Abstract: Approaches of the concept of style -- The hand of the artist -- Personality and work of the artist -- Awareness of the history of art -- The idea of progress -- The concepts old and new -- Seeing and describing works of art -- Comparisons -- References to pictures.

Abstract: Russell and the linguistic philosophy -- I. The quest for logical form -- Reference and meaning -- Two senses of “logical form” -- Logical form, propositional constituents, and reconstructionism -- The “logically perfect” language -- The theory of acquaintance -- Proper names -- The “minimum vocabulary” -- Summary and conclusion -- II. The uses of reconstructionism -- The theory of descriptions -- The analysis of class-symbols -- The logical construction of physical objects -- Conclusion -- III. Critique of Russell’s philosophy of language -- The theory of acquaintance -- The doctrine of logical form -- Philosophical analysis as elucidation of ontological structure -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: RUSSELL AND THE LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY I t is generally acknowledged that Bertrand Russell played a vital role in the so-called "revolution" that has taken place in twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy, the revolution that has led many philo­ sophers virtually to equate philosophy with some variety - or varieties - of linguistic analysis. His contributions to this revolution were two­ fold: (I) together with G. E. Moore he led the successful revolt against the neo-Hegelianism of Idealists such as Bradley and McTaggert; (2) again with Moore he provided much of the impetus for a somewhat revolutionary way of doing philosophy. (I) and (2) are, of course, close­ ly related, since the new way of philosophizing could be said to consti­ tute, in large part, the revolt against Idealism. Be this as it may, how­ ever, the important fact for present consideration is that Russell was a major influence in turning Anglo-American philosophy in the direction it has subsequently taken - toward what may be termed, quite general­ ly, the "linguistic philosophy. " Unfortunately, though his importance as a precursor of the linguistic philosophy is well-known, the precise sense in which Russell himself can be considered a "philosopher of language" has not, to the present time, been sufficiently clarified. Useful beginnings have been made toward an investigation of this question, but they have been, withal, only begin­ nings, and nothing like an adequate picture of Russell's overall philoso­ phy of language is presently available.

Abstract: I -- II -- III -- Concluding Remarks -- A Short Bibliography.

Abstract: At opposite ends of over two millenia Hegel and Aristotle, virtually alone of the great European thinkers, consciously attempted to criticize and develop the thought of their predecessors into systems of their own. Both were thus committed in principle to the view that philosophy in each age of civilization is at once a product, a criticism, and a recon­ struction of the values and insights of its own past; that the fertile mind can only beget anew when it has acknowledged and understood a line of ancestors which has led to its begetting; that the thinker as little as the artist can start with a clean slate and a blankly open-minded atti­ tude to the world which he finds within him and before him. Man is by definition rational; philosophy is his continuous impulse to grasp and appraise a single universe of which he finds himself a part; philosophy therefore contains its history as a constituent element of its own nature, and the developmental character of philosophy must - unless human reason is, unthinkably and unarguably, a mere delusion - in some sense reflect, or even be in some sense identical with, an essentially develop­ mental universe - that is roughly the common creed of Aristotle and Hegel. Both of them further believed, as Plato had believed, that what is most real and intelligible in that universe is eo ipso most good.

Abstract: I: Is Choice Determined by the Strongest Motive? -- A. Motive and choice -- II: Agency, Attention and Choice -- A. Agency -- III: Freedom Without a Substantive Self -- A. A libertarian interpretation of freedom -- B. Some objections -- IV: Freedom and Responsibility -- A. Responsibility and causation -- B. Responsibility and the non-voluntary -- V: Responsibility and Practice -- A. Praising, blaming and dispraising -- B. Punishment -- VI: Responsibility and Obligation -- A. “Ought implies can” -- B. “Ought implies can” and common sense -- C. “Ought implies can” and the determinism-libertarianism controversy -- Works Cited.

Abstract: This work is conceived as a modem study of the relationships of the concept of human freedom with the moral concepts of responsibility and obligation and other closely allied notions. One pitfall into which writers on my sub­ jects have occasionally fallen has been that of spending too much time in critically examining positions and arguments which no sane philosopher has ever offered. In order to guard against the danger of debating with "straw men," I have attempted to engage in critical conversations with several twentieth century writers on my theme. I have attempted to pay special at­ tention to a handful of writers who have written extremely important and influential discussions and who are representatives of a diversity of per­ spectives on the issues involved. In particular, I have taken note of the work of two determinists, Sir David Ross and Hastings Rashdall, a libertarian, C. A. Campbell, and a reprel〉entative of the more recent linguistic-analytic approach, P. Nowell-Smith. Many other important writers have been brought in at crucial points in the conversation. But this is not a history of the problem in the 20th century. Rather, it is a critical, systematic study of a problem or set of related problems. This work may be divided roughly into two parts, a metaphysical-psycho­ logical part comprising the first three chapters, and a metaethical-ethical part consisting of the last three chapters.

Abstract: I: Introduction -- 1. Problem of Justifying Induction and Proposal for Its Dissolution -- 2. Two Types of Recent Arguments for the Validity of Induction -- 3. Arguments from Paradigm Cases and Uses of Words -- 4. Practical Arguments -- 5. Induction as a Genuine Problem and Study of Peirce and Lewis -- II: Scope of Peirce’s Theory of Induction -- III: The Nature and Validity of Inference -- 1. A General Theory of Inference -- 2. Necessary Inference and Probable Inference -- 3. Validity of Probable Inference -- IV: Probable Inference and Justifying Induction -- 1. Induction and Apagogical Inversion of Statistical Deduction -- 2. Induction As a Valid Probable Inference -- V: Requirements for the Validity of Induction -- 1. General Remakrs -- 2. Peirce on Fair Sampling and Fair Samples -- 3. Principle of Fair Sampling: A New Formulation -- 4. Peirce on Predesignation -- 5. Relevancy of Predesignation for the Validity of Induction -- VI: Probability and the Validity of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Peirce’s Two Empirical Conceptions of Probability -- 3. Peirce’s Objections to the Laplacian Definition of Probability and Criticism -- VII: A Non-Probabilistic Justification of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Self-Correcting Nature of Inductive Method -- 3. Criteria for Defining Truth and Justifying Induction -- 4. Other Arguments for the Necessity of General Validity of Induction -- VIII: Concluding Remarks on Peirce’s Non-Probabilistic Justification on Induction -- IX: Problems in Lewis’s Theory of Induction -- X: Induction and Analysis of Knowledge of Reality -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Empirical Knowledge and “A priori” Concepts -- 3. A Fundamental Principle in Establishing Criteria of Reality -- XI: An “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Problems of Justifying Induction in the Theories of Reality and Knowledge -- 3. Empirical Generalizations as Interpretations of Experience and Principle A -- 4. Analyticity of Principle A -- XII: Implications of Lewis’s “A Priori Analytical Justification of Induction -- 1. From Principle A to Justification of Argument from Past to Future -- 2. Lewis on the Practical Successfulness of Induction -- XIII: Concluding Remarks on Lewis’s “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction -- XIV: Nature of Probability and Rational Credibility -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Empirical Interpretation of Probability -- 3. Logical Interpretation of Probability -- 4. Rational Credibility, Fair Sampling and Logical Probability -- XV: Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- 1. Questions Regarding Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- 2. Degrees of Rational Credibility and Criteria for Determining Them -- 3. Justifying Acceptance of Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- XVI: Conclusion -- 1. Similarity Between Peirce’s and Lewis’s Theories of Induction -- 2. Significances of Peirce’s and Lewis’s Arguments -- 3. Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Justifying Induction -- 4. Bearings upon Practicist and Linguist Arguments -- Appendix I. A Chronological Listing of Peirce’s Papers Directly Bearing upon Induction and Probability -- Appendix II. Proof of the Logical Law of Large Numbers (the Maximum Value Law of Hypergeometric Probability) -- Appendix III. Probabilities of Estimates of Values of Population Parameters -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: This book is based on my doctoral dissertation written at Harvard University in the year of 1963. My interest in Peirce was inspired by Professor D. C. Williams and that in Lewis by Professor Roderick Firth. To both of them lowe a great deal, not only in my study of Peirce and Lewis, but in my general approach toward the problems of knowledge and reality. Specifically, I wish to acknowledge Professor Williams for his patient and careful criticisms of the original manuscripts of this book. I also wish to thank Professor Firth and Professor Israel Scheffler for their many suggestive comments regarding my discussions of induc­ tion. However, any error in this study of Peirce and Lewis is completely due to myself. Chung-ying Cheng Honolulu, Hawaii March,1967 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V SUMMARY IX CHAPTER I: Introduction I I. Problem of Justifying Induction and Proposal for Its Dissolution I 2. Two Types of Recent Arguments for the Validity of Induction 3 Arguments from Paradigm Cases and Uses of Words 4 3.

Abstract: Preparatory Considerations -- § 1. Outset from the significations of the word logos: speaking, thinking, what is thought -- § 2. The ideality of language. Exclusion of the problems pertaining to it -- § 3. Language as an expression of “thinking.” Thinking in the broadest sense, as the sense-constituting mental process -- § 4. The problem of ascertaining the essential limits of the “thinking” capable of the significational Function -- § 5. Provisional delimination of logic as apriori theory of science -- § 6. The formal character of logic. The formal Apriori and the contingent Apriori -- § 7. The normative and practical functions of logic -- § 8. The two-sidedness of logic; the subjective and the Objective direction of its thematizing activity -- § 9. The straightforward thematizing activity of the “Objective” or “positive” sciences. The idea of two-sided sciences -- § 10. Historically existing psychology and scientific thematizing activity directed to the subjective -- §11. The thematizing tendencies of traditional logic -- a.Logic directed originally to the Objective theoretical formations produced by thinking -- b.Logic’s interest in truth and the resultant reflection on subjective insight -- c. Result: the hybridism of historically existing logic as a theoretical and normative-practical discipline -- I / The structures and the sphere of objective formal logic -- The way from the tradition to the full idea of formal logic -- 1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics -- § 12. Discovery of the idea of the pure judgment-form -- § 13. The theory of the pure forms of judgments as the first discipline of formal logic -- a.The idea of theory of forms -- b.Universality of the judgment-form; the fundamental forms and their variants -- c.Operation as the guiding concept in the investigation of forms -- § 14. Consequence-logic (logic of non-contradiction) as the second level of formal logic -- § 15. Truth-logic and consequence-logic -- § 16. The differences in evidence that substantiate the separating of levels within apophantics. Clear evidence and distinct evidence -- a.Modes of performing the judgment. Distinctness and confusion -- b.Distinctness and clarity -- c.Clarity in the having of something itself and clarity of anticipation -- § 17. The essential genus, “distinct judgment,” as the theme of “pure analytics” -- § 18. The fundamental question of pure analytics -- § 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to the formal logic of truth. Non-contradiction as a condition for possible truth -- § 20. The principles of logic and their analogues in pure analytics -- § 21. The evidence in the coinciding of “the same” confused and distinct judgment. The broadest concept of the judgment -- § 22. The concept defining the province belonging to the theory of apophantic forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is the judgment in the broadest sense -- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics -- § 23. The internal unity of traditional logic and the problem of its position relative to formal mathematics -- a.The conceptual self-containedness of traditional logic as apophantic analytics -- b.The emerging of the idea of an enlarged analytics, Leibniz’s “mathesis universalis,” and the methodico-technical unification of traditional syllogistics and formal mathematics -- § 24. The new problem of a formal ontology. Characterization of traditional formal mathematics as formal ontology -- § 25. Formal apophantics and formal ontology as belonging together materially, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective themes -- § 26. The historical reasons why the problem of the unity of formal apophantics and formal mathematics was masked -- a.Lack of the concept of the pure empty form -- b.Lack of knowledge that apophantic formations are ideal -- c.Further reasons, particularly the lack of genuine scientific inquiries into origins -- d.Comment on Bolzano’s position regarding the idea of formal ontology -- § 27. The introduction of the idea of formal ontology in the Logische Untersuchungen -- a.The first constitutional investigations of categorial objectivities, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik -- b.The way of the “Prolegomena” from formal apophantics to formal ontology -- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities -- § 28. The highest level of formal logic: the theory of deductive systems; correlatively, the theory of multiplicities -- § 29. The theory of multiplicities and the formalizing reduction of the nomological sciences -- § 30. Multiplicity-theory as developed by Riemann and his successors -- §31. The pregnant concept of a multiplicity-correlatively, that of a “deductive” or “nomological” system-clarified by the concept of “definiteness” -- § 32. The highest idea of a theory of multiplicities: a universal nomological science of the forms of multiplicities -- § 33. Actual formal mathematics and mathematics of the rules of the game -- § 34. Complete formal mathematics identical with complete logical analytics -- § 35. Why only deductive theory-forms can become thematic within the domain of mathesis universalis as universal analytics -- a.Only deductive theory has a purely analytic system-form -- b.The problem of when a system of propositions has a system-form characterizable as analytic -- § 36. Retrospect and preliminary indication of our further tasks -- b. Phenomenological clarification of the two-sidedness of formal logic as formal apophantics and formal ontology -- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments -- § 37. The inquiry concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology; insufficiency of our clarifications up to now -- § 38. Judgment-objects as such and syntactical formations -- § 39. The concept of the judgment broadened to cover all formations produced by syntactical actions -- § 40. Formal analytics as a playing with thoughts, and logical analytics. The relation to possible application is part of the logical sense of formal mathesis -- §41. The difference between an apophantic and an ontological focusing and the problem of clarifying that difference -- § 42. Solution of this problem -- a.Judging directed, not to the judgment, but to the thematic objectivity -- b.Identity of the thematic object throughout changes in the syntactical operations -- c.The types of syntactical object-forms as the typical modes of Something -- d.The dual function of syntactical operations -- e.Coherence of the judging by virtue of the unity of the substrate-object that is being determined. Constitution of the “concept” determining the substrate-object -- f. The categorial formations, which accrue in the determining, as habitual and inter subjective possessions -- g. The objectivity given beforehand to thinking contrasted with the categorial objectivity produced by thinking — Nature as an illustration -- § 43. Analytics, as formal theory of science, is formal ontology and, as ontology, is directed to objects 119 -- § 44. The shift from analytics as formal ontology to analytics as formal apophantics -- a.The change of thematizing focus from object- provinces to judgments as logic intends them -- b.Phenomenological clarification of this change of focus -- ?. The attitude of someone who is judging naïvely-straightforwardly -- ?. In the critical attitude of someone who intends to cognize, supposed objectivities as supposed are distinguished from actual objectivities -- ?. The scientist’s attitude: the supposed, as supposed, the object of his criticism of cognition -- § 45. The judgment in the sense proper to apophantic logic -- § 46. Truth and falsity as results of criticism. The double sense of truth and evidence -- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truth-logic -- § 47. The adjustment of traditional logic to the critical attitude of science leads to its focusing on the apophansis -- § 48. Judgments, as mere suppositions, belong to the region of senses. Phenomenological characterization of the focusing on senses -- § 49. The double sense of judgment (positum, proposition) -- § 50. The broadening of the concept of sense to cover the whole positional sphere, and the broadening of formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice -- §51. Pure consequence-logic as a pure theory of senses. The division into consequence-logic and truth- logic is valid also for the theory of multiplicities, as the highest level of logic -- § 52. “Mathesis pura” as properly logical and as extralogical. The “mathematics of mathematicians” -- § 53. Elucidations by the example of the Euclidean multiplicity -- § 54. Concluding ascertainment of the relationship be-tween formal logic and formal ontology -- ?.The problem -- b.The two correlative senses of formal logic -- c. The idea of formal ontology can be separated from the idea of theory of science -- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic -- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic -- § 55. Is the development of logic as Objective-formal enou...

Abstract: 2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modern sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a naivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate apriori possibilities and necessities.

Abstract: I Stress and Strain -- 1. Introductory -- 2. Stress. Definitions and notation -- 3. Stresses in two dimensions -- 4. Stresses in three dimensions -- 5. Mohr’s representation of stress in three dimensions -- 6. Displacement and strain. Introduction -- 7. The geometry of finite homogeneous strain in two dimensions -- 8. Finite homogeneous strain in three dimensions -- 9. Mohr’s representation of finite homogeneous strain without rotation -- 10. Infinitesimal strain in two dimensions -- 11. Infinitesimal strain in three dimensions -- II Behaviour of Actual Materials -- 12. Introductory -- 13. The stress-strain relations for a perfectly elastic isotropic solid -- 14. Special cases: biaxial stress and strain -- 15. Strain-energy -- 16. Anisotropic substances -- 17. Finite hydrostatic strain -- 18. Natural strain -- 19. The equations of viscosity -- 20. Fracture and yield -- 21. The maximum shear stress theory of fracture and its generalizations -- 22. Mohr’s theory of fracture -- 23. Earth pressure -- 24. The Griffith theory of brittle strength -- 25. Strain theories of failure -- 26. The tensile test on ductile materials -- 27. Yield criteria -- 28. The yield surface -- 29. The equations of plasticity -- 30. Substances with composite properties -- III Equations of Motion and Equilibrium -- 31. Introductory -- 32. Simple problems illustrating the behaviour of elastic, viscous, plastic and Bingham substances -- 33. The elastic equations of motion -- 34. The elastic equations of equilibrium -- 35. Special cases of the equations of elasticity -- 36. Special problems in elasticity -- 37. Wave propagation -- 38. Elastic waves -- 39. The equations of motion of a viscous fluid -- 40. Special problems in viscosity -- 41. Plastic flow in two dimensions -- IV Applications -- 42. Introductory -- 43. Experimental results on the mechanical properties of rocks -- 44. Systems having one or more planes of weakness -- 45. Porous media -- 46. Further discussion of criteria for failure -- 47. Stresses and faulting in the crust -- 48. The Coulomb-Navier theory in terms of invariants -- 49. The representation of two-dimensional stress fields -- 50. Stresses around openings -- 51. The use of the complex variable -- 52. Displacements -- 53. Underground measurements and their results -- 54. Measurement of rock properties -- 55. Effects of flaws, size and stress gradient -- 56. The complete stress-strain curve -- V Applications to Structural Geology -- 57. Introductory -- 58. Combination of strains -- 59. Determination of finite strain from deformed objects -- 60. Progressive deformation -- 61. Analysis of strain in folding -- 62. Instability theory: folding and kinking -- 63. Development of preferred orientations of ellipsoidal particles -- Notation -- Author Index.

Abstract: IN this monograph I have attempted to set out, in as elemen­ tary a form as possible, the basic mathematics of the theories of elasticity, plasticity, viscosity, and rheology, together with a discussion of the properties of the materials involved and the way in which they are idealized to form a basis for the mathe­ matical theory. There are many mathematical text-books on these subjects, but they are largely devoted to methods for the solution of special problems, and, while the present book may be regarded as an introduction to these, it is also in­ tended for the large class of readers such as engineers and geologists who are more interested in the detailed analysis of stress and strain, the properties of some of the materials they use, criteria for flow and fracture, and so on, and whose interest in the theory is rather in the assumptions involved in it and the way in which they affect the solutions than in the study of special problems. The first chapter develops the analysis of stress and strain rather fully, giving, in particular, an account of Mohr's repre­ sentations of stress and of finite homogeneous strain in three dimensions. In the second chapter, on the behaviour of materials, the stress-strain relations for elasticity (both for isotropic and simple anisotropic substances), viscosity, plas­ ticity and some of the simpler rheological models are described.

Abstract: 1 Introduction -- 2 The Assumptions of Science -- 3 Nature of Scientific Research -- 4 Scientific Law and the Practice of Science -- 5 The Uncertainty Principle -- 6 Science and Religion -- 7 Science and Education -- 8 Science and Government -- 9 Conclusion.

Abstract: I am becoming increasingly disturbed by the lack of under­ standing of science revealed by politicians, industrialists and the general public. I am also concerned about the widespread mis­ use of the word "scientific" which is more and more being used in situations where it is quite inappropriate. As a result, in some circumstances gross overestimates are made as to what science can do. In other circumstances the real power of science is foolishly underestimated and the contributions which it can make are squandered. Science is God is an attempt to explain just what is meant by the scientific approach and to define more closoJ. y what the word "scientific" indicates. It is deliberately brief and controversial because I want it to be read. In fact, the material dealt with in each single chapter really deserves a whole book to itself. In the future I hope that I may be able to give to each subject such full treatment. Meanwhile I hope that this book will stimulate discussion about science and will increase understanding of it. DAVID F.

Abstract: I. Reaction to Heidegger -- II. Historicism as Humanism -- III. Hegel and Goethe -- IV. Meaning in History -- V. History as a Natural Happening.

Abstract: This brief survey of Professor Karl LOwith's analysis of the modem histori­ cal consciousness is the outgrowth of a year's study at the University of Heidelberg while Professor L6with was still an active member of the faculty. An early version, in the form of a dissertation, was submitted to the History Department of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A. Numerous friends and colleagues have helped me at various stages of this work and I am indebted to them even though I cannot name them all indi­ vidually. However special thanks must be accorded to Professor W. J. Bos­ senbrook of Wayne State University for introducing me to the entire prob­ lem of anti-historicism and to Professor LOwith's work. I am also greatly indebted to Professor John Barlow of Indiana University for his patient assistance with the translations, however the final responsibility for all renditions rests, of course, solely with the author.

Abstract: Approaches of the concept of style -- The hand of the artist -- Personality and work of the artist -- Awareness of the history of art -- The idea of progress -- The concepts old and new -- Seeing and describing works of art -- Comparisons -- References to pictures.

Abstract: One -- I. The Historical Significance of the Letters -- II. The Metaphysics of Hierarchy -- III. The Hierarchic Design of the Letters -- IV. The Models of Order in the Eighth and Ninth Letters -- Two The Letters of PS.-Dionysius -- The Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius.

Abstract: N eoplatonism begins explicitly with Plotinus in the third century of our era. The later Neoplatonism of the fifth and six century schools at Athens and Alexandria was both the continuation of the philosophy of Plotinus and also a pagan ideology. When these schools were closed, despite attempts at compromise at Alexandria and as a result of direct and indirect political pressures and actions, pagan ideology died. Many philosophers, such as Isidore, Asclepiodotus, Damascius, and Olym­ piodorus, must have foreseen the danger to philosophy, and their extant writings are sprinkled with forebodings. Would the death of pagan ideology, in the form of pagan worship and the Homeric and Orphic traditions, bring about the death of all genuine philosophy as well? One answer to this great question is found in the enigmatic writings of Ps. -Dionysius the Areopagite. Purposing to be the writings of the Athenian convert of St. Paul, they fall within the province of a multitude of so-called "pseudepigraphic" Christian writings. 1. GENERAL ARGUMENT I embarked on the study of Ps. -Dionysius' Letters with two goals in mind: (r) to grasp in clear detail the unknown author's philosophic intentions in writing his famous Corpus and the way in which he set about writing, and (2) to attempt to see with precision the reason for the absence of a political philosophy in Christian Platonism. The Letters provided a richness of detail and information bearing on the first subject which was wholly unexpected.

Abstract: to ethnomusicology -- Training possibilities for ethnomusicologists -- Illustrations -- Index of subjects -- Index of regions and peoples the music of which has been studied and/or recorded -- Index of authors, collectors and musicians -- Index of periodicals and of some publications containing articles by various authors.

Abstract: This booklet hardly needs a preface; the contents, I think, speak for themselves. It contains a short and carefully brought up to date resume of all that I, as a private University Lecturer in Amsterdam, have tried to teach my pupils. It is intended as a general introduction to ethnomusicology, before going on to the study of the forms of separate music-cultures. I sincerely hope that those, who wish to teach themselves and to qualify in this branch of knowledge, will find a satisfactory basis for self tuition in the matter here brought together. Regarding the possibility of a new edition, any critical remarks or infor­ mation as to possible desiderata would be very gratefully received. J. K. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION My request for critical remarks and desiderata has not been ignored. My sincere thanks to all who took the trouble to let me know what they missed in my booklet. Through their collaboration the contents have undergone a considerable improvement and enlargement as compared to the original edition issued in 1950 by the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, under the title 'Musicologica'. I have taken care to add many particulars from non-European sources, with the result that now the book is no longer so Europe-centric as it was.

Abstract: I. The Moon and Man -- 1. Man Moves into the Universe -- 2. Human Consequences of the Exploration of Space -- 3. From Alamogordo to Apollo: Will Man Heed the Lesson? -- II. The Politics of Spacefaring -- 4. Man on the Moon: The Columbian Dilemma -- 5. An American “Sputnik” for the Russians? -- 6. The Lunar Landing and the U.S.-Soviet Equation -- 7. Prospects for International Cooperation on the Moon: The Antarctic Analogy -- 8. Post-Apollo Policy: A Look into the 1970s -- III. The Future of Lunar Studies -- 9. Origin and History of the Moon -- 10. A Space Age Phenomenon: The Evolution of Lunar Studies -- 11. Manned Landings and Theories of Lunar Formation -- 12. A View from the Outside -- IV. The Technological Impact -- 13. The Industrial Impact of Apollo -- 14. Saturn/Apollo as a Transportation System -- 15. Apollo: A Pattern for Problem Solving -- 16. Automatic Checkout Equipment: The Apollo Hippocrates.

Abstract: AFTER THE LUNAR LANDING Our concern in this volume is the impact upon science, technology and international cooperation of man's emer­ gence from the "cradle," the biosphere of Earth, to visit the surface of another planet. The editors invited experts in the physical and social sciences who had been think­ ing, talking and writing about space programs for a long time. Some had been critical of manned space flight, its motives and its costs. Some have been or are currently involved in Project Apollo. Some had not committed themselves to value judgments but were fascinated by probable results. In general, the authors regard the moon landing as a climactic event in man's evolution. Sir Bernard Lovell is likely to have a cataclysmic effect on society suggests it and that an international effort should be mounted to send men to Mars in the 1980s. The question of how Project Apollo relates to a scheme of priorities which takes into account such needs as housing, health, pollution and the problems of urbaniza­ tion enters the discussion from several points of view. Eugene Rabinowitch suggests that Apollo may stimulate the development of a system of establishing national priorities in the application of the nation's resources. Freeman Dyson, on the other hand, does not believe that ix PREFACE x any "hierarchy of committees" can devise an accepted order of priorities.

Abstract: I: The Foundations of Solipsism -- 1: Sensations and Images -- 2: Language and Sensation -- 3: Imagining Instances -- 4: Comprehension -- 5: Understanding and Synonymy -- 6: Verifiability -- 7: Objections -- II: Causality -- 8: Causes and Counterfactuals -- III: Solipsism Proper -- 9: A Quasi-Axiomatic Solipsistic System -- 10: Alternatives to Solipsism -- 11: Anti-Solipsism -- 12: Further Development of the System: Phenomenalism -- 13: Statements about the Past -- 14: Further Development of the System: Other Minds -- 15: Belief -- Conclusion.

Abstract: Philosophers usually have been anxious to avoid solipsism. A large number of good and great philosophers have tried to refute it. Of course, these philosophers have not always had the same target in mind and, like everything else, solipsism over the centuries has become increasingly elusive and subtle. In this book I undertake to state the position in its most modern and what I take to be its most plausible form. At some points in the history of philosophy the solipsist has been one who denied the existence of everything except himself or even the existence of everything except his own present sensations. At other times, the solipsist instead of doubting these things has merely insisted that there could be no good reason for believing in the existence of anything beyond one's own present sensations. Roughly, this doubt is aimed at reasons rather than at things. A solipsist of this sort appears in Santayana's Scepticism and Animal Faith.

Abstract: III Sermons and Religious Treatises -- John Alcock -- St John Fisher -- Desiderius Erasmus -- John Colet -- Hugh Latimer -- John de Feckenham -- William Atkinson Richard Whytford -- Jacobus de Gruytroede -- Richard de Methley -- John Colet -- St John Fisher -- King Henry VIII -- The Bible -- William Tyndale -- Miles Coverdale -- Desiderius Erasmus -- St Thomas More -- William Tyndale -- John Frith -- The Book of Common Prayer -- IV Chronicles and Histories -- Robert Fabyan -- John Bourchier, Lord Berners -- ‘The Translator’ -- John Rastell -- Jan van Dvesborch -- Peter Martyr D’Anghiera -- St Thomas More -- Edward Hall -- George Cavendish -- John Bouge -- Nicholas Harpsfield -- V Romances and Tales -- Anonymous -- Anonymous -- Anonymous -- Philippe Camus -- Jean D’Arras -- Anonymous -- John Capgrave -- Anonymous -- Anonymous -- Anonymous -- Notes -- Bibliographies -- Suggested Reading.

Abstract: Introduction: The Place of Earth and Gods in Heidegger’s Philosophy -- I. Character of Heidegger’s Philosophy -- II. Heidegger’s Problem of Being -- III. Heidegger’s Stand in the History of Philosophy -- IV. Three Phases of Heidegger’s Thought -- V. Detour from Gods to Earth -- I. Dasein -- I. Approach to the Problem of Dasein -- II. To-be-in-the-world -- III. To-be-in -- IV. World -- V. Space -- VI. Togetherness -- VII. Da as Openness -- VIII. Dread -- IX. Death -- X. Conscience -- XI. Temporality -- II. Being -- I. Heidegger’s Post-Sein und Zeit Works -- II. Dasein -- III. Truth -- IV. Thinking -- V. Language -- VI. Befalling and History -- VII. Subjectivism and Metaphysics -- VIII. Nothingness and Nihilism -- IX. Being and Man -- III. World -- I. Problem of World in Traditional Philosophy -- II. World in the First Phase -- III. World in the Second Phase -- IV. World in the Third Phase -- IV. Earth -- I. Physis -- II. Physis and Logos -- III. Language -- IV. World and Earth -- V. Hölderlin’s Understanding of Nature -- V. Gods -- I. Olympian Deities -- II. Chthonian Religion -- III. Dionysus -- IV. Chaos -- V. Gods and Logos -- VI. Gods as Realities -- VI. Foursome -- VII. Thing -- I. Traditional Understanding of Thing -- II. Artwork as an Assembler -- III. Thing as Assembler -- IV. Subjective and Essential Understanding of Thing -- V. Thing and Space -- VI. Philosophy of Thing -- VIII. Dwelling -- I. Building and Dwelling -- II. Dwelling and Logos -- III. Poet as Prophet -- IV. Festivity -- V. Godly and Godless Man -- Appendix: Heidegger and Christianity.

Abstract: Earth and Gods is an attempt to introduce the reader to Heidegger's fully developed philosophy. The title Earth and Gods gives an im­ pression of not being a general study of Heidegger's philosophy. However, this is not true - the earth and the gods are fundamental ontological symbols of his fully developed philosophy, namely, his third and final phase of thought. This phase repeats the problems of both preceding phases in a fuller and more developed manner; hence, it implies them. The two preceding phases are the phase of Dasein and the phase of Being. These two phases are a natural flow of fundamental problems which reach their final formation and development in the phase of earth and gods. Dasein (the first phase) leads to Being, and Being (the second phase) bursts into fundamental ontological powers of Being (Seinsmiichte) which are earth and sky, gods and mortals (the third phase). Since earth is unthinkable without sky and since gods are gods in the world of mortals - of men, the title Earth and Gods is an abbreviation of these four fundamental powers of Being. Hence, an investigation of earth and gods is an attempt to present Heidegger's philosophy as a whole. Such a presentation provides the reader with the background necessary for a more adequate and efficient understanding of the writings of Heidegger himself. Thus, Earth and Gods may rightly be considered an introduction to Hei­ degger's philosophy.

Abstract: 1 Introduction -- 2 Prospecting -- 3 Planning and Development -- 4 Removal of Overburden -- 5 The Use of Explosives in Surface Mining -- 6 Quarrying Hard Rocks -- 7 Working Iron and Copper Deposits by Open Pits -- 8 Opencast Coal -- 9 Surface Mining of Bauxite, Clays, Chalk and Phosphates -- 10 Surface Mining of Gold, Platinum, Uranium and Gemstones -- 11 Sand and Gravel -- 12 Alluvial Mining -- 13 Power Supply in the Surface Mining Industries -- 14 Reclamation after Surface Mining -- 15 The Management of Surface Mines -- Appendix I—Electromagnetic Prospecting -- Appendix II—Performance of Medium and Large Draglines -- Appendix III—Aggregates in Concrete.

Abstract: Quarrying and all other branches of surface mining rather than diminishing in importance have become of more and more consequence economically, industrially and particularly with the depletion of high-grade deep-mined mineral reserves. Low-grade minerals require low cost extraction and this in many cases necessitates very expensive mechanized equipment with the cost of individual units running into millions of pounds in the case of large­ scale operations with high productivity. There has been, and there still is, a tendency for the smaller single quarries to be amalgamated into groups with large financial resources and therefore with the ability to purchase these expensive machines so necessary to make operations viable. This in turn requires wider administrative and technical knowledge in executives of these groups and as these often handle a wide range of products from widely differing systems of working, this technical knowledge should embrace the exploitation of many different types of deposits. There is, at present, a great dearth throughout the world of such qualified executives as is apparent from advertisements of vacancies in the technical press. It would appear that these industries offer an attractive career to the widely qualified and experienced technologist in these fields. This book deals with methods of working in the surface extractive indus­ tries, quarry management and power supply-but does not deal with related ancillary processes except where these affect quarrying operations.

Abstract: Topologie des Logos und Kant-Interpretation -- § 1. Topologie des Logos -- § 2. Die Entwicklung des Logos. Logos, Dialogos und Synlogos. Katalogos und Analogos -- § 3. Die Logik der Analogia -- § 4. Die Kant-Interpretation als Begreifen des Logos -- Erstes Kapitel. Das Ding an sich und „Die Theorie der Erfahrung -- § 5. Die kritische Methode und die Theorie der Erfahrung -- § 6. Die Erfahrung und die besonderen Gesetze -- § 7. Die Erfahrung überhaupt und die besondere Erfahrung. Natura formaliter spectata und natura materialiter spectata -- § 8. Die besondere Erfahrung als Grunderfahrung -- § 9. Die Grenzen der Erfahrung überhaupt. Das Apriorische und das Aposteriorische -- § 10. Das Problem des Dinges an sich -- § 11. Die Existenz des Dinges an sich -- § 12. Dasein und Sosein. Die Logik für das Ding an sich -- § 13. Der Unterschied der transzendentalen Deduktion in der ersten und zweiten Auflage -- § 14. Die transzendentale Deduktion des reinen Verstandesbegriffen in der ersten Auflage. Das Problem der Affinität -- § 15. Einbildungskraft und Apperzeption -- § 16. Die transzendentale Deduktion in der zweiten Auflage. Verstand und Apperzeption -- § 17. Das Wesen der Einbildungskraft -- § 18. Das Wesen der transzendentalen Deduktion -- Zweites Kapitel. Analogien der Erfahrung und Idee -- § 19. Die Bedeutung des Schematismus -- § 20. Der Schematismus und die Urteilskraft -- § 21. Schema und Analogie -- § 22. Mathematische und dynamische Grundsätze -- § 23. Konstitutiv und regulativ. Die negative Bedeutung der Analogie -- § 24. Die positive Bedeutung der Analogie. Die Eigentümlichkeit der Einheit der Analogia -- § 25. Die Grenzen der Grundsätze und das Wesen der Analogie -- § 26. Die erste Analogie der Erfahrung. Die Grenze dieses Grundsatzes. Das Problem des Nichts bei Kant -- § 27. Die zweite Analogie der Erfahrung -- § 28. Der Kausalitätsbegriff bei Kant. Ein Zirkel in Kants Beweis. Die Grenze des Kausalgesetzes -- § 29. Ursache und Wirkung -- § 30. Die dritte Analogie der Erfahrung. Kant und Newton -- § 31. Die Rekonstruktion des Systems der Kantischen Philosophie -- § 32. Die Vernunft -- § 33. Die erste und zweite Idee -- § 34. Die dynamische Idee und die Logik der Analogie -- Drittes Kapitel. Die Teleologie -- § 35. Das Verhältnis zwischen,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” und,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”. Die Entstehung der,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” -- § 36. Der erste Weg von der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” zur,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”: Anhang zur transzendentalen Dialektik -- § 37. Das prinzip der Vernunftseinheit und die Logik der Analogia -- §38. Die allgemeine Erörterung der Teleologie -- § 39. Der zweite Weg von der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” zur,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”. Vertiefung des Erfahrungsbegriffs -- § 40. Die transzendentale Aesthetik -- § 41. Die Zufälligkeit der Erfahrung. Das Grundproblem der Kantischen Philosophie -- § 42. Affinität und Analogie der Erfahrung. Sosein und Dasein. Die Logik der Analogia als Entwicklung der transzendentalen Logik -- § 43. Die reflektierende Urteilskraft und die Entstehung der Erfahrung. Das übersinnliche Substrat und der intuitive Verstand -- § 44. Der glückliche Zufall und der intuitive Verstand. Zwei Standpunkte der Teleologie -- § 45. Der intuitive Verstand nach der Analogie. Der Als-ob Charakter der Analogie -- § 46. Die allgemeine Analogie auf dem Wege von der Erfahrungüberhaupt zur besonderen Erfahrung. Vier Zweckmäßigkeitsbegriffe.,,Kritik des Geschmacks” und,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” -- § 47. Die organische Zweckmäßigkeit. Teleologie und Mechanismus -- § 48. Die grundsätzliche Teleologie als letzte Einheit der Analogien -- § 49. Das Übersinnliche. Das Problem des Genies. Der Weg von der Natur zur Freiheit -- Anhang. Kant und die moderne Physik -- Viertes Kapitel. Transzendentale Logik und Analogos -- § 50. Wesen und Grenze der transzendentalen Logik -- § 51. Das Wesen der Analogia. Reine Logik, Dialektik und Analogia. Analogia bei Aristoteles, Augustinus und Thomas -- § 52. Analogia bei Kant. Analogie in der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” als Analogia proportionis. Analogie in der,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” als Analogia attributionis -- § 53. Universalitas und Universitas. Das Analytisch-Allgemeine und das Synthesitsch-Allgemeine -- § 54. Die logische Konstruktion der Analogia. Satz des Widerspruchs und Satz des ausgeschlossenen Dritten -- Schluss. Die Transzendentale Topik und die Topologie des Logos -- § 55. Der Standpunkt der Kantischen Philosophie als transzendentale Topik.

Abstract: Table des Matières / List of Contents -- Première séance (plénière) -- 1. Paroles de bienvenue -- Prof. Dr. W. Brundert, Oberbürgermeister -- Prof. Dr. E. Schütte, Kultusminister -- Dr. H. Lohse, Präsident, Verein Deutscher Bibliothekare. -- 2. Discours d’ouverture du Président de la Fédération -- 3. Rapport financier du Trésorier -- 4. Rapport du Secrétaire général -- 5. Rapport du représentant de I’UNESCO -- 6. Rapport du représentant de la FID -- Deuxième séance (plénière) -- 7. « Le livre et la bibliothèque dans une société industrielle — Books and libraries in an industrial society » -- a) Prof. Dr. W. RÜEGG -- b) Dr. J. E. MORPURGO. -- c) Mr. V. ORLOV (document distribué). -- Troisième séance (plénière) -- 8. Rapports et résolutions des Sections et Commissions -- Associations internationales: AIL, IATUL -- A. Résolutions des Sections (de types de bibliothèques) -- la. Bibliothèques nationales et universitaires -- 1b. Sous-section des bibliothèques universitaires -- 2. Bibliothèques de lecture publique -- 2a. INTAMEL -- 2b. Sous-section des bibliothèques d’enfants -- 2c. Sous-section des bibliothèques d’hôpitaux -- 3. Bibliothèques spécialisées -- 3a. Sous-section des bibliothèques d’observatoires astronomiques -- 4. Bibliothèques parlementaires et administratives -- B. Résolutions des Commissions (problèmes de bibliothéconomie) -- 1. Unification des règles de catalogue -- 2. Catalogues collectifs et prêt international -- 3. Echange de publications -- 3a. Echange de publications officielles -- 4. Périodiques et publications en série -- 5. Statistique -- 6. Fonds et documents rares et précieux -- 7. Formation professionnelle -- 8. Construction des bibliothèques -- 9. Mécanisation -- 10. Bibliographie -- 9. Communications du Bureau exécutif -- a) Le prix Sevensma -- b) La commission de la statistique -- c) Changements de fonctionnaires -- d) Charte de livre -- e) Sessions futures du Conseil général -- 10. Discours de clôture du Président -- Annexes -- Rapports Annuels Et Détails des Associations-Membres Annual Reports and Details of Member-Associations -- UDC (100) Associations internationales -- Association of Libraries of Judaica and Hebraica in Europe -- International Association of Agricultural Librarians and Documentalists (IAALD) -- International Association of Technological University Libraries (IATUL) -- International Association of Law Libraries -- Association of International Libraries -- Membres nationaux UDC (4) Europe -- Allemagne: -- Bundesrepublik: Verein Deutscher Bibliothekare, 1967/1968 -- Verein der Bibliothekare an öffentlichen Büchereien (vormals: Verein Deutscher Volksbibliothekare) 1967/1968 -- Verein der Diplom-Bibliothekare an wissenschaftlichen Bibliotheken, 1967/1968 -- Deutscher Büchereiverland -- Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Spezialbibliotheken 1967/1968 -- D.D.R. Deutscher Bibliotheksverband, 1967/1968. -- Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, 1967 -- Deutsche Bücherei, 1967/1968 -- Nationale Forschungs-und Gedänkstätten, Weimar -- Autriche:Vereinigung Österreichischer Bibliothekare, 1967/1968 -- Verband Österreichischer Volksbüchereien -- Association des archivistes et bibliothécaires de Belgique, et Vlaamse Vereniging van Bibliothek -en archiefpersoneel -- Croix-Rouge de Belgique. Conseil national des Bibliothèques d’hôpitaux -- Union des Bibliothécaires auxiliaires sociaux. -- Association nationale des Bibliothécaires d’expression française de Belgique -- Bulgarie: Libraries in Bulgaria, 1967/1968 -- Danemark: Libraries in Denmark, 1967/1968 -- Danmarks Biblioteksforening -- Danmarks Videnskabelige og Faglige Bibliotekers Sammenslutning -- Espagne:Asociación nacional de Archiveros, bibliotecarios y arqueólogos de España -- Finlande: Suomen Kirjastoseura, 1967/1968 -- Suomen tieteellinen Kirjastoseura. Finlands Vetenskapliga Bibliotekssamfund -- France: Association des bibliothécaires français -- Grande-Bretagne: The Library Association, 1967 -- Hollande: Libraries in the Netherlands in 1967 -- Rijkscommissie van advies inzake het bibliotheekwezen -- Centrale Vereniging voor openbare Bibliotheken -- Nederlandse Vereniging van Bibliothecarissen -- Hongrie: Association of Hungarian librarians, 1967. -- Islande: Association of Icelandic Librarians -- Italie: Associazione Italiana Biblioteche, 1967/1968 -- Luxembourg: Bibliothèque nationale du Grand-Duché -- Monaco: Bibliothèque de Monaco -- Norvège: Norsk bibliotekforening, 1966 and 1967 -- Norsk bibliotekarlag -- Norsk forskningsbibliotekarers forening -- Pologne: Association des bibliothécaires polonais, 1968 -- Portugal: Direcçäo-Geral do Ensino superior e das Belas-artes -- Roumanie: Asociatia hibliotecarilor din Republica Populara Romîna -- Suède: Svenska Bibliotekariesamfundet -- Sveriges Allmänna Biblioteksforening -- Sveriges Vetenskapliga Specialbiblioteks förening -- Svenska Folkbibliotekarieförbundet -- Swedish libraries, 1967/1968 -- Suisse: Vereinigung Schweizerischer Bibliotekare, 1967/1968 -- URSS: USSR Library Council. Library activities in the USSR (Russian text) -- English summary -- Vatican: Biblioteca apostolica Vaticana -- Yugoslavie: Savez drustava bibliotekara Jugoslavije, 1966/1967 -- (4) Asia -- Hong Kong: Hong Kong Library Association -- Inde: Indian Library Association -- Indian Association of Special Libraries and Information Centers (IASLIC), 1967 -- Israel: Israel Library Association, 1967/1968 -- Japon: Japan Library Association, 1967/1968 -- Jourdain: Jordan Library Association, 1967 -- Liban: Lebanese Library Association, 1968/1969 -- Thailande: Thai Library Association -- Turquie: Türk Kütüphaneciler Dernegi -- (6) Afrique -- Afrique du Sud: The South African Libraries, 1967/1968 -- Ghana: Ghana Library Association -- Tunisie: Association tunisienne des Documentalistes, Bibliothécaires et Archivistes -- (7) Amérique du Nord -- Canada: Canadian Library Association, 1967/1968 -- Association canadienne des bibliothécaires de langue française, 1968 -- Ontario Library Association -- Quebec Library Association -- Etats-Unis d’Amérique American Library Association, 1967/1968 -- Medical Library Association -- Special Libraries Association, 1967/1968 -- American Association of Law Libraries -- Association of Research Libraries -- Puerto Rico: Sociedad de Bibliotecarios de Puerto Rico -- (5) Amérique latine -- Brésil: Associaçâo Paulista de Bibliotecârios -- Associaçâo Brasileira de Bibliotecâ.rios -- Federaçâo Brasileira de Associaçóes de Bibliote-cârios (FEBAB) -- Instituto Brasileiro de Bibliografia e Documentaçâo -- Mexique: Asociación Mexicana de Bibliotecarios -- Pérou: Asociación Peruana de Bibliotecarios -- Uruguay: Asociación de Bibliotecarios del Uruguay -- (9) Australasie -- Australie: Library Association of Australia, 1967 -- Nouvelle-Zélande: New Zealand Library Association, 1967/1968 -- * * * -- Associate members / Membres associés.

Abstract: I. The Epistemology of Albert Einstein -- Section A. The Inductive Beginnings of Scientific Investigation -- Section B. The Formation of Primary Concepts according to Einstein. Their Invention -- Section C. The Deductive Process. The Rules of Naturalness and Simplicity -- Section D. The Epistemological Elements of the Special Theory of Relativity. Confirmation of the Theory -- II. A Metaphysical Analysis of Einstein’s View of Reality -- Section A. The Notion of Reality in Albert Einstein -- Section B. The Problem of the Reality of Relations -- Section C. The Grasp of Reality in Mathematico-physical Investigation -- III. The Metaphysical Foundations Of Einstein’s Epistemology -- Section A. The Foundations of Inductive Beginnings -- Section B. The Roots of the Formation of the Primary Concepts -- Section C. Judgment and Reasoning as Related to Scientific Postulation -- Section D. The Confirmation of the Theorems and the Nature of Scientific Proof -- Conclusions -- Appendix. A note on the Discovery of Being.

Abstract: Now how would things be intelligible if they did not proceed from an intelligence? In the last analy­ sis a Primal Intelligence must exist, which is itself Intellection and Intelligibility in pure act, and which is the first principle of intelligibility and essences of things, and causes order to exist in them, as well as an infinitely complex network of regular relationships, whose fundamental mysterious unity our reason dreams of rediscovering in its own way. Such an approach to God's existence is a variant of Thomas Aquinas' fifth way. Its impact was secretly present in Einstein's famous saying: "God does not play dice," which, no doubt, used the word God in a merely figurative sense, and meant only: "nature does not result from a throw of the dice," yet the very fact implicitly postulated the existence of the divine Intellect. Jacques Maritain God's creation is the insistence on the dependence of "epistemology" on ontology; man's acknow­ ledgement of creation is an insistence on the episte­ mological recovery of ontology.