Abstract: 1 Subject Matter -- 2 Relevance -- 3 The Fate of Hegel Interpretations -- 4 Divisions -- I / Dialectic -- 1 / Dialectic of the Real -- 2 / Positive Dialectic -- 3 / The Subject Matter of Dialectical Philosophy -- II / Dialectic And Metaphysics -- 1 / ‘Metaphysics’ — A Philosophical Discipline -- 2 / Metaphysical Method in General -- 3 / Spinoza and Double Negation -- III / Dialectical Metaphysics -- 1 / Infinity -- 2 / Absolute Necessity -- 3 / Being is Thought -- Summary -- Epilogue / Hegel’s Dialectic and Contemporary Issues -- 1 Analytic and Dialectic -- 2 The Sublation of Hegel’s Dialectic -- 2.1 First Reversion -- 2.2 Second Reversion -- 2.3 Third Reversion -- 2.4 Fourth Reversion -- Concerning Notes And Abbreviations -- Notes -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This book was written in 1968, and defended as a doctoral dissertation before the Philosophical Faculty at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) in 1969. It treats of the systematic views of Hegel which led him to give to the princi­ ple of non-contradiction, the principle of double negation, and the principle of excluded middle, meanings which are difficult to understand. The reader will look in vain for the philosophical position of the author. A few words about the intentions which motivated the author to study and clarify Hegel's thought are therefore not out of place. In the early sixties, when occupying myself with the history of Marxist philosophy, I discovered that the representatives of the logical-positivist tra­ dition were not alone in employing a principle of demarcation; that those of the dialectical Marxist tradition were also using such a principle ('self-move­ ment') as a foundation of a scientific philosophy and as a means to delimit unscientific ideas. I aimed at a clear conception of this principle in order to be able to judge whether, and to what extent, it accords with the foundations of the analytical method. In this endeavor I encountered two problems: (1) What is to be understood by 'analytical method' cannot be ascertained un­ equivocally.

Abstract: Analytical Table of Contents -- 1: The Theory-ladenness of Observation -- 2: An Examination of Some Arguments and Criteria for Radical Meaning Variance -- 3: The Methodological Undesirability of Adopting a Position of Radical Meaning Variance -- 4: The Comparability of Scientific Theories.

Abstract: In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con­ sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in­ vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace­ ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists.

Abstract: I. Statement of the Problem -- II. Eidetics and its Limits -- III. Existential Structures of Disproportion -- IV. Eidetics, Existence, and Experience -- V. Symbol, Hermeneutic, and Conflict of Interpretation -- VI. Philosophical Reflection as Hermeneutics -- VII. Phenomenology and the Sciences of Language: Further Extensions -- VIII. Conclusions -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: The path Husserl entered upon at the beginning of his philosophical writ­ ings turned out to be the beginning of a long, tedious way. Throughout his life he constantly comes to grips with the fundamental problems which set him upon this path. Beginning with the logical level of meaning, laboring through the idealism of the transcendental phenomenology of the period between Ideas I to the Meditations, in search for the ever more originary, he finally arrived at the level of the Lebenswelt. It was this later focus on the ever more originary, the source, the foundation of meaning which led him finally to the horizon of meaning and the genesis of meaning in the Lebenswelt period. This later period allows for a quasi wedding of his phenomenology with some adaptation of existentialism. But this union called for an adaptation of Husserl's logistic prejudice. The period of the Lebenswelt allows many of the later phenomenologists to speak of the failure of the brackets in their extreme exclusion and to allow for a link between man and his world in the Lebenswelt. This link is at the source of the ontological investigations and theories which arise from the phenomenological movement. However, there is the possibility of many tensions in such an endeavor since the study of being can be most abstract and most concrete.

Abstract: Introduction: The Seeming Contingency of the Question concerning the Body and the Necessity for an Ontological Analysis of the Body -- I: The Philosophical Presuppositions of the Biranian Analysis of the Body -- 1. The Philosophical Presuppositions of Biranian Ontology -- 2. The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories -- 3. The Theory of the Ego and the Problem of the Soul -- II:The Subjective Body -- III: Movement and Sensing -- 1. The Unity of our Senses and the Problem of the Relationship between our Images and our Movements -- 2. The Unity of the Body Interpreted as a Unity of Knowledge. Habit and Memory -- 3. The Individuality of Human Reality as Sensible Individuality -- IV: The Twofold Usage of Signs and the Problem of the Constitution of One’s own Body -- V: Cartesian Dualism -- VI: A Critique of the Thought of Maine de Biran. The Problem of Passivity -- VII: Conclusion. The Ontological Theory of the Body and the Problem of Incarnation. The Flesh and the Spirit -- Index of Authors -- Index of Terms.

Abstract: THE SEEMING CONTINGENCY OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE BODY AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BODY When we disclose and bring forth, within ontological investigations aimed at making possible the elaboration of a phenomenology of the ego, a prob­ lematic concerning the body, we may well seem, with respect to the general direction of our analysis, to elaborate only a contingent and accidental specification of such an analysis and to forget its true goal.! Up to the present, we pursued the clarification of the being of the ego [2] on the level of absolute subjectivity and in the form of an ontological analysis. Is it not possible that the reasons which motivated the project of conducting the investigations relative to the problem of the ego within a sphere of abso­ lute immanence may cease to be valid because we might be led to believe that the body also constitutes the object of these investigations and belongs to a first reality whose study is the task of fundamental ontology? Actually, does not the body present itself to us as a transcendent being, as an inhabi­ tant of this world of ours wherein subjectivity does not reside? If, con­ sequently, the body must constitute the theme of our philosophical reflec­ tion, is it not on condition that the latter submit to a radical modification and cease to be turned toward subjectivity in order to be a reflection on.

Abstract: The Author’s Abstracts 1900/01 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume One in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Vol. 24 (1900), pp. 511–12 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume Two in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, Vol. 25 (1901), pp. 260–63 -- A Draft of a “Preface” to the Logical Investigations, 1913 -- I. Eugen Fink’s Editorial Remarks -- II. Husserl’s Text.

Abstract: TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS A DRAFT OF A PREFACE TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS ( 1913) Edited by EUGEN FINK Translated with Introductions by PHILIP J. BOSSERT and CURTIS H. PETERS • MARTINUS NIJHOFF THE HAGUE 1975 © I975 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-I3: 978-90-247-1711-8 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-1655-1 DOl: 10. 1007/978-94-010-1655-1 TO HERBERT SPIEGELBERG ESTEEMED SCHOLAR, MENTOR, FRIEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to express our thanks to H. L. Van Breda, director of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain), for his approval and encouragement of this project, and to Professor Dr. Gerhart Husserl, Professor Dr. Eugen Fink and the editors of Tijdschrift voor Philosophie for their permission to undertake it. We also owe a debt of appreciation to Dr. Karl Schuhmann of the Catholic University of Louvain and to Dr. Elmar Holenstein, Dr. Edi Marbach and Mr. Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain) for their help in reading the original manuscripts and for putting their excellent knowledge of the Husserl "Nachlass" preserved at the Archives at our disposal. We especially wish to thank Professor Herbert Spiegelberg whose careful and critical reading of our manuscript at an earlier stage resulted in numerous suggestions for its improvement; and, last but not least, our wives, Jane and Pam, for their help in preparing the typescripts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Translator's Introductions XI I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION XI II. THEMATIC INTRODUCTION XX III.

Abstract: Physical Theory and Experiment -- Two Dogmas of Empiricism -- Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes -- Some Fundamental Problems in the Logic of Scientific Discovery -- Background Knowledge and Scientific Growth -- The Duhemian Argument -- A Comment on Grünbaum’s Claim -- Scientific Revolutions as Changes of World View -- Grünbaum on ‘The Duhemian Argument’ -- Quine, Grünbaum, and the Duhemian Thesis -- Duhem, Quine and Grünbaum on Falsification -- Duhem, Quine and a New Empiricism -- Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes -- Is it never Possible to Falsify a Hypothesis Irrevocably? -- The Rationality of Science (From‘Against Method’) -- Index of Names.

Abstract: According to a view assumed by many scientists and philosophers of science and standardly found in science textbooks, it is controlled ex­ perience which provides the basis for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable theories in science: acceptable theories are those which can pass empirical tests. It has often been thought that a certain sort of test is particularly significant: 'crucial experiments' provide supporting empiri­ cal evidence for one theory while providing conclusive evidence against another. However, in 1906 Pierre Duhem argued that the falsification of a theory is necessarily ambiguous and therefore that there are no crucial experiments; one can never be sure that it is a given theory rather than auxiliary or background hypotheses which experiment has falsified. w. V. Quine has concurred in this judgment, arguing that "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not indi­ vidually but only as a corporate body". Some philosophers have thought that the Duhem-Quine thesis gra­ tuitously raises perplexities. Others see it as doubly significant; these philosophers think that it provides a base for criticism of the foundational view of knowledge which has dominated much of western thought since Descartes, and they think that it opens the door to a new and fruitful way to conceive of scientific progress in particular and of the nature and growth of knowledge in general.

Abstract: Acceptance Revisited -- Cognitive Decision Theory -- A Critique of Epistemic Utilities -- Induction, Consensus, and Catastrophe -- Elements of Induction -- On Sequential Inference -- Cognitive Decisions under Partial Information -- Local and Global Induction -- Hume and the Problem of Local Induction -- A Conspectus of the Neo-Classical Theory of Induction -- Inquiries, Problems, and Questions: Remarks on Local Induction -- On Piecemeal Knowledge-Formation -- Confirmation, Explanation, and the Paradoxes of Transitivity -- A Selected Bibliography of Local Induction -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The local justification of beliefs and hypotheses has recently become a major concern for epistemologists and philosophers of induction. As such, the problem of local justification is not entirely new. Most pragmatists had addressed themselves to it, and so did, to some extent, many classical inductivists in the Bacon-Whewell-Mill tradition. In the last few decades, however, the use of logic and semantics, probability calculus, statistical methods, and decision-theoretic concepts in the reconstruction of in­ ductive inference has revealed some important technical respects in which inductive justification can be local: the choice of a language, with its syntactic and semantic features, the relativity of probabilistic evalua­ tions to an initial body of evidence or background knowledge and to an agent's utilities and preferences, etc. Some paradoxes and difficulties encountered by purely formal accounts of inductive justification, the erosion of the once dominant empiricist position, which most approaches to induction took for granted, and the increasing challenge of noninduc­ tivist epistemolgies have underscored the need of accounting for the methodological problems of applying inductive logic to real life contexts, particularly in science. As a result, in the late fifties and sixties, several related developments pointed to a new, local approach to inductive justification.

Abstract: Prior Probabilities and Counterfactual Conditionals -- Incomplete Descriptions in the Language of Probability Theory -- A Computational Complexity Viewpoint on the Stability of Relative Frequency and on Stochastic Independence -- A Logic for Subjective Belief -- Discussion -- Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals -- Letter by Robert Stalnaker to W. L. Harper -- Ramsey Test Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change (A Response to Stalnaker) -- Toward an Optimization Procedure for Applying Minimum Change Principles in Probability Kinematics -- Simplicity -- Discussion -- Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference -- Discussion -- Probabilities of Conditionals -- Discussion -- Letter by Stalnaker to Van Fraassen -- Letter by Van Fraassen to Stalnaker.

Abstract: In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four decades there have been striking formal advances in our understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which include the development of the relations between semantics and metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories (especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently the emergence of Baysian statistics as a radical alternative to standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the methods available. The search for principles which would explain why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.

Abstract: I. Islam -- Recommencements de l’algèbre aux XIe et XIIe siècles -- The Influence of Stoic Logic on Al-Ja????’s Legal Theory -- The Beginnings of Islamic Theology -- Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Alfarabi’s Enumeration of the Sciences -- II. The Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries in the Latin West -- The Organization of Sciences and the Relations of Cultures in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries -- La nouvelle idée de nature et de savoir scientifique au XIIe siècle -- Experience, Praxis, Work, and Planning in Bernard of Clairvaux: Observations on the Sermones in Cantica -- III. The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Centuries in the Latin West -- From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning -- Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist -- Reformation and Revolution: Copernicus’s Discovery in an Era of Change -- Réflexions sur les rapports entre théorie et pratique au moyen âge -- Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth-Century Universities: Some Preliminary Comments.

Abstract: Section One Dialogue with Analysis -- The Copula Supplement -- Thought, Language and Philosophy -- Grammar and Metaphysics -- Beyond the Doubt of a Shadow, with an addendum by Samuel Todes, Shadows in Knowledge: Plato’s Misunderstanding of Shadows, and of Knowledge as Shadow-free -- Section Two Transcendental Themes -- Meinong the Phenomenologist -- The “Critique of Pure Reason” as Transcendental Phenomenology -- History, Phenomenology and Reflection -- Reflection on Planned Operations -- Section Three Existential Themes -- Some Perplexities in Nietzsche -- Desire, Need, and Alienation in Sartre -- The Look, the Body, and the Other -- The Significance of Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Language -- Notes on Contributors.

Abstract: Phenomenology in the United States is in a state of ferment and change. Not all the changes are happy ones, however, for some of the most prominent philosophers of the first generation of phenomenologists have died: in 1959 Alfred Schutz, and within the past two years John \Vild, Dorion Cairns, and Aron Gur­ witsch. These thinkers, though often confronting a hostile intel­ lectual climate, were nevertheless persistent and profoundly influential-through their own works, and through their students. The two sources associated with their names, The Graduate Faculty of The New School for Social Research, and the circle around John Wild first at Harvard and later at Northwestern and Yale, produced a sizable portion of the now second gener­ ation American phenomenological philosophers. In a way, it was the very hostility of the American philo­ sophical milieu which became an important factor in the ferment now taking place. Although the older, first generation phenome­ nologists were deeply conversant with other philosophical move­ ments here and abroad, their efforts at meaningful dialogue were largely ignored. Determined not to remain isolated from the dominant currents of Anglo-American philosophy in par­ ticular, the second generation opened the way to a dialogue with analytic philosophers, especially through the efforts of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, led by 2 INTRODUCTION such men as James M. Edie and Hubert Dreyfus and, in other respects, Herbert Spiegelberg and Maurice Natanson.

Abstract: I: Husserl’s Position -- 1. The original realist standpoint -- 2. The concept of philosophy as rigorous science -- 3. Postulates determining the appropriate method of epistemology -- 4. The results of the investigations into outer perception and the constitutive analysis of objects of the real world -- 5. The formal-ontological foundations of the idealist solution -- II: Critical Remarks -- 1. Must the concept of philosophy as rigorous science lead to transcendental idealism ? -- 2. The limits of the applicability of the phenomenological reduction -- 3. Critical remarks on particular results of the analysis of outer perception and the theory of constitution -- 4. Critical remarks on the formal-ontological sources of the Husserlian idealism.

Abstract: Roman Ingarden studied under Husserl before and during the first world war. He belonged to the so-called Gottingen group of Husserl's pupils. Husserl's doctrine was accepted by them and interpreted in a realist vein. Ingarden defended this view all his life. He opposed the development of phenomenology towards idealism. A considerable part of Ingarden's great creative effort is dedicated to the construction of a realist phenomenology and thus, according to him, to continuing the erection of the theoret­ ical structure whose foundations were laid by Husserl in his Logical Investigations. From Ingarden's standpoint the question of idealism versus realism was a crucial one. Ingarden published several studies on Husserl. The first one was written in 1918 and the last one was published posthumously. The present essay was printed in Ingarden's book Z badan nad filozofi:t­ wsp61czesn:t- (Inquiries into Contemporary Philosophy 1963) along with a number of other essays on Husserl and his philoso­ phy. This one is representative for Ingarden's positions. It is a good example of his contribution to an important controversy in the history of phenomenology, and it gives the reader an idea of Ingarden's critique of Husserlian idealism against the background of his argument for realism. Thanks and acknowledgements are due to Mr. J. E. Llewelyn of Edinburgh University. This translation was undertaken in collaboration with him. Arn6r Hannibalsson K6pavogur, Iceland 2I. II.

Abstract: I. The Idea of Philosophy -- I. The Concept of “Something” and of the “Absolute Being” -- II. Solovyev’s “Absolute Being” and Scheler’s “The Eternally Astonishing Roofing of the Abyss of Absolute Nothing” -- III. Summary -- II. Solovyev’s Idea of “Integral Knowledge” and Scheler’s “System of Conformity” -- I. The Meta-Anthropological Aspect -- II. The Historical Aspect -- III. The Epistemological Aspect -- III. The Relation Between Religion and Metaphysics -- I. Typology -- II. The Problems -- IV. Systematic Philosophy -- I. “Organic Logic” -- II. “Organic Metaphysics” -- III. “Organic Ethics” -- IV. The Philosophy of Eros -- V. Special Problems -- I. The Feminist Issue and the Idea of God -- II. On the Question of Influence -- VI. Retrospect -- VII. Russian Philosophy from Solovyev to Shestov — Revision of a Soviet Taboo -- I. The Argument over Russian Philosophy -- II. From Theosophy to Phenomenology -- III. The New Religious Philosophy -- VIII. Soviet Judgement and Criticism of Solovyev -- I. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1 st edition 1947 -- II. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, 2nd edition 1957 -- III. Against Contemporary Falsifiers of the History of Russian Philosophy, 1960 -- IV. History of Russian Philosophy, 1961 -- IX. Soviet Appropriation of Scheler’s Phenomenology -- Notes -- Bibliography — A Summary of the Works by and on Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This comparative study of the works of Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler explores some of the areas in which their thoughts seem to bear a direct relation to one another. The author shows, however, that such a correlation is not based on any factual influence of the earlier Russian on the later philosophy of Scheler. The similarities in their spiritual and philosophical development are significant as the author demonstrates in his chapter on systematic philosophy. This comparison is not just of historical interest. It is meant to contri­ bute to a better understanding between the East and the West. The author provides a basis for future discussions by establishing a common area of inquiry and by demonstrating a convergence of viewpoints already in regard to these problems. The author also discusses the potential role of the ideas of Solovyev and Scheler in the formation of a consciousness which he sees now emerging in the Soviet Union - a consciousness critical of any misrepresentation both of non-Marxist Russian philosophy as well as of Western philosophy in general. In regard to the translation itself, three things should be mentioned. First of all, the distinction between the important German words "Sein" and "Seiendes" is often difficult to preserve in translation. Unless otherwise noted all references to "being" refer to "Seiendes." Second, the abbreviations of the works of Solovyev and Scheler used in the footnotes are clarified in the summary of the works of these authors found on page 31Off. below.

Abstract: I: Introduction -- 1. The Object of this Study -- 2. The Significance of this Study -- 3. Some Difficulties -- 4. On Method -- 5. The Questions -- II: First Historical Approach: Positivism and Neopositivism -- 1. The Notion of Positivism -- 2. The History of Early Positivism (pre-1921) -- 3. The History of Neopositivism (post-1921) -- III: Second Historical Approach: Notions of Philosophy and Relationships to Positivism in Marx, Engels and the Earlier Soviet Philosophers (up to World War II) -- l.Marx -- 2. Engels -- 3. Lenin -- 4. From Lenin to Stalinism -- IV: The Soviet Critique of Neopositivism -- 1. Systematic Background -- 2. Historical Background -- 3. Igor Sergeevi? Narskij -- 4. Vladimir Sergeevi? Švyrev -- 5. Pavel Vasil’evi? Kopnin -- 6. Various other Soviet Authors -- 7. Outcome -- V: Concluding Remarks -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The nrst of the people to be thanked for their help during the composition of this work is Professor I.M. Bochenski, under whom I had the good fortune to study for an extended period of time. Without his help, it is doubtful that this work would have been writt"l1 at all. Among the other professors who helped along the way, I would like to cite in particular Professors A.F. Utz, M.D. Philippe and N. Luyten of the University of Fribourg. Many friends were present at the birth of the ideas contained in this book. By naming K.G. Ballestrem, T.l. Blakeley and M.F. Gagern, I do not want to slight any of the rest. It was A. Spiekermann in Hollinghofen who saw to it that other preoccupations did not rob me of all the time needed for the study of the subject-matter and to the composition of this treatise. Of particular help in getting sources from the libraries of the world were Miss Lifschitz of the Institute of East-European Studies and Mr. Uldry of the Cantonal Library in Fribourg, Switzerland. Finally, my patient typist, Mrs. Frey in Munster, deserves special mention for her beautiful work.

Abstract: One To The Things (Essays on Phenomenolology) -- A. On the Meaning of Phenomenology -- 1. “Phenomenology” -- 2. Ways into phenomenology: phenomenology and metaphenomenology -- 3. A new way into phenomenology: the workshop approach -- 4. Phenomenology through vicarious experience -- 5. Existential uses of phenomenology -- 〉B. On the Rights of Phenomenology -- 6. How subjective is phenomenology? -- 7. Phenomenology of direct evidence (self-evidence) -- 8. Criteria in phenomenology -- 9. The Phenomenon of reality and reality -- Two At the Things (Essays in Phenomenology) -- 10. Toward a phenomenology of experience -- 11. A phenomenological analysis of approval -- 12. “We”: A linguistic and phenomenological analysis -- 13. The relevance of phenomenological philosophy for psychology -- 14. The idea of a phenomenological anthropology and Alexander Pfänder’s psychology of man -- 15. Change of perspectives: constitution of a Husserl image -- Index of names -- Index of subjects.

Abstract: Substantial encouragement for this volume came from the editors and readers of the Studies for Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) at Northwestern University Press. But its publi­ cation has been made possible only by the unqualified and un­ abridged acceptance of the Editorial Board of Phaenomen%gica, which at the time was still headed by its founder, the late Professor H. L. Van Breda, who welcomed the manuscript most generously. This makes his untimely passing even more grievous to me. The stylistic copy editing and proof reading were handled ef­ ficiently by Ruth Nichols Jackson, secretary of the Philosophy Department. In the proof reading I also had the able help of my colleague Stanley Paulson. I dedicate this book to the memory of my late brother, Dr. chern. Erwin Spiegelberg, at the time of his death assistant professor at the University of Rio de Janeiro, who preceded me by two years in emigrating from Nazi Germany. When in 1938 he put an end to his life in an apparent depression, he also did so in order not to become a burden to his brothers, who were on the point of following him. Whatever I, more privileged in health and in opportunities in the country of my adoption, have been able to do and achieve since then has been done with a sense of a debt to him and of trying to live and work for him too.

Abstract: The Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1936) -- The Logic of Complementarity and the Foundation of Quantum Theory (1972) -- Mathematics as Logical Syntax — A Method to Formalize the Language of a Physical Theory (1937–38) -- Three-Valued Logic and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1944) -- Three-Valued Logic (1957) -- Reichenbach’s Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1958) -- Measures on the Closed Subspaces of a Hilbert Space (1957) -- The Logic of Propositions Which are not Simultaneously Decidable (1960) -- Baer *-Semigroups (1960) -- Axioms for Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics (1961) -- Probability in Physics and a Theorem on Simultaneous Observability (1962) -- Semantic Representation of the Probability of Formulas in Formalized Theories (1963) -- The Structure of the Propositional Calculus of a Physical Theory (1964) -- Boolean Embeddings of Orthomodular Sets and Quantum Logic (1965) -- Logical Structures Arising in Quantum Theory (1965) -- The Calculus of Partial Propositional Functions (1965) -- The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics (1967) -- Logics Appropriate to Empirical Theories (1965) -- The Probabilistic Argument for a Non-Classical Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1966) -- Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1967) -- Baer *-Semigroups and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- Semimodularity and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- On the Structure of Quantum Logic (1969) -- On the Structure of Quantal Proposition Systems (1969) -- The Current Interest in Orthomodular Lattices (1970) -- Integration Theory of Observables (1970) -- Probabilistic Formulation of Classical Mechanics (1970) -- Atomicity and Determinism in Boolean Systems (1971) -- Survey of General Quantum Physics (1972) -- Quantum Logics (1974) -- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logics (1974).

Abstract: The twentieth century has witnessed a striking transformation in the un­ derstanding of the theories of mathematical physics. There has emerged clearly the idea that physical theories are significantly characterized by their abstract mathematical structure. This is in opposition to the tradi­ tional opinion that one should look to the specific applications of a theory in order to understand it. One might with reason now espouse the view that to understand the deeper character of a theory one must know its abstract structure and understand the significance of that struc­ ture, while to understand how a theory might be modified in light of its experimental inadequacies one must be intimately acquainted with how it is applied. Quantum theory itself has gone through a development this century which illustrates strikingly the shifting perspective. From a collection of intuitive physical maneuvers under Bohr, through a formative stage in which the mathematical framework was bifurcated (between Schrödinger and Heisenberg) to an elegant culmination in von Neumann's Hilbert space formulation the elementary theory moved, flanked even at the later stage by the ill-understood formalisms for the relativistic version and for the field-theoretic altemative; after that we have a gradual, but constant, elaboration of all these quantal theories as abstract mathematical struc­ tures (their point of departure being von Neumann's formalism) until at the present time theoretical work is heavily preoccupied with the manip­ ulation of purely abstract structures.

Abstract: The philosophy of biology, some claim, should move to the centre of philosophy of science - a place it has not been accorded since the time of Mach. Physics was the paradigm of science, and its shadow falls across contemporary philosophy of biology in a variety of contexts: reduction, organization and system, biochemical mechanism, and the models of law and explanation which are derived from the Duhem-Popper-Hempel tradition. In this volume, the editors present essays which probe such historical and methodological questions as reducibility, levels of organization, function and teleology, issues emerging from evolutionary theory, and the species problem. The volume offers ample evidence of how good contemporary work in the philosophical understanding of biology has become. The editors aptly combine a deep philosophical appreciation of conceptual issues in biology with an historical understanding of the radical changes in the science of biology since the 19th century

Abstract: 1. A Prologue: On Stability and Flux -- References -- 2. Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper -- I. Einstein has Upset the View that Science is Stable -- II. The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires Explanation -- III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than There is -- IV. Popper’s Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of Debates -- V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions -- VI. Rationality is a Means to an End -- References -- Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper’s Philosophy -- Notes -- 3. On Novelty -- I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General -- II. Science and Truth -- III. Popper’s View of Science -- Notes -- Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts -- 4. Replies To Diane: Popper On Learning From Experience81 -- Note -- Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism -- 5. Sensationalism -- 1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge -- 2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism -- 3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience -- 4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense -- 5. Explanation vs. Consent -- 6. The Roots of Scientific Realism -- 7. Conclusion -- 6. When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis? -- I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked? -- II. Can Refutation be Final? -- III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated -- IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports? -- V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection? -- VI.Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports? -- Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations -- 7. Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics -- First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science -- Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance -- I. Conventionalists and the Problem of Induction -- II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman’s Problem -- III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing -- IV. The Need for Constraints is Quite Real -- V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses -- VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail -- VII. Conclusion -- Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement -- 8. Towards A Theory Of ‘Ad Hoc’ Hypotheses -- I. Ad hoc Hypotheses which become Factual Evidence -- II. The Conventional Element in Science -- III. Reducing the Conventions -- IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses -- V. What is a Mess? -- Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism -- 9. The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics -- I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems -- II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated -- III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics -- IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science -- V. Popper’s Theory of Science -- VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use Instances in Different Ways -- VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame-works for Science -- VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics -- IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical Frameworks -- Appendix: What is a Natural Law? -- 10. Questions of Science and Metaphysics -- I. How Do we Select Questions? -- II. We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame-works -- III.The Literature on Questions -- IV.The Literature on the Logic of Questions -- V.The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions -- VI. Collingwood’s Peculiarity -- VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions -- VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions -- IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality -- X.Collingwood in a New Garb -- Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician -- Notes -- 11. The Confusion Between Physics And Metaphysics in the Standard Histories of Sciences -- Appendix: Reply to Commentators -- 12.The Confusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science -- Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom -- Notes -- 13. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology -- I. Kant’s Scandal -- II. Whitehead’s Scandal -- III.The Facts About Induction -- IV.Success and Rationality -- V. The Sociology of Knowledge -- Appendix: Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Autonomism -- 14. Positive Evidence as a Social Institution -- Appendix: The Logic of Technological Development -- 15. Imperfect Knowledge -- I. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Science is Questionable -- II. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Rational Belief is an Error -- III. Imperfect Knowledge-Claims are Qualified by Publicly Accepted Hypotheses -- Notes -- 16. Criteria for Plausible Arguments -- Note -- Appendix: The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism -- 17. Modified Conventionalism -- I. The Problem -- II. Science and Society -- III. Popper’s Problems of Demarcation -- IV. The Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge Revisited -- Appendix: Bartley’s Critique of Popper -- Notes -- 18. Unity and Diversity in Science -- Abstract -- I. Ambivalence Towards Unity: An Impression -- II. The Ethics of Science as a Unifier of Science -- III. Proof as the Unifier of Science -- IV. Manifest Truth as the Unifier of Science -- V. Unity of Science as a Dictator of Unanimity on All Questions -- VI. A Theory of Rational Disagreement -- References -- Appendix on Kant -- 19. Can Religion go Beyond Reason? -- I. Religion and Reason -- II. Dissatisfaction with Science and Religion -- III. Reason and Faith -- IV. The Question of Complementary Relationship -- V. Toward Intellectual Complementation -- VI. Possibilities of Cooperation -- VII. Defects of Both Rationalism and Religion -- VIII. Standards of Rational Thought and Action -- IX. Enlightenment and Self-Reliance -- X. The Sophisticated Religionists: Buber and Polangi -- XI. Science and Universalistic Religion -- Notes -- Appendix on Buber -- 20. Assurance and Agnosticism -- I. The Compleat Agnostic -- II. The Image of Inductive Science -- III. Empirical Facts About Assurance -- IV. The Non-Justificationist Mood -- V. Conversion to Autonomism -- VI. The Assured Agnostic -- Index of Works Cited -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: I Historical Perspectives -- Compossibility and Incompossibility in Leibniz -- Hume and the Discipline of Phenomenology: An Historical Perspective -- Royce and the Reductions -- Wittgenstein’s “Phenomenological Reduction” -- The Occasion and Novelty of Husserl’s Phenomenology of Essence -- Martin Heidegger as a Phenomenologist -- II Systematic Perspectives -- Marriage, Parenthood and Life in Community: A Phenomenological View -- The Monads Have Windows -- Das Noema als reelles Moment -- Eine Tragödie: Wallensteins und unser aller böser Geist -- “Alms for Oblivion”: An Essay on Objective Time and Experienced Time -- Truth Within Phenomenological Speech -- The Phenomenology of Speaking -- Sym-philosophizing in an Ethics Class -- Phenomenological Aspects of Probability -- III Bibliographical Perspectives -- Apologia pro Bibliographia Mea -- Herbert Spiegelberg, Bibliography of Published Works 1930–1974.

Abstract: Professor H. L. Van Breda had hoped to write this preface, but his recent, unexpected and untimely death has left that task in my hands. Although my remarks will not be as eloquent and insightful as his surely would have been, some few words are clearly in order here; for the phenomenological community has not only lost the leadership of Fr. Van Breda these last years, but also the scholarship and leadership of Aron Gurwitsch and Alden Fisher - both contributors to this volume - as well as that of Dorion Cairns and John Wild. Our leaders are fewer now but Herbert Spiegelberg is still very obviously one of them. This volume thus presents the work of some of the past and presently recognized leaders in phenomenology - e. g. Gurwitsch, Straus, and Fisher - but, more important perhaps, it also presents the work of some of those who are sure to be future leaders of our community of phenomenological philosophers, if in fact they have not already achieved this status. Most, if not all, of the contribu­ tors to this volume are in some way or another indebted to Herbert Spiegelberg and his work in phenomenology.

Abstract: I. Radical Empiricism and the Anomalies in the Knowledge of Science -- II. Troubles with the Problem of Demarcation -- III. The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification -- IV. Facts and Theories: Radical Empiricism -- V. Facts and Theories: Conventionalism -- VI. Reformation and Counter-reformation: Paradigms and Research Programs -- VII. Revolutions in Science: The Accumulation of Knowledge and the Correspondence of Theories -- VIII. Revolutions in Science: Science and Philosophy -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.