ISBN:
9789401588713
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (XII, 179 p)
,
digital
Edition:
Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
Series Statement:
Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 265
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
Philosophy (General)
;
Genetic epistemology
;
Linguistics Philosophy
;
Ontology
;
Philosophy of mind
;
Language and languages—Philosophy.
;
Knowledge, Theory of.
Abstract:
The purpose of the book is twofold: to give a theory of reference for the indexical `I' and to explain what is involved in thinking about oneself. The first part constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how `I' refers, while the second part advances a positive account of `I' and I-thoughts. It is argued that `I' refers indirectly through a de re sense that is based on non-conceptual content. `I' expresses an individual concept with two components: a de re sense and a context-independent self-concept. Other issues that are discussed concern self-knowledge, e.g. whether there is something in specific that we have to know about ourselves to be able to self-refer, and the kind of self-consciousness that is required for self-reference. Furthermore, the notions of unity of consciousness and personal identity, as they both are presupposed by a competent use of `I', are examined. Audience: The book is intended for philosophers of mind and language with a general interest in theories of reference and meaning, and more specifically in the first person, the self, and self-knowledge
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-015-8871-3
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
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