Abstract: Eidos and Science -- Durkheim and Husserl: A Comparison of the Spirit of Positivism and the Spirit of Phenomenology -- Can There Be a Scientific Concept of Ideology? -- The Problem of Anonymity in the Thought of Alfred Schutz -- Genesis and Validation of Social Knowledge: Lessons from Merleau-Ponty -- Notes on Contributors.

Abstract: The five essays in this work attempt in interpretive and original ways to further the common field of investigation of man in the life-world. Richard Zaner in his examination of the multi-level approach of the social sciences to the social order points us toward essences and the manner in which they are epistemically understood. By contrasting the work of the later Durkheim with that of Husserl, Edward Tiryakian is able to suggest a commonality of endeavor between them. Paul Ricoeur, after phenomenologically distinguishing three concepts of ideology, examines the supposed conflict between science and ideology and its resolution through a hermeneutics of historical understanding. Maurice N at anson in his discussion of the problem of anonymity reflects on both the sociological givenness of the world and its phenomenological reconstruction, showing the necessary interrelationship of both prior­ ities. Fred Dallmayr, after a presentation of the state of validation in the social sciences and their problems in attempting to ground them­ selves either in regard to logical positivism or phenomenology, refers us to the perspective of Merleau-Ponty concerning the relationship of cognition and experience.

Abstract: I. Irony -- A. Irony and the Concept in The Concept of Irony -- B. Irony as a Measurement and Tool in the Analysis of the Aesthetic Life-View -- II. Anxiety -- A. Anxiety in The Concept of Anxiety -- B. The Concept of Anxiety in Kierkegaard’s Other Writings -- C. The Idea of Anxiety. The Experience and Structure of Anxiety -- D. Attitudes toward Anxiety -- E. Anxiety and the Aesthetic Life-View -- III. Melancholy -- A. The Term “Melancholy” -- B. Melancholy in Either/Or -- C. Melancholy in Repetition and Stages -- D. Towards a Concept of Melancholy -- IV. Despair -- A. Preliminary Considerations -- B. Despair in Either/Or -- C. Despair in The Sickness Unto Death -- D. The Idea of Despair -- E. Despair and the Aesthetic Life-View -- V. The Moods and Subjectivity of the Young Aesthete Johannes -- A. Johannes’ Irony -- B. His Anxiety -- C. His Melancholy -- D. His Despair -- E. Dialetic of Moods in Johannes -- VI. The Dialectic of Moods -- A. Defining “Mood” -- B. The Crisis-Sequence -- C. Interrelationships -- D. Function of Moods in Emerging Religious Subjectivity -- E. Moods and Life-Views -- VII. From Victim to Master of Moods: Towards the Christian Life-View -- A. Preliminary Considerations -- B. Life-View in From the Papers of One Still Living -- C. Life-View in The Book on Adler -- D. Life-View in Either/Or, Stages and the Postscript -- E. Life-View in the Papirer -- F. The Meaning of Life-View -- G. The Aesthetic Life-View Exposed -- Conclusion -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: Kierkegaard himself hardly requires introduction, but his thought con­ tinues to require explication due to its inherent complexity and its unusual method of presentation. Kierkegaard is deliberately un-systematic, anti-systematic, in the very age of the System. He made his point then, and it is not lost upon us today. But that must not deter us from assembling the fragments and viewing the whole. Kierkegaard's religious psychology in particular may finally have its impact and generate the discussion it deserves when its outlines and inter-locking elements are viewed together. Many approaches to his thought are possible, as a survey of the literature about him will readily reveal. ! The present study proceeds with the simple ambition of looking at Kierkegaard on his own terms, of thus putting aside biographical fascination or one's own personal religi­ ous situation. I understand the temptation of both, and have seen the dangers realized in Kierkegaard scholarship. In English-language Kier­ kegaard scholarship, we are now in a new phase, in which the entire corpus of Kierkegaard's authorship is at last viewed as a whole. We have passed the stages of "fad" and of under-formed. Almost all the corpus is available in English, or soon will be. Perhaps now Kierkegaard can be viewed, understood, and criticized dispassionately and objectively, not withstanding author Kierkegaard's personal horror of those adverbs. The present study hopes to make its contribution toward this goal.

Abstract: On the Psychology of Complexions and Relations. 1891 -- Supplementary Notes by Ernst Mally -- An Essay Concerning the Theory of Psychic Analysis. 1894 -- Supplementary Notes by Stephen Witasek -- On Objects of Higher Order and their Relationship to Internal Perception. 1899 -- Additional Notes by Auguste Fischer -- Critical Notes on E. Husserl’s Ideas on a Pure Phenomenology, Volume I. After 1914.

Abstract: 16. The General Subject Matter of Husserl's Phenomenology 45 17. General Thesis and Epoche 46 18. Doubt 47 19. Hyle and Noema 48 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY TRANSLATION OF SELECI'ED TEXTS REFERRED TO IN THE FOOTNOTES 51 INTRODUCTION SECTION I PREFACE Meinong was one of the great philosophers who stand at the beginning of Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. He was a contemporary of Husserl, Frege, Mach, and Russell who were either originally or physicists, except Meinong. Meinong was a historian mathematicians and always a philosopher who became increasingly interested in experi­ mental psychology, under the influence of Franz Brentano. He, as each of his contemporaries, developed his own philosophy. It grew, in a profound fashion, into a very rich realism which was, curiously enoug- based on a staunch empirical attitude. Of all these philosophers, Meinong and Husserl were most closely associated: both of them were students of Brentano and dealt, each. with his own philosophical tools, with the same subject matter, presentations and their objects. Meinong concerned himself, in short critical notes, with Husserl's phenomenology, that is, the first volume of Ideas . . . which was trans­ 1 lated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. The last section of this Introduction will be devoted to Meinong's criticism of Husserl. It is done in the last section because some of Meinong's theory is presupposed for the understanding of his critique of Husserl.

Abstract: I. Philosophy of Human Communication -- 1. Communication as Problematic -- 2. Philosophic Method and Communication -- 3. Speech Act Propositions -- II. Speech Act Structures -- 1. Constatives -- 2. Performatives -- 3. Rules and Conventions -- 4. Locutionary Acts -- III. Speech Act Contents -- 1. Meaning -- 2. Illocutionary Acts -- IV. Speech Act Communication -- 1. Perlocutionary Acts -- 2. Speech as Communication -- V. Existential Speech and the Phenomenology of Communication -- 1. Existential Phenomenology -- 2. Encountering Phenomenological Existence -- 3. The Dialectic Critique -- 1. Books -- 2. Essays and Articles -- 3. Unpublished Materials.

Abstract: The nature and function of language as Man's chief vehicle of communi­ cation occupies a focal position in the human sciences, particularly in philosophy. The concept of 'communication' is problematic because it suggests both 'meaning' (the nature of language) and the activity of speaking (the function of language). The philosophic theory of 'speech acts' is one attempt to clarify the ambiguities of 'speech' as both the use of language to describe states of affair and the process in which that description is generated as 'communication'. The present study, Speech Act Phenomenology, is in part an exam­ ination of speech act theory. The theory offers an explanation for speech performance, that is, the structure of speech acts as 'relationships' and the content of speech acts as 'meaning'. The primary statement of the speech act theory that is examined is that presented by Austin. A seconda­ ry concern is the formulation of the theory as presented by Searle and Grice. The limitations of the speech act theory are specified by applying the theory as an explanation of 'human communication'. This conceptual examination of 'communication' suggests that the philosophic method of 'analysis' does not resolve the antinomy of language 'nature' and 'function'. Basically, the conceptual distinctions of the speech act theory (i. e. locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions) are found to be empty as a comprehensive explanation of the concept 'communication'.

Abstract: Editor’s Introduction -- Review of Dr. E. Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic. -- Husserl and Frege: A New Look at their Relationship -- A Reply to a Critic of my Refutation of Logical Psychologism -- The Paradox of Logical Psychologism: Husserl’s Way Out -- On the Question of Logical Method -- Husserl on the Apodictic Evidence of Ideal Laws -- Husserl’s Thesis of the Ideality of Meanings -- Husserl on Signification and Object -- The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations -- Outlines of a Theory of “Essentially Occasional Expressions” -- Husserl’s Conception of a Purely Logical Grammar -- Husserl’s Conception of ‘The Grammatical’ and Contemporary Linguistics -- On Husserl’s Approach to Necessary Truth -- Husserl on Truth and Evidence -- The Task and the Significance of the Logical Investigations -- Suggestions for Further Reading.

Abstract: I Edmund Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen is, by any standard and also by nearly common consent, a great philosophical work. Within the phenom­ enological movement, it is generally recognised that the breakthrough to pure phenomenology - not merely to eidetic phenomenology, but also to transcendental phenomenology - was first made in these investiga­ tions. But in the context of philosophy of logic and also of theory of know­ ledge in general, these investigations took decisive steps forward. Amongst their major achievements generally recognised are of course: the final death-blow to psychologism as a theory of logic in the Prolegomena, a new conception of analyticity which vastly improves upon Kant's, a theory of meaning which is many-sided in scope and widely ramified in its appli­ cations, a conception of pure logical grammar that eventually became epoch-making, a powerful restatement of the conception of truth in terms of 'evidence' and a theory of knowledge in terms of the dynamic movement from empty intention to graduated fulfillment. There are many other detailed arguments, counter-arguments, conceptual distinctions and phenomenolo­ gical descriptions which deserve the utmost attention, examination and assimilation on the part of any serious investigator. With the publication of J. N. Findlay's English translation of the Untersuchungen, it is expected that this work will find its proper place in the curriculum of the graduate programs in philosophy in the English­ speaking world.

Abstract: 1. The development of modem psychology, Dilthey’s decisive critique and his proposals for a reform (explanatory and descriptive psychology) -- 2. The reasons for the limited influence of Dilthey upon his contemporaries: the inadequacy of their understanding and the limits of his beginning -- 3. Task and significance of the Logical Investigations -- a) Critique of psychologism; the essence of irreal (ideal) objects and of irreal (ideal) truths -- b) Researching the correlation: ideal object — psychic lived experiencing (forming of sense) by means of essential description in the reflective attitude -- c) More precise characterization of the reflection decisive for phenomenology (step by step accomplishment of the reflection) -- d) Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience — discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic -- e) The further development of the thought of intentionality in the Logical Investigations. The productive character of consciousness. Transition from a purely descriptive psychology to an a priori (eidetic-intuitive) psychology and its significance for the theory of knowledge -- f) The consistent expansion and deepening of the question raised by the Logical Investigations. Showing the necessity of an epistemological grounding of a priori sciences by transcendental phenomenology — the science of transcendental subjectivity -- 4. Summarizing characterization of the new psychology -- Systematic Part -- 5. Delimiting phenomenological psychology: distinguishing it from the other socio-cultural sciences and from the natural sciences. Questioning the concepts, nature and mind -- 6. Necessity of the return to the pre-scientific experiential world and to the experience in which it is given (harmony of experience) -- 7. Classifying the sciences by a return to the experiental world. The systematic connection of the sciences, based upon the structural connection of the experiential world; idea of an all-inclusive science as science of the all-inclusive world-structure and of the concrete sciences which have as their theme the individual forms of experiential objects. Significance of the empty horizons -- 8. The science of the all-inclusive world-structure as a priori science -- 9. Seeing essences as genuine method for grasping the a priori -- a) Variation as the decisive step in the dissociation from the factual by fantasy — the eidos as the invariable -- b) Variation and alteration -- c) The moments of ideation: starting with an example (model); disclosure brought about by an open infinity of variants (optional-ness of the process of forming variants); overlapping coincidence of the formation of variants in a synthetic unity; grasping what agrees as the eidos -- d) Distinguishing between empirical generalization and ideation -- e) Bringing out the sequence of levels of genera and gaining the highest genera by variation of ideas — seeing of ideas without starting from experience -- f) Summarizing characterization of the seeing of essences -- 10. The method of intuitive universalization and of ideation as instruments toward gaining the universal structural concepts of a world taken without restriction by starting from the experiential world (“natural concept of the world”). Possibility of an articulation of the sciences of the world and establishment of the signification of the science of the mind -- 11. Characterizing the science of the natural concept of the world. Differentiating this concept of experience from the Kantian concept of experience. Space and time as the most universal structures of the world -- 12. Necessity of beginning with the experience of something singular, in which passive synthesis brings about unity -- 13. Distinguishing between self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient realities. Determination of real unity by means of causality -- 14. Order of realities in the world -- 15. Characterizing the psychophysical realities of the experiential world. Greater self-sufficiency of the corporeal vis-à-vis the psyche -- 16. The forms in which the mental makes its appearance in the experiential world. The specific character of the cultural object, which is determined in its being by a relation to a subject -- 17. Reduction to pure realities as substrates of exclusively real properties. Exclusion of irreal cultural senses -- 18. Opposition of the subjective and the objective in the attitude of the natural scientist -- 19. The true world in itself a necessary presumption -- 20. Objectivity demonstrable in intersubjective agreement. Normalcy and abnormalcy -- 21. Hierarchical structure of the psychic -- 22. Concept of physical reality as enduring substance of causal determinations -- 23. Physical causality as inductive. Uniqueness of psychic interweaving -- 24. The unity of the psychic -- 25. The idea of an all-inclusive science of nature. Dangers of the naturalistic prejudice -- 26. The subjective in the world as objective theme -- 27. The difficulty that the objective world is constituted by excluding the subjective, but that everything subjective itself belongs to the world -- 28. Carrying out the reflective turn of regard toward the subjective. The perception of physical things in the reflective attitude -- 29. Perceptual field — perceptual space -- 30. Spatial primal presence -- 31. Hyle — hyletic data as matter for intentional functions -- 32. Noticing givenness as I-related mode of givenness of the object -- 33. Objective temporality and temporality of the stream -- 34. Distinction between immanent and transcendent, real and irreal in perception. The object as irreal pole -- 35. Substrate-pole and property-pole. The positive significance of the empty horizon -- 36. The intentional object of perception -- 37. The phenomenological reduction as a method of disclosing the immanent -- 38. The access to pure subjectivity from external perception -- 39. Analysis of perception with regard to the perceiver himself -- 40. The problem of temporality: presenting — retention and protention (positional and quasi-positional modifications of perception and their significance for practical life) -- 41. Reflection upon the object-pole in the noematic attitude and reflection upon the I-pole as underlying it. All-inclusive synthesis of the I-pole. The I as pole of activities and habitualities -- 42. The I of primal institutions and of institutions which follow others. Identity of the I maintaining its convictions. The individuality of the I makes itself known in its decisions which are based upon convictions -- 43. The unity of the subject as monad — static and genetic investigation of the monad. Transition from the isolated monad to the totality of monads -- 44. Phenomenological psychology foundational both for the natural and for the personal exploration of the psyche and for the corresponding sciences -- 45. Retrospective sense-investigation -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno­ logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research manuscripts of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A.

Abstract: I. Logic and the Forgetfulness of Being -- II. The Foundation and Limitation of Logic -- III. Heideggers “Attack” on Logic: The Nothing -- IV. Logic versus Authentic Thought -- V. Symbolic Logic: Its Development and Relation to Technicity -- VI. Logos and Language: The Overcoming of Technicity -- Conclusion.

Abstract: Since his inaugural lecture at Freiburg in 1929 in which Heidegger delivered his most celebrated salvo against logic, he has frequently been portrayed as an anti-logician, a classic example of the obscurity resultant upon a rejection of the discipline of logic, a champion of the irrational, and a variety of similar things. Because many of Heidegger's statements on logic are polemical in tone, there has been no little misunderstanding of his position in regard to logic, and a great deal of distortion of it. All too frequently the position which is attacked as Heidegger's is a barely recognizable caricature of it. Heidegger has, from the very beginning of his career, written and said much on logic. Strangely enough, in view of all that he has said, his critique of logic has not been singled out as the subject of any of the longer, more detailed studies on the various aspects of his thought.

Abstract: I. Introduction -- II. The Problem of Psychologism -- III. Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic: A Re-Evaluation -- IV. Sartre and the Cartesian Ego -- V. The Ego and Consciousness in Rival Perspectives: Sartre and Husserl -- VI. World and Epoché in Husserl and Heidegger -- VII. Heidegger and Dewey.

Abstract: The essays which are collected in this book were written at various intervals during the last seven years. The essay "Heidegger and Dewey," which is the last one to be printed in the book, was actually the first one I wrote. It was written as a seminar paper for John D. Goheen's course on Dewey in the Spring of 1968 at Stanford University where I was a second-year graduate student. The paper went unchanged into my thesis "Four Studies in Phenomenology and Pragmatism," which I eventually submitted in 1971, and it is here reprinted with no alteration except for the title. A first version of the two essays on Sartre was written in the Spring of 1969 during my first year of teaching at Princeton University. Even­ tually I decided to break the essay into two parts. A shortened version of "Sartre and the Cartesian Ego" was read at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in December 1973.

Abstract: I. Statement of the Problem -- II. Eidetics and its Limits -- III. Existential Structures of Disproportion -- IV. Eidetics, Existence, and Experience -- V. Symbol, Hermeneutic, and Conflict of Interpretation -- VI. Philosophical Reflection as Hermeneutics -- VII. Phenomenology and the Sciences of Language: Further Extensions -- VIII. Conclusions -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: The path Husserl entered upon at the beginning of his philosophical writ­ ings turned out to be the beginning of a long, tedious way. Throughout his life he constantly comes to grips with the fundamental problems which set him upon this path. Beginning with the logical level of meaning, laboring through the idealism of the transcendental phenomenology of the period between Ideas I to the Meditations, in search for the ever more originary, he finally arrived at the level of the Lebenswelt. It was this later focus on the ever more originary, the source, the foundation of meaning which led him finally to the horizon of meaning and the genesis of meaning in the Lebenswelt period. This later period allows for a quasi wedding of his phenomenology with some adaptation of existentialism. But this union called for an adaptation of Husserl's logistic prejudice. The period of the Lebenswelt allows many of the later phenomenologists to speak of the failure of the brackets in their extreme exclusion and to allow for a link between man and his world in the Lebenswelt. This link is at the source of the ontological investigations and theories which arise from the phenomenological movement. However, there is the possibility of many tensions in such an endeavor since the study of being can be most abstract and most concrete.

Abstract: The Author’s Abstracts 1900/01 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume One in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Vol. 24 (1900), pp. 511–12 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume Two in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, Vol. 25 (1901), pp. 260–63 -- A Draft of a “Preface” to the Logical Investigations, 1913 -- I. Eugen Fink’s Editorial Remarks -- II. Husserl’s Text.

Abstract: TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS A DRAFT OF A PREFACE TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS ( 1913) Edited by EUGEN FINK Translated with Introductions by PHILIP J. BOSSERT and CURTIS H. PETERS • MARTINUS NIJHOFF THE HAGUE 1975 © I975 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-I3: 978-90-247-1711-8 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-1655-1 DOl: 10. 1007/978-94-010-1655-1 TO HERBERT SPIEGELBERG ESTEEMED SCHOLAR, MENTOR, FRIEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to express our thanks to H. L. Van Breda, director of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain), for his approval and encouragement of this project, and to Professor Dr. Gerhart Husserl, Professor Dr. Eugen Fink and the editors of Tijdschrift voor Philosophie for their permission to undertake it. We also owe a debt of appreciation to Dr. Karl Schuhmann of the Catholic University of Louvain and to Dr. Elmar Holenstein, Dr. Edi Marbach and Mr. Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain) for their help in reading the original manuscripts and for putting their excellent knowledge of the Husserl "Nachlass" preserved at the Archives at our disposal. We especially wish to thank Professor Herbert Spiegelberg whose careful and critical reading of our manuscript at an earlier stage resulted in numerous suggestions for its improvement; and, last but not least, our wives, Jane and Pam, for their help in preparing the typescripts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Translator's Introductions XI I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION XI II. THEMATIC INTRODUCTION XX III.

Abstract: Introduction: The Seeming Contingency of the Question concerning the Body and the Necessity for an Ontological Analysis of the Body -- I: The Philosophical Presuppositions of the Biranian Analysis of the Body -- 1. The Philosophical Presuppositions of Biranian Ontology -- 2. The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories -- 3. The Theory of the Ego and the Problem of the Soul -- II:The Subjective Body -- III: Movement and Sensing -- 1. The Unity of our Senses and the Problem of the Relationship between our Images and our Movements -- 2. The Unity of the Body Interpreted as a Unity of Knowledge. Habit and Memory -- 3. The Individuality of Human Reality as Sensible Individuality -- IV: The Twofold Usage of Signs and the Problem of the Constitution of One’s own Body -- V: Cartesian Dualism -- VI: A Critique of the Thought of Maine de Biran. The Problem of Passivity -- VII: Conclusion. The Ontological Theory of the Body and the Problem of Incarnation. The Flesh and the Spirit -- Index of Authors -- Index of Terms.

Abstract: THE SEEMING CONTINGENCY OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE BODY AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BODY When we disclose and bring forth, within ontological investigations aimed at making possible the elaboration of a phenomenology of the ego, a prob­ lematic concerning the body, we may well seem, with respect to the general direction of our analysis, to elaborate only a contingent and accidental specification of such an analysis and to forget its true goal.! Up to the present, we pursued the clarification of the being of the ego [2] on the level of absolute subjectivity and in the form of an ontological analysis. Is it not possible that the reasons which motivated the project of conducting the investigations relative to the problem of the ego within a sphere of abso­ lute immanence may cease to be valid because we might be led to believe that the body also constitutes the object of these investigations and belongs to a first reality whose study is the task of fundamental ontology? Actually, does not the body present itself to us as a transcendent being, as an inhabi­ tant of this world of ours wherein subjectivity does not reside? If, con­ sequently, the body must constitute the theme of our philosophical reflec­ tion, is it not on condition that the latter submit to a radical modification and cease to be turned toward subjectivity in order to be a reflection on.