ISBN:
9789400921191
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (XI, 260 p)
,
digital
Edition:
Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
Series Statement:
Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 215
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
Philosophy (General)
;
Genetic epistemology
;
Science Philosophy
;
Logic
;
Philosophy, medieval
;
Knowledge, Theory of.
;
Science—Philosophy.
Abstract:
1 Introduction -- 2 Nominalism and Constructivism -- 1. Some of the main problems in historical nominalism in relation with the nominalism of Camap’s “Logical Structure of the World” -- 2. Anti-metaphysics and metaphysics, or from ontological neutrality to ontological commitment -- 3. A minimalistic ontological program -- 4. General outline of the new ontology -- 3 Ontology and Epistemology from Empiricism to Conventionalism -- 1. Ontological commitment and empiristic considerations -- 2. “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen” -- 3. Science is of the general -- 4. Things are sums of qualities -- 5. Evolution towards conventionalism -- 4 Logical Semantics and Ontology -- 1. General outline of some basic problems of logical semantics -- 2. The theory of signification and supposition of Ockham -- 3. Nelson Goodman’s extensionalistic solution -- 5 Linguistic Semantics -- 1. Behaviourism in semantics -- 2. Ockham on the relation between thought and language -- 3. Evolution, cognitivism and the notion of conceptual scheme -- 6 The Individual Ontology and Ideology -- 1. The roots of the problem -- 2. Ontology. The constructivistic individual -- 3. Ideology -- 7 Particular and General -- 1. Building a world out of general abstract elements -- 2. Building a world out of particular concrete elements -- 3. Strawson on the particularities of general terms -- 4. Is perception basically perception of what is particular? -- 5. How do children in fact learn language? -- 8 Thought and Language Intentions and Intensions -- 1. Nominalists and empiricists on universals, concepts, intensions -- 2. Knowledge of brain mechanisms in the past -- 3. Behaviourism versus mentalism -- 4. G.D. Wassermann: a neuropsychological model of thought and language -- 9 Nominalism, Empiricism and Conventionalism -- 1. Ockham’s scepticism -- 2. Induction and contemporary nominalism -- 3. Conventionalism versus scientific realism -- Notes -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6 -- 7 -- 8 -- 9.
Abstract:
Though the subject of this work, "nominalism and contemporary nom inalism", is philosophical, it cannot be fully treated without relating it to data gathered from a great variety of domains, such as biology and more especially ethology, psychology, linguistics and neurobiology. The source of inspiration has been an academic work I wrote in order to obtain a postdoctoral degree, which is called in Belgium an "Aggregaat voor het Hoger Onderwijs" comparable to a "Habilitation" in Germany. I want to thank the National Fund of Scientific Research, which accorded me several grants and thereby enabled me to write the academic work in the first place and thereafter this book. I also want to thank Prof. SJ. Doorman (Technical University of Delft) and Prof. G. Nuchelmans (University of Leiden), who were members of the jury of the "Aggre gaatsthesis", presented to the Free University of Brussels in 1981 and who by their criticisms and suggestions encouraged me to write the present book, the core of which is constituted by the general ideas then formulated. I am further obliged to Mr. X, the referee who was asked by Jaakko Hintikka to read my work and who made a series of constructive remarks and recom mendations. My colleague Marc De Mey (University of Ghent) helped me greatly with the more formal aspects of my work and spent too much of his valuable time and energy to enable me to deliver a presentable copy. All remaining shortcomings are entirely my responsibility. I asked Prof.
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-009-2119-1
URL:
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