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  • World Bank  (6)
  • [Washington, D.C] : World Bank  (5)
  • Washington, D.C : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank  (1)
  • Medical care
  • 1
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Washington, D.C : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank
    ISBN: 0821387618 , 0821387626 , 9780821387610 , 9780821387627
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource (xiv, 91 p) , ill , 26 cm
    Ausgabe: 2011 World Bank eLibrary
    Serie: Africa human development series
    Serie: World Bank working paper no. 214
    DDC: 362.1096894
    Schlagwort(e): Medical care ; Medical care ; Health Manpower ; Health Services ; Medical care ; Health Manpower ; Health Services
    Anmerkung: Includes bibliographical references
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource
    Ausgabe: 2009 World Bank eLibrary Also available in print
    Serie: Policy research working paper 4825
    Paralleltitel: Obermaier, Andreas J Cross-border purchases of health services
    Schlagwort(e): Medical care ; Medical care ; Medical care ; Medical care
    Kurzfassung: "This paper explores the structure of cross-border health purchasing between Austria and Hungary and determines the size of this phenomenon as well as the barriers to a further increase. Austrian patients may receive health care treatment in Hungary in three different ways. First, patients may receive benefits in the context of the European Community Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 (Category I patients). Second, outside those regulatory structures, Austrian patients travel to Hungary to receive medical treatment, especially dental treatment, and then seek reimbursement from their Austrian insurance (Category II patients). Third, some patients receive medical treatment in Hungary outside both schemes (Category III patients). There are about 42,500 Category I patients per year; and 58,000 Category II patients world-wide per year. An unknown but supposedly greater number of patients travel to Hungary to receive mainly dental treatment and cosmetic surgery (Category III). Most health actors in both Austria and Hungary do not regard cross-border purchasing of health services as having cost-saving effects. They put forward major legal, institutional, political, and psychological barriers, which inhibit public and private Austrian providers, to facilitate trade in health care and which inhibit individual patients to realize cost savings through capitalizing on lower health care prices in Hungary. Therefore, for the time being, trade in health care and patient mobility between Austria and Hungary is a circumscribed phenomenon in terms of quantities, and it will most probably remain so in the near future. "--World Bank web site
    Anmerkung: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/8/2009 , Also available in print.
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 3
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Serie: Policy research working paper 3978
    Paralleltitel: Available in another form Health service delivery in China
    Schlagwort(e): Medical care ; Medical care
    Kurzfassung: "The authors report the results of a review of the Chinese-language and English-language literatures on service delivery in China, asking how well China's health care providers perform, what determines their performance, and how the government can improve it. They find current performance leaves room for improvement in terms of quality, responsiveness to patients, efficiency, cost escalation, and equity. The literature suggests that these problems will not be solved by simply shifting ownership to the private sector, or by simply encouraging providers-public and private-to compete with one another for individual patients. In contrast, substantial improvements could be (and in some places have already been) made by changing the way providers are paid-shifting away from fee-for-service and the distorted price schedule toward prospective payments. Active purchasing by insurers could further improve outcomes. "--World Bank web site
    Anmerkung: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/25/2006 , Also available in print.
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 4
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Serie: Policy research working paper 3669
    Paralleltitel: Das, Jishnu Money for nothing
    DDC: 610
    Schlagwort(e): Medical care ; Medical care
    Kurzfassung: "The quality of medical care received by patients varies for two reasons: differences in doctors' competence or differences in doctors' incentives. Using medical vignettes, the authors evaluated competence for a sample of doctors in Delhi. One month later, they observed the same doctors in their practice. The authors find three patterns in the data. First, what doctors do is less than what they know they should do-doctors operate well inside their knowledge frontier. Second, competence and effort are complementary so that doctors who know more also do more. Third, the gap between what doctors do and what they know responds to incentives: doctors in the fee-for-service private sector are closer in practice to their knowledge frontier than those in the fixed-salary public sector. Under-qualified private sector doctors, even though they know less, provide better care on average than their better-qualified counterparts in the public sector. These results indicate that to improve medical services, at least for poor people, there should be greater emphasis on changing the incentives of public providers rather than increasing provider competence through training. "--World Bank web site
    Anmerkung: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/18/2005 , Also available in print.
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 5
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Serie: Policy research working paper 3667
    Paralleltitel: Mattoo, Aaditya Does health insurance impede trade in health care services?
    Schlagwort(e): Health insurance ; Health insurance ; Medical care ; Medical care ; Health insurance ; Health insurance ; Medical care ; Medical care
    Kurzfassung: "There is limited trade in health services despite big differences in the price of health care across countries. Whether patients travel abroad for health care depends on the coverage of treatments by their health insurance plan. Under existing health insurance contracts, the gains from trade are not fully internalized by the consumer. The result is a strong "local-market bias" in the consumption of health care. A simple modification of existing insurance products can create sufficient incentives for consumers to travel. For just 15 highly tradable, low-risk treatments, the annual savings to the United States would be
    Anmerkung: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/15/2005 , Also available in print.
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 6
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Serie: Policy research working paper 3772
    Paralleltitel: Garcia-Prado, Ariadna Sweetening the carrot
    Schlagwort(e): Medical care ; Physicians ; Public health ; Medical care ; Physicians ; Public health
    Kurzfassung: "It is widely observed that many physicians working in public health facilities do not put in the required effort and time in their jobs. At the same time, many public physicians remain highly motivated, working long hours for little financial reward, in providing quality health services. This mix of provider-types poses fundamental challenges in the design of compensation mechanisms and monitoring regime in public facilities, where the objective of any reward-control paradigm is to improve the inoptimal performance of some physicians without compromising the effort of those already motivated. This paper presents a model to explain shirking behavior among public physicians and explores combinations of monitoring and incentive mechanisms that meet the twin objectives of inspiring the shirkers without losing the motivated. Drawing on the basic Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model and the theory of social custom, the paper develops and presents a design of incentive structures that consists of punitive monitoring systems accompanied by non-pecuniary rewards. The analysis shows that intensive monitoring persuades the shirking physicians to improve their performance but may have a negative effect on the morale of those already motivated. The findings indicate that non-pecuniary rewards and recognition for the latter can potentially restore the incentives and counter the deleterious effect of increased supervision. The policy implications are discussed by presenting case studies in the health care context of developing countries. "--World Bank web site
    Anmerkung: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/18/2005 , Also available in print.
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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