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  • HeBIS  (6)
  • Online-Ressource  (6)
  • Cambridge : Cambridge University Press  (6)
  • Kollektiventscheidung  (6)
  • Wirtschaftswissenschaften  (6)
  • 1
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Handbook of computational social choice (2016)
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Details
    ISBN: 9781107446984
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (xv, 535 Seiten) , Diagramme
    Paralleltitel: Erscheint auch als
    DDC: 302/.130285
    RVK:
    ST 650
    RVK:
    QC 160
    RVK:
    SK 830
    Schlagwort(e): Informatik ; Social choice ; Interdisciplinary research ; Computer science ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Computerunterstütztes Verfahren ; Public-Choice-Theorie ; Informatik ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Public-Choice-Theorie ; Computerunterstütztes Verfahren ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Informatik
    Anmerkung: Auf der Frontpage: "Online publication date: May 2016" , Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 May 2016)
    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107446984
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107446984
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
    HU Berlin
    München BSB
    BSZ
    GBV
    KOBV
    HeBIS
    BVB
  • 2
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Incentives : motivation and the economics of information (2006)
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    Details
    ISBN: 9780511617430
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (xii, 591 pages)
    Ausgabe: Second edition.
    DDC: 302/.13
    RVK:
    QC 010
    Schlagwort(e): Motivation ; Informationsökonomie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Wirtschaftliches Verhalten ; Anreiz ; Asymmetrische Information ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Public-Choice-Theorie
    Kurzfassung: This book, first published in 2006, examines the incentives at work in a wide range of institutions to see how and how well coordination is achieved by informing and motivating individual decision makers. The book examines the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs. It investigates the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to kidney transplants, to see if they enhance general well being. The book examines a broad range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets, to the entire economy. The analysis is conducted using specific worked examples, lucid general theory, and illustrations drawn from news stories. Of the seventy different topics and sections, only twelve require a knowledge of calculus. The second edition offers new chapters on auctions, matching and assignment problems, and corporate governance. Boxed examples are used to highlight points of theory and are separated from the main text.
    Anmerkung: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617430
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
    HeBIS
  • 3
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Decisions and elections : explaining the unexpected (2001)
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    Details
    ISBN: 9780511606076
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (xiii, 240 pages)
    DDC: 658.4/03
    RVK:
    QC 020
    Schlagwort(e): Arrow, Kenneth Joseph ; Sen, Amartya ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Wahl ; Entscheidungsfindung
    Kurzfassung: It is not uncommon to be frustrated by the outcome of an election or a decision in voting, law, economics, engineering, and other fields. Does this 'bad' result reflect poor data or poorly informed voters? Or does the disturbing conclusion reflect the choice of the decision/election procedure? Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow's famed theorem has been interpreted to mean 'no decision procedure is without flaws'. Similarly, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen dashes hope for individual liberties by showing their incompatibility with societal needs. This highly accessible book offers a new, different interpretation and resolution of Arrow's and Sen's theorems. Using simple mathematics, it shows that these negative conclusions arise because, in each case, some of their assumptions negate other crucial assumptions. Once this is understood, not only do the conclusions become expected, but a wide class of other phenomena can also be anticipated.
    Anmerkung: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606076
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
    HeBIS
  • 4
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Domain conditions in social choice theory (2001)
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Details
    ISBN: 0511016239 , 0511118988 , 0511492308 , 0521791022 , 9780511016233 , 9780511118982 , 9780511492303 , 9780521791021
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 153 pages)
    DDC: 302/.13
    RVK:
    MB 2520
    RVK:
    QC 160
    RVK:
    SK 850
    Schlagwort(e): PSYCHOLOGY / Social Psychology ; Social choice ; Voorkeur ; Wiskundige modellen ; Besliskunde ; Domein (wiskunde) ; Existentie van oplossingen ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Mathematisches Modell ; Decision making / Mathematical models ; Social choice / Mathematical models ; Mathematisches Modell ; Social choice Mathematical models ; Decision making Mathematical models ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Mathematisches Modell ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Mathematisches Modell
    Anmerkung: Includes bibliographical references (pages 131-145) and index , 1 - Introduction -- - 2 - Notation, definitions, and two fundamental theorems -- - 3 - The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives -- - 4 - Arrovian social welfare functions, nonmanipulable voting procedures and stable group decision functions -- - 5 - Restrictions on the distribution of individuals' preferences -- - 6 - The existence of social choice rules in n-dimensional continuous space -- - 7 - Concluding remarks , "Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K.J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied, together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over 40 theorems associated with domain conditions." , "Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students."--Jacket
    URL: Volltext
    URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492303
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
    München BSB
    HeBIS
    BVB
  • 5
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Social choice : a framework for collective decisions and individual judgements (1992)
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    Details
    ISBN: 9780511521911
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 152 pages)
    DDC: 302/.13
    RVK:
    QC 160
    RVK:
    MR 2200
    Schlagwort(e): Kollektiventscheidung
    Kurzfassung: This textbook provides a survey of the literature of social choice. It integrates the ethical aspects of the subject, (discussing potentially desirable conditions for social judgements) with positive aspects of decision mechanisms that centre on the revelation of true preferences. The literature on the subject presently consists of a great many papers. This book draws them together in common notation and points out interpretations which are often missing in specialist papers. Applications in economics, electoral politics, and ethics are discussed. The book will be used by senior undergraduate and graduate students of economics, political science and philosophy as a text book in the subject.
    Anmerkung: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521911
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
    München BSB
    BSZ
    GBV
    KOBV
    HeBIS
    BVB
  • 6
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Rational choice, collective decisions, and social welfare (1983)
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    Details
    ISBN: 9780511897993
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 278 pages)
    DDC: 302/.13
    RVK:
    CC 7750
    RVK:
    QC 160
    Schlagwort(e): Wohlfahrtstheorie ; Fürsorge ; Kollektiventscheidung
    Kurzfassung: Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective decision making is clearly needed that specifies how social cooperation should be organised among contributing individuals. Suzumura gives a systematic presentation of the Arrovian impossibility theorems of social choice theory, so as to describe and enumerate the various factors that are responsible for the stability of the voluntary association of free and rational individuals. Among other topics covered are an axiomatic characterisation of the concept of a rational choice, the simple majority decision rule and its extensions, the social choice implications of the concept of equity as nonenvy, the constrained majoritarian collective choice rules and the conflict between the Paretian ethics and the libertarian claims of individual rights.
    Anmerkung: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511897993
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
    München BSB
    BSZ
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    HeBIS
    BVB
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