged) -- The Principles of Problematic Induction (with an Addendum) -- The Principles of Demonstrative Induction -- Mechanical and Teleological Causation -- Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik, und Wahrheit -- Probability and Induction -- Broad on Induction and Probability -- Replies to my Critics.

Abstract: In his essay on 'Broad on Induction and Probability' (first published in 1959, reprinted in this volume), Professor G. H. von Wright writes: "If Broad's writings on induction have remained less known than some of his other contributions to philosophy . . . , one reason for this is that Broad never has published a book on the subject. It is very much to be hoped that, for the benefit of future students, Broad's chief papers on induction and probability will be collected in a single volume . . . . " The present volume attempts to perform this service to future students of induction and probability. The suggestion of publishing a volume of this kind in Synthese Library was first made by Professor Donald Davidson, one of the editors of the Library, and was partly prompted by Professor von Wright's statement. In carrying out this suggestion, the editors of Synthese Library have had the generous support of Professor Broad who has among other things supplied a new Addendum to 'The Principles of Problematic Induction' and corrected a number of misprints found in the first printings of this paper. The editors gratefully acknow­ ledge Professor Broad's help and encouragement. A bibliography of Professor Broad's writings (up to 1959) has been compiled by Dr. C. Lewy and has appeared in P. A. Schilpp, editor, The Philosophy of C. D. Broad (The Library of Living Philosophers), pp. 833-852.

Abstract: Knowing in the Strong Sense -- Sophistic Measures -- Eros and Knowledge -- Absent Objects -- The Difference Between the Psychology and the Epistemology of Perception -- Inferential Meaning in Philosophic Questions -- Conceptual Models in Knowledge -- The Analytic, the Synthetic, and C. I. Lewis.

Abstract: Due to the unprecedented interest which the announcement of the topic of epistemology evoked from contributors, two annual volumes will be devoted to it. This volume accordingly is entitled Epistemology I, and the next volume will be entitled Epistemology II. The Editor KNOWING IN THE STRONG SENSE PETER M. BURKHOLDER Professor Norman Malcolm has defended what he calls "the strong sense" of "know." 1 It is one of the propositional senses; i.e. what is said to be known, in this sense, is an item of information rather than a person, a poem, a physical object, or a skill. According to· Malcolm, this sense of "know" is important and useful.' Philosophers have had it "in mind when they have spoken of 'perfect,' 'metaphysical,' or 'strict' cer­ tainty" (Ke, 70). Moreover, laymen use it when they profess to know such obvious truths as "2 + 2 = 4" or "This is an ink-bottle" (said while peering at and poking an ink-bottle). Nevertheless, in spite of his opinion that it is important, Malcolm has not given a detailed analysis of the strong sense of "know." Thus we may be justified in studying it, first to determine exactly what it is, and then to evaluate it. I do not, of course, wish to suggest that Malcolm necessarily WQuid accept my account of the strong sense as an accurate expli­ cation of his opinions. However, in its descriptive aspects my analysis seems compatible with his written statements.

Abstract: I. What is an Aristotelian Syllogism? -- II. Logical Necessity -- III. Perfection -- IV. The Figures -- V. Reduction and Deduction -- Conclusion -- Appendix: Aristotle and syllogisms from false premisses -- Indices.

Abstract: The present book is the English version of a monograph 'Die aristotelische Syllogistik', which first appeared ten years ago in the series of Abhand­ 1 lungen edited by the Academy of Sciences in Gottingen. In the preface to the English edition, I would first like to express my indebtedness to Mr. J. Barnes, now fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. He not only translated what must have been a difficult text with exemplary precision and ingenuity, but followed critically every argument and check­ ed every reference. While translating it, he has improved the book. Of those changes which I have made on Mr. Barnes' suggestion I note only the more important ones on pages 4, 12, 24sq, 32, 39, 6lsq, and 158. Since the second edition of the German text appeared in 1963 some further reviews have been published, or come to my notice, which I have 2 been able to make use of in improving the text of this new edition. I must mention here especially the detailed critical discussions of my results and arguments published by Professor W. Wieland in the Philosophische Rundschau 14 (1966), 1-27 and by Professor E. Scheibe in Gnomon 39 (1967), 454-64. Both scholars, while agreeing with the main drift and method of my interpretation, criticise some of my results and disagree with some of my arguments. It would not be possible to discuss these technical matters here with the necessary thoroughness.

Abstract: Book One — Introduction -- I — The Approach to Ethics and Morality -- 1. Methodological Considerations -- 2. Moral Integrative Levels -- 3. A Summary Perspective -- Book Two — The Ethical Integrative Series -- II — The Ethics of the Individual -- 1. The Individual Good -- 2. Approaches to the Good -- 3. The Pursuit of the Good -- III — The Ethics of Society -- 1. Morality as Social Structure -- 2. The Covert Moral Structure -- 3. The Overt Moral Structure -- 4. Rights and Duties -- 5. The Law and Legal Procedures -- IV — The Ethics of the Human Species -- 1. From Society to Humanity -- 2. Characteristics of the Human Species -- 3. The Morality of the Human Species -- 4. Moral Encounters with Near-by Species -- V — The Ethics of the Cosmos -- 1. The Cosmic Perspective -- 2. The Cosmic Good -- 3. Truth and Value -- 4. Cosmic Type Responsibility -- 5. Cosmic Confrontation -- 6. Normative Cosmic Ethics -- 7. The Ethics of Man in Relation to the Cosmos -- Book Three — The Moral Situation and Its Outcome -- VI — Ideal Morality -- 1. The Choice of Ideals -- 2. Individual Ideals -- 3. Social Ideals -- 4. Human Ideals -- 5. Cosmic Ideals -- VII — Concrete Morality -- 1. Bad Behavior and Immorality -- 2. Bad Individual Behavior -- 3. Bad Social Behavior -- 4. Bad Species Behavior -- 5. Bad Cosmic Behavior -- VIII — Moral Strategy -- 1. The Uses of Strategy -- 2. The Strategy of Individual Obligation -- 3. The Strategy of Social Obligation -- 4. The Strategy of Human Obligation -- 5. The Strategy of Cosmic Obligation -- Name Index -- Topic Index.

Abstract: No statement, except one, can be made with which all philosophers would agree. The exception is this statement itself. The disagreement has the advantage that it gets all the proposals out into the open where they can be examined, but it has the dis advantage that the cogency of any one philosophy must rely entirely upon that wide public which is unprepared to deal with it. Fortunately, ethics has a more immediate appeal than some other branches of philosophy; yet the history of the topic gives no indication that this circumstance has had the happy results we might have expected. One peculiarity of ethics is that its problems are rarely settled on its own grounds. Ethical problems are for the most part referred to socially established moralities, and moralities are socially established not on the basis of philosophy but rather by some sponsoring insti­ or politics. Such establishments, however, tution, usually religion depend on the prior preparation of ethical proposals by philosophers. For it stands to reason that an ethics cannot be socially established if there is no ethics to establish. Thus philosophers provide the justifi­ cation for socially-established moralities while seeming not to do so.

Abstract: I. Principal Elements of Navya-ny?ya Logic -- II. Ga?ge?a’s Theory of Pervasion -- Anumitinir?pa?a and Vy?ptiv?da by Ga?ge?op?dhy?ya Transliteration, Translation and Commentary Anumitinir?pa?a and Vy?ptiv?da -- Section I. General observations about inference -- Section II. Theory of pervasion -- I. Five definitions of pervasion as non-deviation -- II. Two definitions of pervasion called Lion-Tiger Definition -- III. Absence limited by a property whose loci are different from its counterpositive -- IV. Preliminary refutation of a series of definitions of pervasion -- V. The conclusive definition of pervasion -- VI. Universal absence -- VII. Pervasion between particulars -- Sanskrit Index -- English Index.

Abstract: The history of Indian logic is roughly divided into three periods: old Nyaya, Buddhist logic and new Nyaya. Each period is characterized by the production of some outstanding Sanskrit text. The main texts of the first and second period have been translated into, and explained in, European languages. But the principal text of the third period, GaIigesa's Tattvacintamal).i, is still not accessible through a Western language. The present book is intended to fill up this gap to some extent. The object of this study is to present both to sanskritists and to logicians an essential part of Indian logic as laid down in the first two sections of the Anumanakhal).c;la of the Tattvacintamal).i. No attention will be paid here to the doctrines of GaIigesa's predecessors and the theories developed by his commentators. Though this study is not con­ cerned with comparative philosophy, Western logic will be employed for the purpose of interpretation. Under Western logic I bring both traditional logic and modern logic, which, in my opinion, form one discipline of reasoning. This may account for my use of some Latin terms belonging to scholastic thought. Transliteration and translation have been made from the text of the Anumitiniriipal).a and Vyaptivada in the Bibliotheca Indica edition of GaIigesa's Tattvacintamal).i (with Mathuranatha's commentary), Part II Anumanakhal).c;la from Anumiti to Biidha, Calcutta, 1892. A photostatic copy ofthat text precedes the transliteration, translation and commentary.

Abstract: Memorial Address -- Allocution -- Remarques sur la théorie intuitionniste des espaces linéaires -- Some Remarks about Synonymity and the Theorem of Beth -- Beth’s Tableau-Method -- Quelques remarques sur les “Tableaux de Beth” -- Une hypothèse sur l’extension des relations finies et sa vérification dans certaines classes particulières (deuxième partie) -- La philosophie géométrique de Henri Poincaré J. J. A.Mooij -- Logique et théorie physique -- L’argument probabiliste pour une logique non classique de la mécanique quantique -- Courant potentiel en magnétogazdynamique -- Nouvelle méthode de résolution de l’équation de Helmholtz pour une symétrie cylindrique -- Recherche en mécanique ondulatoire non linéaire -- Problème de Cauchy dans le modèle de Lee en métrique indéfinie -- Conclusions -- Bibliography of E. W. Beth.

Abstract: 1. The Necessity of Metaphysical Solutions -- 2. Language and Metaphysics -- 3. What Metaphysics Can Be -- 4. Properties of the Metaphysical Language -- 5. On What There Is -- 6. How We Know the Essence of What There Is -- 7. Modes of Knowledge and Intuition -- 8. The Verification of Metaphysical Statements -- 9. The Veridicality of Eidetic Intuition -- 10. Functions and Events -- 11. Negation, Conjunction, and Events -- 12. Implication and What There Is -- 13. Functions and Facts -- 14. Functions and Meaning -- 15. Functions and Categories and Universals -- 16. Events and Actual Occasions -- 17. Actual Occasions -- 18. Cosmology -- 19. Commitments and Language -- Name Index.

Abstract: This book is not merely about metaphysics; it is an essay in metaphysics. Furthermore, it is written in the firm conviction that metaphysics is possible and meaningful metaphysical statements can and should be made. However, I felt it necessary to approach the perennial problems of metaphysics through the avenues of linguistic analysis. I have tried not only to infiltrate the position of the linguists but to show that a fifth column already existed there. Yet the objections to metaphysics needed to be met or at least some indication of how they could be met had to be shown. It is never enough to demonstrate that objections are un­ founded - some positive indications of a possible metaphysics had to be offered. This book, as a consequence, tries also to draw at least in broad outline, a metaphysical position that seems to me to be well-founded. In the present state of philoso­ phy in the United States especially, this is sufficient reason for publishing another book in philosophy. I want to express my appreciation to a number of people. To my colleagues at North Carolina I am grateful for stimulating criticisms that often helped me see my way through to solutions. To Professors B. Blanshard (Yale University), and Ledger Wood (Princeton University), I am grateful for reading the manuscript.

Abstract: One Philosophical Analysis: A General Discussion -- Two Ordinary Language -- Three Meanings, Concepts, and the Uses of Verbal Expressions -- Four Synonymity -- Five Semantic Analysis I -- Six Semantic Analysis II -- Seven Semantic Analysis III. Analysis and Reconstruction -- Eight Deductive Inference and Analysis -- Nine Language and Truth -- Ten Extra-Linguistic Analysis.

Abstract: It is neither far-fetched nor over-modest to assume that some readers will feel that another book on philosophical analysis is superfluous, seeing that there are at present a number of fine books, essays or col­ lections of essays on the subject. Part of the reason which makes me hope that the present book is not superfluous is that its aim is different from that of many of these books or essays. What I myself have at­ tempted to do is to outline my own views regarding the nature and possible types and forms of philosophical analysis: the result of sustained reflection on the subject for the past few years. The methods of analy­ sis that are here regarded as "proper," and in a greater or lesser degree philosophically useful methods are not, in their general features, really anything new. They are advocated or are actually being practised by different contemporary philosophers; and some of them have a long and hallowed history behind them. However, the present work attempts to present these methods in a form or manner which, it is hoped, will make them acceptable, or less inacceptable, to philosophers with widely-divergent attitudes or biases. An important feature of the book is that no one method or type of method is regarded as the proper method or type of method of philosophical analysis to the exclusion of others; in sharp contrast to the views or practice of a considerable number of contemporary philosophers.

Abstract: The Early Modern Revolution in Science and Philosophy -- Taxonomy and Information -- On the Elementarity of Measurement in General Relativity: toward a General Theory -- Symposium on Innate Ideas -- Recent Contributions to the Theory of Innate Ideas -- The ‘Innateness Hypothesis’ and Explanatory Models in Linguistics -- The Epistemological Argument -- Natural Kinds -- Metaphysics as Heuristic for Science -- Comments -- Rationalism and the Physical World -- On the Foundations of Probability Theory -- Comments -- Elementarity and Reality in Particle Physics (with an exchange of letters between E. K. Gora and W. Heisenberg) -- Comments -- Semantic Sources of the Concept of Law -- Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper -- Comments -- Conceptual Revolutions in Science -- Comments -- The Center of the World -- Comments: Analytic Premises and Existential Conclusions -- On the Improvement of the Sciences and Arts, and the possible Identity of the Two -- Comments: Acute Proliferitis -- Comments -- Comments: Illustration vs. Experimental Test -- Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language -- Three Studies in the Philosophy of Space and Time -- What I Don’t Believe.

Abstract: This third volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science contains papers which are based upon Colloquia from 1964 to 1966. In most cases, they have been substantially modified subsequent to presentation and discussion. Once again we publish work which goes beyond technical analysis of scientific theories and explanations in order to include philo­ sophical reflections upon the history of science and also upon the still problematic interactions between metaphysics and science. The philo­ sophical history of scientific ideas has increasingly been recognized as part of the philosophy of science, and likewise the cultural context of the genesis of such ideas. There is no school or attitude to be taken as de­ fining the scope or criteria of our Colloquium, and so we seek to under­ stand both analytic and historical aspects of science. This volume, as the previous two, constitutes a substantial part of our final report to the U. S. National Science Foundation, which has continued its support of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science by a grant to Boston University. That report will be concluded by a subse­ quent volume of these Studies. It is a pleasure to record our thanks to the Foundation for its confidence and funds. We dedicate this book to the memory of Norwood Russell Hanson. During this academic year of 1966-67, this beloved and distinguished American philosopher participated in our Colloquium, and he did so before.

Abstract: The Logic of our Language -- Petitio in the Strife of Systems -- Observations on the Uses of Order -- Cultural Relativity and the Logic of Philosophy -- A Material Theory of Reference -- On Letting -- On the Illogic of the Mental -- On the Uses and Interpretation of Logical Symbols -- Notes on a Past Logic of Time -- The Problem of Judgment in Husserl’s Later Thought -- Philosophical Logic and Psychological Satisfaction.

Abstract: With this issue we initiate the policy of expanding the scope of Tulane Studies in Philosophy to include, in addition to the work of members of the department, contributions from philosophers who have earned advanced degrees from Tulane and who are now teaching in other colleges and universities. The Editor THE LOGIC OF OUR LANGUAGE ROBERT L. ARRINGTON Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus that "logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. " 1 In line with his suggestion that a proposition is a 'picture', Wittgenstein argued that propositions 'show' the logical structure of the real. He was insistent, however, that "the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one. " 2 As a result of this we can misunderstand the structure of fact. Philosophical problems arise just when "the logic of our language is mis­ understood. " 3 It is common knowledge that much of this view of logic was rejected by Wittgenstein himself in the Philosophical Investi­ gations. There we are told that language has no ideal or sublime 4 logic which mirrors the structure of the extra-linguistic world. Consequently, inferences from the structure of language to the structure of that extra-linguistic world are invalid. Reality can be 'cut up' in any of a number of ways by language. Wittgenstein adopted a view of philosophy which would render that discipline a non-explanatory, non-critical study of the multiple ways in which language can be used.

Abstract: I: Activity and Materialism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Marx and old Materialism -- 3. Idealism as the Basis of Marx’s Materialism -- 4. Marx’s Criticism of Hegel -- 5. Marx and the Young-Hegelians -- 6. Marx’s Dialectical Materialism -- II: Activity and Knowledge -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Marx and Materialism -- 3. Marx and Idealism -- 4. Marx’s Epistemological Method -- 5. Knowledge as Activity -- 6. Marx and Pragmatism -- III: Activity and Philosophy -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Hegel’s Theory of the State -- 3. Marx’s Diagnosis of the State -- 4. The Cure of Society -- IV: Summary and Evaluation -- 1. Materialism -- 2. Epistemology -- 3. Philosophy -- 4. Evaluation -- An English Translation of Marx’s Doctoral Dissertation -- The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature -- Foreword -- One: the Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature in General -- I. The Subject of the Treatise -- II. Judgments Concerning the Relationship of Democritean and Epicurean Physics -- III. Difficulties with Regard to the Identity of the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature -- Two: on the Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Physics in Detail -- I. The Declination of Atoms from a Straight Line -- II. The Qualities of the Atom -- III. Atomoi Archai and Atoma Stoicheia -- IV. Time -- V. The Meteors.

Abstract: This essay attempts to demonstrate the significance of the principle of activity in the philosophy of Karl Marx. The principle of activity in Marx has both a general and a specific meaning. In general the princi­ ple refers to the activist element in Marxian practice motivating both Marx and his contemporary devotees. The specific facet of the principle relates to Marx's philosophy - the principle of activity being that con­ cept which underlies the entire system. Activity for Marx is both a philosophic concept and an element of human experience demanded by his system. Marx, that is, not only theorizes about activity but also illustrates his theory in hislife. Hence, we find the principle of activity both in his writings and in his doings. the words Action, Tiitigkeit, or Praxis to refer to Marx most often used the principle of activity. No major philosopher has fully dealt with the concept of action. We sometimes suppose that action only occurs when we can observe some outward result or motion. Spinoza's definition of action disallows this narrow interpretation of activity. I say that we act when anything is done, either within us or without us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is to say ... when from our nature anything follows, either within us or without, which by that nature alone can be clearly and 1 distinctly understood.

Abstract: 0. Introduction -- 1. Ontology -- 2. Semantics -- 3. The So-Called Logical Relations -- 4. The Traditional Lack of Distinction Between UF and UO -- 5. Merkmal-Eigenschaft -- 6 Function -- 7. The Idea of levels (‘Stufen’) in the Philosophical Tradition -- 8. Wertverlauf -- 9. Existence -- 10. Number -- 11. The Main Results of the Present Investigation -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: 0. Introduction -- 0.1 The linguistic and logical interests of contemporary philosophy -- 0.2 Natural and logistic languages -- 0.3 The concern of the present study -- 0.4 Plan of the book -- Appendix I/Brief historical survey of logistic philosophy -- Appendix II/The different traditions of contemporary semiotics -- One / The logistic analysis of language and the relation of representation -- 1. A Philosophical Revolution -- 2. From the Theory of Knowledge to the Logical Analysis of Language -- 3. From the Psychological Concept to the Graphical Sign -- 4. The Relation of Representation -- Two / The relation of representation of predicate signs and contemporary views on universals -- 5. Bertrand Russell -- 6. Ludwig Wittgenstein -- 7. Rudolf Carnap -- 8. Stanislaw Le?niewski -- 9. W. V. Quine and N. Goodman -- 10. The Interpretations of Predicate Signs -- 11. Conclusion -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: It is the aim of the present study to introduce the reader to the ways of thinking of those contemporary philosophers who apply the tools of symbolic logic to classical philosophical problems. Unlike the "conti­ nental" reader for whom this work was originally written, the English­ speaking reader will be more familiar with most of the philosophers dis­ cussed in this book, and he will in general not be tempted to dismiss them indiscriminately as "positivists" and "nominalists". But the English version of this study may help to redress the balance in another respect. In view of the present emphasis on ordinary language and the wide­ spread tendency to leave the mathematical logicians alone with their technicalities, it seems not without merit to revive the interest in formal ontology and the construction of formal systems. A closer look at the historical account which will be given here, may convince the reader that there are several points in the historical develop­ ment whose consequences have not yet been fully assessed: I mention, e. g. , the shift from the traditional three-level semantics of sense and deno­ tation to the contemporary two-level semantics of representation; the relation of extensional structure and intensional content in the extensional systems of Wittgenstein and Carnap; the confusing changes in labelling the different kinds of analytic and apriori true sentences; etc. Among the philosophically interesting tools of symbolic logic Lesniewski's calculus of names deserves special attention.

Abstract: A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- Z.

Abstract: Introduction: Greatness of Western Man -- Introduction: Greatness of Western Man -- I: Ordinance -- I Philosophy and Myth -- II Disintegration of Phtsis-is-Logos -- III Concealed Re-Entry of Phtsis-is-Logos Into the Western World -- IV Re-Disclosure of Phtsis-is-Logos in Contemporary Times -- II: Philosophy in Philosophies -- V the Early Greek Philosophers -- VI Plato -- VII Aristotle -- VIII Saint Thomas Aquinas -- IX Rene Descartes -- X George Berkeley -- XI Immanuel Kant -- XII Friedrich Nietzsche -- III: Contemporary Man -- XIII Greatness of Contemporary Man -- XIV Scientism -- XV Technology.

Abstract: The present study is not a series of disconnected essays concerning select­ ed Western philosophies. All its parts belong organically together and constitute one whole. For this reason, the reader is warned not to use it as a reference book for one or another philosopher here treated. The study begins with the declaration of the exposition of fundamental event in Western philosophy which prevails with a different hue in each of the major philosophies and which relates these to pre-philosophical or mythical thought. The study then treats selected Western philosophies se­ parately with the tendency to disclose the major event of philosophy in them. Finally it approaches contemporary man from the perspective of the fundamental event in philosophy. An inquiry into Western man's greatness is maintained here all along as intimately bound up with the historical development of philosophy. Philosophy involves greatness - not one of many philosophies, how­ ever, but Philosophy as such. Philosophy as such is not a composite of the various major philosophies in history; it precedes these, and is present in each one of them in a concealed way. It holds sway over them, and they belong to it. Philosophy rules the thought of thinkers; it is the Ordinance which directs the way of thought, and which is responded to by the thought of the thinkers. In this way, the major philosophies in history are diverse phases which, like the bends and turns of a river, belong to Ordinance - to Nature's thought.

Abstract: I / Metaphysics and Experience -- I. Hocking’s Metaphysics: Analyses and Evaluations -- The Making of a Philosopher: Ernest Hocking’s Early Years -- Solipsism Surmounted -- Hocking’s Place in American Metaphysics -- Hocking and the Dilemmas of Modernity -- Hocking’s Contribution to Metaphysical Idealism -- Idealism and Our Experience of Nature -- Preface to Privacy -- Integrity -- 2. Related Problems: Evil, Selfhood, Existence and Artistic Responsibility -- The Problem of Evil -- Is the Self an Ultimate Category? -- Existence and the Life World -- Word Versus Deed in Plato -- II / Religious Philosophy and the World’s Living Religions -- I. The Problem of Religious Knowledge -- A Half-Century of Hocking’s Reflection -- Empiricism in Religious Philosophy -- Biblical Faith and Philosophic Truth -- The Spirit of Indian Philosophy -- 2. The Ecumenical Spirit in the World’s Living Religions -- Tambaram:Twenty-Five Years After -- The Role and Responsibility of the Christian Mission -- Religious Diversity and Religious Reconception -- Problems of Religious Freedom -- Fellowship of the Spirit -- III / Philosophy, Society and a World Civilization -- I. The Meaning of Contemporary History -- Philosophy, Society and Civilization -- Reflections on the Literature of Whither Mankind -- The Interplay of Physics, Politics and Religion in Today’s World -- Pan-Humanism, Culturism and the Federal Union of Europe -- 2. The Meeting of East and West -- Professor Hocking and East-West Philosophy -- Valid Materialism: A Western Offering to Hocking’s Civilization in the Singular -- Indian Philosophy and the West -- Human Personality in East-West Perspectives -- It is Time to Remind the West -- Conclusion -- History and the Absolute -- The Bibliography of William Ernest Hocking.

Abstract: Gabriel Marcel reminds me that I asked him to write for this book. This is quite true, but not the whole story. During the visit with Ernest Hocking which he describes so eloquently in his essay, "Solips­ ism Surmounted," he learned from Hocking's hostess, Elizabeth Hazard, that I was planning hopefully for a Hocking F estschri/t. On his return to Harvard, where he was preparing his James Lectures, he wrote me offering an essay should these plans develop. Encouraged, I kept his letter while I moved my family to India and settled into a new job. When it was possible to begin work on the book in earnest I then made my request, reminding him of his original offer. I mention this because I discovered that his enthusiasm was to be typical of those who came to know about the project. Charles Moore commented that such a book was "long overdue," and Walter Stace spoke for us all when he said: "I am sure that there is no one in our profession who would not wish to be associated with any project in his honor. " Given the wide range of Hocking's interests and influence, it was difficult to know just how the volume should be organized.

Abstract: I. The Problem of Moral Knowledge -- 1. Contemporary sources of moral skepticism -- 2. Hume and the deductive fallacy -- 3. The meaning of moral obligation -- 4. The criteria of knowledge -- 5. Plan of the book -- II. Duty and Goodness -- 1. Types of theory -- 2. The deontologists’ critique of utilitarianism -- 3. Intuitionistic utilitarianism as a theory of moral knowledge -- 4. The identification of goodness and duty -- 5. The “ought-to-be” argument -- 6. The deductive argument-a restatement -- 7. The appeal to self-evidence -- 8. Reductionistic utilitarianism -- 9. Moral goodness and duty -- 10. Duty and goodness and the “ought” and the “is” -- III. Duty and Rightness -- 1. The intuitionism of the deontologists -- 2. Prichard’s “unreasonable” theory -- 3. The self-evidence of our duties -- 4. The duty to keep promises -- 5. Intuition and generalization -- 6. Rightness and duty -- 7. From rightness to duty -- IV. A New Point of View -- 1. Oxford philosophy -- 2. The revolution in philosophy -- 3. Wittgenstein -- 4. Analysis and moral philosophy -- 5. Analysis and the problem of moral knowledge -- V. Duty and Ordinary Language -- 1. An interpretation of Toulmin’s conclusions -- 2. A reinterpretation of Toulmin’s conclusions -- 3. Good reasons and generally accepted reasons -- 4. Toulmin’s theory and the deductive fallacy -- 5. Does Toulmin escape the deductive fallacy? -- 6. Summary comments on Toulmin’s moral theory -- 7. Nowell-Smith and the problem of moral knowledge -- 8. Wittgenstein and the revolution in philosophy -- VI. A Return to Intuitionism -- 1. The deductive fallacy, skepticism, and intuitionism -- 2. A defense of intuitionism -- 3. Knowledge and a plurality of intuitions -- 4. Intuitive self-evidence and moral knowledge -- VII. Reason and Duty -- 1. Two notions of self-evidence -- 2. Preliminary objections -- 3. Duty and good reasons -- 4. A moral axiom -- 5. A story -- 6. Elaboration and comments -- 7. The principle of personal impartiality -- 8. Egoism and morality -- 9. The deductive fallacy -- VIII. Toward a General Theory of Morality -- 1. Outline of a positive theory of obligation -- 2. Practical qualifications -- 3. Morality and utility -- 4. Goodness and the naturalistic fallacy.

Abstract: As its title indicates, this book is concerned with two different fields of philosophy, ethics and epistemology. The bulk of the argument is devoted to epistemological questions, as these arise within the context of morality. Hence, the conclusions I reach could probably best be described as prolegomena to the elaboration of a theory of ethics. I have plans, which I hope will be realized in the next few years, of elaborating such a theory. I started work on Moral Knowledge in the summer of 1958 with the help of a University Faculty Fellowship, for which I am most grateful. of the research for the book, as well as a good bit of its writing, Much was done in two libraries, The University Library, Berkeley, and the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Members of the staffs of both libraries, by their courtesy and helpfulness, lightened immeasurably the task of my research. lowe a special debt of gratitude to four people-to Mr.

Abstract: I. The Semantic Aspect of Plato’s Theory of Ideas -- 1. The first assumption -- 2. The second assumption -- 3. Metaphysics out of semantics -- II. Aristotle’s Way Out -- 1. Some oblique criticisms of Plato’s semantic assumptions -- 2. Universals and particulars -- III. Examination of the Platonic Assumptions -- 1. An attack by empiricists -- 2. A new approach -- IV. A Constructive Move -- 1. Resemblance -- 2. Universals.

Abstract: The primary purpose of this book is to depict the main features of the classical problem of universals in order to provide a better understand­ ing of the various suggestions made by the moderns towards the solution of that problem. The work is not historical; however, since knowledge of the history of the problem is essential for understanding the import of the new approach, references are given to classical theories and interpretations are offered without any pretension that they are either exhaustive or final. I have tried to argue that the problem, though often appearing in metaphysical guise, is, in fact, part of the more general problem of semantics, i.e., the relation between words and the world. The medieval theory that universals are the meaning of general words is linked here with a recent theory that the meaning of a word is explainable in terms of its function and not in terms of its putative denotation. What comes of this fusion is this: that if the medieval theory that universals are the meaning of general words is in any way credible, then to know the meaning of such words requires close attention to their functions on the ground that words in general do not mirror the world, rather they are tools used to change it.

Abstract: I. The Nature of the Problems and Some Previously Suggested Solutions -- I. An outline of the problems to be considered -- II. An outline of some contemporary writers -- III. A statement of the problems to be solved, and the procedure to be followed -- II. An Examination of the Concept of “Self Evidence” in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching -- I. The nature of the problem, some preliminary considerations, and an outline of the procedure to be followed -- II. S. Thomas’s teaching concerning the concept of “self evidence” in natural law precepts -- III. The role of the Thomistic concept naturalis inclinatio in our knowledge of self-evident natural law precepts -- IV. A critical assessment of some of the precepts suggested by contemporary writers as being self-evident, together with a summary of the main findings of this chapter -- III. The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle -- I. Recapitulation -- II. The problem of the character of precepts which are not self-evident -- III. The problem in the Commentary on the Sentences -- IV. The Problem in the Summa Contra Gentiles -- V. The problem in the Commentary on the Ethics -- IV. The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Summa Theologica -- The History of the text -- Method of presentation to be followed -- V. Some Comments on the Validity and Usefulness of the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Precepts -- I. A statement of the aims of this chapter and an outline of the procedure to be followed -- II. Our assessment of S. Thomas’s teaching on the possibility of “logical extension” in natural law -- III. A final assessment of S. Thomas’s teaching on primary and secondary precepts, and their division -- IV. The validity and value of the distinction between primary and secondary precepts -- VI. The Concept of Variability Among the Secondary Precepts of Natural Law -- I. A discussion on the aims of this chapter and the procedure to be followed -- II. Mere historical changes in positive moral beliefs -- III. Historical changes correlated with the rational development of man -- IV. Changes in natural law due to the intrinsic complexity of certain particular situations -- V. The variability of decisions in particular situations due to the contingency of principles -- VI. Variability in natural law due to the “non-obligatory” character of positively formulated precepts -- VII. Variability in natural law due to changes in the intrinsic structure of society -- Conclusion -- Index of Authors.

Abstract: Never before in the history of mankind has there been a period when hitherto accepted moral principles have been more severely tested. The agonized cry of a world smitten by two major wars in a handful of years leaves no doubt in the minds of many that natural law ethics, ifit is to have relevance and to survive, must provide at least the outline of an answer to the problems of every day living. To date, many hundreds of books and articles have been written setting forth with great eloquence the basic and immutable principles of natural law ethics. But too often these discussions fail to consider, in their agonizing detail, situations where there is a choice between conflicting values, conflicting loyalties, conflicting ideas and duties, each of which has a claim to recognition. It is only in the isolation of the particular case that the frightening dilemmas of natural law can be most clearly experienced. To give just two illustrations.

Abstract: 1 Introduction: Some Concepts and Definitions -- 1.0 Arguments and Argument Forms -- 1.1 Symbolic Logic and its Precursors -- 1.2 Symbolization -- 1.3 Logical Functors and Their Definitions -- 1.4 Tests of Validity Using Truth-tables -- 1.5 Proof and Derivation -- 1.6 The Axiomatic Method -- 1.7 Interpreted and Uninterpreted Systems -- 1.8 The Hierarchy of Logical Systems -- 1.9 The Systems of the Present Book -- 1.10 Abbreviations -- 2 The System P+ -- 2.1 Summary -- 2.2 Rules of Formation of P+ -- 2.3 Rules of Transformation of P+ -- 2.4 Axioms of P+ -- 2.5 Definitions of P+ -- 2.6 Deductions in P+ -- 3 Standard Systems with Negation (PLT, PLT’, PLTF, PPM) -- 3.1 Summary -- 3.2 Rules of Formation of PLT -- 3.3 Rules of Transformation of PLT -- 3.4 Axioms of PLT -- 3.5 Definitions of PLT -- 3.6 Deductions in PLT -- 3.7 The Deduction Theorem -- 3.8 The System PLT’ -- 3.9 Independence of Functors and Axioms -- 4 The System PND. Systems of Natural Deduction -- 4.1 Summary -- 4.2 The Bases of the System PND -- 4.3 Proof and Derivation Techniques in PND -- 4.4 Rules of Formation of PND -- 4.5 The Structure of Proofs in PND -- 4.6 Rules of Transformation of PND -- 4.7 Proofs and Theorems of the System PND -- 4.8 Theorems of the Full System PND -- 4.9 A Decision Procedure for the System PND -- 4.10 A Reduction of PND -- 5 The Consistency and Completeness of Formal Systems -- 5.1 Summary -- 5.2 The Consistency of PLT’ -- 5.3 The Completeness of PLT’ -- 5.4 Metatheorems on P+ -- 6 Some Non-Standard Systems of Propositional Logic -- 6.1 Summary -- 6.2 What is a Non-Standard System? -- 6.3 The Intuitionistic System and the Fitch Calculus (PI and PF) -- 6.4 Rules of Formation of PI -- 6.5 Rules of Transformation of PI -- 6.6 Axioms of PI -- 6.7 Definitions of PI -- 6.8 Deductions in PI -- 6.9 The Propositional Logic of F.B. Fitch -- 6.10 The Johansson Minimum Calculus -- 7 The Lower Functional Calculus -- 7.1 Summary and Remarks -- 7.2 Rules of Formation of LFLT’ -- 7.3 Transformation of LFLT’ -- 7.4 Axioms of LFLT’ -- 7.5 Definitions of LFLT’ -- 7.6 Some Applications and Illustrations -- 7.7 Rules of Transformation of LFLT’ -- 7.8 Axioms of LFLT’ -- 7.9 The Propositional Calculus and LFLT’ -- 7.10 Deductions in LFLT’ -- 8 An Extension of LFLT’ and Some Theorems of the Higher Functional System. The Calculus of Classes -- 8.1 Summary and Modification of the Formation Rules of LFLT’ -- 8.2 The Lower Functional Calculus with Identity -- 8.3 Quantification over Predicate Variables. The System 2FLT’= -- 8.4 Abstraction and the Boolean Algebra -- 8.5 The Boolean Algebra and Propositional Logic -- 9 The Logical Paradoxes -- 9.1 Self Membership -- 9.2 The Russell Paradox -- 9.3 Order Distinctions, Levels of Language, and the Semantic Paradoxes -- 9.4 The Consistency of LFLT’ -- 9.5 The Decision Problem -- 9.6 Consistency and Decision in Higher Functional Systems -- 10 Non-Standard Functional Systems -- 10.1 Summary -- 10.2 Intuitionistic and Johansson Functional Logics -- 10.3 The Fitch Functional Calculus of the First Order with Identity (LFFF=).

Abstract: The present work constitutes an effort to approach the subject of symbol­ ic logic at the elementary to intermediate level in a novel way. The book is a study of a number of systems, their methods, their rela­ tions, their differences. In pursuit of this goal, a chapter explaining basic concepts of modern logic together with the truth-table techniques of definition and proof is first set out. In Chapter 2 a kind of ur-Iogic is built up and deductions are made on the basis of its axioms and rules. This axiom system, resembling a propositional system of Hilbert and Ber­ nays, is called P +, since it is a positive logic, i. e. , a logic devoid of nega­ tion. This system serves as a basis upon which a variety of further sys­ tems are constructed, including, among others, a full classical proposi­ tional calculus, an intuitionistic system, a minimum propositional calcu­ lus, a system equivalent to that of F. B. Fitch (Chapters 3 and 6). These are developed as axiomatic systems. By means of adding independent axioms to the basic system P +, the notions of independence both for primitive functors and for axiom sets are discussed, the axiom sets for a number of such systems, e. g. , Frege's propositional calculus, being shown to be non-independent. Equivalence and non-equivalence of systems are discussed in the same context. The deduction theorem is proved in Chapter 3 for all the axiomatic propositional calculi in the book.

Abstract: I: The Specification of Logic as a Science -- I. Preliminary View of What Logic Is -- II. Relation of Logic to Other Sciences -- III. The Subject of Logic -- II: The Nature of the Subject of Logic -- IV. Rationate Being -- V. Intentions -- VI. Relations -- III: The Intentions of the three Acts of Reason -- VII. The Intention of Universality -- VIII. The Intention of Attribution -- IX. The Intention of Consequence -- Conclusion.

Abstract: Ever since philosophy became conscious of itself, there has been a problem of the relations between the real world which philosophy sought to understand and explain, and the thought by which it sought to explain it. It was found that thought had certain requirements and conditions of its own. If the real world was to be understood through thought, there was a question whether thought and the real correspond­ ed in all respects, and therefore whether they had the same conditions and laws, or whether some of these were peculiar to thought alone. For the solution of this problem it was necessary to study thought and the process of knowing and the conditions which the manner of know­ ing placed upon our interpretation of the real. With a consciousness of the peculiarities of thought and of its laws, philosophers could then more surely make use of it to arrive at the knowledge of the real world which they were seeking, without danger of reading into the real what is peculiar to thought. This necessity gave rise to the science of logic, a science which is still necessary, and for the same reasons. It has an importance in philosophy which it is disastrous to overlook.

Abstract: I. Introduction -- 1. John Grote’s Life -- 2. Writings -- 3. Statement, and Division, of the Problem -- 4. Survey of Sources and of Previous Work on the Problem -- 5. Transition to Next Chapter -- II. Grote’s View of Phenomenalism -- I. Distinction of Terms: ‘Noumenon,’ ‘Phenomenon,’ and ‘Thing in Itself’ -- 2. What Phenomenalism Means -- 3. Phenomenal Reality -- 4. Two Tests of Phenomenalism -- 5. The Phenomenalist Spirit or Mind -- 6. Summary and Foreword to Next Chapter -- III. Grote’s Interpretation of the Relation of Phenomenalism to Philosophy -- 1. Each is Necessary to the Other -- 2. Consciousness as Active and Passive -- 3. Analysis of Sensation -- 4. Time and Space -- 5. The Relationship of Phenomenalism to Philosophy Further Illustrated -- 6. Relationship Through Contrast -- 7. Mind Provides Unity -- 8. Grote Avoids A Basic Blunder in Behaviorism -- 9. Kant’s Abstraction of Phenomenal Reality from Reason -- 10. Abstracting of Consciousness from Phenomena is Unwarranted -- 11. Historical Recapitulation -- 12. Main Contribution of the Chapter, with Comment -- 13. Transition to Next Chapter -- IV. Philosophy As Consciousness and the Ego -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Ferrier’s Treatment of Philosophy and Phenomenalism -- 3. Criticism of Grote and Ferrier on the Basis of Lotze’s Position -- 4. Meaning of ‘Know,’ and ‘Know About,’ in Reference to Phenomenal Reality -- 5. Relativity of Knowledge -- 6. Summary of Main Issues -- V. ‘Philosophy’ and the Scale of Sensation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Importance of the Scale of Sensation -- 3. Two Kinds of Knowledge — ‘Higher’ and ‘Lower’ -- 4. Hamilton, Mill and Reid Compared -- 5. Descartes and Hamilton -- 6. Proper Use of Certain Terms in Relation to the Scale of Sensation -- 7. Critical Reflection on the Foregoing Chapter -- VI. Phenomenalist Logic and Knowledge -- 1. Introductory -- 2. Grote’s Own Position Revealed Through Criticism of Hamilton and Mill -- 3. Phenomenalism Inadequate For A Perfect Scheme of Knowledge -- 4. Critical Observations and Analyses -- VII. The Introspective Method in Knowledge -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Locke’s Psychology -- 3. Hume’s Rationalism -- 4. Berkeley’s Subjectivism -- 5. Spencer’s and Morell’s Evolutionism -- 6. Retrospect and Prospect -- VIII. Immediateness and Reflection -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Purpose of the Chapter in Introducing These Terms -- 3. Meaning of Immediateness and Reflection -- 4. Significance of Immediateness and Reflection in Grote’s Philosophy -- 5. Critical Comment -- 6. Relation to the Following Chapter -- IX. Personalism in Grote’s Writings -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Epistemological Monism -- 3. Monistic, Pluralistic, and Theistic Personalism -- 4. Critique of Materialism -- 5. Critical Comment -- 6. Summary and Transition to Next Chapter -- X. Grote’s Idealism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Grote’s Platonism -- 3. Critique of Utilitarianism -- 4. A Critique of Moral Ideals -- 5. Critical Remarks -- 6. Concluding Note to this Chapter -- Conclusion -- 1. Grote’s Position in the History of Philosophy -- 2. Further Critical Comment -- Appendix: An Exposition of the Miscellaneous Writings of John Grote -- I. “On A Furture State” -- 1. Glorification of body and mind -- 2. Simplicity of style and thought in this article -- 3. Effect of present life on the future -- 4. Manner of individual appearance in a future life is unimportant -- 5. Stress on the importance of both present and future life -- 6. Comment -- II. “On Glossology” -- 1. Concerning terminology -- i. Break in Grote’s projected work on glossology -- ii.’ Phone’ and ‘noem’ -- iii.’ Phonism’ and ‘noematism’ -- iv. Ideas of physical ‘things’ -- v. Stomatism -- vi. ‘Hypophonism’ -- 2. The philosophy of language -- i. Four divisions -- ii. ‘Noematism’ -- iii. ‘Noematoschematism’ -- iv.’ Phonarium’ -- v. ‘Dianoematism’ -- vi. In extreme cases the modification in noematism is very great -- 3. Criticism of Tooke -- 4. Criticism of Trench -- 5. Comment -- III. “Thought vs. Learning” -- 1. A contrast -- 2. Use of one’s own mind is of chief importance -- 3. Thought and learning stagnation -- 4. Comment -- IV. “Pascal and Montaigne” -- 1. A brief comparison -- 2. Pascal’s devotion to religion -- 3. Montaigne’s neopaganism -- 4. Pascal on happiness -- 5. Comment -- V. “On the Dating of Ancient History” -- 1. Dating of events by two methods — epochal and eponymous -- 2. Dynastical reckoning -- 3. Olympiadic dating -- 4. Dating by lunar months -- 5. Dating originating in Christendom -- 6. Other methods of dating -- 7. Present and future methods of dating -- VI. “Origin and Meaning of Roman Names” -- 1. Significance of ‘nomen,’ ‘praenomen,’ and ‘cognomen’ -- 2. Criticism of Plutarch -- 3. Change in a Roman name -- 4. Criticism of Varro’s view -- 5. Present-day names based on Roman rather than on Greek -- VII. Conclusion to Miscellaneous Writings -- Chronological Bibliography of the Writings of John Grote -- General Bibliography.

Abstract: An objective of this book is to discuss some of the contributions made by John Grote to philosophy. This work is an extension of a dissertation written for the doctorate at Boston University. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance in many places to Professor Peter A. Bertocci and the late Professor Edgar S. Brightman both of whom read the entire manuscript in its original form. Also, the author acknowledges the encouraging interest and support of his wife, Helen, whose many suggestions have improved the writing and without whose assistance this work would not have been accomplished. The author assumes complete responsibility for whatever errors or deficiencies appear in the book. All known writings of Grote are listed and the more important ones analyzed. LAUCHLIN D. MACDONALD CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1. JOHN GROTE'S LIFE i. Sketch of his life John Grote will remain best known by reason of the thought formu­ lated in the Exploratio Philosophica, or Rough Notes on Modern I ntellectu­ al Science. To the philosophical world of his own time he was well known as the teacher who ably held the chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge from r855 until the year of his death, r866, to the Knightbridge Professor, William Whewell whose in succession Philosophy of Science is the subject of at least one chapter of the Exploratio Philosophica. Grote's birthplace was Beckenham in Kent, and the date, May 5, r8r3.

Abstract: One/Historical Section -- I. The impact of communist ideology in hungary prior to 1945 -- II. The Evolution of Hungarian Marxism-Leninism Under Communist Rule -- two/Systematic Section -- III. A Review of Current Results -- IV. The Official Projects -- V. Who is who in Hungarian Marxism-Leninism -- VI. The Scientific, Educational and Cultural Institutions -- VII. The Major Marxist-Leninist Periodicals -- Three/Bibliographic Section -- VIII. Introduction -- IX. Bibliography of Books, Monographs, and Dissertations on Problems of Communism in Hungary from 1945 Through 1964 -- X. Bibliography of Studies and Articles on Problems of Communism from 1945 Through 1964.

Abstract: The immediate purpose of this handbook is to aid further research by stating, in a form providing handy reference, the facts concerning the Communist ideology in Hungary Following a narrative of the vicissitudes of that ideology prior to its power-phase - intended as a general introduction contributing to the proper assessment of the 1945-1965 period, which is the main concern of this book - the essential and relevant facts concerning the events, issues, organizations and opinions which have shaped post-war Hungarian Marxism­ Leninism are set out without indulging in lengthy commentaries and personal value-judgements. (Since even the 1956 revolution is treated thus - perhaps the most important, and certainly the most controversial single event of the above period - I should add that the reader interested in finding a detailed analysis and evaluation of the ideological relevance of that event may refer to my Individualism Collectivism and Political Power, The Hague, 1963, pp. 111-140. ) Despite the specificity of much of the data, sufficient translations of Hungarian titles, names and terms have been provided to render the present book useful for the investigator regardless of whether or not he reads Hungarian. But the fundamental purpose of this volume is to make a modest contribution to East-West understanding. It has arisen from the belief that the lessening of world-tensions is best served by understanding, and understanding is best served by objective information.

Abstract: I. Teil: Gegenwärtigung als Statischer und Genetischer Urmodus der Welterfahrung -- A. Einführung in den ersten Problembereich der Untersuchung -- B. Die zunächst aufweisbaren Strukturen der Wahrnehmungsgegenwart -- C. Gegenwärtigung als Urkonstitution der Wahrnehmungswelt -- D. Die Protention -- E. Die Unterscheidung von noematischer und noetischer Zeitigung -- F. Die Konstitution der Allzeitlichkeiten -- II. Teil: Lebendige Gegenwart als Urmodus Ichlicher Lebendigkeit -- A. Einführung in den zweiten Problembezirk der Untersuchung -- B. Die radikalisierte Reduktion -- C. Selbstgegenwärtigung und Selbstkonstitution -- D. Die Rätsel der lebendigen Gegenwart -- E. Die ständige Funktionsgegenwart als allzeitliches nunc stans -- F. Zurückführung der Rätsel der lebendigen Gegenwart auf das eine Rätsel der Einheit von Stehen und Strömen -- III. Teil: Entwurf Eines Rückgangs auf das Anonyme Nunc Stans -- A. Aufgabenstellung -- B. Die Funktionsgegenwart als „absolutes Faktum“ -- C. Die Analogie vom Mitgegenwart und Selbstgegenwart.

Abstract: I. Introduction to Franz Brentano’s Philosophy -- 1. Problems of Interpretation -- 2. General -- II. The Early Position -- 1. About the concept of truth. Early criticism of the correspondence theory -- 2. Arguments for the Existence of entia rationis -- III. The Transition -- 1. Analysis of Linguistic Function -- 2. Arguments against the Existence of entia rationis -- IV. The Transition and Background -- 1. Mental Acts -- 2. Judgements -- 3. An attempt to retain the correspondence theory without entia rationis -- V. Late position (critical part) -- 1. Criticism of the correspondence formula res -- 2. Criticism of the correspondence formula intellectus and adequatio -- VI. Late position (positive part) -- 1. Truth -- 2. Evidence -- VII. Ramifications of the analysis of truth -- 1. Self-evident judgements, ‘a priori’ and ‘a posterioir’ -- 2. The relation between self-evident and demonstrable knowledge -- Concluding Remarks -- Appendices.

Abstract: Franz Brentano 1 was an important philosopher, but for a long time his importance was under-estimated. At least in the English speaking countries, he came to be remembered best as the initiator of a philoso­ phical position which he in fact abandoned for good and sufficient 2 reasons. His ultimate and most important contributions passed almost unnoticed. Even such a well-informed and well-prepared book as Passmore's IOO Years of Philosophy (Duckworth, I957), is open to the same comment; Passmore concentrated his attention on the early Brentano, because he regarded his influence on the British philo­ sophical scene as being confined to Brentano's early work. Brentano's pupils, e. g. , Husserl, Meinong, Marty and Twardowski, were often influential and, often enough, they departed from the strict common­ sense and advisedly cautious attitude of their great teacher. Thus even on the continent, the public image of Brentano tended to be incomplete (and sometimes distorted), outside the narrower circle of pupils, followers, and people with special interest. This, or very nearly this, was still the case in I955, when my contacts with the followers of Twardowski made me turn towards the study of Brentano. Since then there has been a gratifying revival of interest in his work. His early book on Aristotle was reprinted in German and two of his main positions, Psychologie and Wahrheit und Evidenz, are appearing in English translations. Translations into other languages, e. g.

Abstract: The Nature of the Human Intellect as it is Expounded in Themistius’ “Paraphrasis in Libros Aristotelis de Anima” -- The Theory of Will in St. John Damascene -- Idea and Concept: a Key to Epistemology -- Divine Providence in St. Thomas Aquinas -- Descartes on Distinction -- Hegel and the Doctrine of Historicity of Vladimir Solovyov -- The Salient Features of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Knowledge -- A. Metaphysical Critique of Method: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

Abstract: Hegel once said that philosophy is the "world stood on its head" and Karl Marx credited his own philosophic genius with setting the Hegel­ ian world right side up again. But both of these intellectual Atlases of the philosophical sphere that hid before our mind's eye a symbol bears further reflection. Philosophy down the ages has always involved at least two elements, first, the universe of being as its objective pole and second, man gazing into this crystallic sphere as the subjective pole. The "world" of Hegel and Marx and of most philosophers can be interpreted to mean the world we know and live in and about which all philosophers wonder. Thus for the philosopher - whoever he be - the concern of his interest is not limited to any particular segment of reality and no thing is off-limits to the beams of his mental radar. Yet this scope seems to many too vast and proud an enterprise. The philosopher seems to leap upon his horse and ride off in all directions at once. He is the day dreamer who indulges in fantasy and escapes from the world of practical concern and anxiety. On the other hand the reflective person must concede that it is the ideas ofthe philosophers more than the strategems of the generals that have shaped history and destinies.

Abstract: The Ethics of Belief -- On Beliefs and Believing -- Substance and Experience -- Panentheism in Neo-Platonism -- Ultimacy and the Philosophical Field of Metaphysics.

Abstract: I Introduction -- 1. Terminology -- 2. Logic, Methodology and Science -- II The Phenomenological Method -- 3. General Remarks -- 4. “Back to the Things Themselves” -- 5. The Object of Phenomenological Investigation -- III Semiotic Methods -- 6. General Remarks -- 7. Formalism -- 8. Rules of Syntactic Meaning -- 9. Semantic Functions and Types -- 10. Semantic Meaning and Verifiability -- 11. Example of Semantic Methods in Practice -- IV The Axiomatic Method -- 12. General Remarks -- 13. The Axiomatic System -- 14. Mathematical Logic -- 15. Definition and Concept Formation -- 16. Example of the Axiomatic Method in Practice -- V Reductive Methods -- 17. General Remarks -- 18. The Structure of the Natural Sciences -- 19. Types of Explanatory Statements -- 20. Induction -- 21. Probability and Statistics -- 22. Historical Method -- Epilogue Guide to Further Reading -- Index of Persons -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: Professor Bochenski, as he himself points out in the prologue, is a logician; he is best known in England and the United States for his work in the history of logic, and more recently in Soviet and East European philosophy. But he has taught philosophy for many years - in Rome, in Switzerland, and on a number of visits to the United States - and in this book provides an elementary introduction to contemporary work in the field. As a means to this end he has chosen to deal with four alternative methods employed by philosophers in the twentieth century. Philosophical methodology has not attracted much attention, in English­ speaking circles, as a distinct branch of the discipline of philosophy; the term "methodologist", if used at all, would ordinarily be taken to refer to somebody concerned with scientific rather than philosophical method. When, therefore, Professor Bochenski refers, as he frequently does, to "contemporary methodologists", meaning people who debate the re­ spective merits of phenomenology and mathematical logic as ways of approaching the world, the phrase has an odd ring. But philosophical methodology really makes a great deal more sense than scientific method­ ology. In science methodology is almost superfluous; given all the avail­ able information and a reasonably clear idea of what is wanted, there is usually not much ambiguity as to the means of getting it, or not much that could be resolved by mere argument.

Abstract: 1. The Problem -- 2. A Critique of Reason -- 3. Subjectivity -- 4. The Paradox -- 5. The Christian Purpose served by the PostscriptKierkegaar -- 6. The Anti-Christianity of the Postscript -- 7. Index.

Abstract: The Existence of Augustinian “Metaphysics” -- Mutability and Immutability -- Being and Non-Being -- Self-Identity -- Creation and Formation -- Truth -- Participation -- Analogy -- “Essence” and Creatures -- “ Essence” and God.

Abstract: The properly metaphysical dimension of Augustine's thought has received little special attention among scholars - even "Scholastics. " The Thomist metaphysicians - especially we "Anglo-Saxon" ones - receive first honors for being the most neglectful of all. Why? I t is a puzzling phenomenon particularly in the light of the fact (recognized by almost every Thomist) that the very existence of Thomas the theologian is inconceivable apart from his pre-eminent Christian mentor in the intellectual life, the Bishop of Hippo. It is a puzzling phenomenon because, although the Christian metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas is not the Christian metaphysics of Augustine, these metaphysics could not be simply opposed to one another, else the theologies wherein they exercise the indispensable function of vital rational organs would themselves be discordant. But what respectable "Scholas­ tic" would deny that, in their essential teaching about God and the things of God, the thought of these two masters is remarkably congruent? May I suggest that one of the major reasons for this paradoxical neglect of Augustinian metaphysics on the part of Thomists (above all, in the English-speaking world) is their simplistic assumption that whereas Aquinas was an Aristotelian in phi­ losophy, Augustine was a Platonist, despite the fact that in theology they were substantially at one - as if there could be theological agreement, formally speaking, even where there is metaphysical disagreement, formally speaking.

Abstract: One / The Preparatory Phase -- I. Franz Brentano (1838–1917): Forerunner of the Phenomenological Movement -- II. Carl Stumpf (1848–1936): Founder of Experimental Phenomenology -- Two / The German Phase of the Movement -- III. The Pure Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) -- IV. The Older Phenomenological Movement -- V. The Phenomenology of Essences: Max Scheler (1874–1928) -- VI. Martin Heidegger (1889-) as a Phenomenologist -- VII. Phenomenology in the Critical Ontology of Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950).

Abstract: The present attempt to introduce the general philosophical reader to the Phenomenological Movement by way of its history has itself a history which is pertinent to its objective. It may suitably be opened by the following excerpts from a review which Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University, the Head of the Division for International Cultural Cooperation, Department of Cultural Activities of Unesco from 1953 to 56, wrote in 1950 from France: The influence of Husserl has revolutionized continental philosophies, not because his philosophy has become dominant, but because any philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method. It is the sine qua non of critical respectability. In America, on the contrary, phenomenology is in its infancy. The aver­ age American student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the "tricks" of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real import of what is said into the kind of analysis with which he is familiar. . . . . . . No doubt, American education will gradually take account of the spread of phenomenological method and terminology, but until it does, American readers of European philosophy have a severe handicap; and this applies not only to existentialism but to almost all current philosophicalliterature.

Abstract: I. Introduction -- II. Socrates’ Moral Problem -- I. Justice: Internal and External -- II. Self-Knowledge and its Problems -- III. On the Nature of the Self -- III. The Problem of Art or Techne -- I. The Analysis of Art -- II. The Whole of Art -- III. Does a Doctrine of the Final Good Exist? -- IV. The Mystical Choice Again, and its Alternative -- V. Summary -- IV. The Problem of Knowledge -- I. On the Earlier Theory of Ideas -- II. The Limits and Conditions of Discourse -- III. The Doctrine and Art of Definition -- IV. Opinion and Image -- V. Knowledge-Theory and Self-Knowledge -- V. The Platonic Universe -- I. The Problem of the Universe of Discourse -- II. The Development of the Platonic Universe -- III. The Unity of the Final Universe -- IV. Knowledge in the New Cosmos -- V. Self-Knowledge and the Microcosm -- VI. Philosophy and Myth -- VI. Conclusion and Criticism -- I. Recapitulation: Ignorance and Self-Knowledge -- II. The Question of Immortality -- III. A Platonic View of the Person.

Abstract: This book is intended to offer an interpretation of an important aspect of Plato's philosophy. The matter to be interpreted will be the Platonic myths and doctrines which bear upon self-knowledge and self-ignorance. It is difficult to say in a word just what sort of thing an interpretation is. Rather than attempting to provide a set of rules or meta-rules supposed to define the ideally perfect interpretation, several distinctions will be suggested. I should like to distinguish the philological scholar from the inter­ preter by saying that the latter uses what the former produces. The function of the scholarly examination of a text is to make an ancient (or foreign) writing available to the contemporary reader. The scholar solves grammatical, lexical, and historical problems and renders his author readable by the person who lacks this scholarly learning and technique. The function of the interpreter is to make use of such available writings in order to render their content more intelligible and useful to a given audience. Thus, he thinks through this content, explains, and re-expresses it in a form which can be easily related to problems, persons, doctrines, or events of another epoch or of another class of readers. At the minimum, the interpretation of a philosophic writing may be thought to prepare its teaching for application to matters which belong in another time or context. Detailed application of a doctrine is, of course, still another thing.

Abstract: Religious Reformers -- Xenophanes of Colophon -- Heraclitus of Ephesus -- Philosophers of Nature -- The Tranformists -- Anaximander of Miletus -- The Agenetists -- 1. Anaxagoras of Klazomenai -- Epilogue.

Abstract: Again and again and again: PHILOSOPHIA FIAT, QUAE PHILOLOGIA FUIT! As a consequence of certain developments in these last hundred years, ancient philosophy has been slipping from the hands of philosophers to become finally an almost exclusive domain of philologists. This has been happening not only because a tremendous amount of genuinely philological work had to be done, and still is needed, in collecting and textually adjusting the pertinent material, but also because a thorough knowledge and command of the ancient languages has become ever more and more of a rarity among philosophers, unfortunately. From the viewpoint of philosophical culture, this is disastrous. For most philologists are in a state of innocence as far as philosophy is concerned. Of course, they themselves are not aware of it. But the tragicomical fact remains: They have all the answers and do not know the questions. And so, led astray by philosophical miscon­ ceptions, they even commit appalling philological blunders every once in a while.

Abstract: I. Introduction to Franz Brentano’s Philosophy -- 1. Problems of Interpretation -- 2. General -- II. The Early Position -- 1. About the concept of truth. Early criticism of the correspondence theory -- 2. Arguments for the Existence of entia rationis -- III. The Transition -- 1. Analysis of Linguistic Function -- 2. Arguments against the Existence of entia rationis -- IV. The Transition and Background -- 1. Mental Acts -- 2. Judgements -- 3. An attempt to retain the correspondence theory without entia rationis -- V. Late position (critical part) -- 1. Criticism of the correspondence formula res -- 2. Criticism of the correspondence formula intellectus and adequatio -- VI. Late position (positive part) -- 1. Truth -- 2. Evidence -- VII. Ramifications of the analysis of truth -- 1. Self-evident judgements, ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’ -- 2. The relation between self-evident and demonstrable knowledge -- Concluding Remarks -- Appendices.

Abstract: Franz Brentano 1 was an important philosopher, but for a long time his importance was under-estimated. At least in the English speaking countries, he came to be remembered best as the initiator of a philoso­ phical position which he in fact abandoned for good and sufficient 2 reasons. His ultimate and most important contributions passed almost unnoticed. Even such a well-informed and well-prepared book as Passmore's IOO Years 01 Philosophy (Duckworth, 1957), is open to the same comment; Passmore concentrated his attention on the early Brentano, because he regarded his influence on the British philo­ sophical scene as being confined to Brentano's early work. Brentano's pupils, e. g. , Husserl, Meinong, Marty and Twardowski, were often influential and, often enough, they departed from the strict common­ sense and advisedly cautious attitude of their great teacher. Thus even on the continent, the public image of Brentano tended to be incomplete (and sometimes distorted), outside the narrower circle of pupils, followers, and people with special interest. This, or very nearly this, was still the case in 1955, when my contacts with the followers of Twardowski made me turn towards the study of Brentano. Since then there has been a gratifying revival of interest in his work. His early book on Aristotle was reprinted in German and two of his main positions, Psychologie and Wahrheit und Evidenz, are appearing in English translations. Translations into other languages, e. g.