Abstract: Translator’s Introduction -- Lecture I -- Lecture II -- Lecture III -- Lecture IV -- Lecture V -- Addenda -- The Train of Thought in the Lectures.

Abstract: 3 same lecture he characterizes the phenomenology of knowledge, more specifically, as the "theory of the essence of the pure phenomenon of knowing" (see below, p. 36). Such a phenomenology would advance the "critique of knowledge," in which the problem of knowledge is clearly formulated and the possibility of knowledge rigorously secured. It is important to realize, however, that in these lectures Husserl will not enact, pursue, or develop a phenomenological critique of knowledge, even though he opens with a trenchant statement of the problem of knowledge that such a critique would solve. Rather, he seeks here only to secure the possibility of a phe­ nomenological critique of knowledge; that is, he attempts to secure the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge, not the possibil­ ity of knowledge in general (see below, pp. 37-39). Thus the work before us is not phenomenological in the straightforward sense, but pre­ phenomenological: it sets out to identify and satisfy the epistemic require­ ments of the phenomenological critique of knowledge, not to carry out that critique itself. To keep these two levels of theoretical inquiry distinct, I will call the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of knowledge the "critical level"; the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge the "meta-criticallevel.

Abstract: The Paris Lectures -- General Summary of The Paris Lectures -- Translator’s Note -- General Summary -- Summary of the Correspondences between the Texts of The Paris Lectures and The Cartesian Meditations.

Abstract: This study examines the concept of subjectivity developed by Heidegger in his Marburg period and which found its most systematic presentation in Being and Time. Although it is commonly argued that Heidegger's existential analytic seeks to do away with subjectivity, I shall maintain that this analysis does not intend to eliminate subjectivity as such but rather one notion of subjectivity. Heidegger challenges the interpretation of the subject as a worldless and thing-like entity by introducing an interpretation according to which subjectivity is a being-in-the-world that is not a thing. Central to this study is Heidegger's use of Husserl's theory of wholes and parts and the concept of categorial intuition. These Husserlian themes are amalgamated into a phenomenological sense of the apriori which is the foundation for Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. This approach will show that Heidegger's existential analytic is a systematic argument geared toward the development of a phenomenological notion of subjectivity

Abstract: Since the introduction of phenomenology to Japan in the 1910's, Japan has steadily become a major international site for both original and scholarly phenomenological work. Phenomenology in Japan presents several of Japan's leading phenomenologists, studied in both the Buddhist and Western thought, who bring to bear their unique backgrounds on our rich fields of experience. These contributions converge in novel ways on the problem of `dualist', and draw on resources within the phenomenological tradition to respond to its challenges

Abstract: This book starts with a representation of Husserl's idea of phenomenology as a foundational theory of science. The following essays elucidate the main features of the phenomenological method as worked out by Husserl in the course of the development of his philosophy - starting from merely 'descriptive' and going on to 'transcendental' and 'constitutive' phenomenology - in order to get access to the foundations of knowledge in general and of scientific knowledge in particular. Further essays deal with the Husserlian foundations of natural science, and the relations between phenomenology and psychology, as well as those between phenomenology and history. This second revised and enlarged edition - the first appeared in 1987 and was edited by Lee Hardy - contains two further essays: one deals with Husserl's never abandoned idea of phenomenology as a rigorous science and his further claim to restore phenomenological philosophy as 'First Philosophy', and the other one on the problem of crisis of the Western culture Husserl was concerned with during several periods of his life, demonstrates the actuality of his phenomenology even for philosophy of science in our times

Abstract: What is scientific about the natural and human sciences? Precisely this: the legibility of our worlds and the distinctive reading strategies that they provoke. That proposal comes from Edith Stein, who as Husserl's assistant 1916-1918 labored in vain to bring his massive Ideen to publication. She argued that human bodily life itself affords direct access to the interplay of natural causality, cultural motivation, and personal initiative. This study explores the hermeneutical background of Stein's phenomenology and shows that she composed crucial passages of the Ideen manuscripts. Stein's own works on empathy and on psychology establish that natural science is a cultural achievement, resting on the ability to isolate caused data by recognizing and subtracting motivated data from raw data. This subtractive literacy is the most basic scientific competence, and it is fundamentally interpersonal. The reality of the illegible causal remainder overcomes the critiques of science recently offered by psychoanalytic and standpoint feminisms

Abstract: This remarkable volume attests to the world-wide development of a hermeneutical approach to the natural sciences. Questions raised by the essays include: What is a phenomenology of `scientific' perception? How does meaning arise out of laboratory situations? How do individuals or groups come to terms with the particular problem situations in which they find themselves by drawing on the available conceptual and practical resources which structure these situations? The essays are organized around three central themes. One group of authors (Heelan, Kockelmans, and Gremmen/Jacobs) recalls and applies existing historical resources of hermeneutical phenomenology to current scientific and social issues. A second group (Kisiel, Eger) considers the differences between a specifically hermeneutical approach to science and related approaches such as cultural studies and social constructivism. A third group (Ihde, Gendlin) seeks to forge new directions and tools for understanding natural scientific practice. As Crease's introductory essay makes plain, the authors share the commitment of hermeneutical philosophy to the priority of meaning over technique, the primacy of the practical over the theoretical, and the priority of situation over abstract formulation. In the process, the authors revive and transform the ancient Greek idea that the key to living well, to being fully and authentically human, resides primarily in the exercise of the practical not the theoretical virtues, in the art of doing well in the workworld and acting well in the polis

Abstract: Vol. 1: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths Because of his legendary impatience, Wittgenstein's published books are focused on his solutions to his latest problems and consequently often fail to explain not only his earlier solutions but also his problem situation. In the essays collected in this volume, Jaakko Hintikka counteracts the difficulty which this peculiarity of Wittgenstein's poses to his readers by analysing in depth the crucial stages of Wittgenstein's philosophical career and the relation of his ideas to those of other philosophers, especially Russell, Carnap and Husserl, with sometimes surprising results. Vol. 2: Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator Twentieth-century philosophy has tacitly been dominated by a deep contrast between universalist and model-theoretical visions of language. The role of this contrast is studied here in Peirce, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Husserl, Heidegger and in the development of logical theory. Hintikka also develops a new approach to truth-definitions which strongly supports the model-theoretical view. Vol. 3: Language, Truth and Logic in Mathematics The foundations of mathematics are examined by reference to such crucial concepts as the informational independence of quantifiers, the standard-nonstandard distinction, completeness, computability, parallel processing and the extremality of models. Vol. 4: Paradigms for Language Theory and Other Essays Several of the basic ideas of current language theory are subjected to critical scrutiny and found wanting, including the concept of scope, the hegemony of generative syntax, the Frege-Russell claim that verbs like `is' are ambiguous, and the assumptions underlying the so-called New Theory of Reference. In their stead, new constructive ideas are proposed. Vol. 5: Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery In the essays collected here, Hintikka both defends and outlines a genuine logic of scientific discovery, the logic of questions and answers. Thus inquiry in the sense of knowledge-seeking becomes inquiry in the sense of interrogation. Using this new logic, Hintikka establishes a result that will undoubtedly be considered the fundamental theorem of all epistemology, viz., the virtual identity of optimal strategies of pure discovery with optimal deductive strategies. Vol. 6: Analyses of Aristotle This collection comprises several striking interpretations of Aristotle's logic and methodology that Jaakko Hintikka has pu ...

Abstract: Formal ontology combines two ideas, one originating with Husserl, the other with Frege: that of ontology of the formal aspects of all objects, irrespective of their particular nature, and ontology pursued by employing the tools of modern formal disciplines, notably logic and semantics. These two traditions have converged in recent years and this is the first collection to encompass them as a whole in a single volume. It assembles essays from authors around the world already widely known for their work in formal ontology, and illustrates that through the application of formal methods the ancient discipline of ontology may be put on a firm methodological basis. The essays not only illuminate the nature of ontology and its relation to other areas, in language, logic and everyday life, but also demonstrate that common issues from the analytical and phenomenological traditions may be discussed without ideological barriers. Audience: advanced students of and specialists in philosophy, linguistics, cognitive science, computer science, database engineering

Abstract: This book collects essays considering the full range of Robert Sokolowski's philosophical works: his vew of philosophy; his phenomenology of language and his account of the relation between language and being; his phenomenology of moral action; and his phenomenological theology of disclosure

Abstract: Preparatory Considerations -- § 1. Outset from the significations of the word logos: speaking, thinking, what is thought -- § 2. The ideality of language. Exclusion of the problems pertaining to it -- § 3. Language as an expression of “thinking.” Thinking in the broadest sense, as the sense-constituting mental process -- § 4. The problem of ascertaining the essential limits of the “thinking” capable of the significational Function -- § 5. Provisional delimination of logic as apriori theory of science -- § 6. The formal character of logic. The formal Apriori and the contingent Apriori -- § 7. The normative and practical functions of logic -- § 8. The two-sidedness of logic; the subjective and the Objective direction of its thematizing activity -- § 9. The straightforward thematizing activity of the “Objective” or “positive” sciences. The idea of two-sided sciences -- § 10. Historically existing psychology and scientific thematizing activity directed to the subjective -- §11. The thematizing tendencies of traditional logic -- a.Logic directed originally to the Objective theoretical formations produced by thinking -- b.Logic’s interest in truth and the resultant reflection on subjective insight -- c. Result: the hybridism of historically existing logic as a theoretical and normative-practical discipline -- I / The structures and the sphere of objective formal logic -- The way from the tradition to the full idea of formal logic -- 1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics -- § 12. Discovery of the idea of the pure judgment-form -- § 13. The theory of the pure forms of judgments as the first discipline of formal logic -- a.The idea of theory of forms -- b.Universality of the judgment-form; the fundamental forms and their variants -- c.Operation as the guiding concept in the investigation of forms -- § 14. Consequence-logic (logic of non-contradiction) as the second level of formal logic -- § 15. Truth-logic and consequence-logic -- § 16. The differences in evidence that substantiate the separating of levels within apophantics. Clear evidence and distinct evidence -- a.Modes of performing the judgment. Distinctness and confusion -- b.Distinctness and clarity -- c.Clarity in the having of something itself and clarity of anticipation -- § 17. The essential genus, “distinct judgment,” as the theme of “pure analytics” -- § 18. The fundamental question of pure analytics -- § 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to the formal logic of truth. Non-contradiction as a condition for possible truth -- § 20. The principles of logic and their analogues in pure analytics -- § 21. The evidence in the coinciding of “the same” confused and distinct judgment. The broadest concept of the judgment -- § 22. The concept defining the province belonging to the theory of apophantic forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is the judgment in the broadest sense -- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics -- § 23. The internal unity of traditional logic and the problem of its position relative to formal mathematics -- a.The conceptual self-containedness of traditional logic as apophantic analytics -- b.The emerging of the idea of an enlarged analytics, Leibniz’s “mathesis universalis,” and the methodico-technical unification of traditional syllogistics and formal mathematics -- § 24. The new problem of a formal ontology. Characterization of traditional formal mathematics as formal ontology -- § 25. Formal apophantics and formal ontology as belonging together materially, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective themes -- § 26. The historical reasons why the problem of the unity of formal apophantics and formal mathematics was masked -- a.Lack of the concept of the pure empty form -- b.Lack of knowledge that apophantic formations are ideal -- c.Further reasons, particularly the lack of genuine scientific inquiries into origins -- d.Comment on Bolzano’s position regarding the idea of formal ontology -- § 27. The introduction of the idea of formal ontology in the Logische Untersuchungen -- a.The first constitutional investigations of categorial objectivities, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik -- b.The way of the “Prolegomena” from formal apophantics to formal ontology -- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities -- § 28. The highest level of formal logic: the theory of deductive systems; correlatively, the theory of multiplicities -- § 29. The theory of multiplicities and the formalizing reduction of the nomological sciences -- § 30. Multiplicity-theory as developed by Riemann and his successors -- §31. The pregnant concept of a multiplicity-correlatively, that of a “deductive” or “nomological” system-clarified by the concept of “definiteness” -- § 32. The highest idea of a theory of multiplicities: a universal nomological science of the forms of multiplicities -- § 33. Actual formal mathematics and mathematics of the rules of the game -- § 34. Complete formal mathematics identical with complete logical analytics -- § 35. Why only deductive theory-forms can become thematic within the domain of mathesis universalis as universal analytics -- a.Only deductive theory has a purely analytic system-form -- b.The problem of when a system of propositions has a system-form characterizable as analytic -- § 36. Retrospect and preliminary indication of our further tasks -- b. Phenomenological clarification of the two-sidedness of formal logic as formal apophantics and formal ontology -- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments -- § 37. The inquiry concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology; insufficiency of our clarifications up to now -- § 38. Judgment-objects as such and syntactical formations -- § 39. The concept of the judgment broadened to cover all formations produced by syntactical actions -- § 40. Formal analytics as a playing with thoughts, and logical analytics. The relation to possible application is part of the logical sense of formal mathesis -- §41. The difference between an apophantic and an ontological focusing and the problem of clarifying that difference -- § 42. Solution of this problem -- a.Judging directed, not to the judgment, but to the thematic objectivity -- b.Identity of the thematic object throughout changes in the syntactical operations -- c.The types of syntactical object-forms as the typical modes of Something -- d.The dual function of syntactical operations -- e.Coherence of the judging by virtue of the unity of the substrate-object that is being determined. Constitution of the “concept” determining the substrate-object -- f. The categorial formations, which accrue in the determining, as habitual and inter subjective possessions -- g. The objectivity given beforehand to thinking contrasted with the categorial objectivity produced by thinking — Nature as an illustration -- § 43. Analytics, as formal theory of science, is formal ontology and, as ontology, is directed to objects 119 -- § 44. The shift from analytics as formal ontology to analytics as formal apophantics -- a.The change of thematizing focus from object- provinces to judgments as logic intends them -- b.Phenomenological clarification of this change of focus -- ?. The attitude of someone who is judging naïvely-straightforwardly -- ?. In the critical attitude of someone who intends to cognize, supposed objectivities as supposed are distinguished from actual objectivities -- ?. The scientist’s attitude: the supposed, as supposed, the object of his criticism of cognition -- § 45. The judgment in the sense proper to apophantic logic -- § 46. Truth and falsity as results of criticism. The double sense of truth and evidence -- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truth-logic -- § 47. The adjustment of traditional logic to the critical attitude of science leads to its focusing on the apophansis -- § 48. Judgments, as mere suppositions, belong to the region of senses. Phenomenological characterization of the focusing on senses -- § 49. The double sense of judgment (positum, proposition) -- § 50. The broadening of the concept of sense to cover the whole positional sphere, and the broadening of formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice -- §51. Pure consequence-logic as a pure theory of senses. The division into consequence-logic and truth- logic is valid also for the theory of multiplicities, as the highest level of logic -- § 52. “Mathesis pura” as properly logical and as extralogical. The “mathematics of mathematicians” -- § 53. Elucidations by the example of the Euclidean multiplicity -- § 54. Concluding ascertainment of the relationship be-tween formal logic and formal ontology -- ?.The problem -- b.The two correlative senses of formal logic -- c. The idea of formal ontology can be separated from the idea of theory of science -- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic -- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic -- § 55. Is the development of logic as Objective-formal enou...

Abstract: 2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modern sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a naivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate apriori possibilities and necessities.

Abstract: I. Teil Lebensrelative Werte -- 1. Abschnitt: Die lebensrelativen Werte und die Dingwirklichkeit -- 2. Abschnitt: Vitalwerte -- II. Teil Absolute Werte -- 1. Abschnitt: Personwerte -- 2. Abschnitt: Ontologische grenzen materialer Werte -- III. Teil Das Seinsverhältnis von Dasein zu Dasein -- 1. Abschnitt: Zur Ontologie des Wertens -- 2. Abschnitt: Das „da“ Schelers.

Abstract: I. Principal Elements of Navya-ny?ya Logic -- II. Ga?ge?a’s Theory of Pervasion -- Anumitinir?pa?a and Vy?ptiv?da by Ga?ge?op?dhy?ya Transliteration, Translation and Commentary Anumitinir?pa?a and Vy?ptiv?da -- Section I. General observations about inference -- Section II. Theory of pervasion -- I. Five definitions of pervasion as non-deviation -- II. Two definitions of pervasion called Lion-Tiger Definition -- III. Absence limited by a property whose loci are different from its counterpositive -- IV. Preliminary refutation of a series of definitions of pervasion -- V. The conclusive definition of pervasion -- VI. Universal absence -- VII. Pervasion between particulars -- Sanskrit Index -- English Index.

Abstract: The history of Indian logic is roughly divided into three periods: old Nyaya, Buddhist logic and new Nyaya. Each period is characterized by the production of some outstanding Sanskrit text. The main texts of the first and second period have been translated into, and explained in, European languages. But the principal text of the third period, GaIigesa's Tattvacintamal).i, is still not accessible through a Western language. The present book is intended to fill up this gap to some extent. The object of this study is to present both to sanskritists and to logicians an essential part of Indian logic as laid down in the first two sections of the Anumanakhal).c;la of the Tattvacintamal).i. No attention will be paid here to the doctrines of GaIigesa's predecessors and the theories developed by his commentators. Though this study is not con­ cerned with comparative philosophy, Western logic will be employed for the purpose of interpretation. Under Western logic I bring both traditional logic and modern logic, which, in my opinion, form one discipline of reasoning. This may account for my use of some Latin terms belonging to scholastic thought. Transliteration and translation have been made from the text of the Anumitiniriipal).a and Vyaptivada in the Bibliotheca Indica edition of GaIigesa's Tattvacintamal).i (with Mathuranatha's commentary), Part II Anumanakhal).c;la from Anumiti to Biidha, Calcutta, 1892. A photostatic copy ofthat text precedes the transliteration, translation and commentary.

Abstract: One / The Preparatory Phase -- I. Franz Brentano (1838–1917): Forerunner of the Phenomenological Movement -- II. Carl Stumpf (1848–1936): Founder of Experimental Phenomenology -- Two / The German Phase of the Movement -- III. The Pure Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) -- IV. The Older Phenomenological Movement -- V. The Phenomenology of Essences: Max Scheler (1874–1928) -- VI. Martin Heidegger (1889-) as a Phenomenologist -- VII. Phenomenology in the Critical Ontology of Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950).

Abstract: The present attempt to introduce the general philosophical reader to the Phenomenological Movement by way of its history has itself a history which is pertinent to its objective. It may suitably be opened by the following excerpts from a review which Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University, the Head of the Division for International Cultural Cooperation, Department of Cultural Activities of Unesco from 1953 to 56, wrote in 1950 from France: The influence of Husserl has revolutionized continental philosophies, not because his philosophy has become dominant, but because any philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method. It is the sine qua non of critical respectability. In America, on the contrary, phenomenology is in its infancy. The aver­ age American student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the "tricks" of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real import of what is said into the kind of analysis with which he is familiar. . . . . . . No doubt, American education will gradually take account of the spread of phenomenological method and terminology, but until it does, American readers of European philosophy have a severe handicap; and this applies not only to existentialism but to almost all current philosophicalliterature.