Abstract: I. Freedom, action and deeds -- Worthiness and reward -- History and harmonization -- Character and duty -- V. Races and peoples -- VI. Incentive and propensity -- VII. Excursus: between Epicurus and Stoa -- Name index.

Abstract: The present book is an exp]oration of some basic issues of Kant's moral phi­ losophy. The point of departure is the concept offreedom and the self-legisla­ tion of reason. Since self-Iegislation is expressed in the sphere of practice or morality, it is meant to overcome some of the vulnerable aspects of Kant's theoretical philosophy, namely that which Kant himself pointed to and called the 'lucky chance,' in so far as the application of reason to sensuous data is concerned. The book attempts to show that Kant's practical or moral philosophy faces questions which are parallel to those he faced in the sphere ofhis theore­ tical philosophy. The problematic situation of realization of practice is parallel to the problematic situation of application of theory. It is in the line of the problems emerging from Kant's practical philosophy that the present book deals with some of Kant's minor writings, or less-known ones, in­ cluding his writings in the sphere of politics, history and education. The limitations of self-Iegislation - this is the theme of the book. The book is parallel to the author's previous one on Kant: 'Experience and its Systema­ tization - Studies in Kant" (Nijhoff, 1965, 2nd edition 1973), as well as to: "From Substance to Subject -Studies in Hegel" (Nijhoff, 1974). Jerusalem 1978 ABBREVIATIONS As to the references to Kant's major works, the following procedme will be ob­ served: Kritik der reinen Vernunft will be quoted as Kr. d. r. V.

Abstract: John Dewey ranks as the most influential of America's philosophers. That in­ fluence stems, in part, from the originality of his mind, the breadth of his in­ terests, and his capacity to synthesize materials from diverse sources. In addi­ tion, Dewey was blessed with a long life and the extraordinary energy to express his views in more than 50 books, approximately 750 articles, and at least 200 contributions to encyclopedias. He has made enduring intellectual contributions in all of the traditional fields of philosophy, ranging from studies primarily of interest for philosophers in logic, epistemology, and metaphysics to books and articles of wider appeal in ethics, political philosophy, religion, aesthetics, and education. Given the extent of Dewey's own writings and the many books and articles on his views by critics and defenders, it may be asked why there is a need for any further examination of his philosophy. The need arises because the lapse of time since his death in 1952 now permits a new generation of scholars to approach his work in a different spirit. Dewey is no longer a living partisan of causes, sparking controversy over the issues of the day. He is no longer the advocate of a new point of view which calls into question the basic assump­ tions of rival philosophical schools and receives an almost predictable criticism from their entrenched positions. His works have now become classics.

Abstract: Descriptive Psychology and the Human Studies -- Lived Experience, Understanding and Description -- Structure and Development in Psychic Life -- Psychology and Hermeneutics -- Understanding, Re-experiencing and Historical Interpretation -- Ideas concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (1894) -- I: The Problem of a Psychological Foundation for the Human Studies -- II: Distinction between Explanatory and Descriptive Psychology -- III: Explanatory Psychology -- IV: Descriptive and Analytic Psychology -- V: Relationships between Explanatory Psychology and Descriptive Psychology -- VI: Possibility and Conditions of the Solution of the Task of a Descriptive Psychology -- VII: The Structure of Psychic Life -- VIII: The Development of Psychic Life -- IX: Study of the Differences of Psychic Life: The Individual -- Remark -- The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life -- I. Expressions of Life -- II. The Elementary Forms of Understanding -- III. Objective Spirit and Elementary Understanding -- IV. The Higher Forms of Understanding -- V. Projecting, Re-creating, Re-experiencing -- VI. Exegesis or Interpretation -- Appendices.

Abstract: Perhaps no philosopher has so fully explored the nature and conditions of historical understanding as Wilhelm Dilthey. His work, conceived overall as a Critique of Historical Reason and developed through his well-known theory of the human studies, provides concepts and methods still fruitful for those concerned with analyzing the human condition. Despite the increasing recognition of Dilthey's contributions, relati­ vely few of his writings have as yet appeared in English translation. It is therefore both timely and useful to have available here two works drawn from different phases in the development of his philosophy. The "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology" (1894), now translated into English for the first time, sets forth Dilthey's programma­ tic and methodological viewpoints through a descriptive psychology, while "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life" (ca. 1910) is representative of his later hermeneutic approach to historical understanding. DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN STUDIES Dilthey presented the first mature statement of his theory of the human studies in volume one of his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human Studies), published in 1883. He argued there that for the proper study of man and history we must eschew the metaphysical speculation of the absolute idealists while at the same time avoiding the scientistic reduction of positivism.

Abstract: The Problem of Transcendental Arguments and the Second Critique as Test Case -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Working Model for Transcendental Arguments -- 3. Criteria of a Successful Account of the Argument-Structure of the Analytic of the Second Critique -- The Argument of the Analytic -- 4. Preliminary Outline of the Argument of the Analytic as a Whole -- 5. The Argument of Chapter 1 -- 6. The Argument of Chapter 2 -- 7. The Argument of Chapter 3 -- Conclusions -- 8. Conclusions and Discussion -- Appendixes -- Appendix A: Beck’s Account of the Argument -- Appendix B: Silber’s Account of the Argument -- Appendix C: The Fact of Pure Practical Reason -- Appendix D: Maxims and Laws -- Notes.

Abstract: This work is in no way intended as a commentary on the second Cri­ tique, or even on the Analytic of that book. Instead I have limited myself to the attempt to extract the essential structure of the argument of the Analytic and to exhibit it as an instance of a transcendental argument (namely, one establishing the conditions of the possibility of a practical cognitive viewpoint). This limitation of scope has caused me, in some cases, to ignore or treat briefly concrete questions of Kant's practical philosophy that deserve much closer consideration; and in other cases it has led me to relegate questions that could not be treated briefly to appendixes ,in order not to distract from the development of the argu­ ment. As a result, it is the argument-structure itself that receives pri­ mary attention, and I think some justification should be offered for this concentration on what may seem to be a purely formal concern. One of the most common weaknesses of interpretations of Kant's works is a failure to distinguish the level of generality at which Kant's argument is being developed. This failure is particularly fatal in dealing with the Critiques, since in interpreting them it is important to keep clearly in mind that it is not this or that cognition that is at stake, but the possibility of (a certain kind of) knowledge as such.

Abstract: 1. The development of modem psychology, Dilthey’s decisive critique and his proposals for a reform (explanatory and descriptive psychology) -- 2. The reasons for the limited influence of Dilthey upon his contemporaries: the inadequacy of their understanding and the limits of his beginning -- 3. Task and significance of the Logical Investigations -- a) Critique of psychologism; the essence of irreal (ideal) objects and of irreal (ideal) truths -- b) Researching the correlation: ideal object — psychic lived experiencing (forming of sense) by means of essential description in the reflective attitude -- c) More precise characterization of the reflection decisive for phenomenology (step by step accomplishment of the reflection) -- d) Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience — discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic -- e) The further development of the thought of intentionality in the Logical Investigations. The productive character of consciousness. Transition from a purely descriptive psychology to an a priori (eidetic-intuitive) psychology and its significance for the theory of knowledge -- f) The consistent expansion and deepening of the question raised by the Logical Investigations. Showing the necessity of an epistemological grounding of a priori sciences by transcendental phenomenology — the science of transcendental subjectivity -- 4. Summarizing characterization of the new psychology -- Systematic Part -- 5. Delimiting phenomenological psychology: distinguishing it from the other socio-cultural sciences and from the natural sciences. Questioning the concepts, nature and mind -- 6. Necessity of the return to the pre-scientific experiential world and to the experience in which it is given (harmony of experience) -- 7. Classifying the sciences by a return to the experiental world. The systematic connection of the sciences, based upon the structural connection of the experiential world; idea of an all-inclusive science as science of the all-inclusive world-structure and of the concrete sciences which have as their theme the individual forms of experiential objects. Significance of the empty horizons -- 8. The science of the all-inclusive world-structure as a priori science -- 9. Seeing essences as genuine method for grasping the a priori -- a) Variation as the decisive step in the dissociation from the factual by fantasy — the eidos as the invariable -- b) Variation and alteration -- c) The moments of ideation: starting with an example (model); disclosure brought about by an open infinity of variants (optional-ness of the process of forming variants); overlapping coincidence of the formation of variants in a synthetic unity; grasping what agrees as the eidos -- d) Distinguishing between empirical generalization and ideation -- e) Bringing out the sequence of levels of genera and gaining the highest genera by variation of ideas — seeing of ideas without starting from experience -- f) Summarizing characterization of the seeing of essences -- 10. The method of intuitive universalization and of ideation as instruments toward gaining the universal structural concepts of a world taken without restriction by starting from the experiential world (“natural concept of the world”). Possibility of an articulation of the sciences of the world and establishment of the signification of the science of the mind -- 11. Characterizing the science of the natural concept of the world. Differentiating this concept of experience from the Kantian concept of experience. Space and time as the most universal structures of the world -- 12. Necessity of beginning with the experience of something singular, in which passive synthesis brings about unity -- 13. Distinguishing between self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient realities. Determination of real unity by means of causality -- 14. Order of realities in the world -- 15. Characterizing the psychophysical realities of the experiential world. Greater self-sufficiency of the corporeal vis-à-vis the psyche -- 16. The forms in which the mental makes its appearance in the experiential world. The specific character of the cultural object, which is determined in its being by a relation to a subject -- 17. Reduction to pure realities as substrates of exclusively real properties. Exclusion of irreal cultural senses -- 18. Opposition of the subjective and the objective in the attitude of the natural scientist -- 19. The true world in itself a necessary presumption -- 20. Objectivity demonstrable in intersubjective agreement. Normalcy and abnormalcy -- 21. Hierarchical structure of the psychic -- 22. Concept of physical reality as enduring substance of causal determinations -- 23. Physical causality as inductive. Uniqueness of psychic interweaving -- 24. The unity of the psychic -- 25. The idea of an all-inclusive science of nature. Dangers of the naturalistic prejudice -- 26. The subjective in the world as objective theme -- 27. The difficulty that the objective world is constituted by excluding the subjective, but that everything subjective itself belongs to the world -- 28. Carrying out the reflective turn of regard toward the subjective. The perception of physical things in the reflective attitude -- 29. Perceptual field — perceptual space -- 30. Spatial primal presence -- 31. Hyle — hyletic data as matter for intentional functions -- 32. Noticing givenness as I-related mode of givenness of the object -- 33. Objective temporality and temporality of the stream -- 34. Distinction between immanent and transcendent, real and irreal in perception. The object as irreal pole -- 35. Substrate-pole and property-pole. The positive significance of the empty horizon -- 36. The intentional object of perception -- 37. The phenomenological reduction as a method of disclosing the immanent -- 38. The access to pure subjectivity from external perception -- 39. Analysis of perception with regard to the perceiver himself -- 40. The problem of temporality: presenting — retention and protention (positional and quasi-positional modifications of perception and their significance for practical life) -- 41. Reflection upon the object-pole in the noematic attitude and reflection upon the I-pole as underlying it. All-inclusive synthesis of the I-pole. The I as pole of activities and habitualities -- 42. The I of primal institutions and of institutions which follow others. Identity of the I maintaining its convictions. The individuality of the I makes itself known in its decisions which are based upon convictions -- 43. The unity of the subject as monad — static and genetic investigation of the monad. Transition from the isolated monad to the totality of monads -- 44. Phenomenological psychology foundational both for the natural and for the personal exploration of the psyche and for the corresponding sciences -- 45. Retrospective sense-investigation -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno­ logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research manuscripts of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A.

Abstract: 1 The English People and War in the Early Sixteenth Century -- 2 Holland’s Experience of War during the Revolt of the Netherlands -- 3 The Army Revolt of 1647 -- 4 Holland’s Financial Problems (1713–1733) and the Wars against Louis XIV -- 5 Municipal Government and the Burden of the Poor in South Holland during the Napoleonic Wars -- 6 The Sinews of War: The Role of Dutch Finance in European Politics (c. 1750–1815) -- 7 Britain and Blockade, 1780–1940 -- 8 Away from Impressment: The Idea of a Royal Naval Reserve, 1696–1859 -- 9 Problems of Defence in a Non-Belligerent Society: Military Service in the Netherlands during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century -- 10 World War II and Social Class in Great Britain -- 11 The Second World War and Dutch Society: Continuity and Change.

Abstract: War has ever exercised a great appeal on men's minds. Oscar Wilde's witticism notwithstanding this fascination cannot be attri­ buted simply to the wicked character of war. The demonic forces released by war have caught the artistic imagination, while sages have reflected on the enigmatic readiness of each new generation to wage war, despite the destruction, disillusion and exhaustion that war is known to bring in its train. If there never was a good war and a bad peace why did armed conflicts recur with such distressing regularity? Was large-scale violence an intrinsic condition of Man? The answers given to such questions have differed widely: it has even been suggested that the states of war and peace are not as far removed from one another as is usually supposed. The causes of war and the interaction between war and society have long been the subject of philosophical enquiry and historical analysis. Accord­ ing to Thucydides no one was ever compelled to go to war; Cicero remarked how dumb were the laws in time of war, while Clausewitz's profound observation concerning the affinity between war and politics has become almost a commonplace. War being the severest test a society or state can experience historians have naturally been concerned to investigate their rela­ tionship.

Abstract: In this volume, I have given attention to what I consider to be some of the central problems and topics in the philosophical thought of SjiSren Kierkegaard. Some of the chapters have been previously publish­ ed but were revised for their appearance here. Others were written expressly for this book. I have tried to focus on issues which have not been customarily dealt with or emphasized in the scholarship on Kierkegaard with the exception of the writings of David Swenson and Paul L. Holmer to which (and to whom) I am greatly indebted. Some of the positions for which I have argued in this volume (especially in Chapters IV and V) may be controversial. I am grateful to all those who enabled me to carry out or influenced me in my studies of Kierkegaard or who assisted with regard to the research for or preparation of this volume. Among these are: Professors Paul L. Holmer, F. Arthur Jacobson, and Dennis A. Rohatyn; Dean Wallace A. Russell and Vice President Daniel J. Zaffarano of Iowa State University.

Abstract: I. The Rehabilitation of Rhetoric -- II. Plato and The Sophists -- III. Isocrates and the Power of Logos -- IV. The History and System of Greek Rhetoric -- V. Rhetoric and Philosophy in Rome -- VI. Augustine and Rhetoric -- VII. The Liberal Arts and Education in the Middle Ages -- VIII. The Italian Humanists -- IX. Francis Bacon, René Descartes and the New Science -- X. Pascal and the Art of Persuasion -- XI. Sacred Eloquence -- XII. Kant and the Enlightenment -- XIII. Marx, Nietzsche and Freud -- XIV. Nietzsche and Philosophy -- XV. Philosophy and Metaphor -- XVI. Who is Actually Speaking Whenever Something is Said?.

Abstract: I. Introduction: Hume and Kant and the History of Ideas -- II. Sense, Reason and Imagination -- III. Hume’s “Principles” and Kant’s “Categories” -- IV. Naturalism and Criticism -- V. Hume and Kant on the Philosophy of Religion -- VI. Towards a Theory of “Anthropocentrism” with regard to Naturalism and Criticism.

Abstract: The present work is the product of several years study of the various aspects of Kanfs Critical Philosophy and Hume's naturalism. During that time many individuals have helped with this work and it is hardly possible to set down the names of aH of them. One name does des erve special mention - Prof. Dr. H. Heimsoeth with whom the author has discussed some of the very knotty problems of Kantian Philosophy. Although Hume has been - as Kant freely admits in the Preface to his "Prolegomena" - one of the most decisive influences and turning points in the philosophical development of Kant, the author does not thematize in this work the age-old problem of whether Kant reaHy read, understood and refuted Hume. That it has been, ever since Hume wrote, a favorite pursuit among philosophers to answer hirn, to refute hirn, and to refute Kanfs attempt at refutation of hirn, irrespective of its being convincing or not, must be mentioned with special respect.

Abstract: Berliner Erinnerungen 1933/34 -- „Raum“ und „Zeit“ als „Formen der Anschauung“ und als „Formale Anschauungen“ in Kants kritischer Theorie -- Zur Begriffsbildung der politischen Theorie -- Nietzsche und die Musik -- The System and the Phenomena: The Kant-Interpretations of Nicolai Hartmann and P. F. Strawson -- The Philosopher’s Thraldom. Alogical Sources of Philosophic Thought -- Durchgang und Aufbruch. Zu Max Müllers Sprach-Werk-Erläuterungen -- Selbstüberwindungen, ohne Ende? -- Mixed Pickles -- Rationalistische Verflachungen im modernen bürgerlichen Bewußtsein -- Probleme einer Geschichte der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung -- Kunst und Normalität. Zur Frage der Bewertung von künstlerischen Produktionen Geisteskranker -- Wirklichkeit als moralische Welt: Lessing zum Beispiel -- Der Begriff „Gehalt“ in Goethes Autobiographie „Dichtung und Wahrheit“ -- Some Observations on Kraus’s Impact Then and Now -- Die Philosophie der Landschaft in Brechts „Buckower Elegien“ -- Bibliographie Hermann Wein 1937–1972 -- Nachsatz.

Abstract: So the philosopher's way to be is the source (Quelle) of his values and of his basic model; it is an important way of understanding thrall. It appears, now, that the thought of this paper could be simplified. The primary notion is the philosopher's "way to be." Style, locus of interest, nisus and way of thought can then be seen as growing out of this, as particular aspects or expressions of it. This entire paper then would be an attempt to come to grips with the primary notion. How is a "way to be" related to what is normally called a philo­ sopher's views or theories (the formulable core)? Is it not irrelevant as non-implicatory fact, like biographical details or social background? I do not think so. A philosopher's way to be is not external fact to the formulable core of his thought. It is not "internal" either in the logical sense. It is what allows us to comprehend his explicit views.