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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement : Are There Any Fringe Bidders? (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (24 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement
    Keywords: Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure
    Abstract: Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency
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    MPI Ethno. Forsch.
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Procurement Efficiency For Infrastructure Development And Financial Needs Reassessed (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (44 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Procurement Efficiency For Infrastructure Development And Financial Needs Reassessed
    Keywords: Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 8.2 percent of total infrastructure development costs
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Multidimensionality And Renegotiation : Evidence From Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions In Latin America (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Multidimensionality And Renegotiation
    Keywords: Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Multidimensional auctions are a natural and practical solution when auctioneers pursue more than one objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. However, it is difficult to achieve auction efficiency with multiple award criteria. Using auction data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the probability of renegotiation this paper estimates by a two-stage least squares technique with a binary selection in the first-stage regression. The findings show that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. This implies that such political considerations could hinder efficiency and transparency in auctions. The analysis also shows that the renegotiation risk in infrastructure concessions increases when multidimensional auctions are used. Rather, good governance, particularly anti-corruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Price Structure And Network Externalities In The Telecommunications Industry : Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa (2007)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (43 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Iimi, Atsushi Price Structure And Network Externalities In The Telecommunications Industry
    Keywords: Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure ; Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure ; Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure
    Abstract: Many developing countries have experienced significant developments in their telecommunications network. Countries in Africa are no exception to this. The paper examines what factor facilitates most network expansion using micro data from 45 fixed-line and mobile telephone operators in 18 African countries. In theory the telecommunications sector has two sector-specific characteristics: network externalities and discriminatory pricing. It finds that many telephone operators in the region use peak and off-peak prices and termination-based price discrimination, but are less likely to rely on strategic fee schedules such as tie-in arrangements. The estimated demand function based on a discreet consumer choice model indicates that termination-based discriminatory pricing can facilitate network expansion. It also shows that the implied price-cost margins are significantly high. Thus, price liberalization could be conducive to development of the telecommunications network led by the private sector. Some countries in Africa are still imposing certain price restrictions. But more important, it remains a policy issue how the authorities should ensure reciprocal access between operators at reasonable cost
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Infrastructure And Trade Preferences For The Livestock Sector : Empirical Evidence From The Beef Industry In Africa (2007)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (39 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Iimi, Atsushi Infrastructure And Trade Preferences For The Livestock Sector
    Keywords: Agriculture ; Agriculture ; Competitiveness ; Cred Demand ; Culture ; Debt Markets ; Development ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economics ; Emerging Markets ; Equations ; Exchange ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Free Trade ; GDP ; Income ; International Economics & Trade ; International Trade ; Livestock and Animal Husbandry ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets ; Markets and Market Access ; Middle Income Countries ; Prices ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Trade Policy ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Agriculture ; Agriculture ; Competitiveness ; Cred Demand ; Culture ; Debt Markets ; Development ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economics ; Emerging Markets ; Equations ; Exchange ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Free Trade ; GDP ; Income ; International Economics & Trade ; International Trade ; Livestock and Animal Husbandry ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets ; Markets and Market Access ; Middle Income Countries ; Prices ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Trade Policy ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Agriculture ; Agriculture ; Competitiveness ; Cred Demand ; Culture ; Debt Markets ; Development ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economics ; Emerging Markets ; Equations ; Exchange ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Free Trade ; GDP ; Income ; International Economics & Trade ; International Trade ; Livestock and Animal Husbandry ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets ; Markets and Market Access ; Middle Income Countries ; Prices ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Trade Policy ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Trade preferences are expected to facilitate global market integration and offer the potential for rapid economic growth and poverty reduction for developing countries. But those preferences do not always guarantee sustainable external competitiveness to beneficiary countries and may risk discouraging their efforts to improve underlying productivity. This paper examines the EU beef import market where several African countries have been granted preferential treatment. The estimation results suggest that profitability improvement achieved by countries under the Cotonou protocol compares unfavorably with the returns to nonbeneficiary countries in recent years. Rather, it shows that public infrastructure, such as paved roads, has an important role in lowering production costs and thus increasing external competitiveness and market shares
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